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Abstract 
Feminist scholarship has demonstrated that ‘womenandchildren’ become the central and 
uncontroversial objects of humanitarian care and control in contexts of conflict, disaster, 
and displacement. Yet very little scholarly work has attempted to understand the place of 
men within humanitarian policies, practices and imaginaries. Through an exploration of 
the life and governance of Za‘tari Refugee Camp, Jordan, in which 80,000 Syrians live, 
this thesis argues that for humanitarianism, refugee men present a challenge. 
Humanitarian actors read Syrian men in gendered and racialised ways as agential, 
independent, political, and at times threatening. Refugee men thereby disrupt 
humanitarian understandings of refugees as passive, feminised objects of care, and are 
not understood to be among the ‘vulnerable,’ with whom humanitarians wish to work. 
  
Grounded in feminist and critical International Relations scholarship, and with an 
emphasis on the embodied, material and spatial practices of humanitarianism, this thesis 
draws on twelve months of fieldwork in Jordan, including participant-observation in 
Za‘tari Refugee Camp, and interviews with humanitarian workers and refugees. It 
demonstrates that humanitarian actors consistently prioritise their own goals, logics, and 
understandings of gender, over those of Syrians themselves, and exercise power in 
masculinised ways that actively disempower their ‘beneficiaries’. In the name of ‘global’ 
standards, humanitarian interactions with, and control over, refugee women are justified 
by a rhetoric of ‘empowerment.’ Refugee men, by contrast, are present but made 
invisible within the distribution of humanitarian aid, time, space, resources, and 
employment opportunities. These modes of humanitarian governance challenge Syrian 
men’s understandings and performances of masculinities. Yet when refugee men attempt 
to exercise agency in response to the disempowerment they experience in Za‘tari, 
humanitarian actors understand them as problematically political, and too autonomous 
from the control of humanitarian and state authorities, who attempt to re-assert their 
authority over the camp, and render Za‘tari ‘governable.’  
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A Note on Transliteration and Translation 
This thesis follows the Arabic transliteration guidelines from the International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, except for the diacritic marks, which I omit. I apply the standard 
convention of a single opening quotation mark (‘) for the ‘ayn, and a single closing 
quotation mark (’) for the hamza.  
 
Following this style, I have used the spelling “Za‘tari” to refer to the refugee camp in 
which I did my fieldwork. Other common transliterations are “Zaatari” and “Za‘atari.” 
Where quoting documents or other sources that use either of these versions of the word, 
I have kept the original spelling. Za‘tari refugee camp takes its name from the village of 
Za‘tari, to which the camp is adjacent. With the exception of the abstract, the title of 
Chapter 3, and when quoting others directly, for the sake of brevity I have referred to 
Za‘tari refugee camp simply as ‘Za‘tari.’ I have used the term ‘Za‘tari village’ when 
referring, on the rare occasions it is mentioned, to the village from which the camp takes 
its name.  
 
In cases where there are widely-used English names of places, persons, or institutions, I 
have used these English terms. 
 
All translations from Arabic are my own. 
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“Be interested in masculinities, but be interested in masculinities because you are 
asking feminist questions, about the workings of culture, the workings of 
organisations, and the workings of power.” 
 
Cynthia Enloe 
 
‘How to Take Militarized Masculinities Seriously Without Losing Your Feminist 
Curiosity,’ keynote address at the Center for the Study of Gender and Conflict, George 
Mason University, 2 April 2015 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines the place of refugee men in humanitarian policies, practices, and 
imaginaries. It asks how humanitarian organisations and workers relate to, work with, 
and understand their responsibilities towards refugee men. It argues that humanitarian 
actors read refugee men, in gendered and racialised ways, as agential, independent, 
political, and at times threatening. They thereby disrupt humanitarian actors’ 
understandings of refugees as passive, feminised objects of care and control, and 
humanitarian actors see refugee men as distinct from the ‘vulnerable’ populations for 
whom they wish to care. Through an ethnographically-informed study of Za‘tari refugee 
camp (hereafter Za‘tari), which hosts 80,000 Syrian refugees in northern Jordan, I 
demonstrate that these gendered and racialised understandings of refugee men are central 
to humanitarian actors’ 1  distribution of aid, time, space, resources, and employment 
opportunities, and to how they assess refugees’ vulnerabilities and needs.  
 
Simultaneously, in response to their new context, refugee men attempt to exercise 
agency2 by re-shaping the space of the camp and by creating opportunities for economic 
activity. In doing so, they challenge the policies of humanitarian and state actors who 
exercise sovereign power over them. These actions are deemed, by humanitarian actors, 
to be too political, too autonomous, and thereby to threaten their vision of refugees as 
objects of care, and their vision of refugee camps as depoliticised spaces of service 
provision. Humanitarian actors therefore, while showing a distinct lack of interest in 
many aspects of refugee men’s lives, simultaneously attempt to control, depoliticise, and 
reform refugee men, in line with their own agendas and priorities. In short, for 
humanitarianism, refugee men present a challenge. This thesis explores that challenge, 
and the contestations that result from it.  
 
                                                
1 I use this term to refer to the collectivity of United Nations agencies, international organisations, and 
international and Jordanian non-governmental organisations that were present in Za‘tari, and were all 
working under the banner of the ‘refugee response.’ 
2 Following feminist scholar Naila Kabeer, I understand agency as “the ability to define one’s goals and act 
upon them.” As Kabeer argues, agency encompasses not only observable action, but also “the meaning, 
motivation and purpose which individuals bring to their activity.” See Naila Kabeer, “Resources, Agency, 
Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment,” Development and Change 30, 
no. 3 (1999): 438; there is large and varied academic debate on the notion of agency, particularly among 
feminist scholars, often centred around the work of Saba Mahmood. While aware of these debates, I have 
opted to use the more minimalist definition above, which speaks well to the phenomena and context I am 
analyzing. See Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011). 
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On a more fundamental level, this is a critical, feminist study of interventions undertaken 
under the auspices of a humanitarian response to displacement. It argues that, 
throughout their operations with refugees, humanitarian actors privilege their own 
understandings and experiences of gender, and their own political priorities, over those 
of the Syrians for whom they are ostensibly working. In line with other (post-)colonial 
interventions into the societies of the South, humanitarians’ perspectives are legitimised 
by their designation as ‘global,’ while Syrians’ perspectives are relegated to being ‘local.’ 
Through an in-depth exploration of the specific context of Za‘tari, this thesis marshals 
ethnographic methods to make ‘strange’ the ‘familiar’ hierarchies of humanitarianism,3 
through which humanitarian actors suppress the agency of those in whose lives they 
intervene. It excavates and critiques the assumptions and beliefs about men and 
masculinities that undergird the gendered and racialised deployment of humanitarian 
power. 
 
International Relations, Humanitarianism, and Men and Masculinities 
This work is situated at the intersection of feminist International Relations (IR) and 
critical scholarship on humanitarianism. Feminist IR research has consistently 
demonstrated the centrality of gender, and processes of gendering, to power, politics, 
and discourse in the international system;4 gender “both constitutes and is constituted by 
international politics.” 5  I understand gender to be a set of practices, relations, and 
discourses that define understandings of ‘men,’ ‘women,’ ‘masculinity,’ and ‘femininity’ in 
a particular context.6 Gender is fluid, interactive, and contingent, and simultaneously 
structural and a component of individual identity.7 Gender and other structures of power 
and differentiation, including race, class, sexuality, and ability, should be analysed “both as 
                                                
3 See John Van Maanen, “An End to Innocence: The Ethnography of Ethnography,” in Representation in 
Ethnography, ed. John Van Maanen (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 1–35. 
4 For some key examples of influential scholarship in this field, see Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the 
Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 687–718; Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches 
and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1990); Charlotte Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001); J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives 
on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Cynthia Weber, Faking It: U.S. 
Hegemony in a “Post-Phallic” Era (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
5 Nicola Pratt, “The Queen Boat Case in Egypt: Sexuality, National Security and State Sovereignty,” Review 
of International Studies 33, no. 1 (2007): 129. 
6 Marsha Henry, “Gender, Security and Development,” Conflict, Security & Development 7, no. 1 (2007): 61–
84; Laleh Khalili, “Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 04 
(2011): 1471–91. 
7 V. Spike Peterson, “Introduction,” in Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. 
V. Spike Peterson (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 1–30. 
  18 
co-constitutive processes and as distinctive and historically specific technologies of 
categorization” (emphasis in original).8 Masculinity is one place within a gender order. It 
varies according to context and its intersections with other structures. Although typically 
associated with ‘men,’ it can be performed, engaged, and contested, by people of all 
genders.9  
 
By exploring spaces and topics typically deemed irrelevant to research in IR, and by 
demonstrating their importance to international politics, feminist scholars have 
demanded that the scope of IR be expanded beyond its ‘traditional’ domain.10 As part of 
a broader movement of critical scholarship, which notably includes queer and post-
colonial perspectives,11 feminist IR scholars have also called for a broadening of IR’s 
methodologies, and have resisted the notion that feminists must adopt the methods and 
topics of ‘mainstream’ IR in order to be considered part of the discipline.12 
 
While feminists have asked the crucial question, “where are the women?”13 they have 
simultaneously critically analysed men and masculinities in IR, de-naturalising 
masculinised modes of power and personhood.14 Simultaneously, post-colonial feminist 
scholarship has examined how understandings of men and masculinities in (post-) 
colonial settings have constituted a key part of imperial projects of intervention and 
                                                
8 Jennifer C. Nash, “Re-Thinking Intersectionality,” Feminist Review, no. 89 (2008): 13. 
9 See Raewyn Connell, Masculinities, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
10 E.g. see Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, 
Problems in the Congo and Beyond (London: Zed Books, 2013); Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases; Pratt, “The 
Queen Boat Case in Egypt”; Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007). 
11 E.g. see Meera Sabaratnam, “IR in Dialogue…but Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of 
Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics,” Millennium 39, no. 3 (2011): 781–803; Cynthia 
Weber, “From Queer to Queer IR,” International Studies Review 16, no. 4 (2014): 596–601. 
12 See Terrell Carver, Molly Cochran, and Judith Squires, “Gendering Jones: Feminisms, IRs, 
Masculinities,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 283–97; J. Ann Tickner, “You Just Don’t 
Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists,” International Studies Quarterly 41, 
no. 4 (1997): 611–32; Cynthia Weber, “Good Girls, Little Girls, and Bad Girls: Male Paranoia in Robert 
Keohane’s Critique of Feminist International Relations,” Millennium 23, no. 2 (1994): 337–49. 
13 See Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases Chapter 1. 
14 E.g. see Henry, “Gender, Security and Development”; Paul Higate and Marsha Henry, “Space, 
Performance and Everyday Security in the Peacekeeping Context,” International Peacekeeping 17, no. 1 (2010): 
32–48; Khalili, “Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency”; Paul Kirby and Marsha Henry, “Rethinking 
Masculinity and Practices of Violence in Conflict Settings,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 14, no. 4 
(2012): 445–49; Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski, eds., Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and 
Violence in International Relations (London; New York: Zed Books, 2008). 
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domination. 15  This thesis takes inspiration from, and follows in the path of, those 
scholars who recognise the complex structures of power in which men living in contexts 
of intervention in the South are embedded. It refuses to accept the non-intersectional 
binary “that men are powerful and women are powerless,” 16 and seeks to explore, as an 
act of feminist curiosity,17 the ways in which “power and powerlessness are gendered”18 
in a context of humanitarianism.  
 
The second subfield in which this work is situated is critical scholarship on 
humanitarianism, in particular the research that has explored humanitarianism in 
contexts of displacement. Humanitarianism can be understood as a system, in which 
actors are linked “across multiple scales to constitute the local/global humanitarian 
architecture,” and simultaneously as “an industry that employs hundreds of thousands of 
individuals, in which actors compete for market share.”19 This system and industry of 
humanitarianism overlaps with, and is affected by, the discourses, institutions, and 
practices of other spheres of political activity, such as security and development. 20 
Humanitarian organisations are produced by, and themselves shape, politics on ‘local’ 
and ‘global’ scales.21 Furthermore, in addition to these interconnections, the scope of 
humanitarianism has expanded significantly over the past few decades, as the distinction 
between emergency humanitarian relief and longer-term development has broken down 
among policy circles. 22  Areas such as human rights, democracy promotion, peace 
building and, most notably for this thesis, gender equality, are all now considered, by 
                                                
15 E.g. see Khalili, “Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency”; Jasbir K. Puar and Amit Rai, “Monster, 
Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots,” Social Text 20, no. 3 (2002): 
117–148. 
16 Andrea Cornwall, Henry Armas, and Mbuyiselo Botha, “Women’s Empowerment: What Do Men Have 
to Do with It?,” in Men and Development: Politicizing Masculinities, ed. Andrea Cornwall, Jerker Edström, and 
Alan Greig (London; New York: Zed Books, 2011), 196. 
17 Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2004). 
18 Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne, “Dislocating Masculinity: Gender, Power and Anthropology,” 
in Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies, Male Orders, ed. Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 20. 
19 Cathrine Brun, “There Is No Future in Humanitarianism: Emergency, Temporality and Protracted 
Displacement,” History and Anthropology 27, no. 4 (2016): 395. 
20 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (Zed Books, 
2014). 
21 Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present,” in 
Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, ed. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 1–48. 
22 Riccardo Bocco, Pierre Harrisson, and Lucas Oesch, “Recovery,” in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, 
ed. Vincent Chetail (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 268–78; David G Chandler, “The Road to 
Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2001): 678–700. 
  20 
humanitarian organisations and their funders, to be part of the purview of humanitarian 
activity.23 
 
The idea of humanitarianism, according to Didier Fassin, is: 
 
both rational and emotional, both a principle according to which all 
human beings share a condition that involves a sense of fraternity and 
an affect by virtue of which they feel personally concerned with the 
situation of others.24  
 
In the same article, Fassin elaborates, despite the ostensibly global and unifying nature of 
this humanitarian ideal, Western discussions and commentaries of humanitarian contexts 
tend to centre Western actors, rather than those who are on the receiving end of 
interventions carried out under the banner of humanitarianism.25 In these schema, as 
Barbara Harrell-Bond has argued, humanitarian organisations, moving from the West to 
offer ‘help,’ are regularly depicted as acting benevolently and heroically.26 Yet ‘in the 
field,’ humanitarian governance is hierarchical and authoritarian, as refugees (and others) 
are ‘managed’ through a “quasi-military mode of operations.” 27  As objects of care, 
refugees are also, inextricably, objects of humanitarian control; 28  humanitarian work 
“strik[es] with one hand, heal[s] with the other.”29  
 
In recent years, many critical scholars have emphasised that, within any particular 
context, humanitarianism is a set of embodied, spatial and material practices. 
Humanitarianism, they have demonstrated, and its relationships with its ‘beneficiaries,’ 
cannot be understood without acknowledging and analysing its material, spatial and 
human embodiments.30 More recently, critical scholars of humanitarianism have been 
                                                
23 Barnett and Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present.” 
24 Didier Fassin, “The Predicament of Humanitarianism,” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 22, 
no. 1 (2013): 38. 
25 Fassin, “The Predicament of Humanitarianism.” 
26 Barbara Harrell-Bond, “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane?,” Human Rights Quarterly 
24, no. 1 (2002): 51–85. 
27 Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 24. 
28 Michel Agier, Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government, English ed (Cambridge, 
UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2011); See also Liisa H. Malkki, “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, 
Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization,” Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (1996): 377–404; Guglielmo 
Verdirame and B. E. Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitariansism (New York; Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2005). 
29 Michel Agier, “Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian 
Government),” An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 1, no. 1 (2010): 29. 
30 See Mark Duffield, “Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life in Post-
Interventionary Society,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 4 (2010): 453–74; Lisa Smirl, “Building 
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attentive to the rapidly growing use of technology and ‘innovation’ within 
humanitarianism, and questioned the rationalities, effects, and politics of these new 
methods of humanitarian governance. 31  This thesis takes up both of these sets of 
insights, and applies and explores them within the context of Za‘tari.  
 
This thesis offers original contributions to both of these fields, within which refugee men 
have rarely been a focus of scholarship. Despite the clear demonstration, by feminist 
scholars, that ‘womenandchildren’ become the uncontroversial and undifferentiated 
objects of humanitarian care in contexts of conflict, disaster, and displacement,32 very 
little scholarly work has attempted to understand the place of men within humanitarian 
policies, practices and imaginaries. The academic work that has been done in this field 
has primarily focused on refugee men and gender equality, sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV), or the perceived security risks posed by refugee men.33 This academic 
scholarship therefore often replicates the narrow lenses through which humanitarian 
actors themselves understand their interactions with refugee men. 
 
By contrast, my thesis refuses to work solely within these frameworks, and explores 
refugee men as an object of humanitarianism. It examines, for example, the position of 
refugee men and masculinities in refugee camp governance, in the determination of 
‘vulnerability,’ and in the creation of economic livelihoods. My research demonstrates 
that refugee men are assumed, by humanitarians, to be sufficiently independent and 
agential such that they do not constitute clear objects of humanitarian care. Yet refugee 
men’s independent and agential attempts to shape their own circumstances and improve 
their own conditions are deemed, by those same humanitarians, too autonomous and 
                                                                                                                                      
the Other, Constructing Ourselves: Spatial Dimensions of International Humanitarian Response,” 
International Political Sociology 2, no. 3 (2008): 236–53; Lisa Smirl, “Plain Tales from the Reconstruction Site: 
Spatial Continuities in Contemporary Humanitarian Practice,” in Empire, Development & Colonialism: The Past 
in the Present, ed. Mark R. Duffield and Vernon Marston Hewitt (Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, NY: 
James Currey, 2009), 88–102. 
31 See Mark Duffield, “The Resilience of the Ruins: Towards a Critique of Digital Humanitarianism,” 
Resilience 4, no. 3 (2016): 147–65; Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “UNHCR and 
the Pursuit of International Protection: Accountability through Technology?,” Third World Quarterly Online 
first (2018); Tom Scott-Smith, “Humanitarian Neophilia: The ‘Innovation Turn’ and Its Implications,” 
Third World Quarterly 37, no. 12 (2016): 2229–51. 
32 Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993). 
33 E.g. see Katarzyna Grabska, “Constructing ‘Modern Gendered Civilised’ Women and Men: Gender-
Mainstreaming in Refugee Camps,” Gender & Development 19, no. 1 (2011): 81–93; Barbra Lukunka, “New 
Big Men: Refugee Emasculation as a Human Security Issue,” International Migration 50, no. 5 (2012): 130–
41; Elisabeth Olivius, “Refugee Men as Perpetrators, Allies or Troublemakers? Emerging Discourses on 
Men and Masculinities in Humanitarian Aid,” Women’s Studies International Forum 56 (2016): 56–65. 
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radical, and are therefore resisted by humanitarian actors. Humanitarian relationships 
with, and understandings of, refugee men, are therefore crucial to understanding how 
humanitarianism operates in contexts of displacement.  
 
This thesis also offers a novel contribution to the emerging literature on Syrian refugees, 
and state and humanitarian responses to Syrian refugees in the Middle East. This 
growing body of scholarship has analysed, to name a few key issues, host states’ policies 
towards refugees; the legal and humanitarian regimes that shape Syrians’ access to refuge 
and aid; and Syrians’ lives in, and experiences of, exile. 34  Other researchers have 
produced scholarship on SGBV and early marriage, economic opportunities for Syrians, 
the possibilities of return to Syria, and journeys from Syria, often on to Europe.35 Within 
this literature, however, very little work has been conducted about Syrian refugee men 
specifically – either in terms of their lives in exile, or in terms of how humanitarian actors 
have responded to and worked with Syrian men.36   
 
Simultaneously, this thesis adds to the existing body of scholarship on masculinities in 
contexts of displacement and exile. This literature, which is often produced within the 
fields of refugee studies, migration studies, and development studies, typically focuses, as 
I later discuss in more detail, 37  on how masculinities are performed in exile, or on 
                                                
34 For a few examples of this literature, see André Bank, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan:  Between Protection 
and Marginalisation,” GIGA Focus Nahost, no. 03 (2016); Maja Janmyr and Lama Mourad, “Modes of 
Ordering: Labelling, Classification and Categorization in Lebanon’s Refugee Response,” Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 2017; Peter Seeberg, “Migration into and from Syria and Nontraditional Security Issues in the 
MENA Region: Transnational Integration, Security, and National Interests,” in Migration, Security and 
Citizenship in the New Middle East, ed. Peter Seeberg and Zaid Eyedat (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 167–93; Matthew R. Stevens, “The Collapse of Social Networks among Syrian Refugees in Urban 
Jordan,” Contemporary Levant 1, no. 1 (2016): 51–63. 
35 Ruba Al Akash and Karen Boswall, “Listening to the Voices of Syrian Women and Girls Living as 
Urban Refugees in Northern Jordan: A Narrative Ethnography of Early Marriage,” in Migration, Mobilities 
and the Arab Spring: Spaces of Refugee Flight in the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. Natalia Ribas-Mateos (Cheltenham; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016), 142–57; Heaven Crawley et al., Unravelling Europe’s “Migration 
Crisis”: Journeys over Land and Sea (Bristol: Policy Press, 2017); Wendy Pearlman, We Crossed a Bridge and It 
Trembled: Voices from Syria (New York: Custom House, 2017); Various, “Syrians in Displacement,” Forced 
Migration Review 57 (2018), http://www.fmreview.org/syria2018.html. 
36 For rare exceptions, see Jennifer Allsopp, “Agent, Victim, Soldier, Son: Intersecting Masculinities in the 
European ‘Refugee Crisis,’” in A Gendered Approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, ed. Jane Freedman, Zeynep 
Kivilcim, and Nurcan Özgür Baklacioglu (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2017), 155–74; 
Rochelle Davis, Abbie Taylor, and Emma Murphy, “Gender, Conscription and Protection, and the War in 
Syria,” Forced Migration Review 47 (2014): 35–38; Roxanne Krystalli, Allyson Hawkins, and Kim Wilson, “‘I 
Followed the Flood’: A Gender Analysis of the Moral and Financial Economies of Forced Migration,” 
Disasters 42, no. 1 (2017): 17–39; Magdalena Suerbaum, “Defining the Other to Masculinize Oneself: Syrian 
Men’s Negotiations of Masculinity during Displacement in Egypt,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 43, no. 03 (2018): 665–86. 
37 See Chapter 2. 
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questions of gender equality or SGBV.38 In this research, I also explore these areas,39 and 
do so within a humanitarian crisis that has become a central issue in international politics 
since 2012, and also bring the aforementioned scholarship into conversation with 
debates in IR. Nevertheless, I do not claim to offer, in this work, a complete account of 
masculinities in Za‘tari. Such an account would require access that was unfeasible in the 
context of Za‘tari, as I discuss below and in Chapter 3, and would also require an analysis 
of the masculinities of those who do not identify as men,40 which I was similarly not able 
to access or address within the scope of this research project. While I am interested in, 
and discuss extensively, the masculinities of Syrian men and of humanitarians in Za‘tari, 
my central object of study is refugee men, and their place within humanitarianism.  
 
To introduce my thesis, in this chapter I firstly offer a brief overview of the context of 
Jordan, and its history as a refugee-hosting state. I explain why Za‘tari was chosen as the 
site of my fieldwork, although the camp is introduced in much more detail in Chapter 3. 
After introducing the broad context of my fieldwork, I explain the methodology I used, 
my access to the camp, and the organisations with which I worked. I reflect on my 
positionality in the field, the ethical challenges I encountered, and how I chose to deal 
with them. Finally, I offer an outline of each chapter in this thesis, and foreshadow both 
the topics and arguments I will present in each. 
 
The Context of Jordan 
For the majority of its existence as a state, Jordan has hosted large numbers of refugees. 
Refugees have constituted a very high proportion of the country’s population since the 
creation of the State of Israel and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
to neighbouring countries. Although there are around 630,000 Palestinians in Jordan 
                                                
38 E.g. see Luigi Achilli, “Becoming a Man in Al-Wihdat: Masculine Performances in a Palestinian Refugee 
Camp in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, no. 2 (2015): 263–280; Grabska, 
“Constructing ‘Modern Gendered Civilised’ Women and Men”; J. Hart, “Dislocated Masculinity: 
Adolescence and the Palestinian Nation-in-Exile,” Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 1 (2008): 64–81; 
Rosemary Jaji, “Masculinity on Unstable Ground: Young Refugee Men in Nairobi, Kenya,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 22, no. 2 (2009): 177–94; Lukunka, “New Big Men”; Simon Turner, “Angry Young Men in a 
Tanzanian Refugee Camp,” in Refugees and the Transformation of Societies: Agency, Policies, Ethics and Politics, ed. 
Philomena Essed, Georg Frerks, and Joke Schrijvers (New York ; Oxford: Berghahn, 2004), 94–105. 
39 See in particular Chapters 5 and 6. 
40 I did not ask for my interlocutors’ gender self-identification, but have used the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ 
about my interlocutors in accordance with their gender presentation within the prevailing gender schema. I 
recognise, however, that they may self-identify in other ways. 
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who do not hold Jordanian citizenship, the clear majority of Palestinians in Jordan do.41 
There are no official, public figures differentiating between so-called ‘West Bank’ 
(Palestinian) and ‘East Bank’ Jordanians (also known as ‘Transjordanians’), but most 
analysts assume that Palestinians compromise at least half of the 6,600,000 Jordanian 
citizens living in Jordan.42 In addition to large numbers of Palestinian arrivals in 1947-9 
and 1967, Jordan received around 300,000 (almost all Palestinian) citizens of Jordan who 
were expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf states in the early 1990s.43 From the 1990s 
onwards, Jordan has hosted a large number of Iraqi refugees – approximately 160,000 
according to one 2007 study,44 although the Government of Jordan (GoJ) claimed the 
figure was closer to 750,000.45 As of the time of my fieldwork, there were around 65,000 
registered Iraqi refugees in Jordan, as well as much smaller populations of Somali, 
Sudanese, and Yemeni refugees.46 
 
When faced with the Syrian uprising across its border, and tens and then hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians attempting to enter Jordan from 2012 onwards, the GoJ initially 
maintained a relatively open border policy. But even by early 2013, as Human Rights 
Watch reported, Jordan was denying access to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees living in 
Syria, all single men of ‘military age,’ and anyone not possessing identification 
documents. 47  From mid-2013, due to the strain this new population placed on 
communities in northern Jordan especially, Jordan began to restrict the number of 
Syrians it processed, and sporadically closed and re-opened its borders. By 2016, the 
restrictions on entry to Jordan had become so severe that around 75,000 refugees were 
living in no man’s land on the eastern border between Syria and Jordan, in an area known 
                                                
41 Rochelle Davis et al., “Hosting Guests, Creating Citizens: Models of Refugee Administration in Jordan 
and Egypt,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2017): 1–32. 
42 See Mohammad Ghazal, “Population Stands at around 9.5 Million, Including 2.9 Million Guests,” 
Jordan Times, January 30, 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/population-stands-around-95-
million-including-29-million-guests; Curtis R. Ryan, “Identity Politics, Reform, and Protest in Jordan,” 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 3 (2011): 564–78. 
43 Nicholas van Hear, “The Impact of the Involuntary Mass ‘Return’ to Jordan in the Wake of the Gulf 
Crisis,” International Migration Review 29, no. 2 (1995): 352–74. 
44 Fafo Institute, “Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics,” 2007, 
http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/jordan/IJ.pdf. 
45 For more on this controversy, see Lewis Turner, “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian 
Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 
(2015): 386–404. 
46 Davis et al., “Hosting Guests, Creating Citizens.” 
47 Bill Frelick, “Fleeing Syria: Insights on Lebanon’s Open Border,” Human Rights Watch, March 24, 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/24/fleeing-syria-insights-lebanon-s-open-border. 
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as ‘the berm,’ because they could neither return safely to their homes in Syria nor enter 
Jordan.48    
 
By 2015-2016, when I was conducting my fieldwork, there were around 630,000 
registered Syrian refugees living in Jordan, a number which has slowly risen to around 
650,000 by the start of 2018.49 This population is relatively young, with around half of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan being under 18 years of age, and women, men, girls and boys 
are each roughly a quarter of the total number. As in the 2000s when Iraqi refugees were 
the subject of significant international attention, the GoJ has again claimed that the actual 
number of Syrians in Jordan is significantly higher than the figures from the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The December 2015 census 
reported a figure of 1.257 million Syrians in the country, which assumes that an 
estimated 600,000 Syrians were in the country before the start of the uprising, a figure 
deemed deeply unrealistic by many humanitarian actors. The GoJ, nonetheless, has 
regularly used figures of between 1.2 and 1.4 million to emphasise the burdens under 
which Jordan has been placed by its hosting of Syrian refugees.50  
 
As Davis et al. have explored in depth, Jordan’s policies towards refugees vary 
extensively according to the nationality of the refugees in question. Like Iraqi refugees 
before them, Syrians were designated as ‘guests’ by the GoJ, while UNHCR was 
delegated to determine refugee status. Approximately 80 percent of Syrian refugees (like 
all Iraqi refugees in Jordan) live outside of camps. To access government health and 
education services, after registering with UNHCR, Syrians were required to register with 
the Ministry of Interior.51 Syrians living outside of camps – in the cities, towns, villages, 
farmland and deserts of Jordan - are referred to as living in ‘host communities.’ A clear 
majority of the registered Syrians who live in host communities, just over 500,000 people 
in total, live in the large cities of Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa. The remaining 20 
percent live in refugee camps. There are small camps, which host hundreds or a few 
thousand refugees, including Emirati-Jordanian Camp, Cyber City, and King Abdullah 
                                                
48 Davis et al., “Hosting Guests, Creating Citizens.” 
49 Unless stated otherwise, all figures for the Syrian refugee population, and the demographic breakdown 
thereof, are from UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal,” 
March 21, 2018, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
50 Katharina Lenner, “Blasts from the Past: Policy Legacies and Memories in the Making of the Jordanian 
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Park, and two large camps, Azraq and Za‘tari, which host approximately 50,000 and 
80,000 Syrian refugees respectively.  
 
Za‘tari, the Syrian refugee camp in Jordan with the largest population, was the main 
focus of my fieldwork. I selected Za‘tari, rather than another camp or a non-camp 
setting, for multiple reasons. Refugee camps have long been an interesting and 
productive focus of scholarly attention. Researchers have examined the modes of 
humanitarian and state governance within them, how camps become (de)politicised, the 
effects of encampment on refugees’ rights, how refugees attempt to build lives and 
communities under encampment, and the struggles they must engage in to do so. 52 
Events in Za‘tari, a newly-established, large, formal encampment, were very relevant to 
these scholarly debates. I was also interested in Za‘tari specifically because, in an era in 
which there have been some moves away from formal encampment, 53  Za‘tari had 
emerged as a restrictive, securitised, differentiated space within Jordan, whose 
governance was being deeply contested by refugees themselves. The intensity of 
humanitarian governance that encampment allows also made Za‘tari a very suitable site 
for investigating humanitarian policies and their effects. On a personal level, my long-
standing interest in questions of exile, encampment, and refugeehood in the Middle East, 
which grew out of extensive time spent in Palestine, also made the politics of Syrian 
displacement of great interest to me. On a practical level, Za‘tari was much easier to 
access on a sustained basis than the other main camps for Syrians in Jordan, such as 
Azraq and Emirati-Jordanian camps. 
 
Methodology 
My fieldwork in Jordan lasted for almost 12 months, from the beginning of September 
2015 to late August 2016. Over this period of time, as I will subsequently outline in 
detail, I conducted interviews with 28 humanitarian and non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) workers; 3 employees of a private security organisation working in Za‘tari; 3 
(prospective) employers of refugees outside of Za‘tari; 2 employees of European donor 
                                                
52 For some of the central contributions to these debates over the past few decades, see Agier, Managing the 
Undesirables; Hyndman, Managing Displacement; Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National 
Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Simon 
Turner, “Suspended Spaces - Contesting Sovereignties in a Refugee Camp,” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, 
Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, ed. Thomas Blom and Finn Stepputat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile. 
53 See Jeff Crisp, “Finding Space for Protection: An Inside Account of the Evolution of UNHCR’s Urban 
Refugee Policy,” Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 33, no. 1 (2017): 87–96. 
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agencies; 2 senior officials from Jordanian think tanks; interviews with 16 Syrian refugees 
in Za‘tari; a group discussion with 12 Syrians at the Questscope Youth Centre; interviews 
with 16 Syrian refugees living in Jordanian host communities, many of them former 
residents of Za‘tari; undertook 27 days of participant and non-participant observation 
within Za‘tari; 1 day of non-participant observation and interviews in Azraq Refugee 
Camp; 2 days of non-participant observation and interviews in Emirati-Jordanian 
Refugee Camp; 4 days of non-participant observation in refugee community centres run 
by the Danish Refugee Council in non-camp areas of Jordan; 19 full and 6 part days of 
office-based project work for ARDD; and the equivalent of at least 6 days’ work 
conducted for ARDD from home. In addition to these activities, I was invited to assist 
with 6 days of workshops on gender, identity and gender-based violence (GBV) taking 
place at the Collateral Repair Project, which runs a community centre for refugees living 
in East Amman in November 2015. In addition to my interviews, I also visited the 
offices and projects of six other NGOs and think tanks working on refugee-related 
questions; attended public discussion events, in both English and Arabic, on topics 
including early marriage, the portrayal of Syrian refugees in the media, and the rights of 
refugee and migrant women in Jordan; visited fellow researchers conducting related 
research in cities such as Mafraq and Irbid; attended a weekly reading group of students 
and researchers in Jordan for 3 months; and attended academic presentations and 2 
multi-day academic conferences.  
 
During this time period from September 2015 to August 2016, with the exception of 
trips outside of Jordan for conferences, to renew my visa, and a Christmas break, I was 
living in and based in Amman. I chose to base myself in Amman in part because it was 
where I had some pre-existing networks, but more because it was where the vast majority 
of NGOs working in the country, including those working in Za‘tari, had their main 
offices. By being based in Amman, I could more easily build networks, hold meetings, 
conduct interviews with humanitarian workers, and attend relevant events. I also judged, 
in advance of my fieldwork, that living in Amman, a large capital city, would allow me to 
more easily take breaks, meet like-minded people with whom to socialise, and to ‘switch 
off’ from my fieldwork, and would thereby be better for my mental health while 
undertaking fieldwork that would include multiple challenges.  
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Central to my fieldwork was my work with a Jordanian NGO named ARDD (Arab 
Renaissance for Democracy and Development). I undertook a part time internship with 
ARDD, which formally lasted from September 2015 to February 2016, although I 
continued to assist with their work on a more ad-hoc basis for the remainder of my 
fieldwork. Subsequent to the end of my fieldwork, ARDD employed me as a consultant 
to assist with the authorship of a report about their work. I was introduced to ARDD’s 
Director, Samar Muhareb, through Y Care International, a London-based charity with 
which I had previously volunteered. Upon reading about ARDD’s work online, and from 
an e-mail introduction to Samar and her assistant, ARDD seemed like a very appropriate 
organisation with which I could establish a relationship. I explained to ARDD the broad 
research questions that I was interested in, and that I wished to undertake volunteering 
with an organisation in Za‘tari, which would both help me undertake research and to 
contribute to the humanitarian work taking place. In April 2015 we agreed that I would 
become an intern with them, and left the final details of my role until my arrival in 
Jordan in September 2015.  
 
At my first in-person meeting at ARDD, in September 2015, I was introduced to the 
team from the Civic and Political Participation Unit, who had been undertaking a project 
on civic engagement in Za‘tari, funded by UN Women (United Nations Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women). The next element of this work, 
which was due to begin that same month, was working with men and boys on SGBV 
prevention. We agreed that, over the course of my internship, I would visit the camp 
with them to assist with the workshops taking place, which typically meant going to the 
camp one day a week. In addition to visiting the camp to conduct workshops on SGBV 
prevention and civic engagement, I joined ARDD on visits to the camp for the opening 
of a women’s centre, for events to mark a campaign against GBV, and to visit initiatives 
organised by our project’s participants. I spent three more days in Za‘tari with ARDD in 
July and August 2016, to assist, in a similar capacity, with the next iteration of this work. 
As I discuss in Chapter 3, access to the camp is very highly regulated by the Ministry of 
Interior, and it is necessary for any visitor to the camp to have a permit. ARDD arranged 
a permit for me for all of the visits associated with their work.  
 
In the September-February period, and again for a short period in July, I spent between 
one and two days a week in ARDD’s Amman office supporting the project. In this 
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office-based role, my primary responsibilities were to write reports for colleagues and 
donors on what had happened in the workshops that week, and to assist with the 
collection and analysis of data about the project. Although I spent these office-based 
days in Amman, this time was of critical importance in building my understanding of the 
work that takes place in Za‘tari. It allowed me to experience the rhythms of a project 
cycle, interactions among colleagues and with donors, and the (dis)connections between 
offices in Amman and projects implemented in Za‘tari. Perhaps paradoxically, this time 
in Amman allowed me access to Za‘tari in ways that it would otherwise have been very 
hard to achieve as a researcher, given the restrictions on accessing the camp, and the 
wariness that some organisations had about assisting researchers with permits.54 
 
Additionally, I spent time in Za‘tari in a variety of other capacities. I spent three days as a 
volunteer English teacher in the camp, in December 2015 and March 2016, through a 
programme run under the auspices of International Relief and Development (IRD), and 
organised by a friend and fellow researcher. I spent two days visiting Za‘tari through two 
friends, the first of whom was working there, the second of whom was employed by a 
foundation looking to support work in the camp. I also visited the Emirati-Jordanian 
camp with this latter friend. These visits allowed me more time in the camp, and to 
experience it in a multitude of capacities. For example, I was able to experience, to an 
extent, how outsiders with different affiliations were greeted and how NGO workers 
discussed their work with potential donors. In the summer of 2016, as I discuss in 
further detail below, I received a permit from the Ministry of Interior to visit the camp as 
a researcher, and spent a further three days in Za‘tari, as well as a day in Azraq Camp and 
a day in Emirati-Jordanian Camp. 
 
I did not conduct interviews with humanitarian workers in my capacity as an ARDD 
intern, but the connection with ARDD was nevertheless very helpful for arranging and 
conducting these interviews. It gave me a series of networks and relationships in the 
humanitarian sector, more credibility in the eyes of some of my interlocutors, and a more 
in-depth and personal understanding of the work being undertaken by the sector, all of 
which enhanced the quality and productiveness of my interviews. Furthermore, some of 
my interviewees were people I met initially through my work with ARDD. Others 
interviews resulted from introductions or recommendations by friends and acquaintances 
                                                
54 See Chapter 3 
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from the United Kingdom (UK) and Jordan, others I approached through publicly 
available contact details because of the relevance of their work, and some interviewees 
recommended or introduced me to others that I subsequently interviewed.    
 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 28 
humanitarian and NGO workers, as well as 3 employees of a private security 
organisation working in Za‘tari, 3 (prospective) employers of refugees outside of Za‘tari, 
2 senior officials from Jordanian think tanks, and 2 employees of European donor 
agencies.55 The humanitarian and NGO workers were from a variety of organisations, 
seniorities, and positionalities. In terms of seniority, they ranged from an NGO Director 
to project managers to junior field staff. I interviewed employees of multiple United 
Nations (UN) agencies, including former and current staff members of UNHCR, 
employees of international NGOs (INGOs), and employees of Jordanians NGOs.  
 
Almost half of these interviewees (18) were Jordanian. The other interviewees were of a 
range of nationalities, including from other Middle Eastern states, although 15 were from 
states in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Given that, as I discuss in this thesis, 
the perspectives of Jordanian and non-Jordanian humanitarian workers often differed, 
and that they tended to occupy different roles within humanitarian structures, it was 
important to interview a significant number of both Jordanians and non-Jordanians. 17 
of these interviewees were women (9 Jordanian, 8 non-Jordanian), and 21 men (9 
Jordanian, 12 non-Jordanian). I can converse comfortably and conduct interviews in 
Arabic, as I did with my Syrian interviewees. The vast majority of native Arabic speakers 
working in humanitarian roles, however, preferred to conduct the interviews in English, 
with some explaining that they were more accustomed to discussing their work in 
English, even if it was implemented in Arabic. A small number of these interviews, 
however, included exchanges in Arabic as well.  
 
The questions I asked interviewees differed greatly depending on the expertise and 
experience of the interviewee, and as befits a project that explores multiple aspects of 
humanitarianism with a gendered lens. For example, some interviews focused in depth 
on specific projects that the interviewee had personally undertaken with refugees, others 
focused on the interviewees’ broader experiences of working in the humanitarian sector, 
                                                
55 One of the interviews with a donor agency took place in July 2017, after my fieldwork in Jordan, and was 
conducted via telephone from London. 
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and others still focused on the interviewee’s perceptions of how the humanitarian sector 
works with refugees in gendered ways. The semi-structured nature of these interviews 
allowed me to both give the interviewee some information about the proposed topics of 
discussion in advance, for me to plan the questions I wanted to ask them, and to be 
flexible when new or unexpected topics, which I wanted to pursue in more detail, arose 
during the interview. For all of these interviews, I explained to them the research project 
I was undertaking, and used a digital recorder to record the consent of the interviewee, 
the level of anonymity they required, and whether and how they wished to be referred to 
in my thesis and publications. Some chose to allow me to use their names, with others I 
discussed and agreed how they could be referred to, and a small number asked that the 
interviews be for background only. I also explained that they could withdraw their 
consent for the interview at any time, including for information they had already 
disclosed, and that they did not have to answer any questions they did not want to 
answer.   
 
These interviews, which typically lasted about one hour, usually took place either in the 
Amman office of the agency or NGO for which the interviewee worked, or in a public 
place such as a café. Occasionally, interviewees invited me to their homes. A small 
number of interviews were conducted via Skype from Jordan, and one additional 
interview, subsequent to my fieldwork, was conducted via telephone from London. 
Conducting these interviews in Amman, rather than in Za‘tari itself, in which there were 
few private spaces and where humanitarian workers had busy schedules, enabled me to 
conduct interviews more easily. Furthermore, since Za‘tari is part of the broader refugee 
response in Jordan, some of the policies and programmes that are carried out there are 
decided by teams working on country-wide policies. Some of my interviewees were 
therefore people who, for example, worked on developing policies on SGBV for the 
refugee response as a whole, even if they themselves were not typically based in Za‘tari.  
 
While working with ARDD in Za‘tari, I was not able to conduct any interviews with 
Syrians: we were working according to ARDD’s schedule and requirements, and I did 
not want to potentially jeopardise their work in the camp by conducting research 
interviews while entering the camp on my permit as an NGO worker. I did, however, 
have many interesting and fruitful discussions and interactions, with both Syrians and 
humanitarian workers, during these visits, and this thesis is very informed by this time 
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spent in the camp. When I entered the camp with a research permit from the Ministry of 
Interior, I was able to enter for 3 days over a specific two-week period, which was in 
July-August 2016. During this time, I arranged a visit to the Questscope Youth Center, 
to whose staff I was already known, which resulted in very productive individual and 
group conversations, and I met dozens of other Syrians, and held conversations with 
them which ranged greatly in formality and length. 
 
I was advised by multiple humanitarian sources that it would be impossible for me to 
tape record interviews, or even to tape record verbal consent for interviews, with Syrians 
in the camp, because it would create too much nervousness among my interviewees 
living in a context, and with a long history, of intense policing. This accorded with my 
own, by this stage extensive, experience and understanding of the camp’s politics. People 
would similarly, I knew, be extremely reluctant (and in some cases unable) to read and 
sign a long consent form. To respond to this context, I decided to ask people to sign 
their names to a very brief statement I had written, in Arabic, beforehand, stating that “I 
agree to answer questions for Lewis Turner’s research about life in Za‘tari camp.” Some 
were even reluctant to sign something this brief and clear. The boundaries between 
‘interviews’ on the one hand, and conversations that took place and that I recorded later 
as ‘fieldnotes,’ therefore became somewhat blurred in some instances. I have recorded as 
an ‘interview’ the conversations that were more formal, typically although not always 
longer, in which I felt I had an appropriate amount of time to introduce my research and 
positionality, and when I was confident that my interlocutors understood the nature of 
our interaction. In this context, I was typically able to take notes of my interviews, either 
during or directly after the exchanges, and I usually did this on my mobile telephone. 
 
Nevertheless, over the days I entered the camp with a research permit, all of my 
interlocutors for both more informal conversations and more formal interviews were 
aware that I was a researcher, none knew of my association with ARDD, and so were not 
liable to understand me to be an NGO worker. The vast majority of people I approached 
appeared very happy to talk to me, sometimes at length. My conversations and interviews 
on these days sometimes lasted just a few minutes, but at other times, for example with 
Syrians at Questscope, more than an hour. In response to these dynamics, I have not felt 
able to quote my Syrian interlocutors at length as much as I would have liked, but I argue 
that this is an appropriate response to the complexities of conducting research and 
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obtaining informed consent in such an environment. I also decided that if a Syrian who 
my UNHCR guide, my police escort (see below), or I had approached showed any 
hesitation in talking to me, I would quickly declare that we should move on, so as to not 
pressure them to talk with me, and did this on more than one occasion. 
 
In these discussions and interviews while entering the camp with a research permit, I 
typically asked Syrians in Za‘tari about their relationships with humanitarian actors, their 
perceptions of the extent to which humanitarian actors were interested in, and provided 
for, different sectors of the camp population, and how living in the camp had brought 
gendered changes in their families and communities. Many of my interviewees were or 
had been shop-holders or workers in the market, and/or Cash Workers for NGOs56 and 
in these instances some of my questions focused on the work they had done, their 
perceptions of it, what it provided them, and the challenges they had encountered in 
pursuing livelihood opportunities. 11 of these interviewees were men, and 5 were 
women. 
 
I conducted 13 interviews with Syrians in non-camp settings in Irbid Governorate in 
northern Jordan. A majority (9) of these interviewees were former residents of Za‘tari 
camp, who had spent anything from a few days to several months living there upon their 
arrival to Jordan. 7 of these interviewees were women, and 6 were men. I conducted 
these interviews in order to improve my understanding of the earlier years of the camp, 
and to understand how life as a Syrian refugee differed in camp and non-camp contexts. 
With these interviewees, my questions typically focused on their experiences in Za‘tari 
(for those who had previously stayed there), their experiences and perceptions of the 
differences between camp and non-camp environments, their relationships with 
humanitarian actors outside of the camp, their experiences and perceptions of the 
gendered nature of these interactions, and livelihood opportunities and challenges in 
non-camp areas. Because these interviewees were not subject to the same levels of police 
surveillance as in Za‘tari, and following the advice of my local academic and 
humanitarian contacts, I asked to record consent for these interviews using a tape 
recorder, to which all of these interviewees agreed. In the following section, I discuss my 
access to, and ethical issues surrounding, these interviews. 
 
                                                
56 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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I did not conduct any formal interviews with officials from Jordanian Government 
Ministries or with Jordanian officers within Za‘tari, although I did, as noted below, have 
the opportunity for extensive informal discussions with Jordanian police officers, and 
conducted interviews with the British trainers and mentors of the Community Police in 
the camp.57 The reasons for this decision were relevance, utility, and practicality. I was 
clear that humanitarian, rather than state, policies towards refugee men would be my 
focus, and while state policies provided a background to the humanitarian work taking 
place, humanitarian actors rarely referenced state policies as relevant to their work. On 
the issues on which they were relevant, for example deportation, I was aware, from 
fellow researchers and humanitarian workers, that it would be impossible to obtain 
formal interviews on these issues. I was also concerned that I might put my dual 
positionality as a researcher and NGO worker (and therefore my permit and regular 
access to the camp) in jeopardy, were I to discuss in detail my research about the camp 
with Jordanian officials. 
 
In addition to these interviews, in order to further help me locate Za‘tari within the 
broader Jordanian context, and to better understand the specificities of camp and non-
camp contexts, I spent 4 days undertaking non-participant observation in community 
centres run by the Danish Refugee Council in Ma’an, Karak, and Amman, where I also 
conducted 3 interviews with Syrian volunteers at their centres. I did not use a tape 
recorder for these interviews. They were, however, each between 30 and 60 minutes 
long, during which I had extensive time to explain my research and ensure informed 
consent was being given. I took notes during the interviews. I also assisted, as noted 
above, with 6 days of workshops on gender-related questions that took place at the 
Collateral Repair Project community centre in Amman.  
 
More broadly, while living in Amman, I was to a significant extent absorbed in certain 
kinds of humanitarian environments. A high proportion of my social circles, including 
the person with whom I shared a flat, were working in, volunteering in, writing about, or 
researching, the humanitarian sector and/or the lives of Syrian refugees in Jordan, and 
some of my friends and acquaintances in Amman were themselves Syrians. Therefore, 
even though I lived some distance (approximately 40 miles by car) from the main site of 
my fieldwork, the concentration of office-based work, interviews, events, and relevant 
                                                
57 See Chapter 3. 
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interactions in Amman meant that my fieldwork remained relatively immersive 
throughout the twelve-month period.  
 
Positionality and Ethics 
My positionality, and the nature and topic of my fieldwork, presented a series of personal 
challenges and ethical dilemmas in the field. There were, in the first instance, ethical 
choices to be made about what, precisely, to research. When I began this project, I had 
envisaged its central focus would be on changing masculinities among Syrians in exile, 
and that my work would speak primarily to literatures and debates on gender and 
masculinities in the Middle East. The work that has resulted is of relevance to these 
scholarly fields, and Syrian masculinities in Za‘tari have remained part of my focus. 
Nevertheless, in 2015, around the beginning of my fieldwork, I began to orient myself 
more towards a study of humanitarianism. This was influenced, in part, by the 
aforementioned access restrictions, which, it became clear, would limit the amount of 
time I could spend in Za‘tari, and the aspects of life that I would be able to experience 
and effectively research.  
 
This shift in focus, however, was also the result of a political decision to ‘study up.’58 I 
was concerned that a project that centred Syrian men and their understandings of gender, 
in a context of displacement that resulted from mass violence, might be liable to be 
appropriated by social and political actors attempting to exclude, repress and disempower 
the refugees and others who were arriving in Europe at that time. Syrian men in Europe, 
and men read as ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’, were being denounced as ‘terrorists’ and ‘sexual 
predators,’ thereby delegitimising the attempts of millions to seek decent, safe, and 
secure lives in Europe.59 The political context within which a researcher works should 
help to shape decisions about what is researched, said and written.60 Syrian men, their 
understandings of masculinities, and their resistance to camp and state authorities, all 
appear extensively throughout this thesis, but within the framework of a decision to 
focus my attention on the policies, practices, and imaginaries of humanitarian actors.  
 
                                                
58 See Laura Nader, “Up the Anthropologist - Perspectives Gained from Studying Up,” in Reinventing 
Anthropology, ed. Dell Hymes (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 284–311. 
59 Lesley Pruitt, Helen Berents, and Gayle Munro, “Gender and Age in the Construction of Male Youth in 
the European Migration ‘Crisis,’” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43, no. 3 (2018): 687–709. 
60 See Nicola Pratt, “Weaponising Feminism for the ‘War on Terror’, versus Employing Strategic Silence,” 
Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2013): 327–31. 
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Other challenges that I experienced relate to my prior discussion of methodology. 
Because many of my social circles were involved in humanitarian work, social events 
rarely felt entirely like social occasions, in which I might ‘switch off’ from research. 
These casual interactions were at times extremely valuable for my research, as they added 
a great deal of depth, context, and perspective to my fieldwork. Writing fieldnotes about 
social occasions however, in order to reflect on the conversations and interactions that 
had taken place, made me feel as if I were ‘spying’ on the social settings, while also taking 
part in them. Occupying this kind of dual role often left me feeling drained and 
duplicitous. 
 
These challenges felt particularly acute with regard to my colleagues and work at ARDD. 
ARDD staff members were all aware that I was a PhD student who had come to Jordan 
to undertake research as well as to participate in their work. I was also introduced to the 
Syrians we worked with as someone who was both working with ARDD and studying 
for a PhD about the Syria refugee response. I was aware, however, that in the context of 
a refugee camp, where residents encounter a huge range of NGO workers and other 
outsiders, the nuances of my positionality may well not have been clear to the Syrians in 
our workshops. This dynamic, at times, left me deeply uncomfortable. My training in 
ethnographic methods, the ethical review process I had undertaken, and discussions with 
my supervisor, all helped me to gain confidence in making decisions about what to use, 
what to anonymise, and what to not use at all. Most pertinently, conversations on 
confidential topics that took place within workshops have not been used in this thesis, 
except where ARDD felt it appropriate to put that information into the public domain, 
and in these cases I have cited ARDD’s publicly-available reports. Nevertheless, I could 
not un-know, or un-learn, what I had heard or learned in spaces of confidentiality, and 
the discomfort that this created was, to an extent, an unavoidable part of the research 
methodologies I was employing. 
 
At the same time, this discomfort was also productive. While I disliked feeling uncertain 
and anxious about these dual roles, I also recognised (and was encouraged by my 
supervisors to recognise), that there was an immense productivity in simultaneously 
experiencing a context in multiple ways. The discomfort was an indication that I was 
participating and observing at the same time, and part of the process of learning and 
critically examining how newly-encountered spaces operate. Furthermore, particularly as 
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I gathered more data from a range of settings and sources, I began to see the ways in 
which it would be possible for me to discuss the issues I wanted to without betraying 
confidences or acting unethically, and thus my feelings of discomfort eased over the 
course of my fieldwork. Once I returned from Jordan, I started publishing short pieces 
of work on the topics of refugee men and masculinities, as well as other topics relating to 
the refugee response. I was delighted to receive many positive reactions to these 
publications from colleagues at ARDD. My work was shared by some of them, and by 
the organisation, on their social media pages. About 18 months after my fieldwork 
ended, as I write these words, my work appears to have cemented, rather than disrupted 
or betrayed, these relationships.  
 
Due to the immersive nature of fieldwork, and the specific topics and contexts with 
which I was engaging, I also regularly found myself feeling exhausted and/or upset. On 
many days I would return home from a day in Za‘tari or in ARDD’s office, having 
attempted to both fulfil my work role and to observe and understand the context, and 
would then need to write fieldnotes. I tried to make these as extensive as possible, and 
often they extended to around 5,000 words about one day, particularly if I had spent a 
day in Za‘tari. This process, especially when I worked with ARDD multiple days in a 
row, was exhausting. My supervisor encouraged me to take breaks (including leaving 
Amman and/or Jordan on a regular basis), and to attempt to socialise with people who 
had nothing to do with my research. These tactics, in particular the breaks from 
Amman/Jordan, however short, helped to combat this challenge, although did not 
entirely overcome it. 
 
In addition to, and reinforcing, the exhaustion was the fact that the stories I would hear 
from Syrians were at times deeply distressing. I heard stories of torture, death, 
bereavement, imprisonment, deportation, and hopelessness, to name a few. I was also 
aware that the stories I was hearing, and the spaces I was encountering, were only tiny 
fragments of what has become one of the largest humanitarian catastrophes in decades. 
The enormity of what is termed the Syria crisis, both inside and outside its borders, was 
at times overwhelming. Feeling overwhelmed and sad felt entirely appropriate, but 
nonetheless needed to be managed and processed. Taking regular breaks again helped 
with this, and I sought the support of friends, both in Jordan and in the UK. I also had a 
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policy, at least when in my apartment, of allowing myself to express sadness when I felt 
it, which helped me to understand and process what I was witnessing and feeling. 
 
Throughout my fieldwork, I also had to be cognisant that interactions between 
researchers and refugees are structured by relations of power and inequalities.61 In my 
case, as someone identified as a white Western man, these inequalities ran along lines of 
at least gender, race, and citizenship, in addition to other resultant inequalities, such as 
access to space and freedom of movement. None of my interactions with Syrians led me 
to believe that I was being read by them as non-heterosexual. These power inequalities 
can readily lead to the exploitation of refugees, and disrespect for their needs, time, and 
perspectives.62 As the Syrian photographer Manar Bilal has argued, specifically citing 
Za‘tari as an example, refugee camps are used by privileged outsiders as tourist 
attractions, and to bolster their own portfolios, profiles, and images even while they 
profess to be ‘spreading awareness.’ Bilal argues that outsiders should only “[e]nter the 
camps when you have a purpose and are able to provide something.”63  
 
In line with Bilal’s argument, part of my motivation for working with an NGO was that I 
could also contribute to the work being done, even as I entered for purposes that were 
undeniably my own, and from which I have, and will continue, to benefit. My Arabic 
language skills, extensive experience in the Middle East, and my experience working on 
questions of gender with NGOs, all meant that I was able to substantively contribute to 
ARDD’s work. I sincerely hope that, through engagement with non-academic audiences, 
the research I have undertaken will also provide benefits for refugees, and I have taken 
substantive steps to try to ensure this happens. In addition to the work I undertook with 
ARDD, since my fieldwork, I have been interviewed for and reviewed policy briefs and 
research reports for NGOs,64 and have written short articles that are designed, in terms 
                                                
61 For a summary of many key ethical issues involved in research with refugees, and for an extensive list of 
further resources, see Christina Clark-Kazak, “Ethical Considerations: Research with People in Situations 
of Forced Migration,” Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 33, no. 2 (2017). 
62 Moe Ali Nayel, “Palestinian Refugees Are Not at Your Service,” Text, The Electronic Intifada, May 5, 
2013, https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-refugees-are-not-your-service/12464. 
63 Manar Bilal, “Our Refugee Camps Are Not Tourist Attractions,” The Huffington Post, n.d., 
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64 E.g. see CARE and Promundo, “Men and Boys in Displacement: Assistance and Protection Challenges 
for Unaccompanied Boys and Men in Refugee Contexts” (CARE and Promundo, 2017), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CARE-Promundo_Men-and-boys-in-
displacement_2017.pdf; Henri Myrttinen and Megan Daigle, “When Merely Existing Is a Risk: Sexual and 
Gender Minorities in Conflict, Displacement and Peacebuilding” (London: International Alert, 2017). 
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of both content and publication choice, to be accessible to both academic and non-
academic audiences.65 I am not under any illusions, however, that it is likely that the 
individuals in Za‘tari who gave me their time, and shared with me their views, will 
themselves personally and directly benefit from anything that comes from this research.  
 
When conducting interviews with refugees living outside of camps, to whom I was 
introduced through academic contacts as explained above, I had not been working with 
an NGO in that community, as I had been in Za‘tari. I therefore decided, after 
consulting both my contacts from the community organisation that would facilitate my 
interviews, and those who had introduced me to them, that it would be appropriate for 
me to make a small donation to the families we were visiting. In deciding the appropriate 
level, I relied on the advice of these contacts and others who were familiar with the 
organisation’s work and the local context. I decided on offering each family 15 Jordanian 
Dinars (JOD) (approximately $21)66, and a blanket, which the community organisation 
had identified as a need, and which they purchased in advance. As Clark-Kazak argues is 
appropriate, this compensation was not tied to the completion of the interview, or to a 
particular length of time being spent in conversation;67 some interviews lasted for 45 
minutes, others less than 10, but the same compensation was offered to each family, in 
exactly the same way.  
 
Ethical challenges also presented themselves, in particular, when accessing the camp 
through the permit I received from the Ministry of Interior to visit the camp to conduct 
research. When using this permit, when I arrived at the camp I reported, as required, to 
the police headquarters. For the first two days of my three days using this permit, I was 
given a police accompanier for the duration of my visit. On the third day I was not, 
because the camp was receiving a large political delegation that day.68 I was similarly 
given police accompaniers during the visits to Azraq and Emirati-Jordanian camps 
undertaken using this same research permit. When meeting Syrians on these days, 
therefore, I was typically in the presence of a police officer, although at times they chose 
                                                
65 See Lewis Turner, “Are Syrian Men Vulnerable Too? Gendering the Syria Refugee Response,” Middle 
East Institute (blog), November 29, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/are-syrian-men-vulnerable-
too-gendering-syria-refugee-response; Lewis Turner, “Who Will Resettle Single Syrian Men?,” Forced 
Migration Review, no. 54 (2017): 29–31. 
66 The Jordanian Dinar has been pegged to the US dollar since 1995, at a rate of 1 JOD to $1.41. 
67 Clark-Kazak, “Ethical Considerations,” 12–13. 
68 See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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to wait outside of buildings I entered, or to engage in separations conversations to the 
ones I was having.  
 
Very conscious that the camp is policed extensively, and wanting to ensure that there 
were no adverse effects of my presence or interactions for the Syrians I was speaking to, 
I chose not to ask questions about specific topics in the presence of police officers (for 
example on deportations) and to use depoliticised language that did not explicitly call 
into question Jordan’s role (and self-perception of its role) in the refugee response. That 
I had multiple ways of accessing the camp, as discussed above, and a research day in 
Za‘tari without a police officer, meant that different discussions were possible at 
different times. It is also worth noting that having extensive opportunities to casually 
interact with police officers was both useful and thought-provoking, as I discuss in 
different parts of this thesis. 
 
When in the presence of police officers, I also attempted to frame my questions, 
wherever possible, as questions about gender relations in the Syrian community, and 
whether and how humanitarian actors were serving the needs of women, men, boys and 
girls. In my discussions with police officers and other state employees, both when 
applying for the permit and when reporting to the police stations in the camps, it had 
become clear to me that framing my topic in these ways would help my research to be 
seen as non-threatening and appropriately ‘non-political’. On rare occasions, a police 
officer would interject to emphasise the ‘burdens’ that Jordan was experiencing, for 
example when discussions of service provision appeared to touch on state policy. At 
other times, they would appear intrigued, or at times amused, by Syrians’ views of 
humanitarian actors and their work. Humanitarian structures and policies were clearly 
unfamiliar, even strange, to the police officers, as they were to many Syrians. 
 
Despite the aforementioned structural inequalities between myself as a researcher and the 
refugees I met, many of my Syrian interlocutors appeared to differentiate me from many 
of the other Western outsiders they had met, because I could comfortably and 
extensively converse with them in Arabic. On one occasion, a Syrian man heavily 
involved with NGO activities in the camp listed to me the names of the Arabic-speaking 
non-Arab staff that he had encountered in more than 2 years of living in Za‘tari. So 
memorable were these encounters, that he knew each of their names. I was the fifth 
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person on his list, and I knew three of the others personally.69 My linguistic abilities also 
made me less of a burden to NGOs and others I was visiting, as I did not require their 
assistance in speaking to Syrians. More importantly, however, not operating through a 
translator allowed for more open and meaningful conversations between myself and 
Syrian refugees, for more direct engagement with them, and for them to speak to me in 
their own words and frameworks. 
 
Early in my fieldwork, I decided that another way in which I could act ethically in this 
context was to not, in my capacity as a researcher, take photographs of individual 
Syrians, for example my interviewees. In my work with ARDD, unfortunately, it was not 
possible to follow this rule, because of the perceived need to document our workshop 
activities, but all individuals who were photographed in the workshops had given their 
written consent to the organisation in advance. Nevertheless, it was clear to me, from my 
conversations with both Syrians and humanitarian workers, that continually being 
photographed was one of the aspects of humanitarian practice to which Syrians objected 
the most, even when they formally gave their consent. To the extent possible, I did not 
want to participate in or reinforce these practices and therefore decided that the most 
appropriate response to the situation was to not ask for photographs in my capacity as a 
researcher. Furthermore, my project is centrally concerned with how ideas about gender, 
race, refugeehood, and ‘vulnerability’ are imagined. In that context, I worried that to take 
photographs and use them in this thesis might even invite the same kind of gaze onto 
refugees that has reinforced the hierarchies and exclusions being critiqued here. I hope 
that the words speak for themselves. 
 
Chapter Outline 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 explores the place of refugee men in 
humanitarianism. This chapter reviews critical, feminist, and postcolonial literatures on 
gender and humanitarianism, refugeehood and humanitarianism, and the politics of 
(humanitarian) interventions in the South. It combines this literature review with 
ethnographic observations and interview excerpts from my fieldwork, including how my 
research was received and interpreted in the field. In doing so, it argues that refugee men 
have an uncertain position within humanitarian operations and imaginaries. Refugee men 
disrupt humanitarian understandings of ‘gender’ and refugeehood, and complicate how 
                                                
69 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016.  
  42 
humanitarian organisations navigate their understandings of, and relationships to, 
‘politics’ and power. In advancing these arguments, this chapter expands the focus of 
academic inquiry on men in contexts of displacement and humanitarianism beyond the 
areas that are typically central to research, such as changing masculinities, gender equality, 
and SGBV.  
 
Chapter 3 turns to an exploration and history of Za‘tari. It argues, in contrast to much of 
the existing literature, that refugee camps should be understood not as spaces of 
exception but rather simultaneously as instantiations of variegated state sovereignty and 
sites of humanitarian intervention. Through an overview of the camp’s history, and with 
a focus on the material, spatial, and embodied practices of humanitarianism, this chapter 
examines the key contestations that have surrounded Za‘tari’s development and 
governance. In particular, it analyses humanitarian attempts to create an ‘orderly’ 
depoliticised camp, Syrians’ attempts to resist these modes of governance, and 
humanitarian responses to, in particular, Syrian men’s ‘political’ attempts to exert agency 
over the life and governance of camp life.  
 
Chapter 4 examines how the different humanitarian understandings of refugee men, 
outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, lead to a failure to recognise refugee men’s needs, and to a 
lack of interest in working with them on the ‘softer side’ of humanitarian activities, such 
as psychosocial support and providing community spaces. Syrian men themselves are 
understood by humanitarians to be uninterested in, and unavailable for, humanitarian 
work, and therefore to be responsible for the relative lack of work involving them. By 
contrast, refugee women, in particular those living without male partners, are deemed 
automatically to be ‘the most vulnerable.’ This justifies not only the targeting of women 
for specific services, but also helps to reinforce a hierarchical power relationship between 
humanitarians and refugee women, in which women’s autonomy and decisions are 
overridden by the ‘global’ goals of humanitarianism.  
 
Encounters between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ are similarly a theme of Chapter 5, which 
looks at the area of humanitarian work in which there was the most extensive enthusiasm 
for increasing work with refugee men: ‘engaging’ them in SGBV prevention. The ways in 
which this work is conducted, this chapter argues, reveal the perceived supremacy, for 
humanitarian actors, of ‘global’ humanitarian frameworks over the ‘local’ interpretations 
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of reality among the Syrian community. The perceived ‘challenges’ of implementing the 
work in an ‘Arab’ cultural and linguistic context, analysed in this chapter, uncover key 
aspects of humanitarians’ understandings of gender in the Syrian community. Moreover, 
humanitarians’ relative inability to conceptualise refugee men as victims of GBV 
demonstrates again, from a different angle, the assumption that it is women and children 
who should be the central objects of humanitarian care and concern.   
 
In Chapter 6 the focus turns to the question of livelihoods, which was a key 
preoccupation of refugee men themselves. Being a ‘breadwinner,’ I argue, was central to 
the performance of masculinities for many Syrian men in Za‘tari, although men’s access 
to work, and their relationships to work and masculinity, varied somewhat along the lines 
of class and generation. Humanitarian policies on livelihoods, and their attempts to give 
access to the paid labour market to women and ‘the vulnerable,’ challenged many Syrian 
men’s (and women’s) understandings of masculinities. In the resulting contestations, I 
argue, humanitarian actors again prioritised their own perspectives and experiences on 
work, livelihoods, and gender, over the perspectives and experiences of Syrians 
themselves. 
 
This final substantive chapter focuses on the market of Za‘tari, which was brought into 
existence by Syrians themselves. This chapter argues that Syrians’ struggles to create and 
sustain the market should be understood as attempts to resist the passive, feminised 
subject positions demanded of them by authorities, and to create spheres of life outside 
of their control and surveillance. The market, however, represents a form of self-reliance 
that is too autonomous from, and therefore too radical for, humanitarian agencies, who 
bring to the market their own agendas: of approved self-reliance, private sector 
partnerships, and the promotion of ‘innovation.’ Humanitarian agencies utilise 
masculinised forms of power, alongside a repressive state apparatus, to attempt to 
control and regulate Syrians’ autonomous economic activities. Yet at the same time, 
humanitarians promote Syrians’ activities in the market to external audiences, marketing 
them as ‘entrepreneurial’ refugees. Following this chapter, the conclusion reviews the 
main arguments and material presented in this thesis, outlines areas that the thesis was 
unable to tackle, discusses possible topics for future research, and summarises the thesis’ 
main contributions to scholarship.  
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Chapter 2: Humanitarianism and Refugee Men 
 
I arrived at the café to which I had been invited to meet a humanitarian worker for a 
conversation about my research. As the café was brimming with a combination of 
foreigners and Jordanian hipsters, we sat outside, making the most of the faint February 
sunshine. “I’m really glad you’re asking these sorts of questions,” he said, “because there 
is no-one working on men, especially single young men.” He recounted to me meeting 
some Syrian men in their mid-twenties in a small Jordanian town. They had all entered 
Jordan informally, because men travelling without families were often turned back at the 
border. Their families, still in Syria, depend on them financially, and the men send back 
every bit of money they can, meaning they live in terrible conditions in Jordan. But their 
earning capacities are limited; they even time their work for the periods of the day when 
they think the police are least likely to be patrolling their neighbourhood. Yet these men, 
he told me, appeared to be of little interest to the vast majority of humanitarian 
organisations and workers he had encountered. Every 6 months or so, someone would 
bring up the lack of progress made on a ‘men and boys’ strategy. The lack of progress 
was lamented, briefly, but the issue would remain untouched for another 6 months.  
 
This chapter explores the position of refugee men in humanitarianism. It provides a 
literature review of a diverse range of critical, feminist, and postcolonial scholarship on 
gender and humanitarianism, refugeehood and humanitarianism, and the politics of 
(humanitarian) interventions in the South, and combines this review with ethnographic 
observations and interview data from the field. It thereby situates my research both 
within these scholarly fields and within the context of the refugee response in Za‘tari, 
while demonstrating the importance of this research to the production of knowledge 
about humanitarianism. It argues that refugee men have an uncertain position in 
humanitarian policies, practices and imaginaries because of humanitarian understandings 
of gender, refugeehood, politics and power. Humanitarians’ inability to understand men 
as objects as well as subjects of power means that refugee men appear before them as 
agential, independent, political, and at times threatening, and thereby, as the above 
vignette demonstrates, not a central object of humanitarian concern.  
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Refugee Men and Masculinities as Objects of Research 
When I introduced my research to acquaintances, friends, interlocutors and colleagues in 
the NGO sector in Jordan, the topic typically prompted some combination of interest, 
intrigue, and at times even excitement. These reactions surprised me. I had assumed that 
‘research fatigue’ would lead to me being greeted as simply ‘yet another’ foreign 
researcher, and this did happen to an extent. But prior to my fieldwork I had also been 
concerned about whether research on ‘refugee men and masculinities,’ which was how I 
would often summarise my research topic, would seem relevant and appealing to people 
working in the humanitarian sector. For example, I was concerned that some people 
might assume, because of the subject of my research, that I was hostile to work with 
refugee women, or part of a movement that claims that feminism, and its focus on 
women’s lives, has gone ‘too far.’1  
 
With these concerns in mind, I had expected that in order to facilitate good relations 
with interlocutors it might be necessary or beneficial to explain my research as being 
about ‘gender,’ which is often understood within NGOs, as elsewhere, to be 
synonymous with ‘women’.2 I would therefore on occasion firstly introduce myself as 
someone researching ‘gender and the refugee response,’ before subsequently explaining 
my specific focus. Contrary to my expectations, however, it was the idea of research 
about men and masculinities that elicited enthusiasm, rather than research about ‘gender.’ 
Visiting the office of a major INGO in Amman, where I was being shown around by the 
friend of a London-based contact, I met an employee who worked in refugee protection. 
She received my one sentence introduction about ‘gender and the refugee response’ 
politely, but with no great enthusiasm. She asked me “what about gender” I was 
studying, to which I replied that my focus was on “men and masculinities.” As I wrote in 
my fieldnotes later that day, “I would almost say her eyes lit up.”3 
 
While this largely unexpected interest in my research proved, at many points, to be an 
asset, it prompted me to question the reasons behind people’s reactions. Over the course 
of my fieldwork I identified four factors that motivated this interest among humanitarian 
and NGO workers. These different factors were each often associated with groups that 
                                                
1 Suvi Keskinen, “Antifeminism and White Identity Politics,” Nordic Journal of Migration Research 3, no. 4 
(2013): 225–32. 
2 Judy El-Bushra and Judith Gardner, “The Impact of War on Somali Men: Feminist Analysis of 
Masculinities and Gender Relations in a Fragile Context,” Gender & Development 24, no. 3 (2016): 443–58. 
3 Fieldnotes, Amman, 01.10.2015. 
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were identifiable because they shared particular positionalities and/or political positions. 
One first such element was novelty. In contrast to extensive interest in ‘gender’ 
(‘women’), my interlocutors appeared to have encountered very few people researching 
or writing about refugee men, which was consistent with my review of academic and grey 
literatures (see below). In the first months of Za‘tari, “Everyone who came in, every PhD 
person, every consultant and everyone else,” was specifically looking at issues relating to 
women and girls.4 Some of these visitors, in particular journalists working on issues such 
as ‘early marriage,’ had produced sensationalised stories about Syrian women and girls, 
thereby hampering the prevention and response work that agencies were undertaking.5 In 
a context where large quantities of research are produced, particularly on (certain aspects 
of) ‘gender,’ and where people are regularly asked to take part in interviews, my choice of 
an ‘unusual’ topic was part of what generated my interlocutors’ enthusiasm.6  
 
Secondly, I noticed early on in my fieldwork that many of my interlocutors assumed that 
my research, because it was about ‘masculinities,’ was focused on sexual violence 
prevention. As discussed in Chapter 5, work to ‘engage men and boys’ to be ‘allies’ 
against SGBV was rapidly gaining ground around the time that my fieldwork 
commenced. Research on ‘masculinities’ was therefore regularly seen through that lens.7 
After one meeting with a think tank, only a couple of weeks into my fieldwork, I found 
myself reflecting on the conversations that had just taken place, wondering how exactly 
they had become so focused on sexual violence prevention.8 I realised that this appeared 
to be the only way my interlocutors could understand the ‘relevance’ of researching 
refugee men and masculinities. I quickly thereafter learned that discussing SGBV 
prevention work was a productive way of explaining introducing my research to NGOs, 
particularly to individuals working in gender, and a topic through which I could approach 
potential interviewees. When conducting interviews with gender-focused humanitarian 
workers, however, moving the conversation away from discussions of SGBV prevention, 
so that it could focus on the humanitarian sector’s responsibilities towards refugee men 
more generally, sometimes proved challenging. This was because, it appeared to me, 
                                                
4 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari, via Skype, 08.12.2015. 
5 Interview with SGBV specialist (1), Amman, 30.11.2015; see also Chapter 4. 
6 Interview with women’s protection and empowerment programme manager, Amman, 28.03.2016; 
conversation with NGO workers, Amman, 12.12.2015. 
7 Meeting with think tank, Amman, 16.09.2015; conversation with NGO workers, 28.03.2016. 
8 Fieldnotes, Amman, 16.09.2015. 
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SGBV prevention work with men occupied a central place in their understandings of 
what work with refugee men should involve.9 
 
Other people I met within the NGO sector who exhibited great enthusiasm for my 
work, were those who felt that the refugee response was systematically overlooking, or 
ignoring, refugee men. These NGO employees, who worked in the refugee response but 
typically not as gender specialists or in gender-focused roles, were tired of a seemingly 
relentless focus on ‘vulnerable’ women, or, to adapt Cynthia Enloe’s term, 
‘refugeewomenandchildren.’10 This focus, which some believed was in part donor-driven, 
existed and continued whether or not there was evidence to support it, and at times in 
spite of contrary evidence about where resources might be most needed. 11  From 
conversing with these people, often in informal social settings, I considered many of 
them to be people who I might think of as my ‘typical allies’ – left-leaning feminists who 
appeared to have, broadly speaking, a similar outlook on politics.12 
 
At times, however, I encountered supporters of my research with whom I was much less 
comfortable. Some of those who were very enthusiastic about my research appeared to 
want to critique the humanitarian sector’s approach towards refugee men using 
perspectives that I would regard as non- or anti-feminist. I found myself being 
encouraged fervently by people (mostly, but not exclusively, men), who described 
themselves as not feminists but equalists,13 who asked why there was a UN Women but 
no UN Men, 14  or who emphasised to me the ‘natural’ and ‘biological’ differences 
between men and women.15 I found such support, and my own discomfort with it, to be 
a useful reminder that research and writing on men and masculinities can be used to 
support and to further anti-feminist agendas that stand in opposition to the motivations 
for my research.16 
 
                                                
9 Conversations and interviews with humanitarian and NGO workers, Amman, 30.11.2015, 28.03.2016 and 
18.05.2016. 
10 Conversations with NGO workers, Amman, 06.09.2015 and 20.02.2016. See Enloe, The Morning After, 
166–67. 
11 See Chapter 4. 
12 Fieldnotes, Amman, 20.02.2016 and 29.02.2016. 
13 Conversation with humanitarian worker, Amman, 28.01.2016. 
14 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 12.06.2016. 
15 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
16 See Connell, Masculinities, Chapter 1; Rachel O’Neill, “Whither Critical Masculinity Studies? Notes on 
Inclusive Masculinity Theory, Postfeminism, and Sexual Politics,” Men and Masculinities, 2015, 100–120. 
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My research was similarly considered something of a novelty to many Syrians I met in 
the camp. Syrian men regularly appeared surprised to be asked about the issues 
specifically facing them as men, or to be asked how men specifically experienced life in 
the camp.17 During a visit to the Community Police station in Za‘tari, the Jordanian 
officers who had been giving me a tour of the station, and who met many visitors such as 
me, asked what topics I was interested in. They nodded approvingly as I explained, in 
Arabic, my interest in men’s lives in the camp. While I was explaining my research topic 
to them, the Syrian man who appeared to be employed to clean the police station, and 
who had hurried in front of us during the tour to unlock the door of whichever room we 
were entering next, reappeared from the space we had just been in. Standing behind the 
police officers, he leaned against the doorframe, cocked his head slightly, and smiled 
inquisitively at me as I explained my work.18  
 
By contrast, there was no shortage of outsiders who would come to ask about the lives 
of Syrian women. A Syrian man I met in the course of my interviews told me that he had 
been talking to journalists who were visiting the camp, and offered to take them to visit 
his friends in their nearby shop. Upon asking a little about the people to whom he was 
referring, the journalists declined, saying they were only interested in talking to Syrian 
women. For my interlocutor, this was indicative of many visitors’ attitudes towards 
Syrian men. I asked him if he agreed with my perception that NGOs were very interested 
in working with women and children, but not really with men. “Yes, of course,” he 
chuckled, “this is our life.”19 Even though, as became clear in some of my discussions 
with Syrian men, we did not always share a broader outlook on questions of gender, this 
dynamic nevertheless helped to create a level of rapport with some of the men I met. It 
was understood to demonstrate, I believe, a level of interest in the particularities of their 
circumstances that it was unusual to hear from an outsider.20 
 
Perhaps paradoxically, therefore, it was humanitarian actors’ widespread lack of interest 
in Syrian men’s lives and gendered experiences of refuge that created the extensive 
enthusiasm I encountered for my research. The lives of refugee men have similarly been 
of relatively little focus for academic scholars. Not only has gender remained somewhat 
                                                
17 Conversations with Syrian refugees, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016, 27.07.2016, and 01.08.2016. 
18 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
19 Conversation with Syrian refugee man, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
20 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016, 27.07.2016, and 01.08.2016. 
  49 
marginal within studies of refugees and migration,21 but within that scholarship only a 
few studies have specifically looked in-depth at refugee men and masculinities. These 
contributions to knowledge have typically focused on refugee men’s understandings or 
performances of masculinities. For example, scholars have explored the effect of the 
experiences of refuge on intergenerational hierarchies among refugee men,22 the different 
masculinities that can prevail within a particular context,23 how they interact with broader 
political movements and ideologies such as nationalism,24 and how they relate to issues of 
SGBV.25 As a body of literature, it demonstrates how contexts of refugeehood often 
challenge pre-existing conceptions of masculinities, because men’s circumstances in exile 
make it very difficult for ideals, such as breadwinning, the protection of the family, and 
status in the community, to be embodied and performed. In Chapter 6 I explore, in a 
similar vein, how economic breadwinning was a central feature of masculinity for many 
men in Za‘tari, and how difficult it was to fulfil these gendered responsibilities in a 
context of encampment and humanitarian governance.  
 
But the defining focus of this thesis is not Syrian men’s understandings of masculinities, 
but rather humanitarian actors’ understandings of Syrian men and masculinities, and the 
practices and relationships these understandings create. From the early stages of my 
fieldwork, humanitarians’ reactions to my research topic, and the ways in which they 
discussed Syrian men, fascinated me. Rather than centring Syrian men’s masculinities in 
my analysis, I decided to centre those who hold power over them, yet seemed so 
unfamiliar with them. In doing so, my thesis takes a relatively unusual approach of 
understanding men as simultaneously, in Farha Ghannam’s words, “the subjects and 
objects of systems of power.” This entails, she argues, looking not only at forms of 
‘masculine domination,’ but also at men’s vulnerabilities, dependencies, and 
                                                
21 Sarah J. Mahler and Patricia R. Pessar, “Gender Matters: Ethnographers Bring Gender from the 
Periphery toward the Core of Migration Studies,” International Migration Review 40, no. 1 (2006): 27–63. 
22 See Julie Peteet, “Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian ‘Intifada’: A Cultural Politics 
of Violence,” American Ethnologist 21, no. 1 (1994): 31–49; Turner, “Angry Young Men in a Tanzanian 
Refugee Camp.” 
23 Gustavo Baptista Barbosa, “Non-Cockfights: On Doing/Undoing Gender in Shatila, Lebanon” 
(London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2013); Jaji, “Masculinity on Unstable Ground”; 
Peter Kabachnik et al., “Traumatic Masculinities: The Gendered Geographies of Georgian IDPs from 
Abkhazia,” Gender, Place & Culture 20, no. 6 (2012): 773–93; James Alan Schechter, “Governing ‘Lost 
Boys’: Sudanese Refugees in a UNHCR Camp” (University of Colorado, 2004); Alice Szczepanikova, 
“Gender Relations in a Refugee Camp: A Case of Chechens Seeking Asylum in the Czech Republic,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 18, no. 3 (2005): 281–98. 
24 Achilli, “Becoming a Man in Al-Wihdat”; Hart, “Dislocated Masculinity.” 
25 Lukunka, “New Big Men”; Marjolein Quist, “Traumatic Masculinities: The Disconnect Between the 
Feminized Policies and Practices of Humanitarian Aid and the Gendered Reality of Syrian Refugee Life in 
Settlements in Lebanon” (Utrecht University, 2016). 
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disempowerments.26 In the context of Za‘tari, understanding men’s disempowerments 
requires a critical analysis of the actors who hold power over them, and the humanitarian 
system in which they live. In line with intersectional feminist scholarship,27 this thesis 
recognises that Syrian men are internally differentiated, and that they can be privileged in 
some contexts, parts of their lives, or relative to other positionalities and identities, and 
simultaneously be disempowered in other ways. Within Za‘tari, Syrian men’s positions 
within social structures, and the ways in which they are gendered and racialised by 
humanitarian and state actors, has led to them being understood both as troublemakers 
who need to be ‘governed,’ and as having very little relevance to much humanitarian 
work.28  
 
In following this path, as noted in the first chapter, the thesis speaks to cross-disciplinary 
scholarship that has analysed the position of men and masculinities in projects of 
intervention, colonialism and foreign domination, in the Arab world and elsewhere. 
Scholars have demonstrated how portrayals and understandings of colonised men as 
effeminate,29 and the ‘Orient’ as a place of perverse sexuality, were key parts of imperial 
projects.30 As Laleh Khalili has argued, while some men from colonised nations were 
“naturalized as feminine, conquered, penetrated, and possessed,” others were part of 
“martial races,” able to ‘redeem’ their masculinity by fighting for the empire. 31  This 
continues in contemporary Afghanistan, she demonstrates, where Afghan men, in the 
eyes of the US, “can be at once courageous and manly allies and sodomising homosexual 
rapists.” In (post-)colonial Jordan, Joseph Massad argues, Arab men were similarly 
simultaneously positioned by colonialists as hypermasculine and feminine, both 
“‘unscrupulous men of violence and yet ‘so gentle’.”32  
 
                                                
26 Farha Ghannam, Live and Die Like a Man : Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), 170. 
27 See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 1989 (1989): 139–67; Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241–99; Nash, “Re-Thinking 
Intersectionality.” 
28 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
29 Jasbir K. Puar, “Mapping US Homonormativities,” Gender, Place & Culture 13, no. 1 (2006): 67–88. 
30 Rachel Adams and David Savran, “Part IV: Empire and Modernity Introduction,” in The Masculinity 
Studies Reader, ed. Rachel Adams and David Savran (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 227–31; Puar, “Mapping US 
Homonormativities.” 
31 Khalili, “Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency,” 1485. 
32 Joseph Andoni Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), 140; see also Amira Jarmakani, An Imperialist Love Story: Desert Romances and the War 
on Terror (New York, London: New York University Press, 2015). 
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This approach avoids a problematic tendency found in some areas of the literature on 
men and masculinities within the Arab world. As Paul Amar has argued, “masculinity 
studies, until today, remains haunted by the need to problematize deviant, working-class, 
youth, colonized and racialized masculinities and to provide pragmatic interventions and 
public policy fixes.”33 Within wider public, journalistic, and some scholarly discourse, 
Amar continues, the masculinity of Middle Eastern men has become one of the “primary 
public tools for analyzing political and social conflict in the region.”34 I therefore do not 
aim to understand what is ‘wrong’ with Syrian masculinities or how they can be 
‘corrected;’ this work is done by the humanitarian sector itself. 35  Nor do I wish to 
position “emasculated” refugee men as “a human security issue.”36 I seek not policy fixes, 
but a critique of policy.  
 
The position of Syrian men within humanitarianism in Za‘tari, I argue, cannot be 
understood solely in terms of men’s position within broader post-colonial dynamics or 
understandings of men in the Arab world. It must be placed within an analysis of how 
‘gender’ and ‘gender work’ are understood by the humanitarian sector, the ways in which 
the gendered and racialised figure of the Syrian/Arab man stands in tension with 
prevailing depictions of ‘the refugee,’ and humanitarianism’s gendered understandings 
and deployment of politics and power. In the remainder of this Chapter, by drawing on 
my ethnographic fieldwork and by reviewing scholarly literatures, I will address these 
issues in turn 
 
Doing ‘Gender Work’ in a Humanitarian Context 
Firstly, humanitarian relationships with refugee men must be analysed in the context of 
humanitarian actors’ understandings of ‘gender’ and what constitutes ‘gender work’ in a 
humanitarian context. Like many development actors, humanitarian actors have 
increasingly taken on gender equality as a goal of their work and have promoted gender 
mainstreaming and women’s ‘empowerment,’ as part of their efforts to achieve this. 
Within this work, however, ‘gender’ is still understood, despite rhetoric to the contrary, 
to mean ‘women,’ and ‘gender work’ understood to mean ‘helping women.’ 37 
                                                
33 Paul Amar, “Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of ‘Men in Crisis,’ Industries of Gender in 
Revolution,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 7, no. 3 (2011): 45. 
34 Amar, 38. 
35 See Chapter 5. 
36 Lukunka, “New Big Men.” 
37 Andrea Cornwall, “Revisiting the ‘Gender Agenda,’” IDS Bulletin 38, no. 2 (2007): 69–78. 
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Furthermore, in contexts like Za‘tari, this ‘gender work’ must simultaneously be 
understood as part of, and undergirded by, a long line of gender-focused (post-)colonial 
interventions into the societies and cultures of the South.38 
 
‘Women’ and ‘gender’ have increasingly been on the agenda of UNHCR and refugee-
related NGOs since the late 1980s.39 Early advocacy for refugee women focused on 
challenging the alleged ‘gender-blindness’ and ‘neutrality’ of the refugee regime, 
attempting to incorporate women’s experiences of persecution into the definition of a 
refugee set out in the 1951 convention, increasing women’s opportunities for 
resettlement, and highlighting and responding to the threats that refugee women face, in 
particular SGBV. 40  In 1989, UNHCR appointed a Senior Coordinator for Women 
Refugees for the first time, and in the subsequent years the agency produced a series of 
new policy documents on refugee women.41 The potential, agency and participation of 
refugee women, which had been side-lined in the consistent portrayals of them as 
‘vulnerable,’ was increasingly part of international policy debates.42 UNHCR and other 
refugee agencies were subject to increasingly prominent critiques for the ways in which 
their policies reinforced, rather than challenged, patriarchal structures within the 
communities they worked with, for example through the automatic distribution of 
resources to male ‘heads of households.’43   
 
The developments in refugee policy were the result of persistent lobbying for refugee 
women by transnational advocates, and part of a broader trend that was seen in other 
spheres of international politics, particularly in development. Notably, the Platform for 
Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 included a 
commitment to “integrating a gender perspective in all forms of development and 
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political processes.” 44  This commitment became known as ‘gender mainstreaming,’ 
which has become “ubiquitous within development discourse.”45 Despite the ubiquity of 
its terminology, numerous scholars have questioned how effective the mainstreaming of 
gender has been, and in particular whether it has merely attempted to integrate ‘gender’ 
as a component into existing policy frameworks, and thus has failed to undertake a more 
radical gender transformation of these structures. In particular, there are ongoing debates 
about the ways in which ‘gender’ has been institutionalised. Feminist scholars have 
argued that the impact of ‘gender mainstreaming’ has been blunted by the co-optation of 
‘gender’ by institutions and agendas that are contrary to both a feminist ethos, and to the 
feminist political activism that succeeded in getting gender on the agenda in the first 
place.’46 Actual gender analysis, furthermore, is all too often lost or sidelined; as Andrea 
Cornwall has argued “‘doing gender’ is often conflated – in practice – with ‘helping 
women’.”47  
 
At least on paper and in their rhetoric, humanitarian organisations, including UNHCR, 
now include gender equality as one of their goals, and ‘gender mainstreaming’ is designed 
to be a way to advance towards that goal.48 The increased prominence of gender equality 
within humanitarian operations can be understood not only as a result of feminist 
pressure and advocacy, but also as part of a broader merging of humanitarianism and 
development, and the changes that were taking place in parallel within this latter sphere, 
as documented above. While humanitarian relief and development work were once 
predominantly seen as two succeeding phases, with the former catering for emergencies 
and the latter for longer-term projects, since the early 1990s there have been calls to 
coordinate, or even integrate, relief and development operations. 49  This can be 
understood, as David Chandler argues, within a post Cold War context in which there 
was no longer the same clear “division between state-led development aid, open to 
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political considerations, and politically neutral humanitarianism.” 50  At the same time, 
many ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ NGOs were together pushing for a more ‘rights-
based approach’ to development, reinforcing the merging of these fields.51 Much of the 
‘gender’ work that is undertaken in Za‘tari, therefore, as part of the humanitarian 
response, might have, in earlier decades, been primarily associated with (gender and) 
development, rather than humanitarianism. In a context of protracted displacement, such 
as the experience Syrian refugees in Jordan, this merging becomes even more apparent 
on the ground.52  
  
In line with this approach, all humanitarian projects are now meant to show whether or 
not they have the potential to make a contribution to gender equality. The contemporary 
discursive formation in which this appears is typically through an emphasis on ensuring 
that humanitarian programming meets the distinct needs of refugee women, girls, boys 
and men. Whether a project does this or is liable to do this is measured through the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Gender Marker, which has a coding system – 
0, 1, 2A or 2B – for humanitarian projects. The code signifies whether the project “is 
designed well enough to ensure that women/girls and men/boys will benefit equally 
from it or that it will advance gender equality in another way,”53 and the code is assigned 
to a project by a team in each humanitarian cluster (e.g. protection, shelter, health).54 The 
team assesses whether gender is taken into account in the needs assessment for a project, 
whether that leads to gender-responsive activities, and whether and how the gender-
responsiveness of the activities that are implemented successfully will be measured and 
assessed. 55  The marks range from 0 - “no visible potential to contribute to gender 
equality” to 2B for projects whose “principal purpose is to advance gender equality” 
(2B).56 
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While this might appear to be a move away from the long-standing elision between 
‘gender’ and ‘women,’57 in practice the linguistic change to ‘women, girls, boys and men’ 
does not represent a changed understanding of ‘gender’ or what ‘gender work’ involves. 
While some people writing project proposals and reports do, at least rhetorically, 
emphasise the distinct needs of women, girls, boys and men to demonstrate that they are 
‘gender aware,’ in practice, one NGO manager told me “the numbers [UNHCR] really 
care about are how many women and girls” are in a project.58 Another commented that, 
at the field level, “most people knew that gender really just meant get a good score on 
the gender marker by putting in men, women, boys and girls as much as possible.”59 Yet 
for some organisations, even this basic analysis does not take place – not all organisations 
working in the humanitarian response are disaggregating their statistics to differentiate 
between men and women, much to the frustration of gender specialists.60 As Erin Baines 
argued almost fifteen years ago, despite the apparent progress in getting refugee women 
on the agenda of UNHCR and other agencies, and some resultant policy changes, 
“implementation continues to be slow and ad hoc.”61 
 
Furthermore, despite the apparent ubiquity of gender mainstreaming and commitment to 
gender equality, some interlocutors would trivialise the issues that they associated with 
‘gender,’ while yet others would express astonishment at the lack of progress on 
seemingly crucial issues that have been brought to the attention of humanitarian agencies 
for decades. Interestingly, for both gender specialists and those who were opposed to 
their agenda (or who disputed the ‘practicality’ of its implementation), the question of 
toilets appeared to be emblematic. For some of my interviewees and interlocutors, the 
lack of segregated toilets, and the lack of street lighting to get to them safely at night in 
the early days of Za‘tari, were examples of UN incompetence, a lack of consideration of 
women’s needs, or the far too slow ‘learning curve’ that appears to come with every new 
humanitarian response.62 For others, it was an example of the unrealistic, predictable, and 
repetitive demands made by gender consultants and NGOs. Such requests were not 
sufficiently attuned to the circumstances on the ground, I was told by one interviewee, 
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for example as in Za‘tari where latrine blocks had been “stolen” by refugees.63 In any 
case, a different interlocutor told me, in an emergency, there wasn’t much time to choose 
where to put things such as toilets.64 A rhetorical focus on ‘gender’ (‘women’) exists, as 
does resistance to, and derision of, the agenda put forward by gender specialists. 
Remarkably, a seeming consensus on women’s vulnerability co-existed with a failure to 
ensure women had safe access to toilets.  
 
‘Gender’ work within humanitarianism therefore remains, notwithstanding rhetorical 
positionings to the contrary, ‘for’ and about women, rather than gender, and discussions 
of men and masculinities are rarely included under this rubric. For example, I interviewed 
one of the two Health Sector Gender Focal Points, who talked me through the gender 
analysis report she had co-written about her sector and its work. When we reached a 
short section on men, aware of my research interests, she pointed it out, “this is the two 
lines about men. And that’s it, enough for men,” she laughed. 65  This not only 
demonstrates the continued elision of ‘gender’ and ‘women,’ but also adds further 
evidence of why my research topic was often greeted with some enthusiasm: ‘gender’ and 
‘men’ were rarely put into conversation.  
 
Furthermore, when there is evidence that suggests the need for a re-evaluation of the 
‘gender’ as ‘women’ framework, humanitarian actors will often defend, either explicitly or 
implicitly, the frameworks within which they work. The issue of men being survivors of 
SGBV was a clear example of this. One SGBV specialist recounted to me, the 
disappointment clear in her voice, how the claims of male survivors of SGBV would 
sometimes be dismissed or downplayed by her colleagues and her counterparts at other 
organisations. This would be done using the same excuses that, in her experience, were 
previously more commonly used to dismiss women’s experiences of violence: explaining 
the violence away as a ‘cultural practice,’ for example, or claiming that the numbers were 
so few that they were not significant or did not show a trend: “you really would like to 
refresh the memory of some people,” she lamented.66 Her colleagues, it appeared, did not 
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want to delve further into the phenomenon of male survivors of SGBV. Interestingly, 
throughout the interview, and despite her aforementioned comments, she consistently 
referred to “women and children” as the victims/survivors of SGBV.67 Her language 
mirrored and reinforced the exclusions that she was simultaneously critiquing. 
 
A second example comes in the form of a 2013 UN Women report on SGBV among 
Syrian refugees in Jordan.68 According to the responses collected from Syrians, “when 
comparing males and females in the same age group, boys were ranked as more likely to 
suffer sexual violence,” with adult women ranked the highest group, and adult males the 
lowest.69 The report follows this with the claim that “the practice shows that women and 
girls are typically most susceptible to sexual violence in conflict settings, and during 
protracted refugee settings,” citing a 2002 report from the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. “Despite this,” it continues, “it is possible…that some survey responses 
may have been a reflection of perceived susceptibility to violence in Syria or during 
border crossings.” 70 The report then notes the use of sexual violence against men and 
boys in prisons in Syria, and that some respondents may have heard of, witnessed, or 
experienced sexual violence against men in Syria, before advocating for the needs of male 
survivors to be met, and for the reality of their experiences to be publicly acknowledged. 
It is striking that, despite the important call for male survivors of SGBV to receive 
services and have their experiences acknowledged, the report repeatedly appears to cast 
doubt on the validity of the perceptions of the Syrian community, through its repeated 
references to SGBV against men in Syria, or on the journey from Syria to Jordan. It appears 
as if teenage boys being subjected to sexual violence more than teenage girls in this 
particular context was deemed almost inconceivable.71  
 
Humanitarian ‘gender work’ being ‘for’ and about women, and the centring of women as 
objects of intervention in this work, cannot only be understood in the context of the 
changes in humanitarian and development work since the late 1980s. It must also be 
placed into the context of a different and longer history of external interventions into the 
societies and politics of the South. The “invasive gender work of the international civil 
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society” is representative of a liberalism that has, as a “defining characteristic,” an 
“unfailing tendency to experience non-Western peoples as somehow incomplete.”72 The 
peoples of the South, in the eyes of interveners of various stripes, appear as in need of 
reform and education.  
 
Within the context of the Middle East specifically, the status of women has been used 
both historically, and recently, by colonial and imperial powers to justify their claims to 
control, govern, invade, or intervene in different territories.73 These gender interventions, 
for example to ‘save’ the Muslim women of the Middle East, are often backed, like 
humanitarianism, by claims that their visions of human rights and gender equality are 
‘universal.’74 Feminism, as Inderpal Grewal argues, is not, and never has been, separate 
from power. 75  This claim to universality, to be above particularistic interests, is a 
discursive move that functions to provide authority and legitimacy to the actions of those 
who claim it.76 Policies to promote (particular understandings of) women’s rights, gender 
equality, and women’s empowerment within the refugee response were similarly 
understood by humanitarian workers to be manifestations and applications of ‘global’ 
standards. 
  
Yet as post-colonial scholarship has clearly demonstrated, claims to universality on the 
part of external actors in the South hide, however thinly, the ‘Western’ ideas, 
understandings, and reference points that make up the domain of the ‘global.’77 One of 
my interviewees, when explaining the reforms to Jordanian law that the international 
agency she worked for was advocating, used the word ‘Western’ on more than one 
occasion to describe legal and human rights principles that she claimed were only 
partially incorporated into Jordanian law. I noticed that she looked decidedly 
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uncomfortable by her own use of the term ‘Western’. She corrected herself: “[these 
aspects of Jordanian law] were developed in a [pause] I wouldn’t say western system, but 
at least bringing the principles from a more global understanding of human rights.” This 
was subsequently contrasted to Jordan’s shari‘a law, which, it appeared to go without 
saying, did not reflect ‘global understandings of human rights.’ 78  The ‘global’ or 
‘universal’ ideas of humanitarianism that legitimate interventions into the lives of those 
who are deemed humanitarianism’s ‘beneficiaries’ are therefore simultaneously local, 
particular and ‘Western.’  
 
However, acknowledging that all ‘global’ standards are at the same time ‘local’ standards 
typically derived from ‘the West’ has the potential to simultaneously obscure other 
relations of power. As Gayatri Spivak argued of human rights organisations, and which I 
argue can be applied more broadly to humanitarian actors, there is a “layered 
discontinuity” between those running, managing, and implementing NGO programmes 
in the South and those termed ‘beneficiaries.’ This discontinuity is not fully encapsulated 
along a straightforward North/South axis.79 According to Spivak, a key discontinuity to 
be considered is the epistemic discontinuity between those from the South who can draw 
aid from the North, and “understand and state a problem intelligibly and persuasively to 
the taste of the North,”80 and those upon whom they work. Therefore although “‘human 
rights culture runs on unremitting Northern-ideological pressure, even when it is from 
the South,”81 it is “disingenuous” to call human rights work Eurocentric; rather the work 
of “righting wrongs is shared above a class line that to some extent and unevenly cuts 
across race and the North-South divide.”82    
 
The relevance of Spivak’s insights were very clear throughout my fieldwork. For 
example, I would regularly encounter Jordanian NGO workers who would claim that 
Syrians are ‘more conservative’ than Jordanians, which was deemed to explain some of 
the gender practices of Syrian refugees in the country. This kind of claim would often be 
offered as a general statement, as if it were possible to discuss issues of societal 
conservatism at this level of abstraction. Even if one were to accept the plausibility of 
such generalisations, the proposition itself is deeply questionable. For example, according 
to the anthropologist Ann-Christin Wagner, who studies Syrian refugees in Mafraq, one 
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of biggest complaints of Syrian women living in the city is that their mobility in Mafraq is 
significantly more restricted by conservative social norms, which they did not experience 
in Syria.83 
 
At other times, however, these sentiments would be referring to, or making examples of, 
specific groups of Syrians, particularly those, echoing the themes of Spivak’s article, who 
were deemed ‘poor’ and ‘rural.’ These statements would therefore often be attached to 
the population of Za‘tari in particular, the majority of whom lived in rural Dera’a prior to 
the conflict. ‘Early marriage’, for example, was an issue that was deemed to be 
representative of the rurality and poverty of the camp population. 84  As copious 
scholarship has demonstrated, identities are created in contrast to ‘others.’ 85  These 
statements were therefore the creation of a division between the English-speaking, 
typically well-educated Jordanians who work in the refugee response and the allegedly 
conservative refugees who were their ‘beneficiaries.’ Western humanitarians in Jordan are 
not the only ones to engage in righting (gendered) wrongs.  
 
For many of the men I spoke to in Za‘tari, the gender work of humanitarian actors, and 
their consistent focus on women through this work, appeared to be experienced as a 
form of social engineering. I consistently encountered the perception that women were 
becoming more powerful, that gendered roles and responsibilities were changing, and 
that the policies of humanitarian actors and NGOs were the root cause of this change.86 
The frameworks and goals were understood to be external to the Syrian community and 
the Muslim context in which the residents of Za‘tari lived, even if many of the 
programmes were implemented by Jordanian staff who were themselves practising 
Muslims. As Spivak argued, the frameworks are infused with “unremitting Northern-
ideological pressure.”87 Why was all the education and learning in the camp coming from 
“Norwegians and Europeans,” one Syrian man asked me, “what are we meant to learn 
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from them?”88 Or, as another man straightforwardly asked me, “why are they trying to 
change things?”89 
 
The gender interventions that were part of the Syria refugee response, therefore, while 
cloaked in a language of objectivity and universality, are in fact deeply particular and 
political interventions into the lives, social formations, and gendered understandings, of 
the Syrian refugee population. It is ‘known’, ‘globally’, that refugee women (particularly 
poor rural women) are the ones who need humanitarian assistance, and are the ones who 
‘gender’ is ‘about.’ But the view of refugee men as not a fundamental or central object of 
interest for humanitarian work was not limited to work that was focused on ‘gender,’ nor 
was the conflation between ‘gender’ and ‘women’ the only cause of men’s uncertain 
position in humanitarian work. Rather, gendered and racialised understandings of ‘the 
refugee’ render questionable Syrian men’s status within the category of people whom 
humanitarians are ostensibly there to serve.   
 
Interrogating the Figure of the ‘Refugee’ 
As noted in the introduction, in the existing literatures on refugee men, and on men in 
development and humanitarianism, the focus is typically on the creation of masculinities 
or on men’s place in, or relationship to, the gender interventions of the humanitarian 
sector. Such a perspective, while important, is far too narrow a way to understanding 
humanitarianisms’ relationships with refugee men. A more thorough analysis must 
include an understanding of how Syrian men are positioned relative to the figure of the 
‘refugee.’  
 
As Hyndman and Giles have argued, refugees in contexts of protracted displacement in 
the South are typically designated as non-threatening to states and other actors in/from 
the North. These populations of refugees, they claim, “are feminized based on 1) their 
location and 2) lack of legal status,” in contrast to refugees moving to the North who 
“are positioned as potential threats to 1) security and 2) the welfare state” because they 
defy the assumed passivity of refugeehood to move towards the North.90 Those refugees 
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who remain ‘in place,’ they argue, “are both feminized and depoliticised through the 
purported benevolence of humanitarian aid.”91 As they further note, a space of long-term 
displacement in the South can “be feminized as a space of vulnerable 
‘womenandchildren’” even when the population is comprised of women, men and 
children.92 Men are, in physical and demographic terms, part of that population, often to 
the same degree as in refugees’ countries of origin, but simultaneously they do not fit 
into the gendered ways in which refugee populations in protracted displacement in the 
South are imagined – as passive and non-threatening. This renders men in contexts of 
displacement as present but made effectively invisible.  
 
This invisibility of refugee men is demonstrated by the regular absence of men as a 
category or demographic with whom humanitarians believe they should work. Despite 
regular lip-service being paid to accounting for the needs of ‘women, men, girls, and 
boys’, outside of this formulation ‘men’ are rarely mentioned as a category with whom 
humanitarians should work, except if it is to prevent sexual violence against women and 
children. The Jordan section of the 2013 Syria Regional Response Plan for protection 
states it is a challenge to provide sustainable protection services, “especially 
child/adolescent/women friendly spaces in camps and host communities, and life-saving 
services for children and women victims of violence.”93 An Inter-agency update for the 
2014 Jordan plan discusses “vulnerable refugees inside the camp (female-headed 
households, elderly, disabled, youth at risk, etc.)”94 In a similar vein, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 2015 response plan, when discussing Syria itself, 
states that “[w]omen, youth, the elderly and children are caught in the conflict.”95 As will 
be explored in depth in Chapter 4, these understandings of who constitutes a ‘vulnerable’ 
population continue in spite of evidence that they do not accurately reflect the needs of 
the population on the ground.  
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The existence of a ‘youth’ category, and the founding of a Youth Task Force in Za‘tari, 
created an avenue for some forms of work with young refugee men, although in the early 
years of the camp this work too was sorely lacking.96 Who is classified as a ‘youth,’ 
however, is contested. Jordan’s ‘National Youth Strategy’ defines ‘youth’ as those 
between ages 12 and 30,97 in contrast to the more restrictive United Nations definition of 
those between ages 15 and 24.98 Some organisations working in the refugee response 
adopted their own wider definitions, with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 
opening its youth programmes to those between the ages of 16 and 32.99 Furthermore, 
while these categorisations of youth are based on numerical age, the concept of ‘youth’ 
(shabiba) is more fluid than any numerical definition will allow for, as it represents a 
transition from ‘childhood’ to ‘adulthood’, 100  which can itself be disrupted by 
displacement.101 As Chapter 4 will outline, these ‘youth’ activities were oversubscribed, in 
part because of interest from men over 30, who did not fall into any of the other 
demographic categories with whom humanitarians wanted to work. 
 
The absence of ‘men’ as a category with whom to work stands in tension with their 
obvious presence among a population that the humanitarian sector understands itself to 
be assisting. According to one NGO Director, who was critical of the ways in which 
humanitarian actors dealt with refugee men, because men are part of the overall 
population,  humanitarians “can’t actually choose to be against them.”102 At the same 
time they are not really ‘for’ them either; men are seen as separate to the population with 
whom humanitarians should work. In his words: 
 
there is a place in our minds where we are kind, [for example] to 
children and [in] child-friendly spaces, and a place in our minds [where] 
people aren’t there…[while] no humanitarian relief person would ever 
say life would be better in a refugee camp if there were no young 
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males, they’re not there [in our minds], consequently the programming 
for them is not there, the priority is not there.103 
 
Put another way, many humanitarians did not seem to understand working with refugee 
men as part of their job. One interviewee and former Za‘tari NGO worker explained to 
me how, in early 2013, they believed that numerous organisations were prioritising 
women and girls in the forthcoming plans for the year without providing any evidence 
that this was what was most needed by the camp population. Together with a colleague 
from another NGO, they compiled information about all of the projects then operating 
in the camp, and to whom those projects were open. At that time, there were only 3 
activities even open to males over 18. Not even all of these were specifically targeted at, 
or suitable for, adult males, but were merely technically open to them, and some were 
only open to a proportion of them because they were designated as activities for 
‘youth.’104 They presented their findings to a meeting of numerous organisations involved 
in planning forthcoming priorities. I asked my interviewee how their findings were 
received. “There wasn’t any hostility to it,” they explained, “so it wasn’t so much about it 
being poorly received, as not being received at all.” Some were intrigued by the 
suggestion that they should be working with adult males, but others did not seem to 
believe that the absence of work with men was even a gap that needed filling.105  
 
Another interlocutor explained that in one project in Za‘tari that he had been overseeing, 
the attendees had been more than three quarters female. He enquired with his staff about 
this statistic, and was told the various reasons why men weren’t attending – primarily a 
(perceived) lack of interest from Syrian men. 106  While my interlocutor found these 
reasons potentially plausible, he asked his staff what they had been doing to try and get 
men and boys more involved in their work. His question, he told me, was greeted with 
“blank stares all round,” as he leaned towards me with his eyes open as wide as possible 
to demonstrate with exaggerated effect. It appeared not to have occurred to his staff that 
they should be encouraging men to attend their programmes.107   
 
These understandings of refugeehood are also shared, some humanitarian workers told 
me, by major refugee response donors, and by some of the senior management of 
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international organisations, who are typically based in Europe or the United States. Some 
individuals who had tried to advocate for more assistance for particular groups of 
refugee men (for example single men), or who at least were dissatisfied with the 
approach their organisations were taking on questions of gender, told me that their 
donors were primarily interested in refugee women and children, and in particular 
‘female-headed households.’ 108  It is noteworthy, however, that the number of 
humanitarian workers who told me they had wanted to, or had tried to, work with 
refugee men but were prevented from doing so by the donors was very small. In the 
clear majority of cases, it appeared that this gendered epistemology of refugeehood was 
subscribed to by humanitarian workers in the field.  
 
Race also plays an important role in understandings of ‘refugeehood,’ because the figure 
of the refugee is not only gendered, but also racialised. As numerous critical scholars 
have demonstrated, Northern understandings of the ‘refugee’ have changed dramatically 
since the period after World War II. BS Chimni has argued that in the era of the Cold 
War, when refugees were strategically useful to Northern states, the “image of a ‘normal’ 
refugee was constructed – white, male and anti-communist.” 109  In this context, the 
politics of refugees were strategically useful to Western states and actors, because 
refugees’ anti-communist credentials reinforced Western narratives about the USSR and 
its allies persecuting their populations. In the 1980s, however, when there was a 
perception that more Southern refugees were coming to the North, the image of the 
refugee began to change. Using visual depictions of refugees produced by UNHCR, 
Heather Johnson has demonstrated that the “popular image of the ‘normal’ refugee is 
now that of a poor African woman or child.”110 This figure, she argues, was feminised, 
racialised, and also depoliticised, as the focus shifted from the “heroic, political individual 
to a nameless flood of poverty-stricken women and children.”111  
 
As is explored at different points of this thesis, the racialised assumption that ‘normal’ or 
‘default’ refugees were poor ‘Africans’ was widespread among humanitarians working in 
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Za‘tari. ‘Africa’ appeared to be where humanitarians learned how to be humanitarians.112 
The preferences, needs, and actions of Syrian refugees were deemed surprising, either 
pleasantly or problematically, when they diverged from the expected behaviour of 
refugees in ‘Africa.’ This racialisation of the refugee population appeared in 
humanitarians’ reflections on Syrians’ demands for a varied diet,113 in their desire to work 
rather than receive aid,114 and in their ‘entrepreneurship’ and transformation of the camp 
space.115 Like Iraqis before them,116 Syrians were also deemed fundamentally different to 
‘typical’ refugees because they came from, and were hosted in, middle-income countries, 
unlike refugees in ‘Africa.’ This presented a puzzle for some humanitarians, because 
Syrians’ material needs and expectations were higher than those to which many 
humanitarians were accustomed.117  
 
Many refugee populations differ, in multiple ways, from the prevailing feminised and 
racialised understanding of the refugee as ‘African womenandchildren.’ It is noteworthy, 
however, that the ways in which, within global politics, Arab men in particular are 
depicted as threatening, violent and patriarchal,118 positions them as radically other to this 
picture. Yet, at the time of my fieldwork, humanitarians did not typically evoke these 
stereotypes of Arab men. In the early years of the camp, men’s protests over resource 
distribution and living conditions, and their attempts to exercise agency over the space of 
the camp, were seen by humanitarian and state agencies to necessitate increased 
governance of the camp, including increased and at times draconian policing.119 Yet once 
these governing actors were (at least relatively) successful in exerting their agency over 
the camp, men lost one of the main ways in which humanitarian actors could understand 
them: as subjects to be governed. Their invisibility reappeared. 
 
As feminist scholarship has demonstrated, the category ‘men’ has often, and 
problematically, been used as an “unmarked universal category to stand in for humanity 
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in general,”120 leaving women as a marked category. In one sense, the absence of men as 
a category within the frameworks of humanitarian action has the same result; men are 
rendered invisible, the implicit default against which ‘women,’ ‘children,’ ‘youth,’ ‘the 
elderly,’ are marked. As Terrell Carver has argued, however, in a valuable theoretical 
contribution to the study of men and masculinities, the abstract individual in political 
theory is presented simultaneously as masculine and as degendered. While this excludes 
women and their experiences from this default, abstract subject position, it also obscures 
the hierarchies of masculinities that exist, through its presentation of only dominant and 
stereotypical forms of masculinity. 121  Within the context of humanitarian work with 
refugees, refugee women are marked in gendered ways as ‘the vulnerable,’ thus as 
removed from the default abstract figure of ‘humanity,’ who embodies a stereotypical 
form of dominant masculinity complete with agency and independence. Yet 
simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, because refugee women’s perceived 
vulnerability accords with the contemporary figure of ‘the refugee,’ they also occupy a 
default position within humanitarian action. As bodies seen to deviate from this figure, 
refugee men have an unclear position within humanitarian schema. 
 
Humanitarianism, Politics, and the (Dis)empowerment of Refugees 
While refugee men are made invisible within and by understandings of gender and 
refugeehood, their place within humanitarianism is also rendered uncertain by gendered 
understandings of politics and power, and their relation to humanitarianism. The 
mandate of UNHCR, like many other humanitarian agencies, is explicitly humanitarian, 
not political, 122  which can enable humanitarian organisations increased room to 
manoeuvre relative to states.123  Nevertheless, the idea that humanitarianism is apolitical 
is a “convenient fiction,” which relies on a particularly narrow conception of politics,124 
and/or a redefinition of what is ‘political.’ 125  Even humanitarian organisations’ 
accountability to refugees is often understood to be a technical, rather than a political 
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issue. 126  When some forms of humanitarian action are recognised as political, this 
designation often utilises a restrictive sense of the term politics, which equates to, for 
example, ‘politics as policy.’ 127 Attempts to separate humanitarianism and politics, by 
both humanitarian practitioners and some scholars, continue, as Fassin notes, however 
obvious it is that humanitarianism is in fact embedded in politics.128 In addition to its 
ostensible apolitical status, as this thesis will demonstrate, humanitarianism in contexts of 
displacement is also depoliticising of the populations it works with. It is thus not only 
ostensibly non-political, but in practice also anti-political.129 
 
As the previous discussions made clear, women’s rights and empowerment are now 
understood as part of humanitarianism, and therefore as part of the implementation of 
‘objective,’ ‘global’ standards, rather than as part of the ‘political,’ from which 
humanitarians attempt to separate from their work. Reminiscent of James Ferguson’s 
dissection of development in Lesotho, in gender work in humanitarianism there is a 
“common discourse and the same way of defining ‘problems,’ a common pool of 
‘experts,’ and a common stock of expertise.”130 These attempts to promote (particular 
conceptions of) women’s rights and empowerment as part of humanitarianism, and as 
separate from politics, thereby re-inscribe women’s rights as a non-political objective.131 
It re-affirms one of the “recurring litany of Western dualisms,” against which feminists 
have been struggling, that sees women as non-political and located primarily in the 
private sphere, and men as political agents in the public sphere.132 
 
While this re-iteration of the dichotomies of political/non-political and public/private 
depoliticises refugee women in line with visions of refugeehood as feminised, it also 
locates men within the public, political sphere. This means that they can be understood 
as distinct to the typical populations for whom humanitarians should care, as is 
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represented by Jordanian authorities’ threats to separate all single men from the rest of 
the camp population in Za‘tari,133 and the differential treatment given to Syrian military 
defectors, clearly political actors, for whom specific accommodation was set up.134 The 
location of men within the public and political also means that many of the gendered 
threats that men disproportionately experience become subjects that humanitarian actors 
cannot, or will not, speak about publicly. As will be explored in more depth in Chapter 4, 
Syrian men are particularly (although not exclusively) likely to be subject to police 
harassment for working without a permit, forced encampment, deportation to Syria, and 
particular forms of police surveillance because of the securitisation of male, Muslim 
bodies.135  
 
In order to maintain their relationships with the Jordanian state, which is the basis on 
which they can be present within Jordan, humanitarian agencies discuss questions such as 
deportations to Syria primarily away from the public eye and behind ‘closed doors.’ In 
public they emphasise, as then Head of UNHCR Jordan Andrew Harper said, that they 
“understand the government’s legitimate security concerns.” 136  In May 2017, I was 
interviewed, alongside a spokesperson from UNHCR, on Newsmakers, the flagship news 
programme of TRT World about Syrian refugees’ access to work in Jordan. I raised the 
point that refugees who held work permits were less likely to be deported as a 
punishment for work, which was one of the main benefits of obtaining a work permit, 
according to Syrian refugees who hold them.137 The interviewer shifted the focus of his 
questions to this topic, and to whether Jordan was offering Syrian refugees due process 
and adequately protecting their rights. The UNHCR spokesperson declined several 
opportunities to state that Jordan could “do better” in terms of its deportation policy, 
and chose to emphasise the burden Jordan faced hosting refugees, and re-iterated that 
UNHCR advocates for the rights of all refugees. 138  The insistence on the particular 
understanding of non-political humanitarianism severely impedes humanitarians’ abilities 
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to publicly discuss or condemn some of the worst violations of the rights of those they 
are mandated to defend.  
  
Similarly, humanitarian understandings of power highlight some power inequalities, and 
obscure and perpetuate others. A key element of the depoliticised implementation of 
‘global’ women’s rights is the ‘empowerment’ of refugee women. Although humanitarian 
documents often do not define empowerment, or discuss it largely in economic terms,139 
the literature from humanitarian agencies is keen to demonstrate how their programmes 
contribute to ‘women’s empowerment,’ whether that be programmes to support 
survivors of SGBV, creating ‘safe spaces,’ or providing ‘Cash for Work’ (CfW) 
opportunities.140 The generality and ubiquity of the term was one of the striking elements 
of NGO discussions about refugee women during my fieldwork.141 As in other contexts, 
it was assumed that women needed to be ‘trained’ in order to be ‘empowered.’ 142 
Subsequently, as one NGO worker put it, “after all this getting empowered” refugee 
women could run their own projects in the community.143 As feminist scholars have 
argued, the ways in which the notion of empowerment is deployed are limited. 
‘Empowerment’ for women often reflects an individualist and “liberal notion of feminist 
choice” that fails to unsettle the privileges that allow some to make more choices than 
others.144 
 
In line with ‘global’ understandings, it is also assumed that women want to be 
empowered in the particular ways that humanitarians offer. One interlocutor recalled an 
incident from her office, where she worked in a team promoting ‘women’s 
empowerment.’ Her manager, a white woman from the United States, was confronted 
with data that said many Syrian women in Jordan would prefer opportunities to conduct 
paid work from inside, not outside, the home. The manager’s response to this was to 
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argue that women were expressing these preferences because they were conditioned by 
the society in which they live.145 While these views may indeed be socially conditioned, so 
may those of the manager herself. But contemporary liberal thought, as Beate Jahn has 
argued, assumes “that it is not the actual consent of real, existing people that establishes 
legitimacy,” but rather what they would consent to, were they ‘rational’ people. 146 
Revealingly, she argues, this structure of thought is shared by liberalism and imperialism, 
which further locates humanitarianism, with its liberal underpinnings, within the broader 
and longer context of Western (post-)colonial interventions in the Middle East. As has 
been demonstrated in other contexts such as Gaza and Somalia, women often experience 
becoming the leading provider and decision-maker for the family humiliating and 
exploitative, rather than empowering.147  
 
In this narrow understanding of empowerment, women were to be ‘empowered’ as a 
means to gender equality, that is, empowered relative to the men in their communities. 
Humanitarian agencies did not appear to believe, however, that refugee women or men 
needed empowerment relative to humanitarian agencies themselves or against the state 
that hosts them, and enacts violence upon them. There are some attempts to create 
avenues for refugees’ voices to be heard; for example a Women’s Committee has been 
founded, under the auspices of UN Women, to “serve as interlocutors between the 
community, service providers and camp decision-makers.”148 IRD run regular meetings 
for both men and women in the camp to raise community issues, although the camp 
residents with whom I spoke about these meetings said that the responses they get 
usually concerned reports, process, and information about the progress made so far.149 
These programmes, which reflect humanitarian rhetorical commitments to 
‘participation,’150 do not facilitate, or imply a need for, a transfer of power away from 
humanitarians and towards refugees themselves.  
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Whether refugee men in particular are, or should be, among the ‘empowered’ is a 
question that never seems to be asked. I recorded in my fieldnotes the first time I heard a 
humanitarian worker discuss the ‘empowerment’ of men. It was 13th June 2016, nine and 
a half months into my fieldwork. Even in that instance, the sentence in which the ‘men’ 
and ‘empowerment’ were connected was arguing “the Jordanian government doesn’t 
want men to be empowered because they are a threat to the labour market.”151 Even 
though I had previously contemplated, much earlier in my fieldwork, the absence of men 
from the empowerment agenda, I was still almost taken aback by her words. The pairing 
seemed awkward, if not somehow contradictory, within the world in which I was 
operating. In line with the previously discussed failure to understand men both as 
subjects and objects of power, refugee men appear simply as an undifferentiated category 
of privilege. 
 
The empowerment of refugee women as part of the implementation of humanitarian 
agendas, and the silence surrounding whether refugee men need empowerment, places a 
single axis of power and differentiation, between Syrian women and Syrian men, at the 
foreground of humanitarian thinking and work on empowerment. This is reflective of 
the binaries that are infused into humanitarian and development gender work – of the 
“kind of thinking that sets up women as victims and men as the problem and that says 
that men are powerful and women are powerless.”152 Men are assumed to have power 
and agency, thus rendering the notion of their empowerment counterintuitive.  
 
In focusing on this particular form of empowerment for women, humanitarian agencies 
simultaneously keep the focus off the multiple axes of power and differentiation in which 
they themselves are implicated. The apparent depiction of humanitarianism as apolitical 
is accompanied by a portrayal of humanitarians as devoid of power.153 But they are not 
merely impartial defenders of the marginalised, but exercisers of power over those 
marginalised subjects. Empowering refugees to take control of their own lives would, to 
a significant extent, reduce the need for and role of NGOs themselves. More meaningful 
and substantive empowerment, therefore, represents a risk and a threat to NGOs. They 
are “so scared of it…because, to a certain extent, empowerment is a zero-sum game,” 
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one former NGO worker explained to me.154 While it might be assumed that it is Syrians 
who need NGOs, the reverse is also true. As Curt Rhodes, the International Director of 
Questscope explained, NGOs “need local people as the stage upon which they act.” Yet 
within the context of the camp you cannot give up power or control “because the 
paradigm in which you must perform will not allow [that].”155  
 
Humanitarianism itself is deeply disempowering of refugees; hierarchy lies at its heart.156 
UNHCR specifically has long been critiqued for its accountability flowing primarily 
upwards, to its donors and powerful states, rather than downwards, to the populations it 
serves. As Jacobsen and Sandvik note, after decades of discussing downward 
accountability, in 2012 UNHCR could only claim that it “increasingly recognized that 
their principal accountability is to the people they serve.”157 Despite some ostensible 
progress, UNHCR remains one of many humanitarian organisations “that has yet to 
achieve radical improvements in accountability to persons of concern.”158 As Harrell-
Bond, Voutira and Leopold argued many years ago, humanitarianism:  
 
borrows from the idea of charity the concept of non-
reciprocation…and, in turn, uses it in order to impose a 
condition on the donations: desert or merit which is construed in 
terms of absolute destitution on the part of the recipient.159  
 
These are not relations between equals; indeed, the relation underlying work with 
refugees “is almost always one of philanthropy or humanitarian obligation, not 
entitlement.”160  
 
The methodology of a humanitarian survey in Za‘tari demonstrates clearly the 
disempowering and instrumentalising nature of humanitarianism, even as it claims to 
help and empower. In 2015 the International Medical Corps and the Sisterhood is Global 
Initiative, conducted a mental health and psychosocial support needs assessment of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan, in camp and non-camp settings, and Jordanians in 
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communities hosting Syrians.161 Their sample in Za‘tari consisted of 147 individuals who 
were “approached by the research team randomly [who] asked the first person 
encountered in the street by explaining to them the purpose and type of study 
conducted” and sought their consent for a 20-30 minute interview. 162  Some of the 
interviews, the report says, were conducted in “community areas” and “safe spaces 
facilities” of NGOs in the camp, although it does not state how many, or where else 
interviews were conducted. 5% of people approached either did not agree to be 
interviewed, or withdrew before the process was finished. The interview consisted of a 
series of questions, including 
 
about how often during the last 2 weeks did you feel so afraid that nothing 
could calm you down – would you say all of the time, most of the time, 
some of the time, little of the time, or none of the time?...Question four: 
during the last 2 weeks, about how often did you feel so hopeless that you 
wanted to be dead? [Emphasis in original].163 
 
In the name of helping Syrian refugees, Syrians were approached at random on the street 
by a stranger, in a refugee camp which they could not readily leave, and were expected to 
answer potentially (re-)traumatising questions about their recent preference for death 
over life.  
 
This disempowerment is part of a wider facet of humanitarian action that this thesis 
explores: the privileging of humanitarian goals, understandings, and knowledge, over 
those of refugees. The knowledge generated by the local community, for example on 
who is really in need of particular services such as psychosocial support, is disregarded in 
favour of the ‘global’ knowledge of humanitarianism. Humanitarian actors understand, 
plan, and assess their livelihood programmes in respect of their own objectives, rather 
than how they are experienced by Syrian refugees. As Frantz Fanon argued, in reference 
to his psychiatric practice, for a system to work for the people whom it is ostensibly 
serving, those people’s “structuring values have to be embraced without any complexes,” 
rather than being, in the case of the Syria refugee response, centred around the values of 
humanitarians.164   
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This power that the humanitarian sector deploys is not only disempowering for refugees, 
but is deeply gendered and racialised. In its deployment of ‘objectivity,’ its prioritisation 
of the ‘global’ knowledge of humanitarianism, and its understandings of what Syrians 
would ‘rationally’ want, humanitarians exercise their power in ways that accord with what 
Terrell Carver has labelled ‘rational-bureaucratic’ masculinities. These modes of 
personhood value “rationality, logic, economy, functionality, specialization, infallibility, 
consistency, value, reliability, interchangeability, and most importantly, freedom from 
emotion.”165 This demonstrates and embodies the rational element of humanitarianism, 
in which it seeks to apply supposedly universal principles, even as it is motivated by 
emotion and the desire to save strangers.166 As Anibal Quijano and Maria Lugones have 
demonstrated in their work on the coloniality of power, the notion of rationality is 
expressive of a gendered binary and hierarchy and is located within prevailing power 
structures as an exclusively European property, demonstrating that both gender and race 
are built into these hierarchies.167   
 
At other times, when confronted with the agency and politics of refugees, and refugee 
men in particular, humanitarian workers deploy “masculine forms of white authoritarian 
leadership.” 168  The former UNHCR chief official in Za‘tari, Kilian Kleinschmidt, 
demanded that the population over which he held power was subservient, depoliticised, 
and that it respect his ‘macho’ performances as indicative of his power and control over 
the camp. 169  As Linda Tabar has argued, humanitarian responses to suffering are 
predicated on the “non-Westerner’s conformity to a subordinate position that denies 
their voice and agency.”170 In the context of Za‘tari, it was refugee men in particular who 
were seen to disrupt this subordinate position, and that masculinised performances of 
humanitarian power attempted to challenge. In addition to constituting an attempt to re-
align the population of Za‘tari with a particular vision of refugeehood, it can also be 
understood as another attempt, common in the history of external interventions in the 
region, to disempower men in (post-)colonial nations through their feminisation.   
                                                
165 Terrell Carver, “Being a Man,” Government and Opposition 41, no. 3 (2006): 464. 
166 Fassin, “The Predicament of Humanitarianism.” 
167 See María Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial / Modern Gender System,” Hypatia 22, no. 1 
(2007): 186–209; Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2 (2007): 
168–78. 
168 Cynthia Weber, “The Trump Presidency, Episode 1: Simulating Sovereignty,” Theory & Event 20, no. 1 
(2017): 132. 
169 See Chapter 3. 
170 Tabar, “Disrupting Development, Reclaiming Solidarity,” 23. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has asked new questions of humanitarianism. Despite the now long-
standing debates and scholarship on the feminisation of asylum and refugeehood, there is 
surprisingly little interrogation of humanitarianism’s relationships with those who do not 
fit straightforwardly into that framework. Much of the scholarship on refugee men 
focuses on men’s masculinities, how they change in exile, and how men fit into and 
respond to humanitarian work on gender equality and SGBV. By contrast, I have turned 
the focus onto humanitarianism itself, and its understandings of refugee men. In doing 
so, I have argued that refugee men disrupt humanitarian understandings of ‘gender’ and 
refugeehood, and they therefore have an uncertain position in humanitarian policies, 
practices and imaginaries. Humanitarian understandings of power and politics 
depoliticise women’s rights and empowerment, side-line the gendered threats that men 
face, and obscure the masculinised, racialised and disempowering ways that 
humanitarians exercise power over refugee populations.      
 
The analysis presented in this chapter has reviewed literatures on gender and 
humanitarianism, refugeehood and humanitarianism, and the politics of (humanitarian) 
interventions in the South, and put them into conversation with qualitative fieldwork 
from Jordan, to advance these arguments about the position of refugee men within 
humanitarianism. The frameworks and understandings of humanitarianism, however, are 
played out in different contexts in specific ways. Humanitarian practices are embodied, 
spatial, and material, and are attributed particular meanings that are dependent on 
context. The next chapter of this thesis, therefore, focuses its attention to the life, 
governance, and development of Za‘tari, the location of my fieldwork.   
  77 
Chapter 3: Za‘tari Refugee Camp  
 
Upon visiting Za‘tari, it is impossible not to notice the camp’s heavily militarised 
boundaries, which begin with a checkpoint at its entrance. As someone whose formative 
experiences of life in the Middle East were in Palestine, at times I found it impossible not 
to compare the Jordanian checkpoints of Za‘tari to the Israeli checkpoints of the West 
Bank; impossible not to compare the extensive levels of regulation, restriction and 
surveillance that state authorities sought to acquire through these systems; impossible not 
to compare the nervousness, bureaucracy, and inconvenience that these systems create. 
A friend half-joked to me that if she wanted to take her baby to Za‘tari to visit her 
friends and colleagues in the camp, she would smuggle it in rather than apply for a 
permit (and rather than work out whether a permit was officially necessary).1 In that 
moment I also found it impossible not to compare the Jordanian baby without a permit 
potentially unable to cross into Za‘tari, to the Palestinian donkey without a permit I 
witnessed being stopped from crossing into the farmland of Qalqiliya in 2006. These 
systems are at once oppressive and absurd. 
 
The checkpoints and permits are some of the many performances of Jordanian 
sovereignty in and around the camp. Accordingly, I do not see Za‘tari as a depoliticised 
space of exception, as refugee camps are often understood. I begin this chapter by 
arguing that it is rather a product of a specific context, an instantiation of Jordan’s 
variegated sovereignty, a space that both fragments and extends the space of the nation 
state, and a spatial mode of governance that facilitates humanitarian control and 
intervention. I explore how the camp is accessed and experienced by humanitarians and 
other outsiders, and introduce the camp population and its humanitarian service 
providers. In analysing the contestations between humanitarian and state authorities and 
refugees, I demonstrate how Syrians have consistently asserted their agency in the camp 
by rejecting humanitarian attempts to create a depoliticised space of service provision. 
Syrian men, in particular, were understood to be ‘troublemakers’ over whom control 
must be exerted, which was pursued through a combination of authoritarian and 
ostensibly ‘softer’ techniques of governance and policing. 
 
                                                
1 Conversation with NGO worker, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016.  
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Camps as Spaces of Variegated Sovereignty and Intervention 
The ‘refugee camp’ as a space, and the modes of governance it enables, has attracted a 
wealth of scholarship. This work often builds on the analysis of Giorgio Agamben, who 
has become the new “charismatic legitimator” within critical refugee studies over the past 
few decades.2 In particular, Agamben’s analysis of ‘the camp’ as a space of exception, or 
as creating a state of exception, 3   has become central to many analyses of camp 
governance and of the lives of refugees, and others, living within them.4 As Nando 
Sigona has noted, Agambenian analysis is deployed “from the Nazi concentration camps 
to Guantanamo Bay via asylum reception centres.”5 Yet as numerous critics have argued, 
Agambenian scholarship on refugee camps has the effect of generalising, dehistoricising, 
and depoliticising camps, while leaving little analytical space for the contingencies and 
specificities of local contexts, or for the agency of refugees, which is central to the 
analysis presented in this thesis.6 In contrast to Agambenian ahistorical understandings of 
‘the camp,’ Sigona argues, scholars should ‘de-exceptionali[se] the exception,’ and use 
agent-oriented approaches “more rooted in the materiality of the camp.”7 Similarly, the 
Agambenian notion of the camp as a space outside of politics has been challenged by 
scholars who have argued that the camp should instead be understood as a space of 
‘hybrid’ or ‘contested’ sovereignties, with states, humanitarian actors, and NGOs 
exercising aspects of sovereign power.8  
 
A multiplicity of sovereign actors has been argued to be an important feature of the 
contemporary neoliberal landscape across a wide range of contexts beyond camps. 
Aihwa Ong, for example, has outlined a Foucauldian analysis of what she terms 
‘graduated sovereignty.’ Different segments of a population are treated differently in 
accordance with the requirements of market forces, and “some aspects of state power 
                                                
2 P. Owens, “Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’?: Against Agamben on Refugees,” International Relations 23, no. 4 
(2009): 567. 
3 see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (London: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
4 Richard Ek, “Giorgio Agamben and the Spatialities of the Camp: An Introduction,” Geografiska Annaler: 
Series B 88, no. 4 (2006): 363–86. 
5 Nando Sigona, “Campzenship: Reimagining the Camp as a Social and Political Space,” Citizenship Studies 
19, no. 1 (2015): 4. 
6 Dan Bulley, “Inside the Tent: Community and Government in Refugee Camps,” Security Dialogue 45, no. 1 
(2014): 63–80; Adam Ramadan, “Spatialising the Refugee Camp,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 38, no. 1 (2013): 65–77; Kim Rygiel, “Politicizing Camps: Forging Transgressive Citizenships in 
and through Transit,” Citizenship Studies 16, no. 5–6 (2012): 807–25; Sigona, “Campzenship.” 
7 Sigona, “Campzenship,” 5. 
8 Maja Janmyr and Are J. Knudsen, “Introduction: Hybrid Spaces,” Humanity: An International Journal of 
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 7, no. 3 (2016): 391–95; Turner, “Suspended Spaces.” 
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and authority are taken up” by other actors, in Ong’s case study by foreign corporations 
in special economic zones (SEZs).9 As the work of Lucas Oesch demonstrates, in his use 
of Ong’s framework to study Al-Hussein Palestinian refugee camp in Amman, this is also 
the case in refugee camps, although non-state actors have been taking on aspects of state 
power and authority in camp settings for decades prior to the rise of neoliberalism.10 
 
Despite this longer history, I argue that these frameworks, and Ong’s analysis of 
variegated forms of neoliberalism,11 can productively advance our understandings of the 
nature of contemporary governance in Za‘tari. In line with Ong’s analysis of ‘graduated 
sovereignty,’ scholars such as Pascal Debruyne, José Martinez, Pete Moore, Christopher 
Parker and Jillian Schwedler have all demonstrated how neoliberalisations in Jordan have 
created an internally differentiated Jordanian sovereign territory.12 Amongst the city-cum-
corporation of Aqaba, numerous opaque SEZs, and long-standing Palestinian 
encampments, Za‘tari is a new dot on the variegated landscape in which the state’s reach, 
control, and governance are highly context-dependent. The state’s sovereignty, unevenly 
spread across its territory, is therefore not merely an abstract ideal, nor a centralised and 
militarised state power, but must be understood “as a construction, as an ideas-practice 
complex” that is created through everyday discursive and material practices of 
representation, categorisation and distribution.13  
 
Following the critiques of Agamben’s analysis of camps, recognising the diversity of 
instantiations of ‘the camp,’ and in line with this broader scholarship on Jordan, this 
thesis understands Za‘tari neither as a generic ‘space of exception’ from the rest of 
Jordan, nor simply the same as ‘the rest’ of Jordan, for Jordan itself is a highly 
differentiated entity. Za‘tari is materially and ideationally located within the specific 
                                                
9 Aihwa Ong, “Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia,” Theory, Culture & Society 17, no. 4 (2000): 57. 
10 Lucas Oesch, “The Refugee Camp as a Space of Multiple Ambiguities and Subjectivities,” Political 
Geography 60, no. Supplement C (2017): 110–20. 
11 Ong, “Graduated Sovereignty”; Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception : Mutations in Citizenship and 
Sovereignty (Durham, N.C.; London : Duke University Press, 2006). 
12 See Pascal Debruyne, “Spatial Rearticulations of Statehood: Jordan’s Geographies of Power under 
Globalization” (Ghent University, 2013); José Ciro Martínez, “Leavening Neoliberalization’s Uneven 
Pathways: Bread, Governance and Political Rationalities in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 
Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 4 (2017): 464–83; Pete W. Moore, “QIZs, FTAs, USAID and the MEFTA: A 
Political Economy of Acronyms,” Middle East Report, no. 234 (2005): 18–23; Christopher Parker, “Tunnel-
Bypasses and Minarets of Capitalism: Amman as Neoliberal Assemblage,” Political Geography 28, no. 2 
(2009): 110–20; Jillian Schwedler, “The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal Jordan,” Middle East 
Critique 21, no. 3 (2012): 259–70. 
13 Sophia Hoffman, “Disciplining Movement: State Sovereignty in the Context of Iraqi Migration to Syria” 
(SOAS, University of London, 2011), 107; see also Ong, “Graduated Sovereignty.” 
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circumstances of Jordan’s history, politics, and economy. Palestinian refugee camps are 
essentially de facto permanent features of the landscape in Jordan, and were long seen by 
the Jordanian regime as spaces of extra-territoriality, and thereby potential sources of 
violence and instability.14 Numerous Jordanian interlocutors would compare Za‘tari to 
Palestinian camps – in terms of the security risks it might pose, and the possibility that it 
might similarly become a much more permanent settlement.15 In Jordan, throughout the 
region, and across the wider world, camps have often provided shelter, resources and 
recruits for armed groups among refugee populations, who have used the humanitarian 
label of camps to pursue their political and military agendas.16 Security incidents in camps 
continue to occur in Jordan, such as the attack on intelligence officers, five of whom 
died, in Baqa’a Palestinian refugee camp near Amman in the summer of 2016. 17 
Nevertheless, states have regularly insisted on the creation of camps for refugees, to 
attract aid and attention, to isolate and contain refugee populations for security reasons, 
or to segregate them from the wider labour market.18 
 
Within Za‘tari, there are varied and extensive attempts by Jordanian state actors to create 
Za‘tari as a Jordanian space. The separation of Za‘tari from the rest of the population is 
an assertion of Jordanian sovereignty over the territory, and helps to create it as a 
temporary enclave for refugees. Yet in order to avoid the aforementioned challenges 
posed by refugee camps, the space within the camp must also be rendered as ‘Jordanian.’ 
Za‘tari must simultaneously be not-Jordan and Jordan. That is, as a space that is both 
under Jordan’s control, unlike Palestinian camps historically, and that will not develop 
                                                
14 For discussion of Palestinian camps in Jordan and the region, see Luigi Achilli, “Does the Political 
Bore?: The Denial and Camouflage of the ‘Political’ in a Palestinian Refugee Camp” (SOAS, University of 
London, 2012); Julie Peteet, “Cartographic Violence, Displacement and Refugee Camps: Palestine and 
Iraq,” in Palestinian Refugees: Identity, Space and Place in the Levant, by Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi, Routledge 
Series on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011).  
15 Conversations with Jordaniann NGO workers and police officers, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015, 21.07.2016 and 
01.08.2016. 
16 See Gil Loescher and James Milner, Protracted Refugee Situations : Domestic and International Security 
Implications, Adelphi Papers (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2005); Idean Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups,” 
World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 217–42; Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action 
(Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
17 Peter Beaumont, “Jordan Says Intelligence Officers Killed in Refugee Camp Attack,” The Guardian, June 
6, 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/jordan-intelligence-officers-
killed-refugee-camp-attack-baqaa. 
18 Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee 
Influxes,” International Migration Review 30, no. 3 (1996): 655–78; Rose Jaji, “Social Technology and Refugee 
Encampment in Kenya,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 2 (2012): 221–38; Loescher and Milner, Protracted 
Refugee Situations; Turner, “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees.” 
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into a permanent ‘temporary’ feature of the landscape.19 The Syrian population, and the 
Palestinian history, necessitates the performance of Jordanian sovereignty. This is seen in 
the regulation of access into and out of the camp; in the pictures of the Jordanian royal 
family that festoon camp buildings; in the police foot patrols through the market; in the 
singing of the Jordanian national anthem at events; in the military jeeps that are spaced 
out around the camp; and in the heart-shaped Jordanian flag painted on the side of an 
IRD office, flanked by two doves bearing the logos of UNHCR and IRD.20 Like SEZs in 
other contexts, Za‘tari has “both fragment[ed] and extend[ed] the space of the nation 
state.”21 
 
Syrians themselves have a role in some of these rituals of sovereignty. At the beginning 
of an event organised by Syrians (albeit under the pretext of a NGO-led ‘civic 
engagement’ project), ritualistic praise was offered to King Abdullah, and all of Jordan, 
for the hospitality that they had extended to their Syrian brothers and sisters.22 On a walk 
around the market, accompanied by a Jordanian police officer, numerous Syrians would 
greet him, demonstrating, he told me, the trust and respect that the Syrian population 
accords the Jordanian police.23 As Lisa Wedeen argued of the Hafez al-Asad era, “rituals 
of obeisance that are transparently phony” are “symbolic displays of power [that] not 
only operate in tandem with overt coercive controls, they are themselves a subsystem of 
coercive control.” 24  A subsystem of control, as Wedeen demonstrated, with which 
Syrians are intimately familiar. Nevertheless, as is noted at different points in this 
chapter, these performances of Jordanian sovereignty do not mean that the camp is 
uniformly experienced by Syrians ‘as Jordan.’  
 
Furthermore, as previously noted, Jordanian state actors are not the only ones exercising, 
or performing, sovereignty in Za‘tari. Following Foucault,25 Ong argues that sovereignty 
                                                
19 Philipp Misselwitz and Sari Hanafi, “Testing a New Paradigm: UNRWA’s Camp Improvement 
Programme,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28, no. 2–3 (2009): 360–88; Peteet, “Cartographic Violence.” 
20 Author observation, Za‘tari, 25.11.2015, 03.12.2015, 09.02.2016, 03.03.2016 and 21.07.2016. 
21 Ananya Roy, “Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism,” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 35, no. 2 (2011): 234; see also Oesch, “The Refugee Camp as a Space of Multiple Ambiguities and 
Subjectivities.” 
22 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 09.02.2016. 
23 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
24 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination : Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 6, 27. 
25 See Graham Burchell, Peter Miller, and Colin Gordon, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: 
With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Michel 
Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. (London: Allen Lane, 2003). 
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is exercised partly through “control, surveillance and regulation vis-à-vis markets, 
populations and external agencies.”26 This necessitates, in the camp context, a focus on 
humanitarian actors, and in particular UNHCR. Indeed, the refugee camp has a long 
history as a site in which humanitarian agencies perform roles that might more typically 
be understood as functions of the state. While a dominant model for “isolating groups 
seen as problems, risks, or threat [sic] during the colonial period,” it became a model for 
managing refugee populations during World War II,27 and one of the main forms of 
“spatial organisation of forced migration.”28 Spatially containing, separating, and isolating 
refugees in camps, from the perspective of humanitarian agencies, facilitates aid 
distribution and improves administrative efficiency.29 As demonstrated by the debates in 
the 1990s and 2000s over extending UNHCR’s work more systematically to non-camp 
spaces, for some in the agency refugees seemed properly ‘in place’ only in refugee 
camps.30 
 
While, by definition, temporary, camps often develop from spaces to distribute 
emergency life-saving relief to sites for the delivery of “long-term ‘care and maintenance’ 
programs [sic].”31 In this context, humanitarian actors treat refugees not just as biological 
matter to be kept alive, but as the objects of what Simon Turner has called an ‘ethical 
project:’ “it was not enough to tell the refugees what they were and were not allowed to 
do. They also had to be convinced of the value of these rules.”32 As the site of this 
‘ethical project,’ the camp “becomes a kind of human laboratory.” 33 Just as a camp is, as 
Liisa Malkki has argued, “a standardized, transferable device of power,”34 large elements 
of this ethical project are similarly understood to be replicable across space in 
                                                
26 Ong, “Graduated Sovereignty,” 56. 
27 Oesch, “The Refugee Camp as a Space of Multiple Ambiguities and Subjectivities,” 114; Cf Kirsten 
McConnachie, “Camps of Containment: A Genealogy of the Refugee Camp,” An International Journal of 
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 7, no. 397–412 (2016). 
28 Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National 
Identity Among Scholars and Refugees,” Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992): 34. 
29 Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile. 
30 See Crisp, “Finding Space for Protection”; Guglielmo Verdirame and Jason M. Pobjoy, “The End of 
Refugee Camps?” (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2013). 
31 Janmyr and Knudsen, “Introduction,” 391; see also Simon Turner, “What Is a Refugee Camp? 
Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp,” Journal of Refugee Studies 29, no. 2 (2016): 139–48. 
32 Turner, “Suspended Spaces,” 320. 
33 Turner, 332; Cf Simon Turner, “Under the Gaze of the ‘Big Nations’: Refugees, Rumours and the 
International Community in Tanzania,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 227–47. 
34 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 52. 
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humanitarian actors’ attempts to implement ‘global standards.’ Organisations came to 
Za‘tari wanting to replicate their work in other contexts.35 
 
The implementation of these agendas in camps is “inextricably linked,” according to 
Jennifer Hyndman, to “refugee containment and immobility.”36 The residents of Za‘tari 
are contained in the camp, and represent, in a quite literal sense, a captive audience for 
the enactment of humanitarianism’s ethical project. This is demonstrated by the ways 
that the population is discussed by humanitarian workers. When there were delays in the 
start date of the project on which I was due to work, colleagues explained that this was 
mitigated to some extent by the fact that people in the camp “do not have much to do” 
and “have a lot of time on their hands.”37 Our work was constructed as if it would be 
filling a void, rather than creating an imposition. 
 
Some of my more critical interviewees shared my understanding that the containment of 
Syrians in Za‘tari was being taken advantage of in order to pursue humanitarian ‘ethical 
projects.’ One NGO worker, who had been working in Za‘tari for eighteen months 
when we met for an interview, spoke frankly:  
 
Sometimes I feel…that we as a humanitarian body…it’s like we have a 
doll’s house or SIMS and you’re trying to create a mini-world, which is 
acknowledging of the culture of the people inside to the extent you 
need to be able to understand them and then try to put things in a way 
that’s going to be understandable or applicable or relevant, but actually 
it’s like we’re trying to fix things that are not just a result of the refugee 
crisis. It’s suddenly like you’ve got this whole town of people and you 
guys are in charge [pause] we’re in charge, so how are we going to do 
it? What would be the perfect world?38  
 
However, the exercise of sovereignty, and the implementation of these agendas, by both 
state and humanitarian actors, does not go unchallenged by Syrian refugees, who have 
continually contested the exercise of power over them, and dominant understandings of 
how camps should be run. A journey to and through Za‘tari demonstrates this clearly. 
 
                                                
35 Conversations with (I)NGO workers, Amman, 03.09.2015; interview with former NGO worker in 
Za‘tari. 
36 Hyndman, Managing Displacement, 24; cf McConnachie, “Camps of Containment.” 
37 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 29.09.2015. 
38 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari, Amman, 16.10.2015. 
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The Slip Road to Dignity: The Journey to Za‘tari 
Each weekday morning, dozens of cars, buses, and minivans head approximately 80 
kilometres north-east from the Jordanian capital Amman to Za‘tari. For humanitarian 
workers (and the journalists, politicians, diplomats and researchers who regularly 
accompany them), Za‘tari is a place visited by day, and exited before dusk. Apart from 
Syrians, the Jordanian police and military officers are the only ones allowed to stay in the 
camp overnight. 39  The humanitarians who work in Za‘tari overwhelmingly live in 
Amman, creating a daily rush to leave the camp by 3pm or 4pm to avoid some of the 
quotidian gridlock that engulfs parts of the capital in the early evening.  
 
On my first journey to the camp in October 2015, I observed that our route included 
taking a turn-off from the highway that was signposted towards al-Karama (which means 
‘dignity’ in Arabic). I later discovered that al-Karama is the name of the one official land 
border crossing between Jordan and Iraq. Upon realising this, the signpost appeared less 
cruelly ironic, as I had previously experienced it. Instead, it offered a subtle reminder of 
Jordan’s fragile geopolitical positioning, which, as the joke goes, is “between Iraq and a 
hard place.” 40  Along with roadsigns for Iraq (or ‘dignity’), one of the more striking 
features of the car journey between Amman and Za‘tari is the large number of signs for 
Syria, and specifically Jabir (the nearest border crossing between Jordan and Syria). 
Vehicles are even invited to turn off towards Syria as they leave the northern villages and 
return towards the Jordanian capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Interview with Stephen Boddy, Community Safety Team Leader, SIREN Associates, Amman, 
15.10.2015. 
40 Curtis Ryan, “Still Between Iraq and a Hard Place,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 
2014, http://www.merip.org/still-between-iraq-hard-place. 
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Figure 1.1: Location of Za‘tari within Jordan.41  
 
The signs to Syria and its border crossings provoked for me a sense of physical 
proximity: they made Za‘tari ‘feel’ close to Syria.42 Indeed, it is only about ten kilometres, 
in a straight line, from the camp to the Jordanian-Syrian border. The vast majority of 
Za‘tari residents, about 90 percent, come from the governorate of Dar‘a, which lies 
directly on the other side of that same border.43  Despite the tensions that the large-scale 
arrival of Syrians has caused, the populations of southern Syria and northern Jordan have 
long been linked by personal, familial, ‘tribal,’ and economic ties. 44  Despite the 
geographical proximity of Za‘tari and Dar‘a, Syrians in Za‘tari regularly compare the 
camp negatively to Syria in terms of its geographical and meteorological features. The 
quality and quantity of water in northern Jordan are deemed inferior, its environment 
more desert than the green countryside of Dar‘a, and its weather less moderate: both too 
cold in the winter, and too hot in the summer.45  
                                                
41 Screenshot from Google Maps. Taken by the author on 16 February 2018. 
42 I am grateful to Ali Hamdan for his thought-provoking discussion of a similar phenomenon linking 
Gaziantep and Aleppo. 
43 Alison Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City (Boston: Affordable Housing Institution, 2014). 
44 MercyCorps, “Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan,” May 
2013, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=2962. 
45 Conversations with Syrian refugee men and women, Za‘tari, 13.10.2015 and 21.12.2015.  
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The entrance to the camp lies at the eastern edges of Za‘tari village, the small settlement 
from which the camp takes its name. The village has one main thoroughfare lined with 
shops and small-scale factories, with multiple streets leading off from it to residential 
areas. It is home to roughly 12,000 Jordanians and, it is reported, an approximately equal 
number of Syrians.46 Three quarters of a kilometre from the north-west edge of the camp 
stands a military checkpoint, which marks the beginning of the camp’s entrance. 
Jordanian soldiers check, at both this checkpoint and a second one, that the vehicles and 
their occupants have the requisite permission from the government to enter the camp.  
 
The first military checkpoint, always staffed by multiple soldiers, is flanked by a military 
anti-improvised explosive device Humvee. The Humvee, upon which an armed soldier is 
stationed, sits under the shade of a metal covering donated by “the people of Japan.” 
With ‘legs’ about seven feet tall, the shelter ensures that the soldier on top of the vehicle 
is shaded from the sun, but the vehicle remains visible from all sides.47 While it is the first 
military vehicle that most visitors to Za‘tari will encounter, it is but one of many that 
encircles the camp.48 There are typically Syrians present among the soldiers and military 
vehicles at this checkpoint. Some are arranging their belongings for the buses that will 
take them back to Syria. Others are taking advantage of being granted permits to 
temporarily leave the camp to visit friends and family, to seek medical treatment, or to go 
shopping.49 Children hang around, trying to earn the smallest amounts of money by 
carrying returning Syrians’ goods into the camp. One morning, one such Syrian boy, of 
no more than 12, sat smoking at the entrance to the camp. With his legs set wide apart, 
one elbow propped upon his knee, cigarette in hand, his masculinised pose was striking 
when set by a body so young.50 This has become the ‘everyday’ scene for visitors to the 
camp, as they drive past in their cars, readying their permits for inspection. 
 
The Permit System: Entering Za‘tari 
The establishment of spaces such as Za‘tari, in the context of Jordanian history and 
politics, creates, from the perspective of state authorities, the need to impose and 
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perform sovereignty in and over the camp. The system of permits and checkpoints is one 
way of doing this. The checkpoint, as Rashid Khalidi has argued in the context of 
Palestinians, constitutes “one of those many modern barriers where identities are 
checked and verified,”51 and thus one of the quintessential experiences of refugeehood 
and statelessness. Reflecting these dynamics, the permits for Za‘tari are issued by and 
inspected by police and military officers, working under the auspices of the Syrian 
Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), an entity within the Ministry of Interior (MoI). 
NGO staff must apply in advance for daily or monthly permits to enter the camp. 
Officially, permits can be issued on the day if applied for within the camp, and within a 
week if applied for from Amman, but numerous stories from interlocutors belied this 
claim. Permits for non-Jordanian staff can take weeks longer than those for their 
Jordanian colleagues, and are often received on the very last day before an event takes 
place or a project begins. Numerous NGO officials, including Country Directors of 
organisations working in Jordan, have even had their requests to visit the camp declined 
by Jordanian authorities, without explanation.52 NGOs must also apply for permits for 
any vehicles that they drive into the camp, which are regularly (although far from always) 
checked by the soldiers. Permits should also be obtained to bring substances such as 
petroleum (for electricity generators) into the camp for use at NGO centres.  
 
Demand for these permits extended beyond those wishing to undertake work and 
research in the camp. Donors, volunteers, journalists, students, politicians, and 
delegations visiting NGOs are often very eager to visit Za‘tari in particular,53 despite it 
hosting only around twelve percent of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. One of the 
police officers who accompanied me in the camp said that he, one of a team doing the 
same role, was typically assigned between ten and twenty delegations to the camp each 
month.54 As the largest camp in the country, Za‘tari is a space where refugees are known 
to live, and thus, on a practical level, believed to be easier to find for those in search of 
interactions, interviews, and observations. According to one senior INGO worker, 
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visitors want to meet Syrian refugees, but do not want to have to make much effort to do 
so.55  
 
In this respect, Za‘tari is part of a wider trend whereby refugee camps, in particular, 
attract disproportionate levels of attention, media coverage, and funding, relative to the 
size of the populations they host.56 To my horror, I noticed that this also took the form 
of some of my colleagues ‘checking in’ to Za‘tari on Facebook when they arrived for a 
day’s work, announcing their presence in the camp to their online friends and followers.57 
The widespread fascination with Za‘tari, however, can also be understood within the 
context of long-standing but rapidly proliferating varieties of ‘poverty tourism’58 across 
the South, one of the “spectacles of suffering” that play a prominent role in Western 
cultures.59 Within Za‘tari specifically, as is explored in Chapter 7, this takes the form of a 
fetishisation and instrumentalisation of Syrians’ ‘entrepreneurship’ in the camp. 
 
Yet those who desire to visit are often unaware of the existence of, let alone the political 
and practical considerations surrounding, the permit system. When they discover that 
they need one, they will often seek sponsorship from an NGO, to which they may be 
able to offer very little. Many organisations are understandably wary of those seeking an 
organisation to sponsor permits to enter Za‘tari. Running NGO programmes can 
“sometimes feel like you’re running a tour company,” said the same person who above 
derided the lack of effort people were willing to make to meet refugees.60  People visiting 
or volunteering for programmes have been known to be inadequately prepared for their 
visits, culturally and politically insensitive, or simply to have feigned an interest in, or 
commitment to, volunteering for an organisation in order to gain a permit to visit the 
camp.61 One senior NGO officer who had arranged for me to visit his organisation’s 
work, told me he was grateful for the email I sent thanking him and giving him feedback 
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on the visit, saying this is only the second time he could remember receiving this kind of 
follow-up in the many years he had been in the role.62  
 
The problem of visitors asking inappropriate questions is not limited to junior staff or 
volunteers. When Antonio Guterres, then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, visited 
Za‘tari on World Refugee Day in 2013, he was filmed being introduced to a Syrian man, 
and promptly asked, through a translator, whether any members of the man’s family had 
been killed in the conflict. The man replies, again through a translator, that his brother 
had been killed, and then begins to cry. Guterres responds by saying that his interlocutor 
is safe now in Jordan and he hopes there will be peace in Syria so the man can eventually 
return, adding a perfunctory “shukran” (thank you) to close the interaction. 63  This 
interaction is included as part of an episode of ‘A Day in the Life: Za‘atari,’ a series of 
short videos produced by UNHCR and Yahoo. The episode in which this incident 
appears is called ‘The Human Touch.’  
 
NGOs are also hesitant to provide permits for visitors out of concern for the 
consequences that the visit might have for the NGO’s relationship with the GoJ, were 
there to be a (perceived) violation of the letter or spirit of the government’s rules. Many 
NGOs see their work, even their presence in Jordan, to be constantly precarious, and 
thus attempt to minimise any potential disagreements with the authorities about sensitive 
issues, such as access to camps.64 This was most clearly demonstrated to me when I 
acquired my research permit from the MoI. I approached friends and contacts who 
worked regularly in the camps, to see if they may be able to provide me with 
transportation. To my surprise, some of those I spoke to were very nervous about the 
possibility of allowing me to travel with them, even though I had an independent permit, 
and would not be with them or their organisation while in the camp itself. One friend 
said that there had recently been an (unspecified) incident in his organisation regarding 
camp permits, and so everyone was being “cautious” and did not want to get “caught 
up” in the review of permit procedures being conducted by senior managers.65 Some 
helped despite their reservations, especially if reassured, on multiple occasions, that they 
would in no way be sponsoring my permit.  
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The desire to visit Za‘tari also extends to high-level political delegations. Even if 
politicians are visiting Jordan for only one day, they will often want to visit Za‘tari.66 The 
camp therefore became a space of high-level briefings, negotiations, and the central 
experience of many politicians who wish to see the ‘refugee crisis’ first-hand.67 In my 
penultimate fieldwork visit to Za‘tari, I was an inadvertent beneficiary of this 
disproportionate focus on the camp. Priti Patel, then UK Secretary of State for 
International Development, made Jordan her first overseas trip in her new role. On the 
first day of that first trip, she visited Za‘tari.68 On that same day, I was conducting one of 
my research visits, and had gone to the main police office to sign in and register my 
presence, and to be allocated a police officer to supervise my visit. Speaking within my 
earshot (although presumably assuming I did not speak Arabic), officers discussed, with a 
little concern, that they had run out of police officers to allocate me due to the Minister’s 
visit. I waited for around 15 minutes in the office, while discussions were held, phone 
calls were made, and superiors consulted. It was eventually decided (perhaps because I 
had already visited the camp twice in the past ten days with police officers supervising 
me), that for this day I could be sent to meet my Syrian UNHCR guide without a police 
officer in tow.69   
 
Za‘tari also regularly received celebrities and other high-profile visitors. To name but a 
few, Prince Charles played football with the children of Za‘tari,70 Janet Jackson visited 
schools run by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),71 and now-disgraced film 
producer Harvey Weinstein visited in 2014, subsequently writing about the “heartbreak 
and hope” he found there.72 In 2016, Bono visited Za‘tari. A UNHCR employee posted a 
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short video of him on Twitter singing “for” Syrian refugees. In the clip, Bono is sitting 
next to a beaming UNHCR camp manager, Hovig Etyemezian. Two Syrian men are also 
in view, looking on apparently nonplussed as Bono informs his audience that he still 
hasn’t found what he’s looking for. Nasser Touaibia, the UNHCR communications 
officer who posted the clip, described it as a “heartwarming moment as #Bono sings for 
@Refugees in #Zaatari #camp. I feel so privileged to be part of this.”73  
 
These visits to Za‘tari are part of a much wider trend of ‘celebrity humanitarians.’ While 
bringing attention and at times resources to humanitarian crises, critical scholars such as 
Alexandra Budabin, Lisa Ann Richey, and Lilie Chouliaraki, have documented the 
problematic dynamics and consequences of celebrities’ engagement with the 
humanitarian sector. 74  Chouliaraki, reflecting on the nature of contemporary 
humanitarianism under neoliberalism, has examined how celebrity humanitarians can be 
understood as an instance of ‘post-humanitarianism,’ which relies on pity rather than 
solidarity, and “limit[s] our resources for reflecting upon human vulnerability as a 
political problem of injustice.” 75  Examining the materiality of celebrity humanitarian 
interventions, Budabin has highlighted how celebrities choose their own ‘causes,’ how 
celebrities can divert resources from existing organisations on the ground, and how they 
foreground their own voices over those of people affected by humanitarian crises.76 
 
The checkpoint at Za‘tari’s entrance sees these different kinds of workers and visitors on 
a daily basis. As long as all the relevant permits are in order, the Jordanian soldiers who 
staff the checkpoint will invite you through. However, one is faced immediately not with 
the camp itself, but a narrow tarmacked road known among NGO workers as ‘the 
service road’. About 750 metres long, it connects the first and second security 
checkpoints that regulate access to the camp. Pickup trucks, driven by Jordanians, 
operate a group ‘taxi service’ for Syrians going into the camp, although few can afford to 
pay the 1 JOD ($1.4 US) charged for such a short journey. The power differentials could 
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scarcely be clearer: Syrians walk, humanitarians drive. Indeed, often, are driven. At the 
second checkpoint, at the end of the service road, and thus at the entrance of the camp, 
the same permit checks are performed as at the first checkpoint. Upon being waved 
through this second checkpoint, you have entered Za‘tari. 
 
Base Camp: The Service Providers of Za‘tari  
Straight ahead lies one of the most common scenes of Za‘tari. Surrounded by dry mud, 
dust, or puddles, depending of the time of year, is a large group of ‘caravans’ (karafanat in 
Arabic) in which Syrians live. These ‘caravans’ do not have wheels, but are cuboid 
“prefabricated container units”77 While initially Syrians in Za‘tari lived in tents, these 
were gradually replaced by the caravans, with over 17,000 caravans being provided in the 
first 18 months of the camp’s existence.78 Costing a little over $3,000 per caravan, they 
were mostly built in and donated by Saudi Arabia, but also by other Gulf States including 
Kuwait and Qatar.79 Presumably in an attempt to demonstrate their generosity, many of 
these states would put their insignia on the side of the caravans, making Gulf state flags a 
very common sight on the streets of Za‘tari.80 In January 2015, a new design of caravan 
was introduced to the camp, which included concrete flooring, a built-in toilet, and a 
small kitchenette.81  
 
Yet most of the vehicles entering the camp turn almost immediately left, along the ‘ring 
road’ that encircles the camp, past the registration centres of UNHCR and the 
International Organization for Migration, and towards the area of the camp known as 
‘Base Camp.’ Base Camp is the hub of humanitarian activity, containing the offices and 
meeting rooms of UNHCR and many of its main partners, which are mostly organised 
into two lines of caravans with a sheltered seating area running through the middle. At 
the western edge of Base Camp are the security checkpoints through which staff and 
visitors enter, and a canteen. At the eastern end of the two rows of offices a small path 
takes one to a further set of NGO offices, the Family Protection Department (FPD) of 
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the Jordanian police, and the shari‘a court, which deals with matters such as marriages 
and divorces taking place in the camp.  
 
Adjacent to Base Camp are the Za‘tari headquarters of the SRAD, which was created by 
the MoI in 2014 to oversee the country’s refugee response (originally with the name 
Syrian Refugee Camps Directorate). In Za‘tari, its premises also include those of the 
Jordanian police, and the offices where Syrians can apply for temporary permission to 
leave the camp.82 While it works in close coordination with UNHCR, SRAD is the body 
to which the GoJ has given responsibility for security and camp management, not 
UNHCR itself.83 An office in SRAD’s headquarters bears the title of ‘camp manager,’ 
even though colloquially that title is often used by both NGO workers and Syrians to 
refer to UNHCR’s Senior Field Coordinator, the most senior official from the agency in 
the camp.84 
 
A myriad of actors is involved in the provision of services to the population of Za‘tari, 
the vast majority of which are international, as opposed to Jordanian, humanitarian 
organisations and NGOs. UNHCR’s monthly factsheets about the camp contain a list of 
the more than 30 organisations with a ‘presence’ in Za‘tari (including different sections 
of the Jordanian police). 85  This number is lower, however, than the figures often 
discussed by NGO workers, and does not include some organisations that are regularly 
present in the camp carrying out on-going work, even if they do not have a permanent 
office in Base Camp. 86  Many of these projects, in line with the analysis of 
humanitarianism outlined in Chapter 2, focus on providing spaces and services for 
women and children, and furthering their ‘empowerment.’ While some organisations are 
in Za‘tari to implement specific, time-limited projects, others have responsibilities on a 
more stable basis. For example, UNICEF oversees the schools, NRC runs a large 
distribution centre, ACTED is the main actor for water, sanitation and hygiene, and 
ARDD provides free legal advice and representation for refugees living in the camp. 
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Each of the main sectors, such as health, education, food, shelter, and protection, has a 
working group, attended by the relevant humanitarian actors involved in work in that 
sector, and co-chaired by UNHCR and one other relevant agency or NGO. Some of 
these sector working groups also have sub-working groups, for example the SGBV Sub-
Working Group falls under the purview of the Protection Working Group. Camp-wide 
coordination happens through the multi-sector camp management and coordination 
meetings. This structure within Za‘tari replicates, on a smaller scale, the wider 
coordination of the refugee response in Jordan, and staff from Za‘tari attend the Jordan-
wide sector coordination meetings.87 
 
As in many other contexts where refugees are hosted both in camp and non-camp 
environments, 88  Za‘tari received a disproportionate amount of attention and funding 
from humanitarian actors. According to one humanitarian worker who was there when 
the camp opened, Za‘tari, with its definable, available and widely-publicised population,89 
became “overloaded” with programmes, to the extent that NGOs appeared to be “in 
competition” with one another to get beneficiaries for projects for which they had 
already secured funding.90 Despite this funding for specific projects, the overall cost of 
Za‘tari was a challenge for UNHCR. Although the agency does not consistently release 
detailed figures for the amount of money spent in the camp, in 2014 it was reported that 
the overall running costs of the camp were around $500,000 per day.91  
 
A comparatively tiny area at the edge of the camp, Base Camp is spatially and 
imaginatively separated from the rest of the camp, yet is anything but peripheral. The 
area is not open to Syrians living in the camp except for specific purposes (it is also very 
rare for Syrians living outside of the camp to work or volunteer in Za‘tari). A few Syrians 
undertake CfW as cleaners,92 and some NGOs receive Syrians for appointments in their 
offices (for example for those receiving legal advice). This restricted mobility between 
the two areas is regulated by security personnel, who check identity badges and permits 
at the entrances to Base Camp. Fencing of over 7 feet, with coiled barbed wire atop it, 
surrounds the whole of the area. The fencing is covered in black tarpaulin sheets, which 
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dramatically reduce the visibility into the area from outside it (and of course vice versa), 
further reinforcing the sense of division. Those visiting the camp sometimes peer out of 
small holes in the tarpaulin into the main camp, observing the daily life on the other side 
of the fence:93 a close up, yet still asymmetrical, “spectacle of suffering.”94 
 
The spatial segregation of Base Camp from the world of the refugees demonstrates the 
centrality of spatial practices to the power and organisation of humanitarianism. As 
Henri Lefebvre has argued, space “is not simply ‘there,’ a neutral container waiting to be 
filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control, and hence of domination, 
of power.”95 Or, in the words of Michel Foucault, “space is fundamental in any exercise 
of power.”96 Yet the spatial practices of humanitarianism have often been overlooked in 
scholarship.97 In recent years, however, the work of scholars such as Mark Duffield, 
Marsha Henry, Paul Higate, and especially Lisa Smirl, has demonstrated its centrality, and 
has encouraged and enabled new understandings of the practices and hierarchies of 
humanitarianism.98  
 
In the same vein, in his work about post-invasion Kabul in the 2000s, Charles 
Montgomery argued that looking at buildings in (post-)conflict settings is crucial, because 
they “offer cues suggesting how people should act. They tell us about our relationships 
with one another.” 99  The cues, to use Montgomery’s term, that Za‘tari Base Camp 
provides speak to recurring features of humanitarianism in camps, which have been 
elucidated by scholarship: refugees are at the bottom of a hierarchy, being ‘managed’ by 
ideologically-distant humanitarian authorities.100 In the context of Za‘tari, while most of 
the humanitarian workers are themselves Jordanian (someone has to be able to 
communicate with the refugees), the management is disproportionately white and 
western.101 Base Camp spatialises these hierarchies, and makes them tangible. It has a 
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continual electricity supply, while electricity is typically supplied to Syrians for 7 or 8 
hours a day. In Base Camp, wifi routers provide reliable internet access, while internet 
access for Syrians is strongly restricted. 102  Perhaps most glaringly the humanitarian 
workers in Base Camp have the ability to come and go with relative ease, a mobility that 
“fundamentally distinguishes the international community from its intended 
beneficiaries.”103 NGO centres in different areas of the camp are similarly organised in 
spatially exclusionary ways: with fences, guards, padlocks, wifi, electricity, and opening 
times that suit humanitarian workers, rather than Syrian refugees.104 
 
As Mark Duffield has demonstrated, spatial practices also influence the subjectivities of 
those who navigate and exist within them, and these subjectivities “reshape the 
perceptions, interactions and exchanges that link aid workers and host societies.”105 The 
division between Base Camp and the rest of the camp has the effect of isolating 
humanitarian staff from their environment. During my fieldwork, I heard several 
humanitarian workers remark that they spend their days inside caravans sending emails, 
to the extent that they can almost forget they are in a refugee camp.106  
 
I even encountered humanitarian staff who would refer to work within the camp itself, as 
opposed to Base Camp, as ‘the field,’ even though staff working anywhere in Za‘tari 
would be considered in ‘the field’ relative to Amman. As Jennifer Hyndman noted in the 
context of Kenya, the very idea of “the field” as working with refugees in-person, is 
“predicated on geographical distance from a perceived centre,” which is at “the top of 
the spatial hierarchy.” 107  The hierarchies of humanitarianism, expressed through its 
spatial practices on the ground, and designated by (non-)proximity to ‘the field,’ also run 
along the lines of race and nationality. As noted above, staff working in the field were 
overwhelmingly Jordanian, while managers and office-based staff were sometimes 
Jordanian, but often white and/or western. This meant that non-Jordanians were overall 
significantly less likely to leave Base Camp than Jordanian staff.108  
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When Syrians do have personal interactions with non-Arab staff, they usually 
communicate through translators, typically Jordanian staff members of humanitarian 
organisations. Some of the Syrian men I met in Za‘tari were suspicious of those who 
translated for them, believing, on the basis of the English they did know, and the 
reactions of the non-Arabic speaking staff, that their opinions were being ‘softened’ in 
translation.109 Perhaps, as in Frantz Fanon’s Bilda clinic, the translators were understood 
by Syrians to “embod[y] the link between them and colonial authority,” with which the 
translator had an “inclination to be complicit.”110 Reflecting the power dynamics between 
humanitarian staff and Syrians in the camp, attempts to bridge this linguistic divide have 
largely been undertaken by the latter, through English classes that some NGOs offer to 
camp residents. One of the reasons for their popularity, multiple Syrians explained to me, 
is refugees’ desire to be able to better communicate with those managing the camp and 
humanitarian programmes.111  
 
Za‘tari and its Residents 
Beyond Base Camp are the areas where Syrian refugees live. The GoJ had initially 
opposed the large-scale encampment of Syrian refugees on its territory, opening only 
transit centres and ‘camps’ hosting a few hundred refugees, one in a block formerly 
inhabited by migrant workers, and about which relatively little information is publicly 
available.112 In the face of rising numbers of Syrians fleeing to Jordan, however, and 
following negotiations with northern ‘tribal’ leaders, the government decided to open 
Za‘tari in July 2012.113 The establishment of the camp came against the background of a 
declining use of refugee encampment at the global level, driven in part by substantial 
shifts in UNHCR policy.114 Za‘tari helped the GoJ to raise the profile of, and secure 
funding for, its refugee hosting, and furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, Za‘tari has 
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functioned as a device through which Syrians’ access to the Jordanian labour market 
could be regulated.115  
 
Throughout the period of my fieldwork, the camp housed around 80,000 Syrians, which 
is roughly the same number it has hosted since the summer of 2014. Prior to that, in the 
first two years of its existence, at many points over 100,000 Syrians, and briefly slightly 
over 200,000, had been registered as living in Za‘tari. The official figures, while now 
generally regarded by staff on the ground as accurate at around 80,000, have at times 
dramatically over-represented the population of the camp. For example, in 2013, 
UNHCR discovered that the number of Syrians registered as living in the camp exceeded 
the camp population by approximately 50,000. This, I was told by a former UNHCR 
worker, was due to “classic aid world scams” through which Syrians attempted to 
maximise the resources they were able to obtain from the humanitarian sector.116  
 
In part because of the pre-existing networks between the residents of southern Syria and 
northern Jordan, the roughly 80,000 inhabitants of Za‘tari are overwhelmingly (85-90 
percent, depending on the time period in question) from Dar‘a Governorate.117 This 
contrasts with the overall Syrian population in Jordan, of whom just over 40 percent hail 
from Dar’a Governorate.118 The demographics of Za‘tari also differ compared to the 
non-camp Syrian population in Jordan in terms of the rural origins of the camp’s 
population, and in their levels of education. According to the ILO and Fafo, 87 percent 
of Syrians living in the camp were from rural backgrounds, in comparison to only 58 
percent of Syrian of non-camp refugees.119 According to the same study, and for reasons 
explored more below, Za‘tari residents were also less likely, compared to Syrian refugees 
living outside of camps, to have completed secondary or higher education.120  
 
That the vast majority of Za‘tari residents are from the same region of Syria has provided 
some continuity of networks, with many having both immediate and extended family 
members in the camp, as well as friends and neighbours from their villages or towns in 
Syria. Therefore, despite the performances of Jordanian sovereignty in the camp, for 
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many Syrians in the camp, being in Za‘tari, with its Syrian, and somewhat familiar, 
population, is differentiated from being ‘in Jordan.’ In one workshop I was attending in 
the summer of 2016, in the context of discussing cultural differences around gender, one 
participant said he had only ever been in Syria. He paused for a moment, chuckled, and 
said “and Jordan?” with a questioning intonation. “Is this Jordan?”121 As was noted in the 
earlier discussion of sovereignty, the policies and practices of Jordanian state actors 
simultaneously set Za‘tari apart from ‘Jordan,’ even while, necessitated by this separation, 
they attempt to demonstrate its presence ‘in Jordan.’ 
 
According to focus group discussions conducted by NRC with young men and women 
in Za‘tari in 2013, almost all men were involved with agriculture, in some capacity, in 
their hometowns in Syria. They did not typically consider this to be their profession, 
however, but rather a typical part of the daily life and ‘home economy’ of families in 
Dar’a. The level of men’s economic activity in the paid labour market was also high, with 
70 percent of even those aged 15-19 reporting that they economically active, typically in 
‘blue-collar’ and vocational professions. Young women were also often involved in 
agricultural and food-production activities with their families, as part of their daily lives 
and domestic responsibilities, although very rarely entered the waged labour market.122 
According to the ILO and Fafo, the proportion of Za‘tari residents employed in different 
sectors prior to March 2011 broadly mirrored that of the overall Syrian population in 
Jordan, although Za‘tari residents were less likely to have been craft workers, and more 
likely to have an ‘elementary occupation.’123  
 
Once Za‘tari was opened, all Syrian refugees who arrived at the northern Jordanian 
border were taken there, although many left after a period of days, weeks, or months, 
through the ‘bailout’ system. This system enabled Syrians to leave the camp if they had a 
Jordanian sponsor who, on paper, needed to be “over 35 years of age, married, with a 
stable job, no police record, and in a direct family relation with the applicant.”124 In 2012 
and 2013 it was relatively easy to obtain such paperwork, even if the Jordanian sponsor 
did not meet all the criteria, and was often facilitated by Syrians paying unknown 
Jordanians to act as sponsors for them. According to a UNHCR assessment, some 
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Syrians paid as much as $500 in this way to enable them to leave the camp.125 The MoI 
estimated that a further 54,000 people left the camp informally, by being ‘smuggled’ out, 
which could cost $300 for a family, but did not provide the legal paperwork that a bailout 
did, leaving Syrians legally precarious when living outside of the camp. Unknown 
numbers of Jordanian security personnel have been disciplined for taking part in, and 
profiting from, these operations.126  
 
By 2014, however, SRAD was applying the bailout criteria much more stringently, often 
refusing Syrians’ applications. The Syrians who remained in Za‘tari were therefore more 
likely to have been refugees who had fewer connections and networks in Jordan, and 
fewer financial resources at their disposal. When Azraq camp was opened in April 2014, 
new arrivals to Jordan were often sent there, rather than Za‘tari.127 These changes in 
regulations meant that over time Za‘tari essentially transformed from a transit camp, in 
which people often arrived and left within days or weeks, to a more settled camp, with a 
relatively stable population. By the end of 2015, 99.3 percent of the residents of Za‘tari 
had been in the camp for over a year, and 80.7 percent for more than two years.128 
 
The demographic breakdown of Syrians in Za‘tari, and indeed in Jordan as a whole, is 
almost exactly half men and boys and half women and girls.129 The population, again 
both inside and outside of camp, is very young, with slightly over 50 percent of registered 
Syrians in Jordan being under the age of 18.130 Although Syria contains a large number 
and range of religious minorities, the demographic data on Za‘tari produced by 
humanitarian actors typically does not include any information on religious affiliations,131 
presumably reflecting an assumption, which in my experience was accurate, that camp 
residents were (at least almost) exclusively Sunni Muslims. In the work in which I took 
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part, when the topic of religion in the community was discussed, no refugees raised the 
point of religious diversity or plurality within Za‘tari.132  
 
Refugee camps are sometimes imagined as “rows upon rows of tents,”133 implying a 
uniformity of layout and population density, and authorities attempted to achieve this in 
Za‘tari.134 Because of the actions of its Syrian inhabitants, however, Za‘tari is internally 
far from uniform. Often ignoring the patch of land that they were allocated, Syrians have 
moved thousands of caravans around the camp to create living spaces that better reflect 
their needs and vision for the camp, and through which they have staked a claim to its 
space. This was often achieved by appropriating fence posts from the edge of the camp, 
welding wheels to them, and transporting the caravans balanced on the fence posts.135  
 
At times this was done to create extended family homes, rather than the nuclear family 
living envisaged by the criteria used for caravan distribution. The spatial living 
arrangements that have resulted are extremely varied. In some cases they reflect the kinds 
of housing that Za‘tari residents had in Syria, which were themselves varied; in other 
cases new housing arrangements emerged.136 Although some camp residents still live in 
only one caravan, many others live in formations of two caravans either side-by-side, 
opposite each other, or at right angles. Some live in three or more caravans, sometimes in 
a ‘U-Shape,’ with each of the three caravans taking on a different function (for example, 
one can be set aside as a room to receive guests and/or spend time during the day).137 
Others still live in formations of 4 or more caravans.138 On average, between 5 and 6 
Syrians live in a household.139 Motivations for moving caravans included wanting to live 
near to others from their villages, neighbourhoods, or towns of origin. As was recorded 
by Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) in 2013, residents of 
the camp from particular districts of Dar’a Governorate often clustered in particular 
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areas of the camp.140 Syrians have also adapted UNHCR tents, corrugated zinc sheets, 
tarpaulins, and blankets, to name but a few examples, to increase their privacy, create 
shelter from the harsh extremes of climate, and increase the amount of living space 
available to them.141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Population Density in Za‘tari –  December 2015. 142 
 
Syrians rearranging their caravans has resulted in the population density being very 
uneven across the camp, as is demonstrated on the map above. The map shows the 12 
districts into which Za‘tari was divided by UNHCR as part of its 2013 Governance Plan. 
This was devised partly with the intention to “decongest” the western parts of the 
camp143 (those nearest Base Camp and thus nearest service providers) and to decentralise 
administration and services. Put another way, it was an attempt to regain control over the 
planning and use of the camp space from Syrian refugees. The differences among the 
districts can easily be observed and felt when in different areas of the camp. District 2, 
consists of narrow streets between caravans, at times with little more than two feet 
between them. District 7, on the eastern end of the camp, has roads on which two cars 
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can pass, and caravans with space on all four sides, leaving room often for Syrians to 
create small gardens at the entrance to their caravan(s).144 The districts numbered 1-4 
were populated first when the camp opened. The former camp manager, Killian 
Kleinschmidt, referred to Districts 1 and 2, the most populated areas of the camp, as 
“the downtown, the slum.”145 UNHCR’s approach to governing Za‘tari, however, did not 
only involve a spatial re-organisation of the camp. As I will now explore, it included 
clamping down on protest, and new and more extensive forms of policing.  
 
 “Stop this demonstrating business”146: Za‘tari and its Troublemaking Men  
Za‘tari was initially put under the control of the Jordanian Hashemite Charity 
Organization (JHCO), an officially non-governmental, but in practice “semi-official 
agency” of the state.147 Yet by the start of 2013, six months after the camp was opened, it 
had become clear that this situation was untenable, due to the scale of the crisis 
unfolding in Syria (and thereby Jordan) and the inexperience of the JHCO in managing 
an operation anything like Za‘tari.148 To tackle this, the GoJ created the Syrian Refugee 
Camps Directorate, which would become the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate 
mentioned above. Even though the UN system was also struggling to respond quickly 
and dynamically to the emerging situation,149 in early 2013 the GoJ also gave a larger role 
to UNHCR, which essentially took over large swathes of non-security related governance 
of the camp from JHCO.150 New UNHCR personnel, working under the direction of 
Kilian Kleinschmidt, a white, male, German veteran of humanitarian crises in Somalia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Pakistan, were brought in to, in the words of a 
former UNHCR worker, “get it back under control.”151 Kleinschmidt ran UNHCR’s 
operations in the camp until November 2014, during which time the camp changed 
extensively. 
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During the earlier part of its existence – 2012 and 2013 – the camp was much less 
‘orderly’ than it was during the time of my fieldwork. Tens, hundreds or even thousands 
of new refugees were arriving each day,152 the bailout system enabled many people to 
leave after days or weeks, service provision was still being conducted somewhat 
haphazardly and partly through ‘street leaders’ (see below), and the market and 
neighbourhoods of Syrians’ choice were still being created through them moving tents, 
caravans, and other materials around the camp. The camp was the site of multiple 
instantiations of violence and conflict. These included of course the violence inherent in 
restricting Syrians’ freedom of movement, but also interpersonal violence among Syrians, 
violent clashes between refugees and security forces, and sometimes between refugees 
and humanitarian workers.  
 
In a large-scale survey of over 3,000 residents conducted by SIREN, part of the camp’s 
community policing team (discussed below) in 2013, 40 percent of Syrians surveyed 
believed that there was no law enforcement in the camp, almost half of residents could 
not lock their abodes, over fifteen percent had experienced theft in the camp, and over 
one third reported that they felt unsafe walking alone in Za‘tari during the daytime, a 
number that increased at night time. Distribution sites, in particular, were considered to 
be unsafe, with 90 percent of respondents identifying non-food distribution sites as 
unsafe, and over 75 percent considered food distribution sites as unsafe. In the 
qualitative focus group discussions, overcrowding of public spaces, gatherings of male 
youths, fighting and harassment were all considered to be significant problems.153 As well 
as harassment, the camp experienced very high levels of other forms of SGBV, in 
particular domestic violence.154 
 
In addition to these forms of violence and perceived lack of safety, there were extensive 
reports of what has been termed ‘riots’ and ‘criminality’ in the camp. 155  These 
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designations fail to recognise the politics of the underlying disputes over distribution, and 
further demonstrate the ways in which, as Sophia Hoffman has argued, humanitarianism 
simultaneously defines populations as at risk and a risk.156  As has been documented 
above, Syrians would use the resources they found in the camp for their own purposes, 
whether that was to build homes, create shops, move caravans, or other reasons. An 
infamous incident occurred in early 2013, in which Syrian youths dismantled and took a 
pre-fabricated police station. One version of this story is that the station was unguarded 
due to a communication mix-up between different units.157 Another version, which I was 
told personally, is that the Jordanian police officers watched, worried for their safety if 
they tried to intervene.158 Furthermore, so-called street leaders, who were largely self-
appointed members of the community who took on responsibility for their 
neighbourhoods, were rumoured to be taking a proportion of the resources they helped 
to distribute as ‘payment’ for their services.159  
 
Za‘tari was also the scene of violent demonstrations and clashes between refugees and 
Jordanian security forces, which on at least one occasion resulted in the death of a Syrian 
refugee.160 In response to this incident, UNHCR released a statement that included an 
“appeal to Syrian refugees to respect Jordanian law,” and emphasised that “tremendous 
efforts have been made over the past months to create an atmosphere of civility in the 
camp.”161 While incidents such as this would make international headlines, much less 
widely reported were smaller-scale, but much more regular instances of protest and 
stone-throwing, towards both security forces and humanitarian workers.162 One of the 
effects of this history of the camp was that even at the time of my fieldwork some 
humanitarian workers would think of Za‘tari as a place of ‘violence’ and ‘chaos.’ 163 
During my fieldwork I was consistently surprised that some NGO workers would 
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question whether it was, for example, safe to walk through the camp on foot, which 
jarred with my experience of the camp. 164  
 
The political nature of these incidents and protests, and the violence that sometimes 
resulted from them, was rarely explicitly recognised when I discussed that period of the 
camp with my interlocutors. One interviewee, for example, who was stationed in Za‘tari 
for most of 2013, introduced his time in the camp during an interview by describing 
scenes of chaos and disorder. Upon detailed questioning, however, he revealed that when 
violent incidents occurred, they were often around distribution centres, or in disputes 
over registration (and thus the allocation of resources).165 Rather than indiscriminate or 
random acts of violence, another interviewee explained, protests in the camp were often 
“quite small and quite targeted: they’re directed at the UN or security services.” 166 
Protests, and the stoning of vehicles, similarly greeted a September 2012 visit to the 
camp by Lakhdar Brahimi, the then UN and Arab League Special Envoy for Syria.167  
 
Participants in protests, demonstrations, stone throwings, and those who positioned 
themselves, or were positioned by others, as street and community leaders, were 
overwhelmingly men and boys. Street leaders simultaneously exercised power over others 
in Za‘tari, and resisted the power of humanitarian and state authorities.168 In Za‘tari, as in 
other contexts,169 many men were keen to (re)gain masculinised roles of leadership and 
responsibility in the community, which conflict and exile had disrupted.170 It was the 
male population of Za‘tari in particular, therefore, that appeared in the eyes of the 
governing authorities to need to be brought under control. For example, the idea that 
disturbances in the camp were caused by the young and/or single men of Za‘tari (two 
categories that overlap significantly in the context of Za‘tari), appeared in both the 
international press 171  and UNHCR and NGO reports. 172  This created (or perhaps 
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reinforced) a perception of the young men in the camp as “trouble makers,”173 or, in the 
words of the Kleinschmidt to the New York Times, “naughty, naughty kids – the best 
stone throwers on earth.”174 In August 2012, according to an article in the Jordan Times, 
which is no longer available on their website, Jordanian authorities even threatened to 
“separate single men from families in Zaatari” in response to “violent riots” taking place 
there.175 Such a separation has been undertaken by humanitarian actors in other contexts, 
for example in camps in Greece where refugees from Syria and elsewhere live. This 
arrangement left many men, especially younger men, facing isolation, violence, and 
oppressive levels of police surveillance.176  
 
According to some of my interviewees, the perception of young men in the camp as 
dangerous also extended to NGO employees in their interactions with the Syrian 
population. For some NGO employees, fear was created by the actions that young men 
in the camp took to protect and defend themselves. For example, some young men carry 
small-scale weapons with them in the camp, fashioned out of items such as pieces of 
aluminium, which the vast majority of NGOs would not allow within their centres or 
spaces.177 But “by not recognising that [young men’s] fear is driving them, then our fear 
drives us [and] we don’t recognise it either.”178 Young men in Za‘tari were keenly aware 
of the widespread negative perceptions that circulate about them locally and 
internationally, 179  which articulated with broader negative portrayals of Arab men as 
violent and dangerous.180 These protesting young men do not match the vision of the 
‘vulnerable’ refugee with whom humanitarians imagine they should be working, nor are 
camp environments, according to humanitarian logics, meant to be ‘political’ spaces. 
While the emphasis on refugee men’s ‘riots’ and ‘violence’ hypermasculinises them, the 
perceived need to bring protests under control in the camp can be understood as part of 
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humanitarian actors’ attempts to bring the refugee population of Za‘tari more in line with 
the vision of refugees in the South as passive, feminised, and depoliticised. 
 
There were multiple attempts to respond to this mixture of protest, violence, and the 
‘privatisation’ of humanitarian resources, and to create a depoliticised and pliant 
population. Kleinschmidt relied on the deployment of a masculinised, authoritarian 
personal style in order to gain the ‘respect’ of the population, while simultaneously trying 
to reduce the power of the street leaders through a much more widespread, but ‘softer,’ 
police presence in the camp. Backing up this system was a little discussed, but widely 
known, policy whereby Syrians were at risk of arbitrary deportation from the camp to 
Syria. These three features of governance, centred around Kleinschmidt, ‘softer’ policing, 
and deportations, will now be explored in turn. 
 
The authoritarian aspects of camp governance were, in part, centred around 
Kleinschmidt himself. The subject of sympathetic, even sycophantic, portrayals in news 
articles and film documentaries, 181  Kleinschmidt is a deeply polarising figure in the 
humanitarian sector in Jordan because of how he approached the governance of 
Za‘tari.182 He deliberately attempted to maintain a ‘strong man’ image, as he “understands 
the refugees only accept him if he behaves like a mayor in their presence.”183 It appeared, 
from footage of the time, to be a role he enjoyed. In the opening episode of the video 
series “A Day in the Life: Za‘atari” he explains, set to tense music in the background, 
that he is “the manager of Za‘tari camp, they call me the mayor of Za‘tari,” and with a 
slight smile, “but I’m also simply the boss.” 184 This ‘macho’ vision of authority and 
power is recognisable as, to use Cynthia Weber’s phrase, one of the “masculine forms of 
white authoritarian leadership:” 185  humanitarianism is embodied in gendered and 
racialised ways.  
  
Kleinschmidt took an intolerant attitude towards refugees’ protests. He wanted Syrians 
to respect the physical installations of humanitarian agencies, and for refugees and 
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authorities to be “working together.”186 There was simply no room for protests. As one 
Syrian man told me in the summer of 2016, in contrast to the early months of the camp, 
protests are now “not allowed.”187 The aforementioned short films document an incident 
when Kleinschmidt is informed by telephone of a protest because a new transformer for 
the electricity supply had not yet arrived, and he tells a colleague over the phone:  
 
if they don’t stop demonstrating there is no transformer. They can 
burn the camp if they wish. They can burn it all it’s their camp. The 
police has to tell them to go back and stop this demonstrating 
business.188  
 
This shows that particular sorts of ‘politics’ within refugee camps are deemed 
inappropriate, and incompatible with humanitarianism, and demonstrates one of the 
ways in which, as Sophia Hoffman has argued, humanitarian agencies are increasingly 
reliant on national police forces. This reliance contrasts with humanitarians’ prior 
insistence that a clear separation between the two should exist. The increasing levels of 
humanitarian-state security cooperation, she argues, risk eroding both trust in 
humanitarianism and the perception that humanitarians are ‘independent.’189  
 
In another episode, Kleinschmidt is filmed in a verbal altercation with protesting Syrians, 
telling them to “stop this nonsense here. No demonstrations anymore.”190 Speaking later 
to the camera, he explains that this is part of a continued dispute about the new 
transformer. He returned to Base Camp to find that the main entrance had been blocked:  
 
and this is something I simply cannot stand. If everything…I 
mean…opinion is expressed through basically a violent act of reducing 
our freedom of movement or something like that it’s not acceptable.  
 
There is no apparent irony in his suggestion that it is unacceptable for humanitarians’ 
freedom of movement to be limited by refugees, when the camp is designed to facilitate 
exactly the reverse. While one individual, Kleinschmidt’s behaviours articulate with 
others’ observations of the gendered dynamics of humanitarianism. As Cynthia Enloe 
has noted, among Oxfam’s staff the Emergency Aid Department, which for example 
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went to refugee camps, was seen as the most masculinised of its departments, 
“surrounded by an aura of urgency,” requiring expertise and “heavy lifting.”191 
 
In addition to a hostility to Syrians’ protests, humanitarian and governmental actors also 
attempted to depoliticise Za‘tari through the banning the Syrian rebel flag (with green, 
white and black stripes with red stars),192 which I would only very occasionally see in 
public spaces during my fieldwork, but which used to be much more numerous, 
especially along the market streets.193 Coffee shops and shisha bars are also banned, 
which remove from Syrian men some of the main spaces in which they might otherwise 
socialise.194 In my voluntary activities offering English teaching with an INGO in the 
camp, I was required to sign a form acknowledging my awareness and adherence to the 
“safety golden rules,” which included “avoid any religious or political views.”195 This 
depoliticisation of refugees’ lives is central to humanitarian work in contexts of 
displacement,196 and Za‘tari was no exception.197 In a particularly interesting choice of 
words given the links between the feminisation and depoliticisation of refugees,198 an 
NGO Director I interviewed, who was very critical of the way humanitarians functioned 
in the camp, argued that the population of Za‘tari has been “domesticated.”199  
 
Kleinschmidt’s approach also had implications for the competition to exercise sovereign 
power over Za‘tari. Positioning himself publicly as the mayor of a segment of Jordanian 
territory and carrying out plans without consultation with SRAD in the camp did little to 
endear him to Jordanian authorities, or to the UNHCR hierarchy in the country.200 A 
Jordanian police officer who had worked in Za‘tari for over two years understood 
Kleinschmidt’s attitude as based on his experience of working on humanitarian crises in 
‘Africa.’ Humanitarian agencies “can do whatever they want [in Africa]…there is no 
control or order,” he explained. Jordan, by contrast, is a sovereign actor in control of, 
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and present throughout, its territory, and is thereby deserving of deference: “[y]ou are in 
Jordan! We have a system that should be respected.”201 
 
Agents of the Jordanian state were, however, also part of Kleinschmidt’s plans for the 
camp, and in early 2014 it was reported that 800 public security personnel were employed 
in the camp.202 Kleinschmidt wished to replace the street leaders, whom were often the 
leaders or instigators of protests, with whom he regularly had to negotiate, and on whom 
the Jordanian police relied for information, with community police officers. 203  This 
would also, it was hoped, stop situations where UNHCR were approached by members 
of security services, who would ask them to prioritise particular individuals in the camp 
for resource distribution, on the basis, it appeared, that they had supplied, or promised to 
supply, the security services with information. 204  It would simultaneously reduce the 
power of the street leaders and tackle the unwillingness and/or inability of the Jordanian 
security services to police the camp in anything but the most reactive sense. Patrolling 
inside the camp, police officers believed, would potentially put their lives at risk.205 At the 
same time, Kleinschmidt engaged in meetings and consultations with street leaders, and 
tried to encourage them to work together with him to ensure the smooth running of the 
camp.206  
 
The project to implement community policing in the camp was funded by the British 
Embassy in Amman, and was overseen by SIREN Associates. SIREN, an organisation 
that works on policing and security sector reform, is staffed primarily by former or 
retired British (and in particular often Northern Irish) police officers, who form part of a 
long line of foreign ‘experts’ who have helped shape policing in the Middle East.207 
SIREN staff members do not undertake policing themselves, but rather act as “mentors” 
for those undertaking the ‘community policing.’ 208  This policing does not involve 
members of the Syrian community taking the roles of police officers, or assistants, or 
even formal community liaison roles, but rather in Za‘tari ‘community policing’ refers to 
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the style of policing undertaken. As Susan Miller has argued in the context of the United 
States, this involves a re-definition of ‘softer’ skills, which are often coded as feminine, to 
be masculine traits and part of ‘real’ police work.209 While states will often attempt to 
portray community policing as a “gentler and kinder way of policing,” it is “a crucial 
piece of police jargon for what is in reality an aggressively proactive style of policing,” 
and resembles a milder version of counterinsurgency.210  
 
The community police, who are Jordanian police officers, and their assistants, who are 
retired Jordanian police officers, are trained to act as problem-solvers in the camp, and 
have developed “a very good empathy for the Syrians” according to a SIREN project 
manager. 211  On a visit to the community police station in July 2016, I was told by 
community police officers that the biggest problems they dealt with were not criminal 
incidents, but were about supplies of electricity or water, or disputes between 
neighbours.212 Increasing the everyday presence of the police in the camp, and making 
everyday problems and non-criminal disputes part of their purview, has also had the 
effect of increasing Syrians’ perceptions that Jordanian law is both the official law in the 
camp, and that it is actually implemented. This was deemed, by SIREN, a success.213 
While “Jordan” may remain separate from “Za‘tari” in some Syrians’ minds, as discussed 
above, this performance of Jordanian sovereignty and authority was nonetheless having 
an impact on Syrians’ (reported) perceptions of the camp. 
 
I asked a community police officer how else their work differed from the work of other 
police units stationed in and around the camp. He explained that it was about their 
approach and the way they do their work: “[w]e are respectful, humanitarian, and have 
good relations with the community.” This comment prompted a response from the 
(non-community) police officer who was accompanying me around the camp. He turned 
to the community police officer and asked “are we not humanitarian?” The community 
police officer attempted, slightly frantically, to explain that of course he hadn’t meant to 
imply that any other branch of the Jordanian police was not humanitarian, they all were. 
While their discussion continued, the third police officer present started a different 
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conversation with me, perhaps in an effort to distract me from the disagreement taking 
place, which remained friendly, but which nonetheless appeared important to its 
participants.214  
 
Even if community policing is not a gentler, but rather a different, way of exerting 
control over a population, more ‘traditional’ and draconian elements of policing 
continued to be used in Za‘tari, and played an important role in the creation of ‘order.’ 
There is an ever-present awareness among Syrians living in the camp that they are 
potentially subject to deportation back to Syria - refoulement in the language of 
international refugee law. 215  According to my Syrian and humanitarian interlocutors, 
deportations take place largely on the basis of (suspected) security concerns, in particular 
where Syrians are suspected of being affiliated to groups such as Da‘ish  or Jabhat al-
Nusra.216 Given the situations in Syria and Iraq, and the threat that the GoJ believes that 
radicalisation poses to Jordan, the Jordanian security services feel “empowered” to act 
upon security concerns, which are perceived to trump any humanitarian 
considerations.217 In another article that has since between removed from the Jordan Times 
website, the then-Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh is quoted as stating that those 
responsible for “rioting” will also be “repatriated” to “where they came from.” The 
policy of deportation applies across the whole of Jordan.218 According to Human Rights 
Watch, numbers of deportations of Syrians from Jordan spiked in mid-2016 and early 
2017, with the latter period witnessing the deportation of around 400 registered refugees 
per month.219 
 
In the camp context, however, threats of deportation (whether explicit or subtle) extend 
beyond the security services. They are used by individual Jordanians, including those 
working for NGOs in the camp, to stop individual objections or protests, for example 
about the distribution of resources, or even to extract resources from refugees 
themselves.220 Allusions to relatives in the mukhabarat (intelligence services) have a very 
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clear meaning to a Syrian living in a context where deportations are known to occur 
regularly. Those slated for deportation, furthermore, have no due process or ability to 
appeal or challenge the decision.221 In this context, the widespread threat of this measure 
contributes to the depoliticisation of the camp, strongly disincentivising not only overt 
political activity, but also gatherings that may be deemed, or construed, to be ‘political’ or 
in some sense threatening to the Jordanian authorities.  
 
It is widely known, among both camp residents and NGO workers, that deportations are 
a feature of life for Syrians in Jordan. Yet there is also a widespread perception in the 
humanitarian sector that this is one of the most sensitive issues in governmental-
humanitarian relations, and one in which it is perceived that the sector has little influence 
over Jordanian decisions.222 Andrew Harper, then UNHCR’s representative to Jordan, is 
quoted as stating that “if the government believes there is a security concern with some 
refugees, it is very difficult for us to intervene successfully,” and that “we understand the 
government’s legitimate security concerns.”223 Or, as one NGO project manager told me, 
reflecting the aforementioned increasing levels of cooperation between humanitarian and 
state security agencies “you cannot win in a discussion with the police or with the camp 
management because they work, erm, together.” 224  The relative public silences from 
UNHCR on the question of refoulement from Jordan – not only in the case of Syrians, but 
also notably in the case of many hundred Sudanese in December 2015225 – is one of 
many sources of disquiet among many working in the humanitarian sector about the 
relationship between GoJ and UNHCR.226  
 
Others in the camp, in particular NGO workers and police officers, would offer a 
different, or at least further, cause of the change in the camp environment – a change in 
the “mentality” of the Syrian refugees in the camp. Syrians, I was told, began to recognise 
the (semi-) permanence of their situation, and thus began to make their homes in Za‘tari 
(especially as service provision improved over time), and to relate to the environment 
and authorities differently.227 This narrative is also used by humanitarian workers in the 
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press, who blamed the “difficult mentality” of the refugees for many of the problems 
that were facing the camp.228 A Jordanian policeman, while giving me a tour of Za‘tari, 
explained that as time had gone on, Syrians had realised that the Jordanian police were 
not like their counterparts in Syria, but were rather on the side of the population, a 
dichotomous juxtaposition that is untenable in the context of widespread deportations to 
a war-torn country. He relayed to me an incident in which he and colleagues had been 
praying, when a Syrian man rushed up to them to ‘warn’ them that the colonel was 
coming, and so they should stop. The Jordanian policemen explained that, in Jordan, 
unlike Syria, it was not considered problematic for those in uniform to offer overt 
displays of their religiosity. This, he told me, was one of the many individual turning 
points in Syrians’ understanding of their relationship with Jordanian authorities.229 While 
Syrians’ relationships to the space of the camp may have changed over time, particularly 
as they lived in Za‘tari for longer periods, and as service provision improved, blaming the 
“mentality” of Syrians curiously makes humanitarian and security actors invisible in 
processes of change in the camp. It obscures the role their interactions with refugees 
have in creating particular relationships between humanitarian actors and Syrians.230 
 
In November 2014, Kleinschmidt was replaced as the most senior UNHCR official in 
the camp by Hovig Etyemezian, an official who had previously worked for UNHCR in 
Iraq, Tunisia and Mauritania. Etyemezian brought to the role a distinctly different style. 
As a fluent Arabic speaker, he was able to more comfortably and directly communicate 
with Syrians and Jordanians, and was known to attend important events in the camp, 
such as weddings and funerals to which he was invited.231 According to a Jordanian 
official who was stationed in Za‘tari at the time, Etyemezian emphasised, from the 
beginning of his tenure, that any problems in the camp should be solved cooperatively by 
UNHCR and the Jordanian authorities, and that he understood them as working as a 
team all aiming to serve the people of the camp.232 As my interviewee quoted above 
stated, the police and the camp management “work, erm, together.”233  
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By the time of my fieldwork, which began in September 2015, the attempts to reform 
and depoliticise the camp space appeared to have had considerable success. For example, 
the street leaders, with whom Kleinschmidt had repeatedly clashed, had a much-
diminished role in the camp, according to my Syrian interlocutors, in part because service 
provision had become more centralised and controlled. While there was some 
disagreement about the precise level of their influence with authorities, their role in the 
distribution of resources, I was told, had become marginal.234 Camp authorities were also 
able to exercise significantly more control over the organisation of space in the camp. In 
April 2015, a ‘site planning and camp shelter restructure project’ began. This included 
reorganising the location of Syrians’ caravans in order to move caravans that were in 
“irregular house-hold locations,”235 to allow for the installation of a sewage system, and 
to develop a masterplan for the camp where streets would have names, and each caravan 
an address. The goals of this project appear very similar to some of the key goals of 
Kleinschmidt’s 2013 Governance Plan, which aimed to reorganise and regularise space 
within the camp. In February 2016, I observed part of this plan being put into action. 
While chatting to a group of Syrians in between workshops, I pointed out the caravans 
being moved by cranes and winches, and asked them what it was for. This was the 
“tanzim [organisation]” they replied. Years ago, they told me, it was possible to move 
your own caravan and select a location for it, but it wasn’t like that anymore.236  
 
Conclusion 
By the time of my fieldwork, Za‘tari, which had been hastily put together in the summer 
of 2012, and through which hundreds of thousands of Syrians had passed, was a 
settlement of approximately 80,000 Syrians, most of whom had lived there for years, not 
weeks or months. This chapter has located Za‘tari within a particular Jordanian context, 
while simultaneously drawing on broader theories of sovereignty, neoliberalism, and 
space, to understand its location and meaning within that context. Za‘tari is a site for the 
performance of Jordanian sovereignty, which is unevenly exercised across Jordanian 
territory, and the site of a humanitarian ethical project that seeks to intervene upon, and 
reform, the bodies immobilised by encampment. The projects of both Jordanian and 
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state actors have been challenged, contested, and resisted by Syrian refugees living in the 
camp. 
 
The ‘stability’ that had been ‘achieved’ in the camp by the beginning of my fieldwork was 
the result of the efforts humanitarian and state actors’ attempts to render the camp more 
‘governable,’ in response to Syrians’ insistence that they be able to exercise agency in the 
camp, and express themselves politically. Through expansive and extensive forms of 
policing, through the clampdown on protest, the use of deportation, and improved 
service provision, governing authorities have created a depoliticised space, in line with 
humanitarian visions of refugee camps, and a space where the performance of Jordanian 
sovereignty is less contested. In the depoliticisation of the camp, humanitarian agencies 
were also creating a role for themselves as service providers, rather than political actors 
involved in overt contestations of governing, and creating the kind of overtly 
depoliticised and pliant population with which they understand they should be working.  
 
Within these struggles over the camp, refugee men appeared primarily as ‘troublemakers’ 
– as too political, too agential, and too disruptive of humanitarian and state visions of 
refugee camps. Yet while refugee men, in the years subsequent to the establishment of 
the camp, were rendered governable, this did not resolve the complexities, outlined in 
Chapter 2, about their position within humanitarian operations under such ‘normal’ 
humanitarian circumstances. On the contrary, once overt political protest and 
contestation had subsided in Za‘tari, humanitarian agencies did not appear to know what 
their responsibilities to refugee men were. Men became something of an invisible 
presence, as I will now explore in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Care, Control and a Lack of Interest: Humanitarian Relations with 
Syrian Men and Women 
 
One warm evening in May, I was sitting on the large terrace of a friend’s apartment in an 
expensive district of Amman, having dinner with her and her friends, all of whom 
worked for UN agencies in Jordan. As was often the case, my ‘unusual’ research topic 
was the subject of interest and conversation among the other guests. On this particular 
occasion, though, one of my interlocutors appeared somewhat confused at the notion 
that the humanitarian sector was not responding to the needs of refugee men. I gave the 
example of psychosocial support, and the relative lack of provision of it for refugee men, 
compared to refugee women and children. Across the dinner table, almost with 
incredulity, she replied “what would [psychosocial support] be for men, anyway, getting 
them to play basketball?”1 The idea that men might be ‘vulnerable,’ as the humanitarian 
sector understands that term, and in need of support, therapy, or counselling, clearly 
jarred with her understandings of (Syrian) men, and the role and work of the 
humanitarian sector in Jordan.  
 
By exploring how the notion of ‘vulnerability’ was understood and deployed in Za‘tari, 
this chapter analyses relations between humanitarian actors and Syrian men and women 
in the camp. It demonstrates that Syrian men were largely assumed to be agential and 
independent, rather than ‘vulnerable,’ and many humanitarian actors demonstrated a lack 
of interest in working with them. Yet it was Syrian men themselves who were deemed to 
be uninterested in work that was not designed with them in mind, and to be unavailable 
for activities planned according to others’ schedules. At the same time, this chapter 
explores and critiques humanitarian relationships with Syrian refugee women, and argues 
that women’s designation as ‘the most vulnerable’ renders their lives and bodies as sites 
for humanitarian care and control. Despite the rhetoric of women’s empowerment, when 
women make decisions that are contrary to the priorities of humanitarian actors, ‘global 
standards’ on gender override and remove Syrian women’s decisions and agency. 
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The Power of ‘Vulnerability’: Syrian Refugee Women and the Female-Headed 
Household  
Given the analysis presented in Chapter 2, it is unsurprising that Syrian women were 
understood by humanitarians to be uncontroversial objects of humanitarian care. As 
feminist scholars have convincingly demonstrated, ‘women’ are regularly infantilised in 
contexts of humanitarianism and conflict through being consistently grouped with 
‘children,’ creating, in Cynthia Enloe’s terminology, the undifferentiated category of 
‘womenandchildren’ who require care and intervention.2 Both women and children, as 
Liisa Malkki has observed, embody “a special kind of powerlessness” in western 
imaginaries.3 Within the specific context of the Syria response, this was manifested by 
humanitarian actors’ widespread designation of ‘womenandchildren’ as ‘vulnerable,’ or 
often as ‘the most vulnerable.’ That ‘womenandchildren’ were the most vulnerable, or at 
least always vulnerable, was rarely questioned, rarely explained, and rarely reflected on.  
 
UNHCR in Jordan defined vulnerability as: 
 
the risk of exposure of Syrian refugee households to harm, primarily in relation 
to protection threats, the inability to meet basic needs, limited access to basic 
services, and food insecurity, and the inability of the population to cope with 
the consequences of this harm.4  
Within everyday interactions with humanitarian workers, however, the perceived 
obviousness of women and children’s ‘vulnerability’ rendered in-depth discussion of its 
meaning redundant. Vulnerability appeared to be attached to, or a feature of, women and 
children, rather than, as Judith Butler has argued, vulnerability being understood as “part 
of bodily life…[which] becomes highly exacerbated under certain social and political 
conditions.”5  
  
This assumption of womenandchildren’s ‘vulnerability’ articulates with prevailing 
presentations and understandings of refugees in the South, and is another means through 
which refugee women are depoliticised, because of the focus on their perceived 
‘vulnerability,’ rather than how particular circumstances mean they can be in situations 
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with complex needs. It simultaneously speaks to globalised understandings of Muslim 
women. Perceived to be victims of backward, oppressive and misogynistic ‘Arab culture,’ 
and oppressed by their religion, the Muslim woman, like the refugee woman, “invites 
special remedial attention.”6 She is understood to be, as Lila Abu-Lughod has argued, in 
need of saving.7 In accordance with such understandings, within international English 
and Arabic media, Syrian refugee women have been portrayed as “a homogenous group 
of powerless, victimized women.”8 While in some contexts this has been accompanied by 
a discourse of empowered women as the builders of a future democracy, 9  this was 
notably absent on the ground in Za‘tari, despite the focus on women’s ‘empowerment.’10 
 
The understanding of women as ‘vulnerable’ therefore operates as an incitement to 
external intervention, and constitutes a form of power that disciplines the women it 
ostensibly aims to assist. As Wendy Brown has argued, attempts to express, and achieve 
recognition and codification of the experiences of women (and others) can: 
 
tacitly silence those who do not share the experience of those whose 
suffering is most marked (or whom the discourse produces as suffering 
markedly)…[and] also condemn those whose sufferings they record to 
a permanent identification with that suffering.11  
 
Deploying Foucauldian analysis, Brown explains that “confessing injury” comes to 
“constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group.”12 The ‘vulnerability’ of Syrian 
women has become one such regulatory truth. It encourages performances of 
powerlessness on the part of refugee women, “reinforce[s] gendered constructions of 
women’s powerlessness and lack of agency…[and] diminish[es] the understanding of the 
differences in their positioning dependent on class, ethnicity, age and other factors.”13 
                                                
6 Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil, Public Square (Princeton, N.J.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 6; see also Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation? Chapter 5. 
7 Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving? 
8 Katty Alhayek, “Double Marginalization: The Invisibility of Syrian Refugee Women’s Perspectives in 
Mainstream Online Activism and Global Media,” Feminist Media Studies 14, no. 4 (2014): 698; for an 
exploration of the deployment of (a vision of) gender equality among a refugee community as a strategy to 
attract aid and political support, see Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi 
Politics of Survival, Gender, Culture, and Politics in the Middle East (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2014). 
9 Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation? Chapter 1. 
10 See Chapter 2. 
11 Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays On Knowledge And Politics (Princeton, NJ Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 79. 
12 Brown, 78. 
13 Freedman, “Mainstreaming Gender in Refugee Protection,” 600. 
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Yet simultaneously, women’s ‘vulnerability,’ while regulating, disciplining, and 
disempowering, can, it is believed, mobilise resources, sympathy and visibility.  
 
This can be seen in UNHCR’s visual depictions of Syrian refugees, and in the allocation 
of resources and services to them. Photographer Jared Kohler, who was contracted to 
UNHCR Jordan in 2014, told me that: 
 
there is a huge interest [in] both visually and statistically emphasising 
the female and youth and elderly components and to really try to 
downplay and not focus on the fighting age male…unless you can read 
vulnerability in the image directly, it’s going to be considered less 
strong.14  
 
Within this schema, the bodies of women and children can be read as vulnerable 
“directly,” and thereby generate sympathy, whereas the bodies of men cannot. In one of 
the documents for which his photographs were used, the Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework Baseline Survey discussed below,15 there are photographs of or including twenty 
people. There are eleven women and teenage girls pictured, eight young children (mostly 
girls), and one man, very elderly and lying under a blanket. As Kohler explained, “I was 
told at times really we need pictures of women and children, and as a photographer you 
learn to shoot what is wanted and published.” Knowing that it was very unlikely pictures 
of refugee men would be used, he would often not even send in the pictures of men that 
he had taken.16  
 
The question of who is ‘vulnerable’ is central to the allocation of resources to the refugee 
population. In the early months and years of the Syrian refugee presence in Jordan, the 
‘vulnerability’ of refugees was assessed using the standard methodology that UNHCR 
employs: the Specific Needs Code.17 According to UNHCR’s handbook for emergencies: 
 
[t]he following are groups generally considered to have specific needs: 
girls and boys at risk, including unaccompanied and separated children, 
persons with serious health conditions, persons with special legal or 
physical protection needs, single women, women-headed households, 
older persons, persons with disabilities, and persons with a diverse [sic] 
                                                
14 Interview with Jared Kohler. 
15 See UNHCR, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Baseline Survey.” 
16 Interview with Jared Kohler. 
17 Hisham Khogali et al., “Aid Effectiveness and Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Determining 
Vulnerability among Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” Field Exchange Emergency Nutrition Network, November 
2014, 78–81. 
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sexual orientation or gender identity.18  
 
As will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6, in their allocation of work opportunities, 
humanitarian actors are instructed by UNHCR to “[pay] special consideration to 
vulnerable groups.”19  
 
As this definition demonstrates, one demographic entity that humanitarian organisations 
and workers consistently deemed to be particularly ‘vulnerable’ was the ‘female-headed 
household.’ While Erin Baines, writing in the early 2000s, called for a reduction in the 
focus on refugee women as vulnerable, and a simultaneous recognition that not all 
households were ‘male-headed,’ this latter recognition has in fact been accompanied by a 
perceived hypervulnerability of the category of the ‘female-headed household.’20 In the 
everyday language of humanitarian and NGO workers, a ‘female-headed household’ is a 
nuclear family in which an adult woman lives with children, but not with a male partner. 
This designation is the same regardless of whether the woman does not have a partner, 
had a partner who died, is divorced or separated from a partner, or has a partner who is 
not currently (registered as) living in Jordan. In this schema, when a woman is living with 
an adult male partner, the household is automatically understood to be non ‘female-
headed;’ that is, problematically, women only ‘head’ their households in the absence of a 
male partner. As Susie Jolly has argued, this is a deeply heteronormative designation; it 
ignores “the possibility that [the household] could be female headed by choice,” run by a 
lesbian couple, for example, or by a woman who prefers to live without a husband.21 
 
In Oxfam’s “vulnerability scoring system” for Syrian refugees, which is discussed in 
more detail below, this logic is extended even further: a female-headed household is one 
in which there is “no able bodied male in 18-59 age group in the household.” The adult 
male children of a woman living without a male partner, it appears, even if they are only 
aged 18, would automatically be considered to be the ‘head of household,’ or at the very 
least, would prevent the woman from being considered to be the ‘head of household.’ In 
UNHCR reports, however, the person who heads a household is defined by who is the 
                                                
18 UNHCR, “Identifying Persons with Specific Needs (PWSN),” UNHCR Emergency Handbook, 2015, 
https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/64324/identifying-persons-with-specific-needs-pwsn. 
19 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” July 28, 2015, 1, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
20 Baines, Vulnerable Bodies. 
21 Susie Jolly, “Why Is Development Work so Straight? Heteronormativity in the International 
Development Industry,” Development in Practice 21, no. 1 (2011): 24. 
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‘principal applicant’ in the documents that register the family with UNHCR in the 
country, 22 leaving open the possibility that a woman living with her male partner could 
be the ‘head of household,’ even if this is not how the term is used in the vernacular. The 
proportion of households in Za‘tari headed by women according to UNHCR is one in 
five,23 slightly lower than the figure Syrian refugees living in the Middle East overall.24 
 
‘Female-headed household’ is challenging to render straightforwardly into Arabic. When 
asked how to express the term in Arabic, one interviewee, a gender specialist and native 
Arabic speaker, paused for a few seconds, and then offered ‘rabbat usra’ as the translation, 
which is the linguistically feminine version of the typical phrase used to describe a man’s 
position as head of a family. Our mutual friend, who was hosting the interview at her 
house, pointed out that this term meant ‘housewife’ rather than ‘head of household.’  My 
interviewee responded, after further reflection, that the two terms are the same, but that 
context and emphasis would differentiate a housewife from a woman with financial 
responsibility for her family.25  
 
Being a ‘female-headed household,’ one NGO programme manager told me, is one of 
the “standard indicators” of ‘vulnerability’ that his organisation looks for when deciding 
with whom to work.26 When you encounter a woman raising her children without a 
husband, he explained, “you get really, I don’t know, emotional.”27 Another interviewee, 
who had accompanied teams doing vulnerability assessments, reported similar dynamics, 
but he lamented that “as soon as you saw a working age male in the household, you just 
knew how their assessment was going to turn out.”28 I even encountered stories of the 
parents of families registering separately, such as to appear to be a ‘female-headed 
household’ on paper.29 These schema are replicated in other humanitarian organisations, 
even if they do not use the same systems for assessing vulnerability, in particular 
humanitarian organisations and charities from, and/or funded by, Arab Gulf states. 
These charities often operate in parallel to the structures erected by UNHCR and the 
GoJ, but nonetheless have a huge presence on the ground, especially in Jordanian host 
                                                
22 E.g. see UNHCR, “Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014” (Amman: UNHCR 
Jordan, 2014); UNHCR, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Baseline Survey.” 
23 UNHCR, “Zaatari Refugee Camp Factsheet May 2017” (UNHCR Jordan, May 2017). 
24 UNHCR, “Woman Alone: The Fight for Survival by Syria’s Refugee Women” (Geneva: UNHCR, 2014). 
25 Interview with humanitarian worker with focus on LGBTI rights, Amman, 01.06.2016. 
26 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Interview with Jared Kohler. 
29 Conversation with NGO workers and Syrian refugees, Amman, 06.10.2015. 
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communities. According to Elizabeth Dickinson, for these charities “orphans, widows, 
[and] the elderly” are “the categories of needy at the front of the line,” for aid that is 
distributed to the wider community.30  
 
Some western organisations have designed their own tools to assess refugee 
‘vulnerability’ through quantifying the circumstances of a household, and being ‘female-
headed’ is one important criteria. For Oxfam, for example, being a ‘female-headed 
household’ gets one six ‘vulnerability points,’ whereas being a ‘single-parent family’ only 
carries two ‘vulnerability points.’ This would leave a single-parent family with a woman 
as the parent with eight ‘vulnerability points,’ in comparison to a single-parent family 
with a man, who would have two ‘vulnerability points.’ A family needs to get ten ‘points’ 
to reach the threshold for ‘high vulnerability,’ and thereby inclusion in Oxfam’s 
programmes. Women are infantilised and rendered ‘vulnerable,’ in this schema, by the 
absence of men, and thereby constituted as objects of sympathy and charity. Where there 
is an adult male son in the household, these criteria can also place enormous pressure on 
him to provide for the family.  
 
The assumption that women will be particularly ‘vulnerable’ in the absence of a male 
partner appeared to be shared by many of the Syrian men I worked with and interviewed 
during my fieldwork.31 One colleague who had been working with men in Za‘tari told me 
that in her experience, men in the camp did not appear to support women’s rights in 
general, but they did seem to genuinely agree with arguments for the prioritisation of, 
and particular assistance for, female-headed households. 32  Despite the humanitarian 
sector assuming itself to be supporting Syrian women, in the face of oppression they face 
from men in the community, their stance reinforces the importance of the male 
breadwinner and its concomitant patriarchal relations, 33  assumes a heteronormative 
family unit, and is undergirded by patriarchal assumptions about women’s lack of agency.  
 
Despite its use, both formally and informally, of a group approach to ‘vulnerability’ that 
allocates aid according to categories, UNHCR also recognised the weaknesses of this 
system. In an article on the development of a new framework for vulnerability 
                                                
30 Elizabeth Dickinson, “Shadow Aid to Syrian Refugees,” Middle East Report 272 (2014), 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer272/shadow-aid-syrian-refugees. 
31 Conversation with NGO worker and Syrian refugees, Za‘tari, 02.02.2016. 
32 Conversation with NGO worker, Za‘tari, 02.02.2016. 
33 Achilli, “Becoming a Man in Al-Wihdat.” 
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assessments, UNHCR staff noted that the ‘category’ approach uses generalisations, does 
not ask why people are in need of assistance, and does not recognise the situations of 
those who have multiple disadvantages. 34  In response to these drawbacks, UNHCR 
designed what was termed a Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) over the course 
of 2013 and 2014.35 The VAF was meant to enable the monitoring of ‘vulnerability’ 
across time, target assistance more efficiently, and improve coordination between 
humanitarian actors.36 It has been used with refugees living in host communities, i.e. non-
camp populations, where there is a wider variation in the level of assistance received by 
refugees. The VAF works through carrying out a vulnerability assessment, or, as it is 
often referred to by NGO workers, refugees are ‘vaffed.’ This ‘vaffing’ takes into 
account issues including shelter, health, dependency ratio, sanitation and hygiene, 
documentation status, and food. Based on the collected data, a refugee ‘case’ (i.e. those 
registered together, typically a nuclear family) is designated as one of four categories: low, 
medium, high or severe (or 1, 2, 3, and 4). Many organisations worked primarily or 
exclusively with refugees in categories ‘3 and 4,’ i.e. those who were classified as being 
highly or severely vulnerable. Some organisations working in Za‘tari, while not using the 
VAF in the camp, have based parts of their own vulnerability assessments on the VAF.37 
 
The VAF takes into account whether a household is single-headed (rather than female-
headed), and does so in conjunction with assessing the number of dependents in that 
household.38 The much more thorough assessments that the VAF provides, compared to 
the group approach, offer results that contrast sharply with humanitarian actors’ 
assumptions about vulnerability, in particular the economic vulnerability of male- and 
female-headed households. The VAF Baseline Survey of June 2015 found that: 
 
89% of Male [sic] headed households are resorting to crisis or 
emergency coping strategies, compared to 73% of female headed 
households. 92% of Male [sic] headed households are highly or 
severely vulnerable, compared to 83% of female headed households.39  
 
While economic vulnerabilities are only one subset of specific challenges that Syrians 
                                                
34 Khogali et al., “Aid Effectiveness and Vulnerability Assessment Framework,” 79; For an exploration of 
similar critiques, see Clark, “Understanding Vulnerability.” 
35 Khogali et al., “Aid Effectiveness and Vulnerability Assessment Framework.” 
36 UNHCR, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Baseline Survey,” 9. 
37 Interviews with livelihood programme manager, Amman, 27.06.2016; protection programme manager, 
Amman, 27.06.2016; and INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
38 UNHCR, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Baseline Survey,” 89. 
39UNHCR, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Key Findings” (UNHCR, June 2015), 2, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
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may face, the results are nonetheless striking. Reports published by the World Bank and 
CARE provide further evidence that supports the findings of the VAF. The World Bank 
documented that, although the difference was slight, male-headed households were more 
likely to be living in poverty than female-headed households. 40  CARE’s report 
demonstrated that some forms of ‘vulnerabilities’ were more likely to be present in 
female-headed households, and some in male-headed households. Male-headed 
households, this report notes, were significantly more likely (by almost 20 percentage 
points) to not be receiving organisational assistance when they registered with CARE.41 
Yet despite this publicly-available data, the status of women in general, and of female-
headed households in particular, as especially ‘vulnerable,’ appeared to go typically 
unquestioned. Similarly rarely discussed, despite this data, was the question of whether 
Syrian men can also be ‘vulnerable.’  
 
Can Syrian Men be ‘Vulnerable’ Too?  
In contrast to Syrian women (or womenandchildren), Syrian men were rarely considered 
to be the kinds of people, the kinds of bodies, that could be ‘vulnerable.’ When I would 
bring up the notion of refugee men being potentially ‘vulnerable,’ a term I would use to 
replicate prevailing humanitarian language, it would often generate curiosity, intrigue, or 
confusion among my humanitarian and NGO interlocutors, even among those who I 
found to be generally questioning of humanitarianism’s shibboleths.42 The assumption of 
men’s non-vulnerability is repeated in even critical scholarship on Za‘tari. In Sullivan and 
Tobin’s 2014 account of different security actors in the camp, they state that “more than 
80 percent of Zaatari residents could be classified as ‘vulnerable’: 56 percent are children 
(boys and girls under 17) and 25 percent are women aged 18 and older.” Men do not 
even appear in this as a category of the population who could be considered ‘vulnerable.’43  
  
There is a concomitant lack of humanitarian materials and reports dedicated to the 
specific needs and circumstances of refugee men, or the specific gendered threats they 
                                                
40 Paolo Verme et al., The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2015). 
41 Care International, “Lives Unseen: Urban Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Host Communities Three 
Years Into the Syria Crisis” (Amman: Care International, April 2014), 21. 
42 Conversation with humanitarian worker, Amman, 21.03.2016. 
43 Sullivan and Tobin, “Security and Resilience.” 
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face.44 One notable exception was a 2016 report by the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC), which conducted a vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugee men in Lebanon. 
This report clearly demonstrated the difficult, particular, and gendered circumstances 
that Syrian men face. It found that 88 percent of single Syrian men in Lebanon limited 
their movements in order to try and stay safe, often citing fears of arrest or police 
harassment, fewer than 10 percent of men had received assistance in the previous 30 
days, 21 percent had not had enough food to eat, and 53 percent of single men were not 
registered with UNHCR. Of this group, 30 percent believed that single men were 
automatically ineligible to register.45 
 
In some reports, the challenges men face are mentioned, as is their potential exclusion 
from ‘traditional’ approaches to ‘vulnerability.’ Yet in some of these same reports, while 
the circumstances of refugee men are recognised in the main body of the text, these 
observations and analyses are not translated into recommendations for action. For 
example, the Women’s Refugee Commission report Unpacking Gender, which focuses on 
the humanitarian response in Jordan, notes that “reproductive health services are not 
commonly provided for men,”46 that many organisations have a “lack of expertise and 
skills in programming psychosocial and mental health support for men,”47 and that fewer 
organisations are working on psychosocial and mental health questions with men.48 Yet 
none of these issues appear in the report’s recommendations. The report’s summary of 
its good practices and recommendations includes sections on empowering women and 
girls, supporting host communities, engaging refugees, and advancing gender 
mainstreaming.49 
 
Within work on the Syria refugee response, there have been important, although 
exceptional, discussions of the situation of refugee men. The rarity of these discussions 
reflects the fact that discussions of refugee men’s specific and gendered needs are also 
few and far between within wider academic literatures on humanitarianism and 
development. Jennifer Allsopp has explored differing understandings of masculinities 
                                                
44 See Dorothea Hilhorst, “The Other Half of Gender: Are Humanitarians Blind to the Vulnerabilities of 
Male Refugees?,” ALNAP, May 20, 2016, https://www.alnap.org/blogs/the-other-half-of-gender-are-
humanitarians-blind-to-the-vulnerabilities-of-male-refugees. 
45 International Rescue Committee, “Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugee Men in Lebanon” (New 
York: IRC, 2016). 
46 Women’s Refugee Commission, “Unpacking Gender,” 8. 
47 Women’s Refugee Commission, 13. 
48 Women’s Refugee Commission, 9. 
49 Women’s Refugee Commission, 1–2, 16–22. 
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that are found among men who came to Europe during the ‘migration crisis.’ She 
problematises understandings of militarised masculinities, the role of the father figure, 
and the threat of the young male, and argues that vulnerability is central to many men’s 
experiences of refugeehood.50 Also focused on Europe’s ‘crisis,’ Pruitt et al. examine how 
understandings of refugee youth are gendered, how young refugee men (Syrians and 
others) are constructed as a threat in the media, and the difficulties they experience 
accessing services.51 In a Masters thesis, Marjolein Quist has examined how Syrian men 
in Lebanon are unable to fulfil the gendered expectations that they and others in the 
community have of them, particularly in their inability to provide for their families 
financially.52 There is also an important, although still small, literature emerging on the 
specific situations, vulnerabilities, and needs, of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
intersex LGBTI Syrian refugees.53 
 
In line with the findings of these literatures, Syrian refugee men in Za‘tari and other areas 
in Jordan, face a series of gendered challenges. Men who have been working outside of 
camps have been particularly liable to be arrested, subject to forced encampment, or 
refouled to Syria as a punishment for working without a permit.54 Men living both inside 
and outside of camps are also more likely to be read as security threats, and liable to 
police harassment, or even deportation, because of this perception.55 The fear of being 
securitised and arrested meant that many men were reluctant to gather, even with 
relatively small groups of friends, for fear of how such gatherings might be perceived by 
the authorities in the camp.56 Men also faced psychological difficulties resulting from 
their inability to work and to play the gendered role of provider that they expected of 
themselves, and that others in the community expected of them. 57  They also faced 
trauma and mental health difficulties because of the violence they had experienced, 
                                                
50 Allsopp, “Agent, Victim, Soldier, Son: Intersecting Masculinities in the European ‘Refugee Crisis.’” 
51 Pruitt, Berents, and Munro, “Gender and Age in the Construction of Male Youth in the European 
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57 See Chapter 6. 
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whether that be in Syria, on the journey to Jordan, or since arriving in Jordan.58 ‘Male-
headed households’ were statistically just as likely, if not more so, to be economically 
‘vulnerable’ as ‘female-headed households,’ and single men were one of the groups of 
refugees in Jordan most likely to be food insecure.59 Single men have even been barred 
from entering Jordan since 2013, denying them the ability to reach (relative) safety.60 
 
The labour market plays an important, and paradoxical role, in understandings of refugee 
men’s needs. As noted above, Syrian men in Jordan (whether living in Za‘tari or 
elsewhere) have often accessed the labour market in Jordan at the risk of police 
harassment, arrest, forced encampment in Azraq, or deportation to Syria. The 
assumption of the ‘vulnerability’ of the female-headed household is grounded in the 
understanding that if a man were to be present in the house, he would provide an 
income through the labour market. In an era of neoliberal economic transformations and 
rising informality and precarity, this assumption is in any case questionable.61  Yet it is 
even more problematic in the context of Syrian refugees in Jordan, for whom access to 
the labour market was illegalised, and for refugees in Za‘tari, who would often only be 
able to reach it by leaving the camp informally. Yet it was this labour market access that 
was deemed to render Syrian men independent, in contrast to women. As one 
interviewee told me, many humanitarian workers “still have in the back of their minds 
that Arab men can work easily.”62 Perceived access to the labour market was therefore 
understood to reinforce men’s agency, in contrast to women’s vulnerability, an approach 
that erases both the challenges men face and women’s independence and agency.  
 
As I have explored elsewhere at greater length, 63  some Syrian men, especially single 
Syrian men, faced difficulties obtaining resettlement to a third country because 
humanitarians struggle to recognise them as ‘vulnerable.’ Many resettlement states also 
                                                
58 See Chapter 5. 
59 UNHCR, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Key Findings”; World Food Programme and REACH, 
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62 Interview with humanitarian worker with focus on LGBTI rights. This sentiment was repeated in 
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often reject or deprioritise applications from single men in particular, especially 
Arab/Muslim men, on the grounds of ‘security.’ Within Za‘tari, it was very common for 
Syrian men and women to ask me about resettlement – what I knew about it and 
whether I could help them access it, although it was not something all Syrians in the 
camp desired to obtain.64 Due to another designation of ‘vulnerability,’ however, there 
were, at the start of my fieldwork, very few opportunities for resettlement for Za‘tari 
residents. This was due to a perception on the part of humanitarian workers that refugees 
living in camps had the services they needed, unlike those in host communities, who in 
this context were deemed the (potentially) ‘vulnerable.’ Za‘tari’s earlier reputation for 
violence and disorder had also made many states reluctant to consider resettling refugees 
from the camp. This did change somewhat in late 2015 and early 2016, in large part 
because Canada offered to take an unusually high number of refugees with specific 
medical needs, many of whom lived in Za‘tari and other camps, as well as because the 
UK began to offer small numbers of resettlement places to those in camps in the Middle 
East. 65  Nevertheless, resettlement was a much less prominent part of humanitarian 
interactions with, and governance of, refugees in Za‘tari than I had anticipated.   
 
The provision of psychosocial support to refugees provides a pertinent example of how 
designations of ‘vulnerability’ within Za‘tari affect service provision. While it should not 
be assumed, as at times appeared common, that all refugees, as refugees, were necessarily 
‘traumatised’ by their experiences, 66  the data collected in a series of surveys and 
assessments by humanitarian actors working in different areas of Jordan demonstrated 
the need for psychosocial support services. 67  One of these assessments, which was 
conducted in both Za‘tari and non-camp settings in Jordan, demonstrated that levels of 
mental illness and psychological distress among Syrians in Jordan are “substantially 
higher” in Za‘tari than in non-camp settings.68 This lack of programming was, in a small 
environment from which it is difficult to leave, also itself the source of boredom, 
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frustration, and psychological distress, and reinforced many of the difficulties that men in 
the community were facing.69  
 
On the ground, the number of organisations claiming to offer various forms of 
psychosocial support is huge.70 There appears, however, to be a low threshold for what 
can ‘count’ as a form of psychosocial support; some organisations “put 100 kids in a 
room, put music on, tell them to dance, and then they call it psychosocial support 
work.”71 Some fieldworkers found their work being defined as psychosocial support even 
though they themselves had no training in it, and did not consider themselves to be 
doing it.72 It is furthermore claimed, by humanitarian sector actors, that these extensive 
services are targeting at all sectors of the population. The 2015/2016 mental health and 
psychosocial support mapping exercise for Jordan, including its refugee camps, 
completed by the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Working Group, appears to 
show that women, girls, boys, and men are all being targeted almost equally by service 
providers. 73  This data, however, records the services that are technically open to 
particular demographics, not the actual numbers of people using their services, and not 
which groups of people these providers are actively targeting and encouraging to use 
their services. 
 
When it comes to the presentation of such work, and the targeted promotion of it, 
however, the situation appears different. Humanitarian workers typically imagine that 
psychosocial support is required by refugee women and children, and target and promote 
it accordingly. Refugee men are imagined to not require, or at least not be interested in, 
psychosocial support. 74  On an institutional level, psychosocial support was often 
understood to be a subset of ‘gender’ and ‘protection’ work, the former of which, in 
particular, is not imagined to be relevant to Syrian men. For example, the Terms of 
Reference of the Gender Focal Points Network lists, in brackets, three main areas that 
                                                
69 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari.  
70 Conversations with (I)NGO workers, Amman, 12.06.2016 and 11.08.2016; interview with former NGO 
worker in Za‘tari. 
71 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 11.08.2016. 
72 Conversartion with NGO worker, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016. 
73 Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Working Group, “Who Is Doing What, Where and When 
(4Ws) in Mental Health & Psychosocial Support in Jordan: 2016 Interventions Mapping Exercise,” 
February 2016, 20–22, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
74 Interviews with former NGO worker in Za‘tari; SGBV specialist (2); and Lina Darras. 
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are included in protection: child protection, SGBV, and mental health/psychosocial.75 
Until January 2016, the IRC in Jordan classified its psychosocial support work as part of 
its ‘Women’s Protection’ efforts, when it was reclassified to be jointly run by the 
Women’s Protection and Health teams. 76  Furthermore, these services were often 
provided by, or through, centres that were primarily targeted towards and attended by 
women, such as reproductive health centres.77 
 
These assumptions about who needs psychosocial support are also reflected in other 
reports about the provision of psychosocial support to refugees in Jordan. UNICEF’s 
evaluation of its psychosocial support for Syrian children in Jordan, for example, 
explicitly recognises that an “emphasis on women and children as the most vulnerable 
categories may inadvertently lead to other acute needs or less visible groups being 
overlooked.” 78 Yet the same report, without citing any evidence or data, claims that 
“[w]omen, boys and girls in particular have been affected physically, psychologically and 
socially” by the Syria conflict and subsequent displacement.79  
 
Some people working within the NGO sector were critical of the ways that psychosocial 
support was allocated, and the lack of emphasis on services for men. One interviewee 
reported that branching out into working with men was not especially controversial 
among field staff, who were more readily exposed to the needs of Syrian men, but it was 
more of a source of controversy among senior managers.80 It was also easier, a different 
NGO worker told me, to find mental health support for boys than men. When it was 
available for men, it was often framed as support for torture victims, a category more 
easily recognised as ‘vulnerable.’81  
 
In a further demonstration that evidence and knowledge from within the Syrian 
community is produced, but often ignored by humanitarian actors, the need for 
psychosocial support for men was clearly understood by Syrian men and women that I 
                                                
75 Inter-Agency Task Force Jordan, “Terms of Reference for the Sector Gender Focal Points Network,” 
2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
76 MHPSS Sub Working Group, “MHPSS Sub Working Group Jordan Meeting Minutes 20th Of January 
2016,” January 20, 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
77 Interview with Ruba Abu-Taleb. 
78 UNICEF, “Evaluation of UNICEF’s Psychosocial Support Response for Syrian Children in Jordan” 
(Amman: UNICEF Jordan, 2015), 5. 
79 UNICEF, 21. 
80 Interview with women’s protection and empowerment programme manager. 
81 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari.  
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spoke to. In my discussions with young Syrian adults at Questscope, I raised the issue of 
psychosocial support. Of the group I was speaking to, 9 of the 12 were men, and most of 
them were under 30. I asked whether my perception that there was very little 
psychosocial support for men in the camp was accurate, in their view. There was 
widespread agreement that this was the case.  
 
One even asked me if I could name an organisation in the camp that was providing 
psychosocial support to men, because he couldn’t name one. I offered the name of the 
Noor Hussein Foundation, a staff member of which I had previously interviewed, and 
who had confirmed that they did offer psychosocial support to women, men and 
children in the camp. This prompted a discussion among the group of whether what 
Noor Hussein provided was accurately thought of as psychosocial support, and how 
much they actually worked with, or wanted to work with, men. The discussion appeared 
to reach a consensus that they did offer men some psychosocial support, but that this 
was entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the camp.82  
 
One female participant in the discussion said that she felt this was in part due to the 
perception that what men in the camp really want and need is vocational training, and so 
many organisations focused their efforts on that instead. At this point, as in several other 
moments in our discussion, someone else interjected with a mixture of bafflement and 
anger at the sentiments being attributed to humanitarian actors: 
 
But how can they say that men do not need this? Look at all the men 
who are smoking now, but were not smoking before! Look at all the 
problems they have now! Do they think that men don’t feel the effects 
of war and everything that has been going on?  
 
In what could be described as a cruel circular logic, the lack of activities for men, both 
psychosocial-related and otherwise, was understood by many of my interlocutors to be 
one of the causes of men’s psychological difficulties, which then cannot adequately be 
addressed because of the lack of service provision.83  
 
My interlocutors were not the only people living in the camp who thought that men’s 
psychosocial needs were not being taken into account by humanitarian actors. Colleagues 
                                                
82 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016. 
83 Interviews with NGO worker in Za‘tari; and Areej Sumreen, Clinical Psychologist, Institute of Family 
Health, Noor al-Hussein Foundation, Amman, 22.06.2016; conversations with NGO workers and Syrian 
refugees, Za‘tari, 01.12.2015 and 27.07.2016. 
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from ARDD told me that they had encountered men living in the camp who claimed 
that they wanted to, but were unable to, access psychosocial support 84  Another 
interviewee, a former NGO worker in Za‘tari, told me that he had attended focus group 
discussions with both male and female refugees in Za‘tari as part of the planning process 
for the refugee response plan for Jordan. The participants in both the male and female 
focus group discussions had the same first priority: increased psychosocial support for 
men aged 18-25 in the camp.85 In an early assessment of the camp focused on child 
protection and GBV, focus group discussions “revealed that many men believe that ‘the 
majority have nothing to do,’ in the camp and the same is believed to be true for 
adolescent boys.”86 Yet ‘local’ knowledge remains marginalised within the development 
of humanitarian priorities. 
 
Outside of the contexts in which I explicitly raised, with humanitarian workers, the 
topics of the threats refugee men face, and the specific needs and challenges they have, I 
found that they were rarely discussed. Furthermore, even though there was a widespread 
understanding that women and children were ‘the most vulnerable,’ a perceived lack of 
‘vulnerability’ on the part of men was often not even always the primary reason explicitly 
offered by humanitarian actors for a lack of work with men. Rather, responsibility 
appeared to be transferred to Syrian men themselves, who were deemed to be not 
interested in, or not available for, the work of the humanitarian sector.   
 
‘Uninterested’ Syrian Men  
The result of understanding Syrian men, as a category, to be non-‘vulnerable’ was that 
many humanitarian organisations and workers appeared to have little interest in pursuing 
certain types of work or activities with men. This was particularly pronounced in terms 
of psychosocial support, as discussed above, but extended to other areas of ‘softer’ 
humanitarian work, such as creating ‘safe spaces’ and community centres. Attitudes 
within the sector did vary, and some organisations in the camp, for example Questscope 
and NRC, ran significant programmes for ‘youth,’ which is one of the ways in which 
                                                
84 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari and Amman, 27.10.2015; interview with Lina Darras; ARDD, “ARDD-Legal Aid’s 
Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys in SGBV Prevention in Zaatari Refugee Camp” (Amman: 
ARDD-Legal Aid, August 2016), 6, http://ardd-jo.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/ardd-
legal_aids_four_pillars_for_engaging_men_and_boys_in_sgbv_prevention_in_zaatari_refugee_camp_f_2.
pdf. 
85 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
86 CPGBV Sub-Working Group, “Findings from the Inter-Agency CPGBV Assessment,” 17. 
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some Syrian men could access a wider range of services, opportunities, and training.87 Yet 
nevertheless, a clear pattern was detectable: humanitarian organisations and NGOs very 
rarely ran programmes for ‘men’ as a category of ‘beneficiary,’ they typically did not 
consider ‘men’ to be a target group for their programmes, and they did not understand 
men’s (relative or absolute) lack of participation in their programmes to be a problem in 
need of correction. Yet despite this lack of focus on men from the humanitarian sector, 
according to many of my interviewees and interlocutors, the responsibility for this lack of 
interaction lay with Syrian men themselves. Specifically, I was regularly told that Syrian 
men were not interested in the work that humanitarian organisations and NGOs offered.  
 
A variant of this idea was repeated to me by colleagues, in interviews with field workers, 
and in conversations with humanitarian and NGO employees who had heard it from 
their own field staff.88 My interviewees and interlocutors explained this purported lack of 
interest in a variety of ways. Prominent among their explanations was the idea that men 
did not have time to take part in NGO programmes, because they were too busy to do 
so, either because of work or other (often unspecified) commitments.89 As is discussed in 
more depth below, men were often also deemed unavailable during the time slots in 
which NGO programmes took place. Other justifications centred around men’s lack of 
emotional capacity to take part in work that involved discussing their feelings and 
intimate aspects of their lives, 90  or they were deemed not interested because their 
masculinity and pride made them unable to come forward to seek, for example, 
psychosocial support.91 While these specific explanations were sometimes offered, just as 
often I would be told, in a general and perhaps even dismissive sense, that Syrian men 
were simply “not interested” in the work being done by NGOs.   
 
Within these explanations and narratives there was often little, if any, acknowledgement 
that men’s (perceived) lack of interest in the programmes provided by NGOs might be a 
consequence of their interactions with the humanitarian sector. In my experience, Syrian 
men in Za‘tari were unequivocal in their understanding that NGOs were not interested 
                                                
87 Interviews with former NGO worker in Za‘tari; and INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1), Amman, 
30.06.2016; conversation with INGO programme manager, 18.04.2016. 
88 Interviews with Lina Darras; Suhail Abualsameed, consultant and SGBV specialist, Amman, 18.05.2016; 
and Jordanian women’s rights activist; conversations with humanitarian and NGO workers, Amman, 
08.11.2015 and 28.01.2016. 
89 Conversations with NGO workers, Amman, 07.10.2015 and 11.08.2016. 
90 See Chapter 5. 
91 Conversation with humanitarian and NGO workers, Amman, 16.12.2015. 
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in their lives or in working with them.92 As noted in Chapter 2, according to one Syrian 
man, being surrounded by NGOs focusing only on women and children is simply “our 
life.”93 Some of my Syrian interlocutors, keen for an explanation, would ask me why I 
thought this was, and asked me to share how humanitarian workers justified their 
priorities in conversations with me.94 But whether or not NGOs were interested in Syrian 
men did not appear, for my Syrian interlocutors, to be a point of contention – it was 
obvious. Although, as I will shortly discuss, I do not believe it is accurate to 
straightforwardly state that Syrian men were “not interested” in the work being done by 
humanitarian actors, to the extent that they might have appeared uninterested, this was 
because the activities in which they were not interested were often not targeted at them, 
or designed for them. Indeed, they were often explicitly not for men, but for women and 
children. Their ‘lack of interest,’ therefore, should hardly be surprising. 
 
At an evening social event in Amman in April 2016, I was presented with a clear example 
of the lack of reflection on the dynamics that create Syrian men’s ‘lack of interest.’ I met 
a Jordanian INGO worker who had been working at a community centre for refugees (in 
Jordan but not in Za‘tari) and I told him a little about the subject of my research. He 
replied that I would find a visit to the community centre interesting because men, as well 
as women, were among those using the centre, although the presence of men was a fairly 
new development. I asked if that had been difficult to get men to come to the centre, 
because I often heard that Syrian men were not interested in the work of the 
humanitarian sector. This was a problem they had experienced too, he said. He 
recounted to me that his former boss had come to him saying that he wanted more men 
to come, but that after having “tried everything” without success, he didn’t know what to 
do. With the help of my interlocutor, the manager eventually managed to attract some 
men to the community centre by offering new and different activities, for example 
backgammon and chess, which some Syrian men in the local community now attended 
keenly and regularly. Yet putting on activities that might specifically be of interest to men 
was an idea that had not occurred to the centre’s manager in the course of “trying 
everything” to get men to come.95  
                                                
92 E.g. interviews with Syrian shop-holder in Za‘tari, man (3), Syrian man working in Za‘tari (2), Syrian man 
working in Za‘tari (3), married Syrian man living in Za‘tari (3), Za‘tari, 01.08.2016. 
93 Conversation with Syrian man, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
94 Conversation with Syrian men and women, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016; conversation with Syrian man, Mafraq, 
26.05.2016.  
95 Conversation with INGO worker, Amman, 07.04.2016. 
  137 
 
When refugee men did come to humanitarian work that was reflective of the priorities of 
the humanitarian sector, for example the attempts to ‘engage men and boys’ in SGBV 
prevention, which is the focus of Chapter 5, their attendance was not necessarily 
reflective of an interest in the sessions they were attending. The fact that many men had 
to be persuaded to come, with multiple telephone calls to remind and encourage them to 
come, demonstrated that these meetings were hardly reflective of the priorities of the 
Syrians in attendance.96 When they did come to these events, many were clearly far more 
interested in seeing whether they could leverage their attendance into CfW opportunities, 
or to build relationships with NGOs and their employees, which might, for example, 
help to facilitate access to services or information.97 One of my interviewees commented 
that she believes some of the Syrians who attend programmes do so more for the 
refreshments that are provided, and in the hope of finding useful information and 
connections, rather than for the official content of the work.98  
 
Conversely, when humanitarian organisations undertake work with Syrian men that men 
actually want, such as psychosocial support as was discussed above, the notion that 
Syrian men are ‘uninterested’ in the work is shattered, often to the surprise of the 
humanitarian workers involved. I interviewed two programme managers from INGOs 
working with Syrian refugees in non-camp settings about the ways in which they had 
recently begun to provide psychosocial support for men. One had done so as part of its 
SGBV prevention work, and the other had done so after encountering male victims of 
torture in its broader refugee response work. One of these managers commented how 
surprised and pleased she was that the men would return to the programme week after 
week. The other organisation, which provided counselling services, found that their 
programmes had been so popular that they were struggling to cope with the level of 
demand from Syrian men. This INGO had 14 female counsellors providing services to 
women, and 1 male counsellor providing services to men. 99  Men’s apparent lack of 
interest in humanitarian work should therefore be understood in the context of the 
broader contestations around whose priorities and needs have a central role in 
determining what humanitarian work is done, and with whom. Unsurprisingly, many 
                                                
96 Author observation, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015; Amman, 04.11.2015, 10.02.2016 and 28.02.2016. 
97 See ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys.” 
98 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
99 Interviews with protection programme manager; livelihood specialist, Amman, 27.06.2016; and women’s 
protection and empowerment programme manager. 
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Syrian men show little interest in work that is not designed with them in mind, or that is 
not reflective of their priorities, but are enthusiastic participants in work that responds to 
their needs, as they themselves understand them.  
 
‘Unavailable’ Syrian Men  
Along with their purported lack of interest came a purported lack of availability. 
According to multiple NGO workers, Syrian men in Za‘tari were often not available 
during the day, when NGOs were running programmes, because they had other 
commitments, primarily work.100 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, however, there was in 
fact a large shortage of work opportunities in the camp. They were often distributed by 
NGOs at very short notice, and given the dire economic circumstances in the camp, 
Syrian men would typically prioritise them over any other commitments, for example 
their attendance at NGO programmes.101 Some who did not have work in Za‘tari did 
attempt to leave the camp, with or without permission from the authorities, to seek 
work. So while it was the case that work was a greater priority for Syrian men, it does not 
follow that they were always ‘busy working.’ In fact, as has already been noted in this 
Chapter, there was a lack of activities for men in the camp, which was understood by 
many NGO workers in the camp to be have a detrimental effect on the mental health of 
many Syrian men living there.  
 
The proposition that Syrian men could not participate in NGO programmes because 
they were ‘busy working,’ was notable for a second reason. Just as there appeared to be 
little critical reflection on whether men’s ‘lack of interest’ was created by the 
humanitarian sector’s lack of interest in them, there appeared to be little critical reflection 
about whether Syrian men’s ‘lack of availability’ was simply a consequence of when 
humanitarian actors choose to run their programmes. To the extent that men were busy 
with work opportunities, they were usually working only until 3pm or 4pm, which 
typically constituted the ‘end of the day’ for humanitarian workers in Za‘tari. At this time, 
NGO centres in the camp would be closed up, and the gates locked until the next day. 
                                                
100 Conversation with NGO workers, Amman, 09.10.2015. On other occasions, this same idea was 
repeated to me about attempts to work with Syrian men living in non-camp contexts in Jordan: 
conversation with NGO workers, Amman, 11.08.2016. 
101 Author observations and conversations with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 03.11.2015, 01.08.2016 and Amman, 
10.08.2016; see also ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys.” 
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Despite Syrians requesting that more activities be put on after this time,102 very few 
organisations opened their centres beyond the hours of 9am to 4pm.  
 
Questscope’s Youth Centre, under the control of its Syrian volunteers, does open until 
6pm, a fact of which the volunteers appeared very proud.103 Yet in the vast majority of 
cases, the schedules of humanitarian and NGO workers are prioritised above the 
schedules of Syrians, even if this has an impact on ‘the beneficiaries,’ and on who is even 
able to become a ‘beneficiary.’ “The fact is,” one former NGO worker told me, “if 
you’re sixteen and male and working until 3 no-one in the camp gives a shit about 
you.” 104  He described his frustration listening to NGO workers express puzzlement 
about “why aren’t working kids coming to the youth centre?” when the centre was only 
open until 3 o’clock, the time at which they wish to return to Amman.105  
 
At the ‘end of the (humanitarian) day’ there was a great sense of urgency and impatience 
in Base Camp. On one cold December afternoon I was doing voluntary English teaching 
in the camp, and the other volunteers and myself were transported from the classrooms 
back to Base Camp by minibus, arriving at 3.45. This was 15 minutes before the 
organisation’s buses were scheduled to leave back to Amman, yet to my surprise I found 
a large number of their staff already standing outside, in the narrow lane between their 
offices and the perimeter of Base Camp, waiting in the wind and cold for the transport 
back to the capital.106 There was a tangible preoccupation with setting off as quickly as 
possible, in order to try and minimise delays in the queues that develop daily in the early 
evening on the roads entering Amman from northern Jordan.107  
 
Schedules ran according to the needs of humanitarian organisations in a second sense. As 
detailed in Chapter 3, many organisations experienced difficulties in obtaining permits 
for their staff, but they also needed to get the requisite permissions from the authorities 
for a project itself to take place (a requirement that was not specific to refugee-related 
work).108 Sometimes, in Za‘tari, they also needed the support of the relevant working 
group if they were, for example, to receive support in finding relevant project 
                                                
102 Conversations with NGO workers, Amman, 12.06.2016. 
103 Conversations with Syrian Cash Workers at Questscope, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016. 
104 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Author observation, Za‘tari, 03.12.2015. 
107 Author observation, Za‘tari, 13.10.2015, 27.10.2015, 15.12.2015 and 24.02.2016. 
108 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 20 January 2016. 
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participants.109 The combined result of these political-bureaucratic processes was often 
that projects were implemented at very short notice, with tight timeframes, and with 
regular delays and changes to the schedule. 110  Refugees, whose presence as ‘the 
beneficiaries’ is required, are expected to fall into line with the schedules of humanitarian 
actors, and the structures in which they are embedded.   
 
A further question of availability, on which there appeared to be similarly little reflection, 
related to space. As the scholarship of Doreen Massey has demonstrated, spaces “both 
reflect and affect the ways in which gender is understood,” and different bodies and 
gender performances are included or excluded from different spaces. 111  Built into 
humanitarians’ understandings about refugee men’s agency, independence and non-
‘vulnerability’ were gendered assumptions about their privileged ability to access space, 
and to use it in particular ways. A 2015 safety perceptions survey of camp residents, 
undertaken by the Community Police support team, had results broadly in line with these 
assumptions. Women were significantly more likely to feel unsafe leaving the house, 
walking alone in the camp, particularly at night, and leaving their caravans unattended,112 
and in a UN Women report women and girls reported extensive sexual harassment in 
many public areas of the camp. 113  According to the same safety perceptions survey, 
notable numbers of men also reported fears of walking at night and leaving their 
caravans unattended, yet nevertheless on the whole men could move through space 
within the camp more safely and more easily.114   
 
That they can move through space, however, does not tell us anything about to where 
they can move. While men will, on average, be able to move more easily and more safely 
to work or to distribution centres, according to interlocutors from the humanitarian 
sector and the Syrian community, as well as my own participant observation in the camp, 
there were relatively few spaces in the camp for refugee men to go, or to socialise.115 
There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, men in the camp, and their collective 
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activities and protests, have been seen as troublesome, political, and disruptive both by 
humanitarian and state agencies running the camp. In the context of the extensive 
policing and surveillance that takes place in Za‘tari, gatherings of even small numbers of 
men, I was told by Syrians and NGO workers, would cause suspicion, and could place 
the men in danger of arrest or harassment by the police.116  
 
There are multiple mosques and prayer spaces in the camp, which can provide spaces for 
Syrians to go, although meetings in the mosque may also have the potential to arouse the 
suspicion of the authorities. The other major space in the camp, which one might expect 
to provide spaces for socialising, is the market. Yet in line with the previously discussed 
attempts to depoliticise the camp, it barely provides any spaces for extended group 
gatherings. For example, there are very few restaurants or cafes in the market that have 
significant seating areas. During one of my visits I was taken to, I was told, the best and 
most popular falafel restaurant in the camp. Although this restaurant was indeed clearly 
popular, and of a relatively large size compared to other shops in the market, it still only 
had about a dozen chairs for customers to sit down on. Rather than this creating a space 
where people could spend extended amounts of time, when people came to sit down 
they appeared to eat their purchased items and leave quickly, taking the opportunity, on 
the day I was there, to rest briefly from the sweltering August heat.117 While there are 
places that serve tea and coffee, there appear to be no coffee shops in which one can sit 
down for an extended period.118  
 
Similarly, there are no shisha bars119 at all in the camp, although there are shops selling 
shisha pipes and equipment. I asked the owner of one of the shisha pipe shops why there 
were no shisha bars, and he replied that there used to be one but it was closed down 
after a ‘hawsha.’ Not being familiar with this term, I turned to the policeman who was 
accompanying me, who translated the term as ‘quarrel.’ 120  I wondered at the time 
whether ‘quarrel’ might be downplaying the incident, and later learned that the word 
                                                
116 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari; conversations with Syrians and NGO workers, Za‘tari, 
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‘hawsha’ derives from an Arabic term for ‘mob, rabble, riffraff,’121 and thus could imply a 
more dramatic incident or physical altercation, rather than a mere quarrel. I asked both 
the shop-holder and the policeman if they could remember any other details of the 
‘quarrel’ that led to the shisha bar being closed down. Unsurprisingly to me, they both 
said they could not.122 Providing further evidence for this being a deliberate attempt by 
authorities to create a particular sort of environment in the market, according to Melissa 
Gatter’s interlocutors, coffee shops, like shisha bars, are banned from the camp.123 What 
remains therefore, are religious spaces, or private caravans, or some open areas on the 
edges of the camp, where one can sometimes see football games taking place, often not 
far from the militarised vehicles patrolling the camp’s borders.124 
 
The second reason for the lack of spaces for men to go to, or in which they can socialise 
in groups, is the policies of humanitarian actors. In line with their understanding of who 
constituted the ‘vulnerable,’ and that Syrian men were in any case ‘uninterested’ in their 
work, humanitarian agencies and NGOs typically did not create spaces where men 
specifically could go. As one of the very few organisations in the camp that more pro-
actively targeted refugee men and male youth, Questscope had found that numerous men 
over the age of 30 had approached them and asked to be part of their centre, because 
they did not have alternative venues to pursue activities or to have social spaces. 
Committed to the vision of the space as a youth centre, this was typically not possible, 
although Questscope staff and volunteers did try to visit these people in their homes 
instead.125 Humanitarian actors, conversely, did create ‘safe spaces’ for women in the 
camp, who, in line with their presumed ‘vulnerability,’ are assumed to need such 
spaces.126  
 
In one of the reports that I, in my role as an intern, drafted for ARDD, I included an 
observation that refugee men need, and a recommendation that humanitarian actors 
provide, “more spaces [for men] to discuss the pressures they are facing.” One senior 
colleague, supportive of my proposal, suggested that we add the words ‘safe’ before 
spaces, and ‘openly’ before discuss, but warned me that in doing so, we would “kind of 
                                                
121 Hans Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: Arabic-English., ed. J. M. Cowan, 4th Revised edition 
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[be] breaking a taboo.” ‘Safe spaces,’ she explained, are generally considered by 
humanitarian actors to be a resource for women.127 While there are multiple plausible 
understandings of the phrase ‘safe space,’ the ‘safe spaces’ being provided for women in 
Za‘tari were not refuges in which women could reside, but were spaces for gatherings, 
workshops, service provision, socialising, leisure, and confidential, non-judgmental 
discussions among peers. That facilitating men’s access to such spaces would be deemed 
‘taboo-breaking,’ was a striking indication of for whom humanitarian actors imagine they 
should provide space. In a further example of this logic, the Women’s Refugee 
Commission report on the humanitarian response in Jordan recommends the creation of 
safe spaces as a means to empower women and girls, the creation of child-friendly 
spaces, and community spaces for all, but does not discuss a possible need to create safe 
spaces for men, despite noting men’s safety concerns.128  
 
Even if the political environment of the camp had allowed more gatherings of men 
outside of humanitarian and NGO-sponsored centres, they would still not provide a 
substitute for the ‘safe spaces’ in which facilitated discussions could occur, and in which 
services could be provided. The lack of places to go, particularly when combined with 
the lack of work opportunities,129 is perceived by those working in the camp to be one of 
the causes of the extensive psychological difficulties that many men in the camp are 
experiencing.130 “Sitting at home/in the caravan all day” was a lament I heard regularly 
from men in Za‘tari. 131  In my eyes, the phrase appeared, for those who said it, to 
encapsulate so much about what was wrong with their current situation.132 In a cruel and 
cyclical dynamic, these psychological difficulties are often untreated, because this lack of 
service provision both contributes to, but also prevents the treatment of, men’s 
psychological distress.  
 
Therefore, men’s independent attempts to exert agency and influence over the space of 
Za‘tari are challenged by authorities in their attempts to depoliticise and control the 
camp,133 while men’s gatherings are viewed as suspicious and potentially necessitating 
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police intervention. In these logics, men’s efforts and activities are understood to be 
‘political,’ and thereby need to be challenged. On the other hand, women’s gatherings are 
depoliticised and sanitised by the humanitarian status of the spaces that are provided for 
them by NGOs, and legitimised by the empowerment agenda that they are understood to 
be a part of. As ostensibly non-‘vulnerable’ and powerful members of the Syrian 
community, men are not deemed to need such non-political spaces. These binary, 
gendered understandings of the Syrian community’s relationship to politics reinforce a 
notion that feminists have been challenging since at least the time of Sojourner Truth: 
that women’s experiences are personal and non-political, while men exist in the public, 
political realm.134 These gendered differences in state and humanitarian governance do 
not, however, mean that women are not subjects of intervention. In fact, as I will now 
show, women’s ‘vulnerability’ serves as an incitement for humanitarian intervention into 
their lives, and control over their bodies and choices. 
 
Women’s Bodies and ‘Global’ Standards: The Imposition of Breastfeeding  
As Michel Agier has argued, objects of humanitarian care are simultaneously objects of 
humanitarian control. 135  Humanitarian actors are able to exercise power over those 
whom they have defined as weak enough to be their ‘beneficiaries.’136 In the context of 
Za‘tari, this was perhaps most clearly exemplified by the camp-wide policies on 
breastfeeding. In the early months of the camp, breast milk substitutes (BMS), such as 
infant formula, were provided by some donors and INGOs, in particular those from 
Gulf countries.137 This presented multiple challenges to humanitarian agencies: not only 
did these donors apparently not have a plan for how to provide such items sustainably 
over a longer period of time,138 but more fundamentally, the distribution of BMS by aid 
agencies contravenes humanitarian actors’ ‘global standards,’ which emphasise the 
importance of promoting breastfeeding and discouraging the use of alternatives.   
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Humanitarian actors attempt to implement the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
1981 International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes,139 which the WHO deems to 
be “particularly important for controlling donations and distributions” of breast milk 
substitutes in emergency situations.140 In the context of the response to the Syria crisis, 
UNICEF and its partners, including the World Food Programme, International Medical 
Corps, UNHCR and the WHO, have “strongly urged those involved” to “promot[e] 
breastfeeding and appropriate complementary feeding and [to] strongly discourag[e] the 
uncontrolled distribution and use of breast-milk substitutes.”141According to UNICEF, 
breastfeeding is “a miracle investment…a universally available, low-tech, high impact, 
cost-effective solution for saving babies’ lives…the closest thing the world has to a magic 
bullet for child survival.”142  
 
In late 2012, a group of humanitarian agencies and NGOs including UNHCR, the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the WHO and Save the Children Jordan 
released a guidance note on “appropriate” infant feeding techniques, and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the distribution of infant formula in Jordan.143 The 
policy outlined in this guidance note aimed to educate Syrian women on the benefits of 
breastfeeding, and to limit and regulate the distribution of BMS. Save the Children 
Jordan, Medair, and Jordan Health Aid Society, and UNICEF have all been involved in 
the attempts to provide this ‘education’ in Za‘tari. These policies stand in sharp contrast 
to pre-existing practices in pre-conflict Syria, in which it is believed that more than half 
of women did not exclusively breastfeed in the first six months,144 making infant formula 
“the norm.” 145  Similarly, humanitarian workers reported that in Jordan, the idea of 
controlling infant formula was “a new concept among national health staff and 
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caregivers.”146 In programmatic choices and language reminiscent of a wide range of 
humanitarian activities, Save the Children Jordan conducted rapid assessments, opened 
safe havens, and recruited community mobilisers to try to encourage, train and support 
Syrian women in Za‘tari in their breastfeeding.147 The NGO even operated a “bottle/cup 
amnesty activity” in the camp, “where mothers are encouraged to exchange any feeding 
bottle they have for a measured cup which is considered safer, more hygienic and easier 
to clean.”148  
 
The effectiveness of the educational activities in increasing breastfeeding appears limited. 
In a 2014 article by two employees of Medair, which conducted similar work in Jordan, 
although primarily in host communities rather than camps, the authors noted that while 
there was a large increase in Syrian mothers’ knowledge about the benefits of 
breastfeeding, “exclusive breastfeeding practice among the mothers who knew about 
breastfeeding recommendations showed no change” – only about 25% of women 
breastfed exclusively.149 While, as the Medair article detailed, no BMS supplies are issued 
by health facilities for refugees in host communities, and infant formula was only 
available through pharmacies, 150  refugees who maintain their freedom of movement 
within Jordan can in principle continue to access BMS on the open market, if they can 
afford to do so financially. 
 
In the camp context however, with limited freedom of movement and restrictions on 
what goods can enter the camp, education is supplemented by strict restrictions on who 
is able to receive infant formula. Although the Za‘tari policies on breastfeeding were 
presented to me by one of the Health Sector Gender Focal Points as 
“advocacy…towards encouraging women to practice early initiation of breast feeding,”151 
in fact women in Za‘tari with young children essentially have no choice but to breastfeed, 
unless they satisfy one of five criteria laid down by humanitarian actors. In order to 
obtain BMS a woman in Za‘tari must, in the assessment of a midwife: have been 
separated from the child, infected with a disease that could pass to the child through 
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breastfeeding, be taking medication that could pass to the child through breastfeeding, 
have a child with a condition such as galactosemia which prohibits safe breastfeeding, or 
have stopped feeding and subsequent re-lactation efforts have failed. In these instances, 
or if a rape survivor does not wish to breastfeed,152 women will be referred to the one 
place in the camp that is able to provide formula milk for children, which is the Saudi 
Clinic.153  
 
While the 2012 guidance note mentioned above acknowledges that “stress, 
overcrowding, and lack of privacy may temporarily disrupt breastfeeding or make it 
difficult to accomplish,”154 the policy that has been put in place does not appear to take 
that into account. Women choosing not to breastfeed on these, or any other non-strictly 
medical grounds (as defined by humanitarian agencies), do not meet the criteria for a 
referral for infant formula. After all, as two Medair professionals involved in this work 
explain, “a woman’s body is designed to feed and nurture her child even under difficult 
circumstances.”155 To further reinforce this policy, and to reduce the chance that women 
are able to make a choice not to breastfeed, organisations have been told that they “must 
NEVER accept unsolicited donations of ANY milk products.”156 Officials involved in an 
attempt to set up a kitchen project for women in the camp speculated that the policies 
on breastfeeding were one of the reasons why their project had been refused permission 
to open, because it would have involved bringing fresh milk into the camp.157   
  
Statistics show that in September 2014, only 226 women in Za‘tari were able to access 
infant formula through the aforementioned mechanisms.158 Detailed population statistics 
are not available for that month, however data from the first half of the year shows that 
around 4% of the residents of Za‘tari were between 0 and 1 years old,159 meaning that in 
September 2014 it would be expected that there were around 3,200 children under the 
age of one in the camp. Given these statistics, and the prevailing rates of breastfeeding 
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pre-crisis, it is possible that hundreds, if not thousands, of women in Za‘tari were 
essentially be being forced to breastfeed against their wishes. Other data similarly 
indicates that the policy on BMS has had a tangible impact on the lives of women with 
children. For example, a 2014 report compared the levels of breastfeeding in camp and 
non-camp settings.160 While arguing that infant and young child feeding practices “are 
generally poor among the refugees,”161 rates of exclusive breastfeeding in the first six 
months of a child’s life were ten percentage points higher in the camp than outside it.162  
 
According to Ann Burton, Senior Public Health Officer at UNHCR Jordan, “the more 
restricted access to BMS” in the camp is “no doubt [a] significant factor” in explaining 
the differential in breastfeeding rates.163 “More consideration,” Burton goes on to argue, 
should be given to whether “humanitarian actors should withhold support for formula 
feeding in women who have made a truly informed choice.” 164  Despite this call for 
further “consideration” in 2014, nothing appeared to have changed by the time of my 
fieldwork in 2015-2016. For example, the 2016 Inter-Agency Task Force Health Sector 
Gender Analysis repeatedly notes that “females are usually not the decision makers when 
it comes to breastfeeding,”165 implying, with reference to “interpersonal relationships 
between women and men” that it is Syrian men who take these decisions.166 But it makes 
no reference to the fact that, for women in Za‘tari, this decision is unambiguously taken 
away from them by the humanitarian agencies running the camp. On paper, there is a 
commitment to policies on infant feeding being “community led and focused on the 
needs of poor, vulnerable families,”167 but ‘vulnerable’ women, it seems to have been 
decided, need education in ‘global standards’ more than they need choices about their 
bodies.  
 
When it was implemented, the policy was very controversial among some of the Syrian 
population, which is unsurprising given that it was, for many, enforcing a change from 
pre-existing practices in Syria. According to different NGO accounts of the time “angry 
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men” gathered at the health facilities to protest,168 and Syrians started “riots and attacks 
on distribution points.”169 This language betrays the illegitimacy of refugees’ protests in 
the eyes of humanitarian actors, and the extent to which humanitarian knowledge and 
practices are privileged over the knowledge and practices of the Syrian community. The 
portrayal of men as “angry” also reveals the ease with which political disputes about 
resource distribution can be delegitimised by humanitarian actors through appeals to 
widespread gendered and racialised visions of Syrian/Arab men, and how humanitarian 
actors themselves participate in the perpetuation of those depictions.170  
 
Humanitarian Responses to ‘Early Marriage’ 
Questions of gender, agency and bodily autonomy, and the methods and extent of 
humanitarian control over refugees’ lives, were also central to the controversies 
surrounding the ‘early marriage’ of Syrians in Za‘tari. In this context ‘early marriage’ 
referred to the marriages of Syrian children, defined as those under 18 years of age. 
Syrian children who got married were overwhelmingly, although not exclusively, girls, 
and married either Syrian men or boys in the camp, Syrians living in other areas of 
Jordan, or men of Jordanian or other nationalities. Early marriage was a subject of 
particular concern for humanitarian agencies, for whom it was “a human rights issue – 
with regards to the individual’s consent to enter into such a relationship – and a public 
health issue. It is also considered a form of GBV.”171 Not only, an SGBV specialist 
explained to me, was early marriage itself a form of GBV, but “girls who are married 
early are at…a higher risk of also facing other types of GBV within their marriages.”172  
 
Humanitarian actors’ focus on the issue of early marriage, which is reminiscent of the 
attention given by British colonialists to the question of child marriage in India,173 was 
evident in reports produced by UN agencies,174 the establishment of an Early and Forced 
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Marriage Task Force to coordinate humanitarian activities,175 and poster and brochure 
campaigns from UNHCR and its partners to discourage the practice.176 Early marriage 
also received extensive, and often sensationalised,177 coverage within international news 
media.178 More recently, humanitarian agencies have written profiles of women and girls 
in Za‘tari who are fighting early marriage.179 So great was the focus on early marriage, that 
a Jordanian man working for an INGO claimed, at a public discussion event on the 
topic, that in the early years of the Syria crisis, it felt like early marriage was the only issue 
they were there to deal with.180  
 
Many of these marriages were legal under Jordanian law. The legal age for marriage in 
Jordan is 18, for males and females, although written into the law are exemptions for 15-
17 year olds. Marriages can only legally take place between the ages of 15 and 17 if the 
guardians of the person under 18 consent, and if the persons to be married consent 
themselves, although as noted above, humanitarian agencies expressed concerns about 
the ability of under 18 year olds to freely and genuinely consent.181 All marriages between 
Muslims in Jordan are overseen by the shari’a court, a branch of which was established in 
Za‘tari – the first such court in a refugee camp anywhere in the world, I was proudly told 
by a Jordanian police officer.182   
 
In a case where a marriage involves someone under 18, in the assessment of a judge in 
the shari’a court, the marriage must not be a reason to discontinue the child’s education, 
must involve an appropriate age difference, be in the child’s best interests, and provide 
economic, safety or social benefits to them.183 That 13.6% of marriages in Jordan in 2013 
involved one or more person under the age of 18 demonstrates that these exceptions are 
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widely used.184 Although the law has further provisions for marriages to be authorised, in 
exceptional circumstances, when one or more of the parties are under 15, these are very 
rarely granted.185 In Syria, the standard legal age for marriage in Syria is 18 for males and 
17 for females, although, with special approval from a judge, boys may be able to marry 
from the age of 15, and girls from the age of 13.186  
 
Given the humanitarian focus on the issue, there was a surprising lack of clarity about 
the extent of, and changes in levels of, early marriage among Syrians. UN Women’s 2013 
report on the issue documented Syrians’ perceptions of the average age of marriage 
within their community. Almost half of adult Syrian refugees thought that the average 
age of marriage for a girl in their community was somewhere under the age of 18,187 and 
around 2/3rds of those surveyed believed that the average age of marriage had stayed the 
same since coming to Jordan, 23% said that it had decreased for males and females, while 
10% said it had increased.188 UNICEF’s 2014 study of early marriage in Jordan notes 
what it calls a “sharp rise” in early marriage among Syrians, citing the fact that “the 
prevalence of early marriage among all registered marriages for Syrians increase[ed] from 
25 per cent in 2013 to 31.7 percent in the first quarter of 2014.”189 Yet as the same report 
notes, these statistics denote registered marriages in Jordan, and there is an unknown 
number of unregistered marriages in Jordan, whether involving under 18s or not,190 
making accurate statistical trends hard to detect. The report furthermore notes that, 
within pre-conflict Syria, it was very common for marriages not to be registered until the 
paperwork was needed, for example for the birth of a child. This practice developed 
because the law requiring the registration of marriages was not widely enforced, and it 
could be difficult to obtain all of the necessary paperwork to register the marriage (for 
example if a man had not completed compulsory military service.)191  
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Despite the statistically unclear situation, it was generally perceived, by humanitarians, 
that the practice of ‘early marriage’ was increasing.192 Yet simultaneously, there was a 
widespread acknowledgement that ‘early marriage’ was a practice that pre-dated Syrians’ 
time and experiences in Jordan. According to UN Women, ‘early marriage’ was “strongly 
rooted in traditional and primarily rural practices,” and was believed to be increasing as a 
result of difficult circumstances in exile. 193  It was also very common to hear the 
sentiment that ‘early marriage’ was a part of ‘Syrian culture’ both from NGO workers, 
and from Syrians living in Za‘tari.194 Marriage under 18 was particularly common in some 
specific Syrian cities and especially in rural areas, in which the vast majority of Za‘tari 
residents lived before coming to Jordan.195 
 
Simultaneously, however, alongside these narratives emphasising the importance of 
‘Syrian culture’ to the practice of ‘early marriage,’ there was a widespread understanding, 
even if it was not always foregrounded, that child marriage was a strategy employed by 
families in response to their socio-economic circumstances. As Al Akash and Boswell 
have demonstrated, the marriage of Syrian girls, in some cases, provided economic relief 
for her family because another family would (at least in theory) then become responsible 
for her well-being. In other cases, the girl and potentially the wider family would accrue 
other perceived benefits such as the ability to leave a refugee camp and live in the city.196 
Some of these factors are also noted in humanitarian reports.197 Yet at the same time, I 
was told by an SGBV specialist, even though agencies “know, globally speaking as well, 
economic reasons are the main reasons for child marriage taking place…in the current 
context we can’t influence this.” 198 Thus economic factors became, according to this 
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interviewee, “the big disclaimer” on their organisation’s plan of action to tackle early 
marriage.199  
 
As in the case of ‘vulnerability,’ a particular group becomes an object of concern and 
intervention. The circumstances that render ‘early marriage’ a rational, perhaps even 
unavoidable, strategy for some Syrian families, in this case poverty and encampment, are 
sidelined. The focus remains on Syrian culture, and the role of humanitarians in ‘helping’ 
Syrian women and girls by attempting to change their understandings of pre-existing 
practices. According to a Jordanian women’s rights activist, marriages under the age of 
18 were “part of [refugees’] lives in Syria, there wasn’t a thing called early marriage, it’s a 
new category,” she reported with approval.200 Even though many of the Syrian girls in 
question would have been, if there had not been an uprising in Syria, married at the same 
age, and in the same way,201 under the gaze of humanitarianism, the rural, ‘traditional,’ 
non-western population of Za‘tari appears before them as a ‘culture’ in need of reform.202 
Humanitarian crisis presents an opportunity to ‘improve’ the Syrian population. 
 
The discussions and programmes on ‘early marriage’ also further demonstrate both 
humanitarian understandings of gender and agency, and how humanitarian knowledge is 
privileged over the knowledge of the Syrian community. In contrast to humanitarian 
understandings that ‘early marriage’ was a human rights violation, and a cultural practice 
to be reformed, Tobin and Campbell found that Syrian girls in Za‘tari who got married 
under the age of 18 often: 
 
anticipated that getting married earlier would help, not only to reduce 
burdens on their natal families, but also to secure their safety around 
the camp…[they] also indicated that marriage would give them a 
heightened sense of responsibility and agency in an otherwise 
debilitating environment.203  
 
While girls were assumed, potentially often in contrast to their own understandings of 
their situations, to be victims of early marriage, the notion that boys might be victims of 
early marriage rarely seemed to be countenanced. Even though the vast majority of those 
marrying under the age of 18 were girls, there were some cases of two individuals, both 
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under 18, getting married.204 In this instance, however, many INGOs would argue that 
such marriages are an instance of GBV against the girl, but not against the boy. 205 
According to one specialist, there was often an assumption among her colleagues that the 
boy will have some capacity to influence decisions that might effectively be made by his 
parents.206 Even when under 18 and living in dire socio-economic circumstances, male 
refugees were imagined to have a level of agency that was assumed to not exist for girls. 
Females are assumed to be ‘vulnerable,’ males agential.  
 
Refugee men and boys’ ability to exercise agency, however, is both complex and 
circumscribed by context. I was told, for example, by multiple informants, of a case in 
Za‘tari where a Syrian man in his early twenties married a girl under 18. He had, I was 
informed, strongly protested the marriage that was being set up for him by his parents, 
and attempted to find ways out of it. His father informed him, however, that if he did 
not go through with the marriage then he would be disowned and disinherited. He was, 
in effect, left with a choice of going through with the marriage against his will, or being 
on his own, without the support structures of his family. 207  As noted in the above 
discussions on ‘vulnerability,’ the circumstances of men living without the support of 
their families are often some of the most difficult and precarious for refugees in Jordan. 
Other marriages involving children are reported to have taken place in an attempt to 
circumvent restrictions on entry to Jordan.208 As has been documented by human rights 
groups, it was considerably more difficult for Syrian men to enter Jordan if they were 
travelling outside of a family unit or married couple.209 Marrying, even if one would 
otherwise not have done so, might have presented one way out of that potentially life-
threatening situation.  
 
Acknowledging these complexities does not mean that marriage is the ‘correct decision’ 
in any particular circumstance (if there is indeed such a thing as the correct decision), nor 
does it imply any less concern about the welfare of the girls and boys who are married. 
But it does offer a sharp contrast to the humanitarian sector’s portrayals and 
understandings of ‘early marriage’ and gender in Syrian communities more broadly. 
                                                
204 UNICEF, “A Study on Early Marriage in Jordan 2014,” 17–21.  
205 Interview with SGBV specialist (2). 
206 Ibid. 
207 Conversations with NGO workers, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016; and Amman, 08.08.2016. 
208 UNICEF, “A Study on Early Marriage in Jordan 2014,” 32–33. 
209 Frelick, “Blocking Syrian Refugees Isn’t the Way.” 
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According to one interlocutor, these kinds of complexities are often missing when cases 
of early marriage are analysed: 
 
Sometimes it feels like we try to seek out what the problems are…we try to 
seek more examples of early marriage and condemn it immediately rather 
than trying to do a more nuanced understanding of [the situation]…I mean 
people do do evaluations, copious amounts of evaluations, but the image that 
comes out is this very generalised ‘early marriage is bad.’210 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that, in the humanitarian sector’s interactions with Syrian men, 
the enactment of the gendered humanitarian frameworks that were explored in Chapter 2 
is justified through the behaviour of (or behaviour that is attributed to) Syrian men 
themselves – in particular their perceived lack of interest in humanitarian work, their 
inconvenient time schedules, and the priorities these are understood to represent. Syrian 
women’s ‘vulnerability,’ in line with ‘global’ standards, not only reinforces the ostensible 
non-‘vulnerability’ of Syrian men, but also renders women objects of humanitarian care 
and control – their bodies are the domain upon which the agendas of the humanitarian 
sector are carried out. 
 
Both Syrian men’s perceived non-‘vulnerability,’ and Syrian women’s perceived 
‘vulnerability,’ can lead to interactions with the humanitarian sector that harm Syrians. 
Men’s agency is often assumed; women’s agency is often denied. The analysis presented 
here has explored the needs and challenges of Syrian refugee men, located them within 
the specific context of exile in Jordan, and examined how refugee men’s needs are often 
overlooked by humanitarian actors. Rather than attempting to identify a group(s) that is 
‘the most vulnerable,’ humanitarian actors should attempt to understand how different 
groups of people, along gendered and other lines, experience a variety of context-specific 
challenges, threats and needs. As this Chapter has demonstrated, some of these 
challenges are created and perpetuated by the humanitarian sector itself.  
  
                                                
210 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari.  
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Chapter 5: Engaging Syrian Men and Boys in Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Prevention 
 
‘Engaging men and boys’ is a phrase capturing work with men that attempts to reduce 
the chance of men and boys being perpetrators of SGBV, to make them question and 
reform their masculinities, and/or to create of them ‘allies’ against SGBV. In contrast to 
the relative paucity of work with Syrian men in numerous sectors of the refugee 
response, work with men on SGBV prevention was growing rapidly during the time of 
my fieldwork. This ‘engagement’ – one might assume – necessitates conversation and 
exchange. But humanitarian workers expressed severe concern over whether this is a 
conversation that Syrian men would be willing or able to take part in. As one Jordanian 
acquaintance said to me, upon hearing that my research involved discussion of Syrian 
masculinities, “I don’t think anyone’s going to talk to you about that!”1 I heard this kind 
of sentiment so often in the first weeks of my fieldwork in particular, that I joked to a 
friend that “Nobody’s going to talk to you about that,” might be a good working title for 
my thesis.  
 
This chapter focuses on this SGBV prevention work, and in particular the (perceived) 
challenges of ‘engaging’ Syrian men. Many of these challenges come from encounters 
between the ‘global’ frameworks of humanitarianism, which centred human rights and 
western understandings of gender, and those of the ‘local’ context, which centred Islam 
and understandings of gender rooted within the camp community. The former were 
consistently privileged over the latter. After giving an overview of the SGBV response 
within Za‘tari, this chapter explores how humanitarian actors attempted to undertake 
work to ‘engage men and boys’ within this ‘local,’ Arab context. It analyses the 
frameworks chosen for this work, competing understandings of why levels of SGBV in 
the camp were high, humanitarians’ readings of Syrian men as ‘unemotional,’ 
contestations over translation and language, and whether Syrian men could be read as 
‘victims’ of GBV. In doing so, it calls into question the presumed hierarchies of 
humanitarianism – did humanitarian actors’ work, as they assumed, act as a progressive 
influence on local norms and practices?   
 
                                                
1 Fieldnotes, Amman, 15 September 2015. 
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The SGBV Response and its ‘Engagement’ of Men 
SGBV was quickly identified, by humanitarian actors working in Za‘tari, as a widespread 
problem in the camp, and a similar situation was noted by humanitarian actors working 
with Syrian communities across Jordan.2 The most commonly reported form of SGBV, 
according to social workers, psychologists and lawyers, was domestic violence, which was 
believed to account for over 50 percent of all instances of SGBV. Male relatives - 
husbands, uncles, and brothers - were those most often reported to be perpetrators of 
this violence.3 Such dynamics, where high levels of SGBV are recorded within contexts 
of encampment and exile, are far from unique to Za‘tari or Jordan, and have been 
documented by research in a range of contexts.4 Humanitarian actors’ reports on the 
scale and severity of the SGBV challenges facing the Syrian community concurred with 
my experiences working among Syrian refugees. Many Syrians I spoke to, both men and 
women, believed that levels of domestic violence in particular had increased since the 
uprising in Syria and since seeking exile in Jordan.5  
 
Humanitarian actors offer support to survivors of SGBV on a number of levels – case 
managers offer confidential referrals to multi-sectorial services, women and girls’ safe 
spaces have been created, capacity building is offered for medical, legal and psychosocial 
personnel, and campaigns are conducted to raise awareness about SGBV in the Syrian 
community. The SGBV Sub-Working Group coordinated the prevention and response 
work of its members, prepared and coordinated inter-agency assessments, and conducted 
training sessions for SGBV service providers.6 The Gender-Based Violence Information 
Management System, coordinated by UNHCR and UNFPA, was used to “collect, store, 
analyse, and share data related to reported incidents of SGBV.”7 Overall, the response 
                                                
2 See CPGBV Sub-Working Group, “Findings from the Inter-Agency CPGBV Assessment”; Policing 
Support Team, British Embassy Amman, “Safety Perceptions Survey”; UN Women, “Gender-Based 
Violence and Child Protection.” 
3  
4 Sibylle Rothkegel et al., “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence in Situations of Forced Displacement” (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008). 
5 ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys.”; conversations with Syrian men and 
women, Amman, 02.11.2015 and 15.11.2015; and Za‘tari, 17.11.2015; interviews with Lina Darras; and 
Ruba Abu-Taleb. 
6 SGBV Sub-Working Group, “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: Syrian Refugees in Jordan March 
2014,” 2014, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107; SGBV Sub-Working Group, 
“Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: Refugees in Jordan June 2015,” 2015, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
7 SGBV Sub-Working Group, “Gender-Based Violence Information Management System Jordan,” August 
2014, 1, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
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aimed, one SGBV specialist told me, to ensure that ‘global’ standards for dealing with 
SGBV were upheld.8  
 
The systems put in place to help Syrian survivors of SGBV differed markedly from the 
sources of support that Syrians themselves sought. According to a report by the Child 
Protection and Gender-Based Violence (CPGBV) Sub-Working Group, many refugees 
in Za‘tari who were survivors of SGBV would choose not to approach NGOs or formal 
support services, but were more likely to seek support from other family members.9 
Similarly, a UN Women report on GBV among Syrians living in Jordanian host 
communities found that for both sexual and physical violence, Syrian refugee women 
were thought to be most likely to turn to family members, followed by the police, with 
only small proportions of respondents thinking that women would first turn to a health 
clinic for support. In instances of psychological violence, family members were again 
thought to be by far the most likely place where women would turn.10 
 
The Jordanian legal system added complexity to humanitarian actors’ attempts to deal 
with cases of SGBV in line with their perceptions of ‘global’ standards. According to an 
SGBV specialist I interviewed, central to these standards was a ‘survivor-centred’ 
approach, which meant that the survivor should choose which services to access and 
when, and whether and when to involve the police or other authorities.11 But according 
to Jordanian law, she continued, the reporting of some forms of SGBV is mandatory, for 
example if it involves someone under the age of 18, or if it involves sexual violence. This 
put psychologists and doctors in a very difficult position, because even if the survivor did 
not want them to, they were legally obliged to report the incident to the police, 
potentially putting the survivor in danger, for example of so-called ‘honour’-based 
crimes.12 The Jordanian Public Security Directorate has a specific division – the FPD - 
which has a: 
 
                                                
8 Interview with SGBV specialist (2). 
9 CPGBV Sub-Working Group, “Findings from the Inter-Agency CPGBV Assessment,” 3. 
10 UN Women, “Gender-Based Violence and Child Protection,” 23. 
11 Interview with SGBV specialist (2); see also UNICEF et al., “Handbook for Coordinating Gender-Based 
Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings,” 2010, 
https://www.unicef.org/ecuador/GBV_Handbook_Long_Version.pdf. 
12 See Adam Coogle, “Recorded ‘Honor’ Killings on the Rise in Jordan,” Human Rights Watch, October 
27, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/recorded-honor-killings-rise-jordan. 
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distinct mandate to investigate and handle cases of family violence and 
sexual abuse. The department is mandated to carry out investigations, 
follow up on cases, and provide survivors with specialist services.13  
 
A branch of the FPD was set up in Za‘tari, close to the shari‘a court, and ARDD’s offices 
where the NGO provided legal aid. 
 
The increased focus on ‘engaging men and boys’ as part of the SGBV response in Jordan 
is part of a global trend, which can also be seen in other contexts of displacement.14 This 
can be seen in the work, reports and research of organisations including Promundo, 
White Ribbon, MenEngage, UN Women, UNFPA, EME/Cultura Salad, Institute of 
Development Studies, and Sonke Gender Justice among others, 15  and in academic 
articles in journals including Men and Masculinities and Violence Against Women.16  Some 
organisations have been advocating for this approach for a relatively long time. For 
example, the Women’s Refugee Commission produced a handbook on including men in 
gender equality work in 2005,17 and a case study of Promundo’s work was included in 
UNHCR’s 2008 evaluation of its efforts to prevent and respond to SGBV.18  
 
The growing literature, both academic and practitioner-focused, on ‘engaging men and 
boys,’ outlines why many believe this work should be undertaken as part of a wider 
SGBV response. At the centre of the justification is the idea that particular masculinities, 
learned within patriarchal frameworks, create norms and practices that facilitate and 
legitimise violence, especially against women and girls. These include, for example: 
 
                                                
13 UN Women, “Gender-Based Violence and Child Protection,” 76. 
14 See Olivius, “Refugee Men as Perpetrators, Allies or Troublemakers?” 
15 Francisco Aguayo et al., “Engaging Men in Public Policies for the Prevention of Violence Against 
Women and Girls” (Santiago; Washington DC; Panama City: EME/CulturaSalud; Promundo-US; UN 
Women and UNFPA, 2016); Andrea Cornwall, Jerker Edström, and Alan Greig, eds., Men and Development: 
Politicizing Masculinities (London; New York: Zed Books, 2011); C. Müller and T. Shahrokh, “Engaging Men 
for Effective Activism against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence,” Policy Briefing (Institute of 
Development Studies, January 2016); Bob Pease, “Men as Allies in Preventing Violence against Women: 
Principles and Practices for Promoting Accountability,” White Ribbon Research Series (Sydney: White 
Ribbon Australia, 2017). 
16 See Dean Peacock and Gary Barker, “Working with Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence 
Principles, Lessons Learned, and Ways Forward,” Men and Masculinities 17, no. 5 (2014): 578–99; Heather L. 
Storer et al., “Primary Prevention Is? A Global Perspective on How Organizations Engaging Men in 
Preventing Gender-Based Violence Conceptualize and Operationalize Their Work,” Violence against Women 
22, no. 2 (2016): 249–268. 
17 Dana Buscher and Diana Quick, “Masculinities: Male Roles and Male Involvement in the Promotion of 
Gender Equality : A Resource Packet” (New York: Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and 
Children, 2005). 
18 Rothkegel et al., “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-Based 
Violence in Situations of Forced Displacement,” 89. 
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the need to assert power and be in control; an inability to manage anger 
or frustration…a sense of ownership over women’s bodies;…the 
perception of women as sexual objects; and the idea that male sexual 
desire is uncontrollable.19 
 
Since these masculinities represent both a central root cause of SGBV, and can be very 
damaging to the lives of men themselves,20 they require questioning, deconstructing, and 
challenging.  
 
Work to ‘engage men and boys’ is less well developed in the Middle East than in other 
regions of the world.21 Promundo, for example, one of the biggest drivers of this work, 
published its first survey and report on the Middle East only in 2017.22 Despite this, 
within Jordan this work had been called for, by at least some humanitarian actors, since 
the early years of the Syria crisis, for example in a 2013 UN Women report.23 By 2015, 
the SGBV Sub-Working Group had identified “engaging with men & boys as one of the 
priorities for [the year],” and had made it one of the objectives in their annual work 
plan.24 As a result of this, the working group organised a two-day workshop on the topic 
for humanitarian actors in Amman in May 2015. This workshop recommended that 
organisations ensure that, in their messaging, “men and boys are also reflected as agents 
of positive change and not only as potential perpetrators;” to “[i]nclude men and boys in 
activity targets for prevention activities, such as awareness-raising campaigns, and 
training for refugees and asylum-seekers;” and to “sensitize staff to better understand 
gender equality concepts and how it [sic] impacts masculinity.” 25  In the same year, 
UNHCR hired a specialist consultant, Suhail Abualsameed, to undertake training on this 
issue for their staff and partners in the Jordanian police.26 ‘Engaging men and boys’ was 
also an unofficial theme of the ‘16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence’ 
campaign in Jordan, with slogans such as ‘my security is your security.’27 Multiple NGOs, 
                                                
19 Aguayo et al., “Engaging Men in Public Policies for the Prevention of Violence Against Women and 
Girls,” 11. 
20 E.g. see Aguayo et al., 13. 
21 Interview with SGBV specialist (1). 
22 Promundo, “International Men and Gender Equality Survey,” Promundo Global, n.d., 
http://promundoglobal.org/programs/international-men-and-gender-equality-survey-images/. 
23Han:  
24 SGBV Sub-Working Group, “Workshop: Engaging Men and Boys in SGBV Programming: 13/14 May 
2015, Kempinski Hotel, Amman.,” 1. 
25 SGBV Sub-Working Group, 2. 
26 Interview with Suhail Abualsameed. 
27 Interview with SGBV specialist (2). 
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including ARDD, began to undertake their own programmes to ‘engage [Syrian] men and 
boys.’28  
 
Not having been aware of the rapid growth of this work in Jordan, and having initially 
planned to focus less on the actions and policies of NGOs in my research, I had not 
anticipated that I would research or be involved in this kind of work. At the same time, it 
was an area that I was very familiar with in a different context, from my voluntary work 
in the UK with a project called Great Men.29 Set up in 2013 by feminist activists Sarah 
Perry and Genevieve Dawson, Great Men works primarily with teenage boys in schools 
in the UK, to try to create spaces for them to be able to discuss openly, often for the first 
time, questions of gender and masculinity, sexuality, pornography, mental health, and 
violence. From the beginning of my association with Great Men in February 2014, I felt 
very invested in the work it was doing, and the approach that it was, at that time, 
pioneering within the UK. The workshops with boys seemed desperately needed, always 
felt honest, feminist, and politically transformative, and appeared to have a deep impact 
for many of the people we worked with.  
 
Despite my experience in, and in principle support for, this kind of work, the projects to 
‘engage men and boys’ in Za‘tari, including the one on which I worked, made me feel 
deeply uneasy. In part, I believe, this was a discomfort resulting from the inherent power 
inequalities involved in working with a marginalised population,30 whose lives, despite 
these power inequalities, one is unable to improve significantly. But I was also unnerved 
by the work to ‘engage men and boys’ specifically, because it was the only work with men 
about which humanitarian actors appeared to be especially enthusiastic. Syrian men 
would be encouraged, cajoled, persuaded, on occasion I would even say pleaded with, to 
come to workshops about SGBV, which highlighted, for me, the absence of engagement 
with other aspects of their lives.31  
 
As described in Chapter 2, the Youth Task Force in Za‘tari had given a lukewarm and 
perplexed reaction to my interviewee’s suggestion that humanitarian actors should be 
                                                
28 See ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys.”; Interview with protection programme 
manager. 
29 The GREAT Initiative, “Great Men: Engaging Men & Boys, Disrupting Gender Stereotypes,” Great 
Men, accessed July 27, 2017, https://www.great-men.org. 
30 Clark-Kazak, “Ethical Considerations.” 
31 Author observation, Za‘tari, 17.11.2015 and 15.12.2015. 
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providing more activities for men in the camp. Yet when a different interviewee, in 2015, 
had presented the idea of a project working to ‘engage men and boys’ in SGBV 
prevention to the same task force, she described her colleagues’ reactions as “super 
interested…they thought it was really exciting.”32 Refugee men were the targets of the 
work, but only because their involvement could be conceptualised as a means to achieve 
pre-determined humanitarian goals of supporting women and children. My discomfort at 
these dynamics was only exacerbated by the controversies that surrounded how Syrian 
men were to be engaged – how grounded in the local religious context should 
discussions with men be, and what weight should be given to Syrian men’s own 
understandings of why levels of SGBV were high? Men were to be engaged, it appeared, 
according to the frameworks of the humanitarian sector. 
 
Can ‘Global’ Frameworks Engage Syrian Men?  
The language of ‘engaging men’ had become so ubiquitous that it appeared, for many 
humanitarian actors, to have become a synonym for ‘working with men,’ as if it were 
impossible to work with men without in some way ‘engaging them.’ 33 It was therefore 
possible to be in favour of ‘engaging men,’ without exploring exactly what this meant in 
practice. But in more in-depth discussions with and among donors, practitioners, field 
workers, and Syrian men themselves, these issues often came to the fore. One of the 
primary controversies surrounded the use of ‘global’ frameworks of human rights versus 
the ‘local’ framework of Islam. Dean Peacock and Gary Barker, leading figures in two of 
the largest organisations involved in this work globally – Sonke Gender Justice and 
Promundo - argue that “policy and program approaches to involving men in achieving 
gender equality and gender-based violence prevention must be framed within a human 
and women’s rights agenda” [emphasis added].34 Similarly, the WHO suggests, as one of 
the “guiding principles” for actors engaging men and boys for gender equality, that 
organisations should “frame policy and programming with men within an agenda that 
promotes human rights, including women’s rights.”35  
 
                                                
32 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
33 Author observation, Amman, 15.08.2016. 
34 Peacock and Barker, “Working with Men and Boys to Prevent Gender-Based Violence,” 582. 
35 World Health Organizaton, “Policy Approaches to Engaging Men and Boys in Achieving Gender 
Equality and Health Equity” (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010), 15. 
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A similar emphasis on ‘global’ frameworks and human rights was found in the gender 
work of many of the organisations working in Za‘tari.36 One interviewee, a European 
NGO worker who attended a ‘gender awareness’ training organised by UNHCR, 
described the training as “very sound in terms of international/Western interpretations 
of the concept of gender,” but relayed how many of the Western-centric examples used 
by the facilitator from the United States alienated the mostly Jordanian participants.37 
Some young Syrian men whom I met in Za‘tari similarly described how they had 
attended gender workshops run by NGOs in the camp, but said the sessions had mostly 
consisted of a trainer listing the relevant articles from different UN human rights 
declarations and documents.38  
 
While they may be understood, by some actors, to be ‘global’ or ‘international,’ the 
language and ideas of human rights, and women’s rights in particular, have been used in 
the service of particular Northern agendas. This includes, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
attempts to ‘save’ Muslim women, but also to justify broader projects of imperialism.39 
Simultaneously, there is a widespread ‘backlash’ against human rights and the 
frameworks and institutions it inspires, particularly, but not exclusively, in post-colonial 
contexts. This can play out in terms of arguments against human rights on the grounds 
of cultural difference or cultural relativism,40 or the discrediting of campaigns for the 
rights of women (or other groups) through their campaigns’ associations with Western 
frameworks and powers.41 Women and men in post-colonial settings who are subject to 
contemporary humanitarian interventions on gender can experience them as yet another 
‘civilising mission’ from the West. 42  In contrast to Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang’ 
theory of norm diffusion, through which oppressive states will find themselves 
                                                
36 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari; conversation with NGO workers, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016. 
37 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
38 Conversation with young Syrian men, Za‘tari, 02.08.2016. 
39 Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation?, 4–14; Bécquer Seguín, “Imperialists for ‘Human Rights,’” 
Jacobin, December 19, 2014, http://jacobinmag.com/2014/12/imperialists-for-human-rights. 
40 S. R. Harris-Short, “International Human Rights Law : Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective ? Cultural 
Relativism and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.,” Human Rights Quarterly. 25, no. 
1 (2003): 130–81. 
41 Rochelle Terman, “The Unintended Consequences of Western Human Rights Intervention,” Open 
Democracy, December 10, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rochelle-terman/backlash-
unintended-consequences-of-western-human-rights-intervention. 
42 Grabska, “Constructing ‘Modern Gendered Civilised’ Women and Men.” 
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“‘sandwiched’ between domestic and transnational pressure,”43 western interventions in 
the name of human rights have often resulted in a ‘backlash.’44  
 
In the context of the Arab world, as Nicola Pratt has argued, Western powers, despite 
their self-portrayal as supporters of women’s and human rights, have “as a result of their 
geopolitical interests…supported regimes that have clamped down on revolutionary and 
radical popular movements.” The “demise of radical, secular movements,” she argues, 
and the co-optation of the women’s rights agenda by authoritarian regimes,  “has led to a 
decoupling of secular women’s rights agenda from local popular projects…rendering 
secular women’s rights activists vulnerable to accusations of representing foreign 
agendas.”45 Within the context of Za‘tari specifically, in a community where many feel 
abandoned and let down by the international community,46 framing gender equality and 
anti-SGBV work in terms of ‘human rights’ did not typically receive a receptive audience. 
As one senior NGO officer, who had been based in the Middle East for many years, said 
to me, the Syrians he works with “don’t understand anything the UN says about them.”47  
 
In accordance with the emphasis on ‘human rights’ and the ‘global’ standards of 
humanitarianism, and despite the extensive ‘vernacularisation’ of women’s and human 
rights in other contexts,48 the use of Islam within projects to ‘engage men and boys’ was 
controversial for many humanitarian actors. According to Suhail Abualsameed, based on 
his experience working with a range of NGOs and humanitarian agencies, resistance to 
using Islam came, in particular, from non-Jordanian staff members, the vast majority of 
whom were westerners. While the Jordanian staff, sometimes requiring a little 
persuasion, would understand the potential benefits of using religious frameworks, the 
foreign staff often rejected such suggestions with “arrogance…don’t you – Arab, 
                                                
43 Thomas Risse, Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas Do Not Float Freely 
(Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2017); see also Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
“Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” International Social Science Journal 
51, no. 159 (1999): 89–101. 
44 Terman, “The Unintended Consequences of Western Human Rights Intervention.” 
45 Nicola Pratt, “How the West Undermined Women’s Rights in the Arab World,” Jadaliyya, January 25, 
2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23693/how-the-west-undermined-women%E2%80%99s-
rights-in-the-arab; see also Nadje Al-Ali, “The Iraqi Women’s Movement: Past and Contemporary 
Perspectives,” in Mapping Arab Women’s Movements: A Century of Transformations Within, ed. Pernille Arenfeldt 
and Nawar Golley (Cairo: AUC Press, 2012), 93–110. 
46 Conversation with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 16.02.2016;  
47 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 21.10.2015. 
48 Sally Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt, “The Vernacularization of Women’s Human Rights,” in Human 
Rights Futures, ed. Stephen Hopgood, Jack Snyder, and Leslie Vinjamuri (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 213–36. 
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Muslim, Suhail - don’t tell us what’s right and what works, we Spanish and British and 
Canadians will tell you this will not happen.”49 These attitudes are part of a broader 
trend, whereby faith-based actors, particularly from Muslim communities, perceive 
themselves to be side-lined by their ‘secular’ counterparts in efforts to combat SGBV.50 
 
Where human rights frameworks might be alienating, discussing opposition to SGBV in 
the language, and context, of Islam, appeared on the ground to garner a better 
reception.51 This was an approach that ARDD used in its work with refugees, despite the 
potential for controversy this might cause. As a Jordanian NGO, with Jordanian staff 
implementing the work on the ground, ARDD would regularly emphasise, both publicly 
and privately, the importance of SGBV work with men being grounded in the local 
cultural, social, and religious context.52 As the organisation noted in its report on the 
project in which I was involved, “many men in [Za‘tari] will express their opposition to 
SGBV with reference to Islam and its teachings.”53 To some extent, its willingness to 
diverge from the approaches of western organisations ameliorated elements of the 
aforementioned discomfort I felt about the work.  
 
While it may have reduced my discomfort, it heightened the discomfort of others. On a 
social occasion during my fieldwork, I was explaining the work that ARDD did to a 
western acquaintance whose organisation was expanding its work into this field. I 
mentioned that Islam, and discussion of Islam, was an important part of the approach 
used in the project I was working on. “That must be, er…a challenge,” she replied, with 
an expression that I took to be a mixture of surprise and concern. I countered that it was 
one of the most productive techniques we had, and that many of the most vocally 
supportive participants had themselves been local sheikhs or religiously devout 
individuals from the community. She was very impressed, she told me, (and clearly 
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surprised) that Islam could be used in the service of an anti-SGBV agenda.54 Islam was 
assumed, by those with little familiarity with the social worlds in which it is important, to 
be contrary to, and less progressive than, ‘international’ norms and standards.  
 
A second way in which ‘global’ frameworks were seen to sit uncomfortably with ‘local’ 
norms concerned how men were to be engaged. Was it through the questioning and 
deconstruction of masculinities, which is central to justifications for involving men in 
SGBV prevention work, or should ‘local’ understandings of the causes of high levels of 
SGBV be incorporated into the work? While the reasons for domestic violence are 
complex and varied, and in contexts of refuge can involve men re-asserting control they 
have lost in other spheres of life,55 in numerous conversations with Syrian interlocutors, 
both men and women, I encountered a seemingly-widespread perception that high stress 
levels were behind increased levels of SGBV, in particular domestic violence. The Syrian 
conflict, exile in Jordan, and particularly economic struggles and unemployment among 
men, were understood to be one of, and often the primary, reason why there were higher 
levels of violence in the home compared to pre-conflict Syria.56  
 
This idea was also found in humanitarian agencies’ research into SGBV in the camp.57 As 
a 2013 report by the CPGBV Sub-Working Group noted, in previous assessments Syrian 
women had: 
 
disclosed that their husbands were under immense stress, and they 
anticipate this to lead to heightened levels of domestic 
violence…[focus group discussions] confirmed that one of the main 
justifications given for this violence was stress caused by lack of money 
and employment.58  
 
UN Women’s report into SGBV among Syrians living in host communities found a 
similar trend, with “Syrian women [reporting] that their husbands are under immense 
stress and that this increases physical and psychological violence against them and against 
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children within the home.”59 However, as discussed in Chapter 4, providing psychosocial 
support to Syrian men was rarely a priority for humanitarian actors. If the Syrian 
community’s perceptions of why there were high levels of domestic violence were taken 
more seriously, this might have become a central component of efforts to combat SGBV 
in the camp. Men in Za‘tari reported to myself and colleagues that the number of people 
who came to the camp wanting to talk to them about violence was significantly higher 
than the number coming to offer them psychosocial support.60 
 
Despite the idea of a connection between stress levels and domestic violence appearing 
in multiple humanitarian reports, some humanitarians were reluctant to publicly report or 
emphasise this view. A senior colleague told me, for example, that if we were to 
acknowledge Syrian men’s understandings of why violence occurred (understandings that 
were shared by many women in their community), it might create challenges for the 
organisation because other humanitarian actors might think that we, as an NGO, were 
saying that increased violence was justified when stress levels were very high. 61  The 
difference between stress causing and stress justifying violence was a regular, and 
uncontroversial, topic of discussion in the workshops with Syrians,62 but apparently for 
some humanitarian actors the boundaries between these two ideas were sufficiently 
blurred that we had to be very careful in the language we used in public. 63  It was 
politically safer to emphasise the role that masculinities played in the perpetuation of 
violence. This also conveniently avoided the fact that, for many of the men we worked 
with in Za‘tari, positive coping mechanisms in situations of stress were often found in 
spirituality and Islam.64 
 
To ARDD’s credit, in my view, acknowledging and discussing the stresses that men were 
living under was an important part of its approach.65  While men’s relationships and 
responses to stress, and resultant manifestations of inter-personal violence are 
fundamentally related to questions of gender and masculinities, the shorter-term solution 
to the (at least perceived) relationship between stress and violence, which ARDD 
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pursued, was to try to give men better strategies for coping with their stress levels.66 Yet 
if, as I was told, such an approach was too controversial for other agencies, it left me 
questioning how exactly men were meant to be ‘engaged.’ How are masculinities and 
practices of violence to be discussed and understood without context, and therefore, 
without a full understanding of their causes and meanings?  
 
As Alan Greig has argued, work with men on gender and violence “has been slow to 
make the links between the personal violence of men and the political violence of the 
state.”67 As this thesis has demonstrated, all refugees in Za‘tari continue to be subject to 
the violence of humanitarian and Jordanian state actors. Absent this broader political 
context, Greig continues, the “emphasis on violence as a learned behaviour that results 
from harmful norms of masculinity,” results in violence being framed in terms of 
culture.68 In this rare circumstance in which humanitarian actors express fairly consistent 
enthusiasm about working with men, the prioritisation of humanitarians’ understandings 
of the cause of SGBV over those of the Syrian community means that men appear 
before humanitarians as objects to reform, not people in need of help.  
 
Foregrounding the violence that Syrian men in Za‘tari experience would challenge 
humanitarian actors for two reasons. Firstly, some of that violence is perpetrated by their 
humanitarian or state partners. Many organisations perceive their presence in Jordan to 
be highly precarious, and that precarity to preclude criticism of some of Jordan’s policies 
towards refugees. Secondly, humanitarian actors would have had to accept that many of 
the causes of this violence are out of their control. If the violence is largely out of their 
control, if it is more than a question of a culture to be reformed, and masculinities to be 
deconstructed, why would donors fund them to combat it? As a field worker on a project 
funded by an international agency, I found that one of my most important roles was to 
record evidence of ‘change’ in our ‘beneficiaries.’ We would regularly be asked, by a 
donor, to provide ‘proof’ that the four hours of workshops each individual man attended 
were having an impact and changing their views on SGBV, views that one might assume 
have been built up over years and decades. Some of the instances of men apparently 
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reconsidering their views or challenging each other in the workshops were dismissed as 
‘anecdotes.’ What was needed was ‘proof.’69  
 
Many Syrian men brought humanitarian and state policies into conversation with 
questions of stress, their changing gendered lives, and gendered violence in the camp. 
This was especially the case regarding policies that they perceived to be restrictive and 
violent, such as those that inhibit their ability to leave the camp easily.70 In conversations 
with Syrians, and occasionally with NGO workers, it was common to hear Za‘tari 
referred to as a ‘prison.’71 Indeed, although it was rarely discussed as part of the same 
work, threats of violence were also a mechanism used in the camp to tackle SGBV. The 
FPD in the camp, as discussed above, is the Jordanian police institution with a specific 
responsibility for responding to SGBV cases. Yet its policies and actions were 
understood in radically different ways by humanitarian sector actors and Syrian men in 
the camp.  
 
For most humanitarian workers with whom I discussed the issue, the FPD was unable 
and/or unwilling to adequately address the needs of women who were survivors of 
SGBV. The FPD was understood, for example, to often ask men who had committed 
violence in the home to sign an oath to promise that they would not do so again, and the 
FPD would then play a role in assuring the person whom he had been violent towards 
that he was truly sorry and would not repeat his actions.72 According to one Jordanian 
NGO lawyer, who worked closely with the FPD and other branches of the Jordanian 
authorities in Za‘tari, the widespread perception in Jordan that the state should not 
interfere in the ‘private’ affairs of the home, including violence in the home,73 extended 
to many of the officers working for the FPD. He continued to note, however that, 
“when [the FPD] believe in the case, when they believe that this woman is [an] SGBV 
victim, they work very very hard.” I asked, however, whether women who came forward 
were often not believed by the FPD: “honestly, it happens a lot,” he replied.74 
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For many Syrian men, on the other hand, the FPD was a source of great resentment. 
Syrian interlocutors in Za‘tari told myself and colleagues, on multiple occasions, that 
Jordanian law took the side of women and children, not men. In particular, the legal 
power of the FPD to separate children from their families, and to send them to live with 
another family, sometimes in another refugee camp, appeared well known, and deeply 
resented.75 These dynamics, in which increased levels of state intervention in ‘domestic’ 
disputes are seen as against, or detrimental to, men have been noted in other contexts of 
migration and displacement.76 Furthermore, Syrian men were often told that if they did 
not sign that aforementioned ‘oaths’ to demonstrate their repentance for their violence, 
they risked being deported to Syria by the authorities.77 Therefore not only, as Greig 
argued, has gender work with men failed to address the links between broader politics 
and personal violence, but extreme threats of state violence are simultaneously used to 
try and reduce levels of SGBV in the camp. It was humanitarians who decided what 
forms of violence, what understandings of its causes, and what topics of discussion, 
should constitute their attempts to ‘engage’ Syrian men. Yet even though the 
humanitarian sector was largely in a position to attempt to implement the work using its 
own ‘global’ frameworks, there was another perceived challenge facing them – Syrian 
men themselves.  
 
Engaging ‘unemotional’ Arab men 
 
Syrian men themselves were perceived to represent an obstacle to the successful 
implementation of the work, because they were deemed too ‘closed’ or too 
‘unemotional.’ Discussing issues such as (gender-based) violence, masculinities, and 
men’s changing lives as refugees in the camp, was perceived by humanitarian actors to 
necessitate emotional openness on the part of men. These sentiments can be understood 
within a context in which feminist critics and activists have identified men’s ‘repression’ 
of emotions as a symptom and perpetuator of patriarchal arrangements, and thus in 
which greater emotional openness by men is understood to be a means to greater gender 
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equality. 78  Syrian men’s allegedly ‘unemotional’ nature was understood to be derived 
from their status as Arab men, and thus embodiments of Arab culture, in which the 
expression of emotion was perceived to be coded as feminine.79 Syrian men’s ostensible 
lack of emotional openness represents yet another way in which humanitarian actors 
understood Syrian men to be unsuitable for, uninterested in, or unavailable for, the work 
they were undertaking in the camp.  
 
The idea that Syrian men were insufficiently emotionally open to take part in discussions 
about gender and SGBV was expressed to me repeatedly. This came not only in 
discussions about work to ‘engage men and boys,’ but also more generally in people’s 
responses to hearing about my research topic, which was often imagined to be quite 
closely centred around SGBV and interventions to prevent it. Interlocutors from the 
NGO sector and elsewhere, men and women, doubted the feasibility of doing work or 
research about masculinities with or about Syrian men. Syrian men would not be willing, 
I was told, to openly discuss masculinity, or to discuss the role that gender played in their 
lives. 80  These views came from both Jordanians and Westerners. As scholars have 
observed, a non-Western positionality in terms of identities does not preclude what has 
been termed self-orientalism, or self-stereotyping, of groups of people from regions such 
as the Middle East.81  
 
One of the most notable aspects of the designation of Syrian men as insufficiently 
emotionally open is how such images of ‘Arab men’ contrast with long-standing 
orientalist and colonial depictions of men in the region. Both historically and 
contemporaneously, men have been portrayed in ways that simultaneously 
hypermasculinise and feminise their bodies and behaviours – they have been 
characterised as simultaneously “supermasculine” and “yet ‘so gentle.’” 82  Arab men’s 
masculinities are understood to be a “complex and contradictory array of traits.”83 Rather 
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than being ruled, like Western men, by rationality, 84  Arab men are deemed to be 
irrational, ruled by their emotions.85 Protest movements within the Arab world have been 
subject to similar depictions; the so-called Arab street “is either ‘irrational’ and 
‘aggressive’ or it is ‘apathetic’ and ‘dead.’”86  
 
As feminist scholarship has demonstrated, within many gender orders, rationality is 
considered opposed to emotionality; the former is valued and associated with 
masculinity, the latter devalued and associated with femininity.87 In particular, this has 
been the case within Western contexts, where emotion has been feminised and emotional 
detachment masculinised. 88  bell hooks has gone as far as to argue that, “patriarchy 
demands of all males…that they kill off the emotional parts of themselves.” 89  The 
orientalist and (neo-)colonial portrayals of men in the Arab world as being ruled by their 
emotions, in contrast to men in the West, are therefore also a feminisation of Arab men. 
Such depictions should be understood as part of a system “that disempowers non-
western men by proclaiming their effeminacy.”90  
 
The portrayal of Syrian men as ‘unemotional’ can be understood within a discursive 
structure that contrasts ‘the West’ and ‘the Arab world’ as discrete and opposed spaces, 
and a broader homonationalist context in which the former is understood as a space of 
tolerance and sexual diversity, and the latter intolerance and rigid heterosexuality.91 Men 
and masculinities within Western contexts are understood to be increasingly emotionally 
open, accepting and ‘inclusive’,92 and that openness is understood to be a component in 
building gender equality, as previously discussed. Accordingly, ‘the West’ or ‘Europe’ was 
consistently mentioned by multiple gender practitioners and NGO workers (both 
Jordanian and non-Jordanian), as well as Syrian refugees, as a space of gender equality, 
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women’s freedom, and less-masculine men.93 Simultaneously, within Western lenses and 
frameworks, Arab and Muslim men are depicted, in a post-9/11 era in particular, as 
religiously-devout ‘traditional’ family patriarchs with a tendency for violence. 94  Their 
allegedly ‘unemotional’ characters form part of a portrayal of the Middle East region as 
particularly patriarchal.95 
 
I argue that these depictions of Syrian men as unemotional can be understood as a 
continuation of their hypermasculinisation in the eyes of external actors. This 
hypermasculinisation, however, while consistent with prior positioning of Arab men as 
hypermasculine, differs from these previous depictions in that previous 
hypermasculinisations were often accompanied by a simultaneous feminisation 
specifically through the branding of Arab men as too emotional. In a post 9/11 context, 
however, new mappings of gender and race are created.96   
 
But what, exactly, did men being ‘unemotional’ mean? As extensive scholarship has 
demonstrated, the rational/emotional binary, and its mapping onto 
masculinity/femininity, is a Western binary understanding of gender. 97  As one non-
Jordanian INGO worker joked to me, if any population of men is insufficiently open to 
successfully take part in this work, surely it is British men. 98  From my personal 
experiences as a British person, and informed by that perspective and positionality, as 
well as by the extensive time I have spent living in the Middle East, my male friends from 
Jordan, Palestine and Egypt seemed to be much more comfortable with the expression 
of emotion than the stereotypical British man.  
 
I put some examples of behaviour that I would understand to clearly represent emotional 
openness to Lina Darras, the colleague with whom I had worked closely in Za‘tari. The 
examples came from a Syrian mutual acquaintance of ours, whom here I will call ‘Abdu. 
Despite having only met me on a few occasions, ‘Abdu would regularly message me to 
say he missed me, how much he liked my friendship, urging me to visit him when I was 
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next in Za‘tari, and would be warm and tactile when we did next meet in person. While I 
recognise that there are power differentials that will inevitably structure my interactions 
with refugees in Za‘tari, and that building connections with NGO employees can be very 
important for Syrian refugees, the ways in which ‘Abdu would express himself struck me as 
emotionally open. I asked Lina if she would also consider them to be expressions of 
emotion, or emotional openness, or if we were using the term differently. We were, she 
replied, talking about something different: 
 
What ‘Abdu is doing with you is something we call being nice…and 
welcoming, especially to a foreigner. And in general in Arab culture 
welcoming others, welcoming guests, welcoming people from other 
cultures is something concrete and very important…it’s a value, so this 
is not emotion…what we mean when we say emotions is things like 
expressing your feelings to your wife, expressing your feelings in sad 
situations, like death or things like that, having emotion for others.99  
 
Suhail Abualsameed, on the other hand, a gender consultant who is also Jordanian, 
agreed that there was a widespread depiction of men in the region as ‘unemotional,’ but 
strongly disagreed with it: 
 
[It’s] completely my impression and idea about my culture, that actually 
the men are so much more emotional than anywhere else in the world, 
they don’t like to admit it…and [they don’t] identify the things they do 
as emotional…Also, we find them emotional in comparison to western 
culture, or within a western lens, and [so] yes I can love my best friend, 
my male friend and hug him and touch him and express how much I 
love him but this is not emotional…and in the west that’s the 
expression of emotion…So for men here emotional means you break 
down and cry every time you can…really it’s just all about crying.100 
 
Suhail had conducted work on gender and SGBV with men and women from refugee 
communities in Jordan, in both camp and non-camp settings, with GoJ officials, and 
with the staff of UNHCR and humanitarian agencies. For him: 
 
the most open of all the men, [the most] excited and genuinely 
interested in the concepts and wanting to improve their lives and 
change their mindsets are the refugee men, from Syria and Iraq. The 
most resistant were government employees…then in between them 
there’s the staff of the agencies. You would think [humanitarian agency 
staff] would be indoctrinated enough, but you have a good level of 
resistance in work with UNHCR and different agencies. They are the 
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ones who are providing the services, but then you hear things that are 
very problematic around their own beliefs on these issues.101  
 
The expression of emotion, and understandings of what the expression of emotion 
constitutes, are clearly contextual. As Aymon Kreil’s work on male intimacy in Cairo has 
demonstrated, intimacy and emotion are expressed by different actors in different 
contexts, and a range of meanings are derived from those intimacies. 102  That 
humanitarian workers felt able to demand a particular form of emotional openness, on a 
particular topic, within a particular setting, demonstrates quite how much the intimate 
affairs and perspectives of Syrian refugees were meant to be at humanitarians’ disposal. 
Simultaneously, an exploration of who was willing to open up, emotionally, on different 
topics, subverts humanitarian expectations about the ‘global’ being a positive, progressive 
influence on ‘local’ norms. It was men from the refugee communities, according to this 
interviewee, who were noticeably more ‘open’ than humanitarian workers themselves. 
 
How Do You Say ‘Gender(-Based Violence)’ in Arabic? 
Similar dynamics can be seen when it comes to questions of language. The Arabic 
context and language was also understood by numerous humanitarian workers to  
present an obstacle for ‘engaging men and boys.’ As the literary scholar Ferial Ghazoul 
has noted, “[g]ender does not have a ready-made unequivocal signifier in Arabic.”103 This 
lack of a common or vernacular term for ‘gender’ made it difficult to discuss the idea of 
the English term ‘gender,’ which has been “forcefully universalized, through the United 
Nations and human rights instruments and NGOs around the world.”104 Although sexual 
violence could be translated straightforwardly, without a word for ‘gender,’ the 
translation of GBV is clearly a challenge.  
 
The lack of vernacular word for gender is sometimes tackled by simply using the term 
‘gender.’ A phonetic transliteration of gender can sometimes be found in academic texts 
or on materials used for gender workshops for Arabic speakers.105 In other contexts, the 
word ‘gender’ can be used verbally and, depending on the audience, more colloquially. At 
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an Arabic-language event discussing women’s political participation in Jordan, for 
example, all attendees introduced themselves at the beginning, with the word ‘gender’ 
being interspersed with Arabic.106 Yet the circles within which such terminology can 
comfortably be used are limited, and often involve, as in the aforementioned example, 
groups who are professionally acquainted with ideas about gender. A colleague recounted 
to me, for example, an event he attended on the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 in Jordan. Many of the government officials who participated in the 
event were familiar neither with the word ‘gender,’ nor with the idea of a sex/gender 
distinction. Scattered throughout the meeting were calls of ‘Shu ya‘ni gender?’ (what does 
gender mean?), prompting the meeting to be stopped on several occasions for repeated 
explanations to be offered, somewhat to the frustration of other attendees, for whom 
such vocabulary was obvious.107 The unfamiliarity with the terminology even extended to 
(prospective) NGO staff members. A Jordanian NGO programme manager told me that 
several Jordanians who had applied for jobs working on women’s protection and 
empowerment, when asked in an interview what the term ‘gender’ means, would answer 
‘male and female.’108  
 
One of the most common formal translations of the term ‘gender’ is al-naw‘ al-ijtima‘i, 
which literally translates to ‘social type’ or ‘social kind.’109 As Joseph Massad has pointed 
out, this term was one of the more accepted when ‘gender’ first entered Arabic, although 
was no more immediately intelligible to many Arabic speakers than ‘gender’ would have 
been to an English-speaking public before the proliferation of the term in the 1970s.110 
Yet however un-common it might be, as a recognised formal translation of the term 
‘gender,’ it was this term that became the subject of discussion with humanitarian work 
in Jordan, when the issue of how to translate GBV arose.  
 
Some individuals and agency representatives argued that translating the term GBV as ‘al-
‘unf al-mabani ‘ala al-naw‘ al-ijtima‘i,’ that is, literally, ‘violence based on gender,’ would be 
both unhelpful and unnecessary. One non-Jordanian SGBV specialist working for a UN 
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the word being used for “gender.” See Joseph Andoni Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago ; London : 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 171–72. 
110 Massad, Islam in Liberalism, 158–59. 
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agency, for example, had argued in meetings that since “no-one” among the attendees of 
their programmes would “have a clue” what the formal translation of GBV would mean, 
“violence against women” should be used instead (al-‘unf didd al-mar’a). 111  Another 
specialist reported to me that this was the subject of a contested “back and forth” in 
meetings, with UN Women being particularly vocal in arguing that ‘violence against 
women’ was the appropriate wording to use.112  
 
Those advocating for the use of ‘violence against women’ typically did not prevail. In 
many promotional and campaign materials113 (although not all, see below), and in the 
implementation of sessions with refugees in the field, the full and formal translation of 
‘al-‘unf al-mabani ‘ala al-naw‘ al-ijtima‘i’ was used. Practitioners who I interviewed were all in 
favour of doing so, although often somewhat, or very, reluctantly. One said that the 
word felt so ridiculous that when he used it with groups he almost felt he should 
apologise.114 For another colleague who has to use the term regularly in her work, the 
term al-naw‘ al-ijtima‘i is necessary but “so ‘arabiyya fusha;”115 that is, Modern Standard 
Arabic, rather than vernacular Arabic.   
 
Practitioners who felt there was no better choice than to use the phrase would employ a 
variety of strategies to help make it intelligible. One commented that the pictures of 
families that were included on the promotional materials could help to communicate the 
meaning of the words, and that Syrians might understand the broad topic being 
addressed because the word violence was mentioned alongside the picture.116 Another 
said that they would typically introduce the topic by discussions of power and power 
relations, and then move from that to introduce the topic of gender and GBV.117 Others 
would break down the term into its constituent parts and introduce it bit by bit through 
discussion exercises. 118  Even with these strategies, attempting to communicate the 
concept such that it stayed consistently in people’s minds was a challenge. As one 
                                                
111 Interview with SGBV specialist (1). 
112 Interview with Suhail Abualsameed.  
113 E.g. see UNHCR et al., “Dalil Tatbiq Hamlat Amani - al-Urdunn [Implementation Kit for the Amani 
Campaign - Jordan],” 2014, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
114 Interview with Suhail Abualsameed. 
115 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 21.12.2015. 
116 Interview with Suhail Abualsameed. 
117 Interview with women’s protection and empowerment programme manager. 
118 Interview with Areej Sumreen.  
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practitioner told me, “after three or four days [of training], people come back and say, ‘al-
naw‘ al-ijtima‘i [gender/social kind] - I’m an engineer’ or something like this.”119  
 
Despite these difficulties, the term ‘gender’ did appear, very slowly, to be becoming 
slightly more widely known and understood among camp residents. When I returned to 
the camp with ARDD in the summer of 2016 to help conduct some of the next phase of 
their work ‘engaging men and boys,’ some of the younger participants were aware both 
of the term ‘al-naw‘ al-ijtima‘i,’ and of the differentiation between that term and ‘al-jins’ 
[sex]. Later on, I asked them how they knew the word, and they said that they had 
already done other workshops on the topic, with different NGOs in the camp.120 New 
vocabulary was being introduced into the camp by humanitarian actors. As is discussed 
in more detail in the following Chapter, in contrast to ‘gender,’ the idea of men’s and 
women’s ‘roles,’ and of these changing in the camp, was very common among Syrian 
refugees, and this appeared to form part of people’s everyday vocabulary. This new 
vocabulary introduced by NGOs does not simply represent hitherto unknown synonyms 
for pre-existing vernacular words, but rather an introduction of new concepts into 
community life.  
 
In my discussion of these questions of language so far, the focus has been on how to 
translate a concept, and what is possible and practical within the particular socio-linguistic 
context. However, at stake in these debates about translation, I argue, was an underlying 
debate about what GBV actually is. To what sets of practices is the signifier GBV 
referring, and what is understood to unite these practices such that they can be grouped 
in this way, and referred to by a single signifier? It became increasingly clear over the 
course of my fieldwork that there was a lack of consensus among humanitarian actors 
about the meaning of the term GBV. The discrepancies in people’s understandings of 
this concept would often appear in interviews, including, but not necessarily, in the 
aforementioned discussions about translation, but also in my participant observation and 
more casual interactions with colleagues.121 
 
                                                
119 Interview with Suhail Abualsameed. 
120 Conversation with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 02.08.2016. 
121 Interviews with Suhail Abualsameed; Lina Darras; and SGBV specialist (1); fieldnotes, Amman, 
29.09.2015, 17.05.2016 and Za‘tari, 24.11.2015. 
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For example, for some people working in the refugee response, GBV was simply 
synonymous with violence against women (and girls).122 If GBV is (and only is) violence 
against women (and girls), then the proposal to use ‘violence against women’ in Arabic is 
not necessarily an attempt to sacrifice complexity in the name of straightforward 
communication, but it is a proposed translation of two synonyms. In my experience, 
there was a strong correlation between those who understood the terms to be 
synonymous and those who were either in favour of translating GBV as ‘violence against 
women,’ or at least did not raise objections to it.123 As is discussed in more detail below, 
the assumption that women, but not men, can be victims of GBV, has clear implications 
for programming, and whose needs are met. 
 
Although, as stated above, GBV was typically translated on campaign materials as ‘al-‘unf 
al-mabani ‘ala al-naw‘ al-ijtima‘i,’ this alternative translation, to ‘al-‘unf didd al-mar’a’ (violence 
against women), was also occasionally evident. The 16 Days of Activism Against 
Gender-Based Violence, mentioned above, is marked by numerous NGOs and 
government entities in Jordan. Described on UN Women’s website, as an ‘action to end 
violence against women and girls around the world,’124 it is a campaign that takes place in 
over 150 countries annually between 25th November and 10th December. 125  The 
promotional materials released by a group of humanitarian agencies and NGOs for the 
2015 campaign in Jordan included a notebook. Along the top of each page, against an 
orange banner to match the colour of 16 Days campaign was written, in English, ‘16 days 
of activism against gender-based violence,’ alongside the Arabic, which read ‘16 days of 
activism against violence against women’ (sittat ‘ashara yawm min al-nashat didd al-‘unf didd 
al-mar’a).126  
 
For others, GBV was not necessarily targeted against women (and girls), but rather a 
term that appeared primarily to denote violence between men and women. Within this 
framework, the primary distinction between ‘violence against women’ and ‘GBV’ was 
                                                
122 Conversation with NGO workers, Amman, 23.11.2015; interviews with Suhail Abualsameed; former 
NGO worker in Za‘tari; and SGBV specialist (1). I have written ‘and girls’ in parentheses here because, 
although ‘violence against women’ was the phrase that was most commonly used in these contexts, 
occasionally ‘violence against women and girls’ was used in its place.  
123 Interviews with SGBV specialist (1); and SGBV specialist (2); author observation, Amman, 23.11.2015. 
124 UN Women, “16 Days of Activism,” UN Women, 2016, http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-
do/ending-violence-against-women/take-action/16-days-of-activism. 
125 Center for Women’s Global Leadership, “A Life of Its Own: An Assessment of the 16 Days of 
Activism Against Gender-Based Violence Campaign” (Rutgers: Center for Women’s Global Leadership, 
2017). 
126 Fieldnotes, Amman, 09.02.2016.  
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that women could also perpetrate violence against men, for example in the home. This 
violence would be missed by the former understanding, but included in the latter. 
‘Gender’ here appeared to be denoting not masculinities and femininities, nor gendered 
power imbalances that drive and facilitate violence, but rather in fact to be designating 
violence that happened between males and females.127 
 
Others still would use the term GBV to discuss violence that results from prevailing 
norms of masculinities and femininities, and the power imbalances and hierarchies within 
them. Such definitions recognise the possibility of males being victims/survivors of 
GBV, and that the notions of masculinity and femininity that feed that such violence are 
inextricably connected to the violence suffered by females.128 For others, however, using 
the term GBV in this broader sense, was problematic. Indeed, for some, the expanded 
understanding of GBV represented the loss of a ‘gender lens’ of analysis, not an improved 
or more subtle gender analysis. According to one Western SGBV specialist, it was 
perceived as containing a lack of recognition that: 
 
there is a specific type of violence which is also the most invisible kind 
because it’s usually at home, by known people…you know you lose the 
focus completely, so that for me is not helpful.129  
 
This therefore represents another instance in which the ‘global’ does not necessarily 
enlighten the ‘local.’ One Jordanian practitioner told me of her surprise that there was a 
debate over whether men and boys could be victims/survivors of SGBV. The workshop 
participants with whom she worked, who have no background in gender or specialist 
training, could understand and accept this straightforwardly, so why could the experts 
not?130 
 
These varied understandings of GBV are similarly found in definitions of GBV offered 
by different agencies. According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Gender-Based 
Violence Guidelines issued in 2015, “gender-based violence” is an: 
 
umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s 
will and that is based on socially ascribed (i.e. gender) differences 
between males and females. The term ‘gender-based violence’ is 
                                                
127 Interviews with women’s protection and empowerment programme manager; and SGBV specialist (1); 
conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 20.09.2015.  
128 Interview with Suhail Abualsameed. 
129 Interview with SGBV specialist (1). 
130 Interview with Lina Darras. 
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primarily used to underscore the fact that structural, gender-based 
power differentials between males and females around the world place 
females at risk for multiple forms of violence.131 
 
In contrast, in the same year UNHCR issued a revised definition of ‘sexual and gender-
based violence.’ UNHCR’s new definition states that  
 
[s]exual and gender-based violence refers to any act perpetrated against 
a person’s will based on gender norms and unequal power 
relationships. It encompasses threats of violence and coercion. It 
inflicts harm on women, girls, men and boys.132  
 
In a document that compares the two definitions, the attempts to broaden 
understandings of SGBV through this definition are made clear. UNHCR’s new 
definition aimed to “take a more inclusive approach,” to understand “SGBV through a 
dimension broader than, but inclusive of gender,” and to take a wider range of power 
differentials into account.133 Therefore within definitional debates, translation debates, 
and programmatic debates, the ways in which men and boys could be understood as 
victims/survivors of SGBV was a particular point of controversy.   
 
Can Men be Victims134 of Gender-Based Violence 
While men were strongly encouraged to be allies in the fight against SGBV, they were 
less often conceptualised, or dealt with, as (potential) victims of SGBV. As the rapidly 
growing academic literature on male victims of SGBV has demonstrated,135 there is a 
relative absence of men-as-victims from discourses and practices surrounding SGBV, as 
                                                
131 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in 
Humanitarian Action: Reducing Risk, Promoting Resilience and Aiding Recovery,” 2015, 322, 
www.gbvguidelines.org. 
132 UNHCR, “SGBV Prevention and Response: Training Package” (Geneva: UNHCR, 2016), 10. 
133 UNHCR, “Definitions - Sexual and Gender-Based Violence” (personal correspondence with UNHCR 
employee 18 May 2016, n.d.). 
134 Following Chloé Lewis, while I typically use the term survivor, which is understood to recognise the 
agency and resilience of survivors of SGBV, given that it is male victimhood, specifically, that appears for 
some to be conceptually challenging, here I use the term “victim.” See Chloé Lewis, “Systemic Silencing: 
Addressing Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict and Its Aftermath,” in Rethinking 
Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security, ed. Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 203. 
135 E.g. see Kirby and Henry, “Rethinking Masculinity and Practices of Violence in Conflict Settings”; 
Lewis, “Systemic Silencing: Addressing Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict and Its 
Aftermath”; Mariz Tadros, “Challenging Reified Masculinities: Men as Survivors of Politically Motivated 
Sexual Assault in Egypt,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 12, no. 3 (2016): 323–42; Heleen Touquet 
and Ellen Gorris, “Out of the Shadows? The Inclusion of Men and Boys in Conceptualisations of Wartime 
Sexual Violence,” Reproductive Health Matters 24, no. 47 (2016): 36–46. 
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well as little focus on sexual and gender minorities.136 As far back as 2008, UNHCR, in its 
evaluation of its SGBV prevention and response efforts, explicitly recognised that sexual 
violence against men and boys is “neglected, under-reported and hardly addressed by any 
of UNHCR’s programmes.”137 UNHCR also published a 2017 report, authored by Sarah 
Chynoweth, which documented the widespread nature of sexual violence against men 
and boys in the Syria crisis, and the urgent need for more efforts to support male 
survivors. 138  UNHCR’s increasing acknowledgement of the issue is indicative of a 
broader trend within humanitarian and UN agencies. Yet, as Chloé Lewis has argued, 
such “important discursive developments drawing attention to male-directed sexual 
violence in conflict and post-conflict settings…have yet to translate into definitive and 
consistent international policy and service delivery.”139  
 
Lewis’ insights, about both the discursive developments in this area and their lack of 
systematic incorporation into policy and service delivery, are very relevant for the context 
under discussion. SGBV documents in the Syria response have repeatedly recognised 
that “male survivors of SGBV may face barriers to accessing services.”140 The report 
from the two-day workshop in Amman on engaging men and boys discussed above 
highlighted the “lack of service provider awareness of male SGBV survivors’ needs,” the 
“social stigmatization of male survivors who do seek assistance,” that programmes 
targeting women and girls often cannot accommodate male survivors nor meet their 
needs, and that awareness needs raising about the necessity of services for male victims 
of SGBV.141 Simultaneously, however, as noted in Chapter 2, at times the severity and 
even the legitimacy of male victims’ cases have been disputed, with humanitarian workers 
using a variety of narratives and excuses to delegitimise male victims’ testimonies and 
needs.142 Oxfam’s vulnerability scoring system similarly appears blind to the potential 
                                                
136 Myrttinen and Daigle, “When Merely Existing Is a Risk”; Rothkegel et al., “Evaluation of UNHCR’s 
Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Situations of Forced 
Displacement.” 
137 Rothkegel et al., “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence in Situations of Forced Displacement,” 8. 
138 UNHCR, “We Keep It in Our Heart: Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys in the Syria Crisis” 
(Geneva: UNHCR, 2017). 
139 Lewis, “Systemic Silencing: Addressing Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict and 
Its Aftermath,” 219. 
140 SGBV Sub-Working Group, “Workshop: Engaging Men and Boys in SGBV Programming: 13/14 May 
2015, Kempinski Hotel, Amman.,” 1; see also SGBV Sub-Working Group, “Sexual and Gender-Based 
Violence: Syrian Refugees in Jordan March 2014.” 
141 SGBV Sub-Working Group, “Workshop: Engaging Men and Boys in SGBV Programming: 13/14 May 
2015, Kempinski Hotel, Amman.,” 2–3. 
142 Interview with SGBV specialist (2). 
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needs of adult male victims of SGBV: it awards a woman at risk of SGBV ten 
‘vulnerability points,’ and a child at risk of either child labour or SGBV ten ‘vulnerability 
points,’ but does not appear to conceive of the possibility that a man could be at risk of 
SGBV.143  
 
This reluctance to understand men as victims of SGBV can in part be understood 
through the definitional debates discussed above. For some working in the Syria 
response, GBV is understood to be synonymous with violence against women (and girls). 
By definition, then, men cannot be victims of GBV. Even where men are subjected to 
SGBV, it is often understood, or categorised, not as SGBV but as ‘torture.’144 As one 
NGO employee told me, many men were tortured by the regime, or by other armed 
groups, “but this is not considered GBV because it is not related to the roles of women 
and men in society.”145 In this instance, although the term ‘SGBV’ was the term typically 
used by humanitarian workers, and is UNHCR’s preferred term, sexual violence was 
being separated from gender-based violence. Men could plausibly be victims of the 
former, usually as a form of torture, but not the latter. Such narrow conceptions of what 
GBV is fail to recognise, as Miranda Alison has argued in her study of sexual violence in 
conflict, that “sexual violence against men and boys is no less a gendered issue than 
sexual violence against women and girls.” 146  Explanations of these forms of sexual 
violence, she explains, must “take into account the particularly of constructions of both 
gender and ethnicity (and/or sexuality, class, religion, caste, ‘race’, politics and so forth)” 
[emphasis in original].147 For the purposes of the current discussion, the key point is that 
forms of SGBV against men and boys are, like SGBV against women and girls, informed 
by prevailing conceptions of masculinities and femininities and gendered (and other) 
relations of power.  
 
To understand, or presume that, SGBV against men as a form of ‘torture,’ and to assume 
that it was connected to the Syrian regime or armed rebel groups, locates men’s 
experiences of SGBV within the realm of the public sphere, within the realm of politics. 
                                                
143 Oxford Jordan, “Oxfam Jordan - Final Vulnerability Scoring System for Syrian Refugee Families,” n.d., 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
144 R. Charli Carpenter, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict 
Situations,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006): 83–103; Tadros, “Challenging Reified Masculinities.” 
145 Interview with women’s protection and empowerment programme manager. 
146 Miranda H. Alison, “Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity,” 
Review of International Studies 33, no. 1 (2007): 90. 
147 Alison, 90. 
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This distinction must be problematised. Not only does it locate men’s gendered needs as 
somehow outside of the realm of humanitarian action, but it depoliticises women’s 
experiences of violence. While I am not claiming that there are no distinctions to be 
drawn between, for example, sexual violence in regime prisons, and sexual violence 
between family members in the home, the binary between them is detrimental to 
ensuring that services are provided to all who need them, and problematic from a 
feminist perspective. The personal is political, but the political can also be deeply 
personal.   
 
The discussion of men as victims of SGBV has further highlighted the difficulties that 
humanitarian actors have in understanding refugee men as ‘vulnerable’ or as the object of 
‘gender work’ or as in need of  ‘empowerment.’ As in the discussions of psychosocial 
support in Chapter 4, many humanitarian actors believed that Syrian men would not 
come forward and identify themselves as SGBV survivors, or be willing to discuss their 
experiences.148 This has been argued in other contexts too, although the evidence is often 
anecdotal. 149  Again, this idea must be placed in the context of humanitarian actors’ 
actions towards refugee men. If service providers do not, for example, provide enough 
male counsellors or specialist staff, or safe spaces for men within the community, or 
discuss SGBV only at spaces where women are offered services, then many men who are 
victims of SGBV are much less likely or able to come forward.150  
 
Conclusion 
In contrast to much of the material presented in this thesis, this chapter has focused on 
an area, indeed, the area, in which there has been considerable enthusiasm for working 
with Syrian men in the context of the refugee response. Analysing the ways in which they 
have been incorporated into SGBV prevention work has re-affirmed the central 
arguments of this thesis. Despite the focus on SGBV work with men, they are not, or at 
least not readily, understood as ‘vulnerable,’ or as victims. Although men may now have 
a specific and narrow role in the achievement of humanitarian objectives, they are not, in 
and of themselves, the object of those objectives.  
 
                                                
148 Interviews with Ruba Abu Taleb; Areej Sumreen; and SGBV specialist (2). 
149 Allsopp, “Agent, Victim, Soldier, Son: Intersecting Masculinities in the European ‘Refugee Crisis,’” 157. 
150 Interview with women’s protection and empowerment programme manager. 
  185 
They are, however, understood as a new means through which humanitarian actors can 
achieve their pre-defined goals. In contrast to other areas of humanitarian work, men 
appear potentially of use to those holding power over them. As this chapter has 
documented, however, the attempts to take advantage of this usefulness has been 
perceived to be hampered by the Arabic cultural and linguistic context in which the work 
is taking place. That Syrian men are deemed not sufficiently emotionally open to take 
part in this work contrasts with orientalist stereotypes, yet reveals how Syrian men 
continue to be hypermasculinised by external actors. Humanitarianism’s ‘global’ 
standards therefore collide with the ‘local’ context of Za‘tari. While the former takes 
precedence within humanitarian work, these ‘global’ standards do not, as humanitarians 
assume, necessarily act to promote progressive norms or understandings of gender.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter has therefore brought out the instrumentality of 
humanitarian interactions with men in the course of SGBV prevention work. As an 
active contributor to work that attempts to open up conversations with men and boys 
about gender equality in the UK, I remain convinced of this work’s worth and value; 
indeed, its necessity. Yet that this instrumental work, in the context of a humanitarian 
response, takes a central place in the humanitarian sector’s relationships with refugee 
men is, I argue, deeply troubling. Can men be recognised, within humanitarianism, as 
people to be worked with and supported in and of their own right, without that 
engendering a (perceived) disloyalty to those who typically occupy humanitarians’ 
attention?151 Can their lives and priorities be incorporated within humanitarian work? 
Central among those priorities, in the context of Za‘tari, was obtaining paid work – and it 
is this topic to which this thesis turns next. 
 
  
                                                
151 See Carpenter, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict 
Situations.” 
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Chapter 6: Gender and (Cash for) Work, Inside and Outside of Za‘tari 
 
The possibility of obtaining paid work was central to men’s demands of humanitarian 
authorities in Za‘tari. Yet the work available from NGOs was intermittent, precarious, 
and often poorly paid. Earning income was of crucial importance for Syrian families, yet 
NGOs were providing work as a way of implementing their ‘service provision,’ almost as 
if it were a favour. As one Syrian man explained to me, he will sometimes receive a 
telephone call one morning and be told that his shift starts today. Many worry that were 
they to decline work on that morning, they will not receive a chance again. Their 
financial situation often gives them no realistic option but to accept work whenever it is 
offered, yet the remuneration is still entirely inadequate to meet their needs. This same 
man explained that once he got this telephone call his work would often continue for a 
week, but then he wouldn’t receive any more work for two months. The 25 JOD 
(approximately $35) he would receive from this every two months was 10 JOD less than 
the monthly cost of his wife’s medication.1  
 
For many men in Za‘tari, the ability to be, or to perform the role of, a breadwinner, was 
a key element in the construction of masculinities. Within the camp, livelihood 
opportunities were provided by NGOs through a scheme known as ‘Cash for Work’ 
(CfW), through which Syrian refugees are paid to ‘volunteer’ for NGOs, in roles such as 
cleaners, security guards, office assistants, and vocational trainers. In order to analyse this 
scheme, I introduce this chapter by exploring what I term ‘breadwinner masculinities,’ 
and then by situating CfW within broader discussions about work, aid, and neoliberalism. 
In the subsequent exploration of CfW and then of work opportunities outside Za‘tari 
that were available to camp residents, I highlight the contestations that surrounded 
gender, ‘vulnerability,’ and the allocation of work, and the challenges these contestations 
presented for both Syrians and humanitarian actors. They reveal, I argue, the 
prioritisation of humanitarian goals, logics and knowledge, the discomfort with which 
some humanitarians confront their hierarchical relationships with refugees in contexts of 
work, and the ways in which encampment facilitates humanitarian actors’ ability to 
exercise power over the refugee population. 
  
                                                
1 Interview with married Syrian man living in Za‘tari (1), Za‘tari, 27.07.2016. 
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Breadwinner Masculinities 
Work, and its shortage, had a gendered significance for many refugee men in the camp. 
In particular, the inability of many men to provide the primary income, or at very least an 
income, for their family was a source of anger and resentment: at humanitarian agencies 
and NGOs for not providing work, at Jordanian authorities for their restrictions on 
movement, and at humanitarian authorities for their complicity in that system.2 Many 
refugees, who each receive only 20 JOD (approximately $28) per person per month in 
aid,3 have been relying on ever-depleting savings they brought from Syria, or income 
from family members living outside of the camp,4 making the ability to earn income even 
more important. The importance of work however, for many men in Za‘tari, was not 
only related to relief of economic hardship. It also brought psychological relief, because 
of the extreme boredom that many men faced in the camp, and because it allowed men 
to fulfil gendered expectations and to perform the masculinised role of provider for the 
family.5  
 
The importance of work for the enactment and performance of masculinities, and the 
presumption that a man should play the role of breadwinner, 6  has been noted by 
scholarship from a range of contexts, including from Syria,7 Syrian migrant workers in 
Lebanon,8 Syrian men in Egypt,9 and other contexts in the Middle East. This is not 
always the prevailing gendered expectation, and in some communities and contexts in the 
Middle East women are seen as equal breadwinners,10 and women can be embodiers and 
performers of masculinities.11 But in Za‘tari the vast majority of the men I encountered 
understood themselves to be responsible, at least primarily, for earning an income for the 
family. As Aitemad Muhanna has argued in the context of Gaza, for many men work is 
fundamentally associated with their value and self-worth, and without it they feel that 
they can have little or nothing to offer the family.  
                                                
2 Author observation and conversations with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015, 03.11.2015 and 17.11.2015. 
3 UNHCR, “Zaatari Refugee Camp: Factsheet April 2015,” 2015. 
4 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Syrian Refugees Youth Needs Assessment Study.” 
5 ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys,” 11. 
6 Connell, “Margin Becoming Centre.” 
7 Khattab and Myrttinen, “‘Most of the Men Want to Leave’”; Sara Lei Sparre, “Educated Women in Syria: 
Servants of the State, or Nurturers of the Family?,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 1 (2008): 
3–20. 
8 John T. Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon (Stanford, CA: London: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 90. 
9 Suerbaum, “Defining the Other to Masculinize Oneself.” 
10 Ababneh, “Troubling the Political”; Hossein Adibi, “Sociology of Masculinity in the Middle East,” 2006, 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/6069.  
11 Amar, “Middle East Masculinity Studies”; Halberstam, Female Masculinity. 
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The available data suggests that the prevailing expectation within Za‘tari of a male 
breadwinner is a continuation of practices in much of rural Syria before the conflict. In 
rural areas, from which the vast majority of Za‘tari residents come, women would often 
work in agriculture and perform extensive unpaid domestic labour. This agricultural work 
was mostly unpaid,12 although the large-scale migration of men to find work outside of 
rural areas, for example in Aleppo and Idlib in northern Syria, had resulted in an 
increasing number of women joining the paid agricultural labour force.13 In rural areas, 
men were typically expected, by themselves and others, to bear the primary responsibility 
for supporting the family financially through paid work in the labour market.14 Therefore 
women’s participation in paid and unpaid labour markets can coexist with the 
expectation of a male breadwinner, and that expectation can “[reinforce] patriarchal 
structures and normative relations of gender domination by prioritizing the man’s role as 
provider.”15  
 
The expectation of a male breadwinner can furthermore co-exist with economic 
circumstances that render it an impossible ideal to achieve, at least for very large 
segments of the population.16 Indeed, it can be understood as a middle-class model of a 
family, with an idealised vision of a woman at home (or at least who does not have to 
work), because a man provides sufficient income for the whole family.17 Many families 
cannot embody this classed ideal even in ‘ordinary’ circumstances. But scholarship from 
contexts of conflict, exile, and humanitarian crisis often emphasises how central the 
breakdown of the ‘male breadwinner model’ is to gendered experiences of exile, as 
relatively fewer men find (decent) work, and more women enter the paid labour market.18 
 
                                                
12 Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 473. 
13 Malika Abdelali-Martini et al., “Towards a Feminization of Agricultural Labour in Northwest Syria,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 30, no. 2 (2003): 71–94. 
14 Khattab and Myrttinen, “‘Most of the Men Want to Leave.’” 
15 Achilli, “Becoming a Man in Al-Wihdat,” 273. 
16 Connell, “Margin Becoming Centre”; see also Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neale, “Masculinities and 
the Lived Experience of Neoliberalism,” in Masculinities Under Neoliberalism, ed. Andrea Cornwall, Frank G. 
Karioris, and Nancy Lindisfarne (London: Zed Books, 2016), 29–50. 
17 Suerbaum, “Defining the Other to Masculinize Oneself,” 677. 
18 For discussion of these issues in the context of Sudanese exile in Cairo, see Jane Kani Edward, Sudanese 
Women Refugees: Transformations and Future Imaginings (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Anita Fabos, 
“Brothers” or Others? Propriety and Gender for Muslim Arab Sudanese in Egypt (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2010); for Palestine, see Lisa Taraki, Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation 
(Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2006); for Gaza, see Muhanna, Agency and Gender in Gaza; for 
IDPs in Georgia, see Kabachnik et al., “Traumatic Masculinities.” 
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El-Bushra and Gardner’s research on Somali men characterised the collapse of the 
Somali state, “and hence employment,” as a process that, for many men “wiped out 
status, self-respect, security, and income…[t]his was experienced as an existential 
catastrophe for many men.”19 Within their multi-sited study, El-Bushra and Gardner 
found that Somali refugee men living under encampment, in Dadaab in Kenya, were 
particularly affected by these dynamics, and described “the hopelessness they felt at the 
loss of their roles [and] the restrictions they face under Kenyan encampment policy.”20 
This combination of restricted encampment, widespread loss of earning opportunities, 
and the hopelessness many men faced, was replicated in Za‘tari.  
 
This pattern was recognised by some NGO workers in the camp, and by refugees 
themselves. As one Jordanian former Za‘tari worker explained, “within the culture of this 
region, men are the main income generating part of the family.” Not being able to 
perform this role, he claimed, “has a drastic psychological impact on the head of 
household, who is the man.”21 In this, and the narratives of other NGO workers, this 
psychological impact was compounded by a resultant collapsing self-esteem, and by 
social isolation because of a lack of activity.22 These effects on men were also understood 
to be some of the factors behind the increased levels of domestic violence within the 
camp.23 Recognising the various impacts that the lack of work was having on their male 
family members, Syrian women would regularly approach NGO workers to ask if they 
could find work for their husbands.24 In some cases, women who were working said they 
would be happy for their salary to be split in two, if it meant that their husband could 
also have a job.25 Given that such a proposal would not increase the amount of money 
being brought into the family, this example demonstrates that working is, at least for 
some men, important not only because of the income it brings into the family, but 
because of the psychological effects of taking part in paid work, and activity that they 
deem ‘productive.’   
 
                                                
19 El-Bushra and Gardner, “The Impact of War on Somali Men,” 450. 
20 El-Bushra and Gardner, 451. 
21 Interview with former employee of international organisation in Za‘tari.  
22 Interviews with NGO worker in Za‘tari; former employee of international organisation in Za‘tari; and 
former UNHCR worker in Za‘tari; conversation with NGO workers, Za‘tari, 03.11.2015; see also 
Women’s Refugee Commission, “Unpacking Gender.” 
23 See UN Women, “Restoring Dignity and Building Resilience.” 
24 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
25 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1). 
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This also came across strongly in my conversations with refugee men in the camp, both 
in the work undertaken with ARDD, and in other interviews I conducted. The shortage 
of work was one of, and often the, primary reason that participants in our workshops 
would provide when they discussed why they experienced stress and psychological 
difficulties in the camp. One noted that while living with stress was not a new 
phenomenon for them, the fact that there had been work in Syria, but not in Za‘tari, 
represented a radical change in their ability to cope with stress. Another, reflecting on the 
changes in his personal life since coming to Za‘tari, argued that he did not have a 
‘presence’ in the family or community anymore, because he was not working.26  
 
Although at times the issue of work would be discussed by Syrian men as if it were the 
primary issue of concern for all men in the camp, the importance of work to different 
groups of men depended, in part, on their positionalities and statuses. Anger at the lack 
of work opportunities appeared to be particularly felt by older generations of men, many 
of whom had become accustomed to working to provide for their families prior to the 
conflict in Syria. Younger men, by contrast, were often less likely to be under as much 
pressure to provide for their families, or at least to be the main provider for their 
families, and more likely to be focused on trying to find opportunities to continue their 
education.27 Many of these younger men were preoccupied by the disruption that the 
conflict had caused to their expected trajectory from education to work, marriage, and 
family life, and many were thus focused on education in order to try to build a better 
future.28  
 
Differing relationships to work were also found along class lines, with many 
professionally skilled and highly educated men lamenting the kinds of low-skilled work 
typically available in the camp, and expressing an unwillingness to take such positions.29 
By contrast, many other Syrian men, the clear majority in my experience, desired any 
form of work to help them generate income. As a skills study by NRC noted, the camp 
has a “large number of individuals able and willing to take any work opportunity,” which 
                                                
26 ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys,” 8, 11. 
27 ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys.” This perception was shared by an NGO 
worker with extensive experience in the camp: interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari; conversation with 
young Syrian man, Za‘tari, 05.12.2015. 
28 Conversations with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 05.12.2015; and with NGO workers, Amman, 15.12.2015 and 
16.12.2015.  
29 ARDD, “ARDD’s Four Pillars for Engaging Men and Boys.” 
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contributed to the high supply of labour within the camp.30 Many men came to apply for 
job vacancies without knowing what work was available, and some would ask me 
personally if I might be able to find them work with the NGO I worked with, or any 
other NGO I might have connections with. Some of the men who asked me this were 
well acquainted to me, others I was meeting was the first time. What exactly that work 
would entail did not seem important to them.31   
 
These varied relationships to work, and to different kinds of work, mean that while 
earning an income was central to the construction of masculinities for many men in the 
camp, I do not attribute a ‘hegemonic’ status to breadwinner masculinities.32 As critical 
scholarship on masculinities has demonstrated, and as the above discussion again 
confirms, even within a context that can be understood as ‘local,’ relatively homogenous, 
and with identifiable boundaries, masculinities will be plural, and will not necessarily have 
a structure where there is one ‘hegemonic’ masculinity across the category of ‘men,’ who 
are always internally differentiated by other axes.33 
 
Work, Aid, and Neoliberalism 
Given this importance of work for the construction of masculinities, it is unsurprising 
that finding work opportunities was a central preoccupation for many men. They could 
try to find paid employment outside of the camp, to find work in the camp market, or 
could find work through the CfW scheme. Because of camp refugees’ restricted access to 
the wider Jordanian labour market, which is discussed later in this chapter, the limitations 
that have been placed on the informal market, and the fact that most jobs in the market 
went to the family members of stall-holders,34 CfW opportunities were highly sought 
after by Syrians.35  
 
                                                
30 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Syrian Refugees Youth Needs Assessment Study.” 
31 Author observation and conversations with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 09.02.2016 
32 See Connell, Masculinities; Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity.” 
33 C. Beasley, “Rethinking Hegemonic Masculinity in a Globalizing World,” Men and Masculinities 11, no. 1 
(2008): 86–103; Cornwall and Lindisfarne, “Dislocating Masculinity: Gender, Power and Anthropology.” 
34 See Chapter 7. 
35 Author observation and conversations with Syrians, Za‘tari, 13.10.2015 and 03.11.2015, 09.02.2016 and 
27.07.2016. 
  192 
Along with other cash-based interventions (as opposed to the provision of food or other 
material resources), CfW is increasingly used in humanitarian settings.36 There is only a 
very thin academic literature on the use of CfW in humanitarian contexts,37 and “little 
documented experience with the use of cash in camps.”38 Lesley Adams has analysed the 
use of CfW in the aftermath of the tsunami in Sri Lanka.39 Her report, written for the 
Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute, is broadly positive 
about, and supportive of, the use of CfW and cash-based interventions more generally. 
Cash-based interventions allow households “to allocate funds for a diverse range of 
needs – needs which agencies would have been hard-pressed to second guess,” and CfW 
projects assisted with participants’ “psycho-social recovery and the rehabilitation of 
communities.” 40  She does note, however, that many CfW programmes failed to 
adequately take into account the needs of households that were ‘labour-poor’ due to the 
age, disabilities, illnesses, and child-care responsibilities of household members.41  
 
Tobin and Campbell, in one of the few academic discussions of CfW in Za‘tari, describe 
the programme as “a new formation of neoliberal governance in humanitarian crises,” 
because it “place[s] responsibility for the development of the individual on the shoulders 
of the individual themselves.”42 I argue, however, that this designation is not sufficiently 
nuanced to capture the dynamics of CfW in Za‘tari, or the broader contexts in which 
CfW is situated. The complexity of CfW is reflected in the fact that cash-based 
interventions do appear to be a progressive change relative to mechanisms of providing 
humanitarian aid that rely on providing food or material goods, which are much less 
fungible than cash. The use of cash allows Syrians (and Cash Workers in other 
contexts)43 to make their own spending and consumption choices, and to respond to the 
specific needs and circumstances of their own families. The transfer of responsibilities is 
therefore simultaneously a transfer of decision-making power to Syrian Cash Workers.  
                                                
36 Paul Harvey, “Cash-Based Responses in Emergencies” (London: Overseas Development Institute, 
2007); see also Jacobsen and Sandvik, “UNHCR and the Pursuit of International Protection.”  
37 See Lesley Adams, “Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami: Final Report” (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2007); Harvey, “Cash-Based Responses in Emergencies”; Hanna Mattinen and 
Kate Ogden, “Cash-Based Interventions: Lessons from Southern Somalia,” Disasters 30, no. 3 (2006): 297–
315; Tobin and Campbell, “NGO Governance.” 
38 Harvey, “Cash-Based Responses in Emergencies,” 18. 
39 E.g. see Adams, “Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami”; Harvey, “Cash-Based Responses in 
Emergencies.” 
40 Adams, “Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami,” 4. 
41 Adams, 5. 
42 See Tobin and Campbell, “NGO Governance.” 
43 Adams, “Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami.” 
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As noted above in the discussion of masculinities in the camp, the opportunity to be 
responsible for one’s own, and one’s family’s, welfare, is highly in demand among Syrian 
men. Therefore while the attempts to use CfW as a form of humanitarian intervention 
might encourage Syrians to work in order to maintain or improve their standard of living 
(however low it might remain in the camp), and that can be conceived of as an attempt 
to create neoliberal self-reliant subjectivities,44 the opportunity to work is highly valued 
by Syrians. To the extent that a Cash Worker can be understood as a neoliberal subject 
position, it intersects, in the case of many refugees in Za‘tari, with a gendered subject 
position that desires the ability to work, and finds deep fulfilment and well-being in 
doing so. In the words of one former resident of Za‘tari, “I want to work. I want to be 
responsible.”45 This evidence from Za‘tari falls into a much wider body of literature that 
demonstrates that refugees do not want to be dependent on ‘handouts’ from aid 
agencies, but rather want the opportunity to be able to work and provide for their 
families.46 
 
On the other hand, CfW can be understood within a broader context of the 
neoliberalisation of both welfare systems and work, in which the recipients of welfare 
and aid are obliged to work, for low or no wages, in order to demonstrate that they 
deserve welfare. Poverty is thereby conceptualised more as an individual failing, than a 
structural condition.47 Yet the work that is provided by CfW, reflecting trends across a 
range of contexts subject to neoliberalisation, is deeply precarious. The almost $1 million 
spent each month in the camp on CfW can improve the situation of the individuals and 
families who are able to partake in it.48 But it does not, for the vast majority of Cash 
Workers, create financial stability or predictability. As in the case of ‘zero-hours’ 
contracts, which have gained prominence in debates about precarity in other contexts, 
you don’t know how much work you will get, or when you will get it, and when you do, 
                                                
44 Mayssoun Sukarieh, “On Class, Culture, and the Creation of the Neoliberal Subject: The Case of 
Jordan,” Anthropological Quarterly 89, no. 4 (2016): 1201–25. 
45 Interview with married Syrian man living in host community (5), Irbid Governorate, April 2016. 
46 For the key text in this body of literature, see Gaim Kibreab, “The Myth of Dependency among Camp 
Refugees in Somalia 1979–1989,” Journal of Refugee Studies 6, no. 4 (1993): 321–49. 
47 Knut Halvorsen, “Symbolic Purposes and Factual Consequences of the Concepts ‘Self-Reliance’ and 
‘Dependency’ in Contemporary Discourses on Welfare,” Scandinavian Journal of Social Welfare 7, no. 1 (1998): 
56–64. 
48 E.g. see BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp February 2017,” 2017, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 
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it is rarely well paid.49 Under such circumstances, when it is unknown when your next 
work opportunity might come, the reasons for Syrians’ prioritisation of work over other 
activities such as NGO programmes become even clearer.50  
 
The precarious nature of work available to Syrians within Za‘tari largely mirrors the kinds 
of work available to Syrians living elsewhere in Jordan, although outside of refugee 
camps Syrians have often obtained work at the risk of arrest, forced encampment, or 
deportation.51 For the first few years after 2011, Jordan refused to contemplate allowing 
Syrians access to the formal labour market, yet since the opening of Za‘tari in summer 
2012 it has “tolerated” the use of CfW schemes in camps, which have operated “in a 
legal grey zone.”52 In contrast to many CfW interventions,53 SOPs for CfW in Za‘tari 
note that the “incentive rates are set in consideration of the local labour/host community 
market rates and in no way meant to disrupt the local labor [sic] market/trends in the 
host community.”54 This framing betrays a broader concern on the part of the GoJ that 
Syrian refugees may be ‘competing’ with Jordanian workers, although the evidence that 
this has been taking place is limited, and Syrians appear to have been overwhelmingly 
‘competing’ with other non-Jordanians.55  
 
Not everyone working in the camp falls under these regimes of precarity, however. No 
such restrictions appear to be placed on the remuneration of non-Jordanian humanitarian 
staff, whose salaries are typically much higher than their ‘local’ Jordanian counterparts.56 
Furthermore, as one of my Syrian interlocutors in Za‘tari noted, there have been times 
when limits or cuts to CfW opportunities have been justified to Syrians on the grounds 
of limited funds. Are cuts to the salaries of Jordanian or international humanitarian 
workers contemplated, he asked, in order to increase the opportunities for Syrians, who 
earn a small fraction of a humanitarian salary?57 Given that staff salaries and programme 
                                                
49 See Guy Standing, A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens (London; New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014), 165–70. 
50 See Chapter 4. 
51 ILO, “Work Permits and Employment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” 64. 
52 Livelihood Working Group, “Livelihood Working Group. Amman, Jordan 28.07.2016,” July 28, 2016, 3, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
53 Adams, “Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami: Final Report,” 27. 
54 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 3. 
55 ILO and Fafo, “Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market.” 
56 For discussion of these issues, see Ishbel McWha-Hermann and Stuart C. Carr, “Mind the Gap in Local 
and International Aid Workers’ Salaries,” The Conversation, April 18, 2016, 
http://theconversation.com/mind-the-gap-in-local-and-international-aid-workers-salaries-47273. Interview 
with former employee of international organization in Za‘tari. 
57 Interview with married Syrian man living in Za‘tari (3). 
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expenses appear in different budget lines for humanitarian agencies, the same trade-off 
may not have even occurred to them.58 
 
‘Cash for Work’ in Za‘tari 
The vignette above demonstrates one of the many gulfs in perceptions and 
understandings of CfW between humanitarian actors and Syrian refugees, and how 
humanitarian logics and goals are prioritised over those of Syrians themselves. These 
contestations extend to the very nature of what CfW is. For humanitarian actors, CfW is 
a mechanism for service delivery that has been prioritised in light of the “lack of 
livelihood opportunities in Zaatari camp.”59 However, while it provides a crucial income 
for refugees, as a report from NRC makes clear: 
 
these opportunities are not in any way a welfare program meant to 
solve the income concern for the refugees; they are jobs required by 
organisations to fulfill their role in the camp.60  
 
Although they consider it their responsibility to maintain a basic standard of living for 
Syrians in Za‘tari, humanitarian actors do not appear to think it is their obligation to 
provide work for Syrians in the camp, despite the restrictions on Syrians accessing work 
outside of the camp. In any case, as I was told, even working with refugees who 
requested work, rather than aid or assistance, was experienced by humanitarian workers 
as unusual.61  
 
Syrian refugees, on the other hand, would discuss work, and its shortage, very differently. 
In my own discussions with Syrian refugees on the issue of work, and in the interactions 
between Syrians and humanitarian workers that I witnessed, Syrians would discuss work 
opportunities as if humanitarian actors had a responsibility to provide them, at least for 
one person in each family. Given the restrictions on their freedom of movement, which 
made it difficult for Syrians to leave the camp, many Syrians experienced and discussed 
Za‘tari as a prison.62 They therefore placed the obligation for the provision of the means 
of a basic, dignified life onto those enforcing and complicit in their imprisonment.  
 
                                                
58 I am grateful to Katharina Lenner for sharing this observation with me when reviewing this chapter. 
59 BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp February 2017.” 
60 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Syrian Refugees Youth Needs Assessment Study,” 17.; Interview with 
INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1). 
61 Conversation with humanitarian and NGO workers, Amman, 18.12.2015. 
62 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 05.12.2015 and 15.12.2015; interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari.  
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Reflecting these differing understandings of CfW were ongoing tensions about whether a 
CfW position constituted a job. For humanitarian actor, Cash Workers are not deemed 
employees, who would be either Jordanian or ‘international,’ they are rather volunteers 
“who are renumerated [sic] for supporting partner programming in the camp.”63 In line 
with this designation, aid workers will often use the term ‘volunteers’ to refer to Syrians 
who are doing CfW. 64  Bemused by the incongruity of this terminology, I would 
sometimes, in casual conversations with NGO employees, joke that both they and I “get 
cash for work too.” Sometimes my interlocutors would laugh, recognising the point 
being made; at other times they would correct me, and reiterate the distinctions between 
employment and CfW, because I seemed not to have understood it.65 When talking to 
Syrians about their participation in CfW, the language is markedly different. They are not 
volunteering, they are working. Many Syrians spoke with pride about the work they do, 
and the names of international organisations with which they are associated. One Cash 
Worker for IRC spoke to me about the origins of the organisation in post-World War II 
Europe and, upon finding out I was British, asked if I was aware that the IRC was 
headed by David Miliband, the former Foreign Secretary.66  
 
The first and most fundamental problem with CfW, from the perspective of Syrian 
refugees in the camp, was that the number of CfW opportunities provided did not even 
come close to the level they wanted there to be, or to the level that they understood was 
required for the wellbeing of the community.67 The CfW monthly factsheets produced by 
the Basic Needs and Livelihoods (BNL) Working Group demonstrate that typically fewer 
than one in five adults in the camp holds a CfW position. On average, a little under thirty 
percent of ‘cases,’ i.e. family units as they are registered with UNHCR, had someone 
holding a CfW position in any one month.68  
    
The level of remuneration for these positions depends on the categorisation of the skill 
level involved. CfW opportunities are classed as either semi-skilled, skilled, highly skilled, 
piecemeal or technical. Syrians are paid by the particular humanitarian agency or NGO 
                                                
63 BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp February 2017.” 
64 E.g. Interviews with NGO worker in Za‘tari; and former NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
65 Meeting at NGO, Amman, 12.11.2015. 
66 Conversation with Syrian man, Za‘tari, 24.11.2015 and 02.08.2016. 
67 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Syrian Refugees Youth Needs Assessment Study.” 
68 These figures are based on my analysis of the factsheets that were available on UNHCR’s Syrian 
Regional Refugee Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal in August 2017. At that time, 
factsheets were available for May 2016-February 2017, and for April 2017.   
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running the project. Or, in humanitarian terminology, their volunteering is incentivised 
by payments of between 1 and 2.5 JOD per hour (approximately $1.4 – $3.5).69 The vast 
majority of positions available under the auspices of CfW, for example over two-thirds in 
November 2016, were for cleaning either the camp itself or NGO offices within it. 
Following cleaning, the largest number of positions (at 11%) were security guards, who 
would typically provide security at NGO compounds, schools, and other facilities in the 
camp. These Cash Workers would typically guard the gates, let vehicles in and out, and 
help with the maintenance of the centre. ‘Piecemeal work’ is compensated at varied, but 
similar, levels and Cash Workers are paid based on the task completed, for example, per 
metre-cubed of ditch dug. In November 2016, when a large CfW study was completed, 
84% of Cash Workers overall, and 96% of those in positions lasting for one month or 
less, earned the lowest rate available, of 1 JOD per hour.70 
 
Because the opportunities were so highly valued, they were vastly oversubscribed, and 
Syrians would question, and be suspicious of, the recruitment processes that were used 
to select ‘volunteers.’ 71  In particular, in focus group discussions that humanitarian 
agencies held with the Syrian community in 2015, the lack of a clear advertising process 
for CfW opportunities emerged as a widespread source of frustration.72 In the Cash for 
Work Standard Operating Procedures that were created, and for which the focus group 
discussions were conducted, this is addressed by the statement that 
 
ALL NGOs shall publicly inform refugee community and NGO 
actors/UN agencies through brochures, notice boards, social media 
and community centers, [of] the available opportunities, eligibility 
criteria, target groups and selection process” [emphasis in original].73  
 
In line with this approach, one INGO employee said he felt that “in the name of 
fairness,” when recruiting for new positions he had to try to make sure that everyone in 
the camp was aware of the possible opportunity. 74  Even if humanitarian actors did 
conceptualise CfW as a form of ‘service delivery,’ some were clearly nonetheless sensitive 
                                                
69 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 2–3. 
70 REACH, “Cash for Work (CfW) Assessment in Zaatari Camp: Camp Wide,” November 2016, 1, 
http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/unhcr-
reach_jor_factsheet_cash_for_work_assessment_campwide_november_2016.pdf. 
71 Conversation with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 03.11.2015. 
72 BNL Working Group, “Za’atari Cash for Work - Focus Group Discussions Community Feedback on 
2015 CFW Guidelines,” 2015, 1, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
73 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 1. 
74 Conversation with INGO programme manager, Za‘tari, 13.10.2015. 
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to the importance CfW held for Syrians, and the attendant concerns about the equity of 
its distribution. 
 
Recruiting new ‘volunteers’ for CfW was therefore a significant undertaking. When new 
vacancies were advertised, hundreds or even thousands of camp residents would apply. 
One INGO, for example, received around 2,000 applications for 28 positions. Because 
many Syrians in the camp lack their official documents and accreditations, filtering 
candidates based solely on their paper applications became challenging, necessitating, to 
ensure the process was fair, over 700 interviews.75 Multiple panels of interviewers spent 
almost two working weeks conducting the interviews. As one Jordanian employee from a 
different agency commented to me, signalling to the long queue developing outside her 
office, “there is an opportunity for employment and the whole camp comes,” before 
breaking into laughter, seemingly overwhelmed by the volume of applications she would 
have to process.76  
 
Because of the shortages of CfW, a rotation system had been put in place. CfW that fell 
into the different skill levels outlined above was regulated differently in terms of rotation. 
NGOs had to rotate semi-skilled and piecemeal positions on either a weekly, bi-weekly 
or monthly basis, although each organisation could decide which of these options to 
choose.77 Guards and cleaners were exempted from these regulations regarding rotation, 
and some organisations chose to employ them for a period of 3 months at a time.78 More 
skilled positions were often not subject to rotation, because there were fewer Syrians 
who could fulfil those roles, meaning some better educated Syrians were able to hold 
positions for much longer. Although the proportion of opportunities that are subject to 
rotation varies across time, on average around 60 percent are rotational, and 40 percent 
fixed. Fixed positions, however, are not the same as permanent positions, fixed positions 
are merely held by one individual for their duration, which can be very short.79 REACH’s 
assessment of the implementation of CfW, however, suggested that in many cases there 
                                                
75 Fieldnotes, Za‘tari, 13.10.2015 and 09.02.2016; interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1). 
76 Conversation with humanitarian worker, Za‘tari, 09.02.2016. 
77 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 3. 
78 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1). 
79 See footnote 69 above. 
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is a lack of compliance with this rotation system, with some refugees holding jobs for 
longer than they should,80 perhaps because of the time-consuming nature of recruitment. 
 
Where the rotation system was implemented, however, it would often appear to Syrians 
that their work had ended abruptly. Opportunities also sometimes ended because 
agencies and NGOs were conducting short-term projects with limited funding. 
Especially in the earlier months and years of CfW, many Syrians lacked clarity about how 
the system worked, and the organisational logics that underpinned it. As one NGO 
worker commented, while “some of the Syrians now are starting to understand how 
organisations work…it’s [not] necessarily obvious.”81 When their work came to an end, 
some Syrians understood that they had been sacked, whereas from the perspective of the 
NGO the project had simply finished, or the work had to be rotated to another 
individual.82  
 
At the same time, while Syrians would like more opportunities for work in the camp, 
they were also typically in favour of frequent rotation of the opportunities that did exist. 
The “overarching consensus” of the focus group discussions mentioned above was that 
“more frequent rotation allows more individuals to benefit.” 83  Several focus group 
discussion participants also suggested that positions that were not subject to rotation 
could be split between two or more individuals, to increase the numbers able to benefit 
and receive income. 84  Yet while rotations meant that more Syrians could share the 
opportunities that were on offer, it also meant that the amount that it was possible to 
earn was often severely limited. Furthermore, some NGO staff believed that rotating 
positions had the potential to cause disruption to NGO service delivery, because their 
new Cash Workers would need inductions, training and to gain familiarity with the work 
before being able to do it efficiently.85 
 
In contrast to the semi-skilled and piece-rate positions, highly skilled and technical 
positions could either be rotated for periods of longer than one month, or have “no 
                                                
80 See REACH, “Cash for Work (CfW) Assessment in Zaatari Camp,” November 2016, 
http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/unhcr-
reach_jor_factsheet_cash_for_work_assessment_by_district_november_2016.pdf. 
81 Interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
82 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 07.10.2015; interviews with NGO worker in Za‘tari; and 
INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
83 REACH, “Cash for Work (CfW) Assessment in Zaatari Camp.” 
84 BNL Working Group, “Za’atari Cash for Work - Focus Group Discussions,” 2. 
85 Conversation with humanitarian workers, Za‘tari, 03.11.2015. 
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rotation status, depending on the availability of the required skills within the 
population.”86 The differing rotation statuses, and the shortage of some skillsets in the 
camp that were demanded by NGOs in order to help them meet their programmatic 
objectives, effectively inserts a class dynamic into the ability to attain and in particular to 
maintain a CfW position. In cases where there are very few people in the camp with 
particular skill sets - the ability to teach English or calligraphy, or advanced knowledge of 
plumbing, were examples offered by my interviewees87 – agencies and NGOs are allowed 
to continue to employ them for the longer term. Some have even kept individual Syrians 
in the same positions for as long as two years, because they could not find others who 
could do that job as well as the incumbent.88  
 
As one of my interviewees noted, higher levels of education and skill are also often 
effectively inherited along class lines, which increases the likelihood that more than one 
generation of the same family living in the camp will gain CfW for an extended period of 
time89 These longer-term positions can also bring with them personal relationships with 
NGO employees, which are perceived by some Syrians to be paths to extra assistance 
and connections, and thus potentially a source of favourable treatment by NGOs, which 
might range from access to extra services to transportation around the camp in NGO 
vehicles. 90  Even daily work that some had, though, was not enough to meet their 
financial needs. As one woman, whose husband had work each day, asked me, “what is 
200 [JOD] a month for a family of seven?”91 
 
The CfW monthly updates released by the BNL Working Group record how many 
‘cases’ had more than one CfW opportunity during each month. Some months this figure 
was very low, for example 17 in June 2016.92 In other months it was drastically higher, 
with over 400 such cases in each of December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017, 
out of a total of around 5,500 Cash Workers.93 This data does not even capture situations 
                                                
86 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 3. 
87 Interviews with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2); and INGO programme manager in Za’tari 
(1). 
88 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Conversations with Syrian refugees and NGO workers, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
91 Conversation with Syrian woman, Za‘tari, 15.12.2015. 
92 BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp June 2016,” 2016, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
93 BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp December 2016,” 2016, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari 
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where two members of an extended family who have CfW are part of different ‘cases,’ 
for example if members of a younger generation of a family are married and are 
registered and live as a separate family unit. Furthermore, in some months over two 
hundred Syrian individuals were holding more than one CfW position, even though two 
thirds of ‘cases’ had no one involved in CfW at all during those same months.94 Although 
the standardised procedures for offering CfW aim to avoid all such ‘duplications,’ and to 
resolve them when they occur, many agencies and NGOs continued to offer CfW 
positions before checking with UNHCR whether they were already ‘volunteering’ 
elsewhere.95 While, as noted previously, some humanitarian actors went to great lengths 
to ensure that CfW opportunities were (perceived to be) distributed equitably, others 
appeared to prioritise the efficiency of their service delivery by ‘employing’ someone 
without going through the official procedures.  
 
Despite the aforementioned class dynamics of CfW, there were some positions that 
require relatively high levels of education, but from which Syrians, as outsiders to the 
nation, were excluded. Qualified Syrian teachers were not allowed, for example, to work 
as teachers in schools in the camp. Teaching is one of the 17 ‘sectors’ in Jordan that is 
only open to Jordanian nationals. 96 Although Syrians were allowed to work in other 
closed ‘sectors’ in the camp, for example by working as hairdressers and guards, this was 
not the case with teaching. The government insisted a modified version of the Jordanian 
curriculum be taught by Jordanian teachers. Both of these decisions caused resentment 
among the camp population.97 In a form of compromise, the government eventually 
allowed 200 Syrians to work in the schools as ‘teaching assistants.’98 In these instances, 
Syrians’ class and educational statuses could not overcome, or substitute for, their 
outsider status within Jordan; a different set of hierarchies foreclosed their access to 
work. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Camp January 2017,” 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; BNL Working Group, 
“Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp February 2017.” 
94 E.g. see BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp December 2016.” 
95 See BNL Working Group, “Basic Needs Working Group Za’atari Camp. February 2 2016 Meeting 
Minutes,” 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107; UNHCR, “Cash For Work - 
Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp.” 
96 See Ministry of Labour, “Decision: Closed Professions in Jordan,” October 2016, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 
97 Conversations with Syrian men and NGO workers, Za‘tari, 03.11.2015. 
98Human Rights Watch, “‘We’re Afraid for Their Future,’” August 16, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/08/16/were-afraid-their-future/barriers-education-syrian-refugee-
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This system of CfW also creates particular forms of (working) relationships between 
humanitarian actors, their staff, and their Syrian ‘volunteers.’ Many of these relationships 
are intermittent and impersonal, reflecting the fact that the majority of positions offered 
clearly class the ‘volunteers’ who occupy them as interchangeable from one week to the 
next. As one NGO worker interviewee commented, within this structure it is extremely 
hard to create a system where Syrians can learn, progress, get promoted, and take on 
increasing levels of responsibility as one might expect to do in a job.99 Curt Rhodes, 
International Director of Questscope, told me that he “constantly” faces the problem of 
trying to invest time and effort in people under a structure in which they are formally 
obliged to rotate opportunities in a particular way, on a particular time-scale. 100 
Humanitarian authorities in the camp, he argued, “don’t have a place in their minds for 
what you’re trying to accomplish” by investing in individuals, rather than rotating people 
in and out of positions. While it was not difficult, in and of itself, he claimed, to form 
more meaningful and personal relationships with Syrians, “it’s the controllers of the 
invisible environment that are difficult to overcome.” Within this form of work, of 
which he was very critical, ‘local people’ are needed, he said, but only as “the stage upon 
which we act,” rather than as individuals to be respected.101     
 
Many humanitarian and NGO workers find their relationships with Cash Workers in 
their organisations difficult for a second reason, which is the positions of authority into 
which they are inserted as de facto employers of Syrians in the camp. NGO programme 
managers, for example, who may have little or no skill or expertise in a particular field, 
are put in the position of choosing who from among the camp population is able to 
continue to work within their chosen profession. It was “very awkward,” one explained, 
to have had to turn down a former University lecturer for a position teaching a basic, 
introductory course in his field, because he felt the former lecturer would not be an 
effective communicator with those attending the course. 102  It would be similarly 
“awkward,” another NGO employee told me, to employ highly educated Syrians in 
relatively unskilled roles like that of a secretary or a guard. Many in the NGO sector, my 
interlocutor suspected, felt the same, and would hesitate to select them on those 
grounds. 103  The awkwardness, therefore, appeared to be the result of humanitarians 
                                                
99 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
100 Interview with Curt Rhodes. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Conversation with INGO programme manager, Za‘tari, 13.10.2015. 
103 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 04.11.2015. 
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having to confront, or at least acknowledge, their own place in the power hierarchies of 
life in a camp, which often disrupts pre-existing hierarchies and sets of relations among a 
refugee population.104 In particular, exercising power over those who would otherwise be 
positioned as your social equals or superiors, brought humanitarians’ own power to the 
foreground. The ‘awkwardness’ experienced in these contexts can also be contrasted to 
the relative ease with which humanitarians exercise power over refugee women.105 
 
At other times, however, despite these apparent challenges and feelings of 
‘awkwardness,’ the hierarchical relationships, and the prioritisation of humanitarian logics 
and goals, continued without comment being passed. Some CfW programmes involve 
skills training, in which Syrians produce, for example, clothes or handicrafts. These 
products, in some instances, were sold by the agency responsible for the programme. 
The money from the sales went not to the individual Syrians involved in the production 
of goods, as if they were a craftsperson, but were rather re-invested in the programme 
overall, as if the products of refugees’ labour was the property of the humanitarian 
agency. For example, at the opening of the new UN Women’s Oasis that I attended,106 
there was a ‘bazaar’ of products made by Syrian women under the auspices of UN 
Women projects in the camp. Attendees of the opening were invited to buy mosaics, 
jewellery, handicrafts, and large shoulder bags made out of old tents that were previously 
used to house refugees. The bags made out of tents, priced at 20JOD each 
(approximately $28), were especially popular, despite, or perhaps because of, being “a bit 
refugee chic” as one INGO worker put it to me. Many of the Syrian women who had 
made the products proudly pointed out to me which ones they had made, and we 
discussed the techniques involved and the creative decisions they had taken, but they did 
not stand to profit from their labour, beyond what they had already been paid as a 
‘volunteer.’107 At the same event, a large buffet was served for the non-Syrians invited to 
the event, the opening of a centre for refugee women and girls. When the ‘guests’ had 
finished eating, the Syrians present were invited to eat what was left.108  
 
                                                
104 See Agier, Managing the Undesirables; Turner, “Suspended Spaces.” 
105 See Chapter 4 
106 See UN Women, “UN Women and WFP Unveil Expansion of ‘Oasis for Women and Girls’ - Safe 
Space in Za’atari Refugee Camp,” UN Women | Jordan, November 10, 2015, 
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107 Conversation with humanitarian workers, Za‘tari, 10.11.2015.  
108 Author observation, Za‘tari, 10.11.2015.  
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‘Cash for Work,’ Vulnerability, and Gender 
Further contestations about the allocation of work were created by humanitarian actors’ 
attempts to use CfW as a mechanism for ‘empowering’ the ‘vulnerable.’ Humanitarian 
agencies’ desire to ensure that work opportunities were held equally by men and women 
in the camp challenged Syrian men’s breadwinner masculinities by, in the eyes of many 
Syrian men, ‘reducing’ the work available to men. This exacerbated the perception 
among many Syrian men that humanitarian agencies were interested in supporting 
women and children, but not men, and revealed the paradoxical place of labour market 
access in humanitarian thinking about men’s non-‘vulnerability.’ As discussed in Chapter 
4, there was a widespread, although inaccurate and a-contextual, assumption that Syrian 
men could access the labour market easily. This was perceived to be one of the reasons 
why they were assumed to not need support in the same ways as women and children. 
Yet when humanitarian actors provided, essentially, substitute labour market 
opportunities for refugees in Za‘tari, a camp from which it was difficult to leave, this was 
nonetheless seen as an area in which the ‘vulnerable’ needed to be promoted.   
 
Although individual agencies and NGOs offering CfW opportunities are allowed to 
“determine specific selection criteria and target groups,”109 the criteria they develop are 
meant to take into account the camp-wide target to prioritise access to CfW for women 
and refugees deemed ‘vulnerable.’ The CfW SOPs explain that there should be “equal 
access to CfW opportunities for both male and female refugees (50-50), bearing in mind 
the cultural context.” Therefore, it continues: 
 
where a female candidate has met all required qualifications/skills as 
the male counterpart for a job, positive discrimination towards female 
[sic] should be exercised to address the gender gap, and according to 
comparative household needs.110  
 
Despite the official aim of 50-50, men hold around three quarters of positions, and 
women around one quarter.111  
 
From my early interactions with Syrian men in the camp in the autumn of 2015,112 and 
before I had been able to gain access to the official gender breakdown of Cash Workers, 
                                                
109 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 2. 
110 UNHCR, 2. 
111 See footnote 69 above. 
112 Conversations with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015 and 03.11.2015. 
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I had formed an impression that a majority of Cash Workers were women. This 
impression, in some cases, reflected a parallel belief among the people with whom I had 
been speaking about the predominance of women within CfW. Yet in some cases, Syrian 
men I spoke to would speak much more generally about women working, without 
knowing, or offering, figures about the actual gender breakdown. Even 25% of CfW 
opportunities going to women, it appeared to me, represented for them a radical break 
from previous practices in Syria, and posed a severe challenge to the masculinities of 
some men, who believed that they should be prioritised for work opportunities.113  
 
According to the SOPs, in addition to the 50-50 target for men and women, where a 
“specific vulnerability” compromises a person or household’s ability to meet basic needs, 
then those refugees “should be considered primary target [sic]” for CfW, and 
“[e]xceptions should ONLY be in tasks that require challenging physical effort” 
[emphasis in original].114 Despite broader attempts within the Syria response to move 
away from the ‘group’ or ‘category’ approach to vulnerability,115 within the allocation of 
CfW this approach is still used. The UNHCR vulnerability document to which the SOPs 
refer details six categories of “vulnerable” refugees - “woman at risk,” “single parent” 
(which in the vast majority of cases means a “female-headed household”), “serious 
medical condition,” “disability,” “older person at risk,” and “child at risk,” although this 
latter category is not relevant for CfW opportunities, which were only available to over 
18s. Interestingly, when UNHCR and its partners did consultations with refugees in the 
camp about CfW, some of the refugee men’s focus groups disputed these humanitarian 
understandings of vulnerability, arguing that “all refugees in Za’atari are vulnerable.”116 
Yet again, humanitarian and (at least many) refugees’ understandings of ‘vulnerability’ 
differed and, yet again, humanitarian understandings took precedence. ‘Global’ standards 
trump ‘local’ knowledge. 
   
The monthly summaries of CfW provided by the BNL Working Group record the 
proportion of CfW opportunities that are currently held by “vulnerable” refugees, and 
the number of Cash Workers with “vulnerable” family members. On average,117 around 
                                                
113 See also UN Women, “Restoring Dignity and Building Resilience.” 
114 UNHCR, “Cash For Work - Standard Operating Procedures: Zaatari Camp,” 2. 
115 See Chapter 4. 
116 BNL Working Group, “Za’atari Cash for Work - Focus Group Discussions,” 1. 
117 The figures on vulnerability exclude the factsheet for May 2016, which did not include information on 
vulnerability.   
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15 percent of Cash Workers were categorised as vulnerable, and a further 15 percent had 
family members categorised as vulnerable. Of the fifteen percent of Cash Workers 
classed as ‘vulnerable,’ typically around 10 percent were older people at risk, a further 10 
percent were individuals with a serious medical condition, nearly 40 percent had a 
disability, just over 20 percent were women at risk, and a further 20 percent were single 
parents.118 
 
Therefore, while regulations were in place to prioritise women’s and the ‘vulnerable’s’ 
access to CfW, this was subject to the two aforementioned restrictions – “the cultural 
context” and “tasks that require challenging physical effort.” These two criteria are 
subject to interpretation, and potentially to extensive discretion in their application, and 
were considered by some of my NGO interlocutors to be one of the reasons why the 
proportion of CfW opportunities held by women was consistently around 25 percent, 
rather than 50. According to one Jordanian interviewee, it was culturally not the norm, 
for example, for women to do plumbing, or street excavations, or electrical 
maintenance.119 Nor was it deemed widely culturally acceptable, among Za‘tari residents, 
for men to teach female students or women to teach male students. One programme 
manager told me that his NGO cannot say to their male Cash Workers “go and teach 
females because this is global standards;” the local context disrupted humanitarian 
attempts to pursue (a particular vision of) gender equality.120 
 
Some humanitarian actors made efforts to ensure that there were CfW positions that 
women could do within the cultural constraints of the camp. Within the centres run by 
UN Women, for example, women would undertake activities such as making handicrafts 
as part of CfW,121 which were then sold by UN Women (see above). Where there were 
tasks in the camp that had to be done, but these tasks were not widely considered 
culturally or physically appropriate for women, some humanitarian actors made efforts to 
try and see how the job might be broken down. For example, to see what discrete 
elements of work women could comfortably do within the cultural context of the camp, 
which enabled some women to do work in waste management, which would otherwise 
not have been possible for them. Nonetheless, breaking down jobs in this way was time-
                                                
118 E.g. see BNL Working Group, “Cash for Work in Zaatari Camp February 2017.” 
119 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (1). 
120 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
121 See UN Women, “Restoring Dignity and Building Resilience.” 
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consuming, and not all humanitarian actors were committed to facilitating women’s 
employment in this way.122   
 
For those involved in camp life, another aspect of the ‘cultural context’ shaped 
understandings of women’s work. According to numerous interlocutors, women and 
men, Jordanian and Syrian, men’s and women’s work are understood differently in terms 
of the contribution they make to family income. Because men were typically expected to 
be the main income earner, when women did undertake paid labour, that income was 
understood to be supplementary to the ‘main’ income of the household, which it was the 
man’s responsibility to earn. My interlocutors told me that this view was widely shared 
among Za‘tari’s residents, and in both Syria and Jordan more generally. This idea is also 
found, for example, in scholarship on agriculture in north-western Syria, which has noted 
that the designation of women’s income as ‘supplementary’ continued “even if women 
earned more than their husbands” [emphasis in original].123 As Abdelali-Martini and Dey de 
Pryck argue, labelling women’s incomes as ‘supplementary’ (in addition to women’s 
incomes typically being lower) can make them less “threatening to men socially or 
psychologically.”124 This enables the idea of a male breadwinner to continue to maintain 
social relevance and potency, even in the absence of male breadwinners.  
 
In the context of Za‘tari, where many women have paid work while their husbands do 
not, 125  and thus where women’s income was often clearly not ‘supplementary,’ the 
distance between cultural expectations and practices on the ground was even wider than 
in contexts where both men and women were earning money. This appeared to further 
intensify the gendered psychological effects of not working on men. While there was 
more acceptance of the need for female-headed households to earn extra income, 
because of the absence of a man in the household, some could not understand why the 
‘supplementary’ earner, when living within a family with an adult male, was being 
prioritised. As one Syrian man asked me, almost incredulous, “why are they employing 
women when there are men who do not have work?”126  
 
                                                
122 Interview with livelihood specialist, Amman, 27.06.2016. 
123 Malika Abdelali-Martini and Jennie Dey de Pryck, “Does the Feminisation of Agricultural Labour 
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125 Conversations with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 03.11.2015; interview with NGO worker in Za‘tari. 
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Therefore, while the normative value of the male breadwinner remained, for many 
Syrians, the day to day life in the camp was increasingly challenging this ideological 
structure. Married women working, combined with the presence of many female-headed 
households, were understood by many Syrians to be central factors behind the perceived 
change in day to day ‘gender roles’ within the camp.127 As one of ARDD’s workshop 
participants stated, demonstrating the aforementioned perception that women held more 
than a quarter of Cash Worker positions, “gender roles have totally changed. Men are in 
the caravans and women are working.”128 The extra income that many women earned as 
the result of their participation in the paid labour market was perceived, by many men in 
the camp, to have increased women’s power more broadly, both within specific families 
and the wider community.129  
 
As a UN Women study found, the vast majority of women Cash Workers gain both 
financially and non-financially from their participation in CfW, reporting less financial 
strain, less social isolation, and improved social networks. 130  But women’s increased 
participation in paid work, perceived by many in the community as ‘supplementary,’ does 
not involve a ‘re-balancing’ of domestic work, as international agencies have attempted 
to bring about in other contexts.131 According to the same UN Women report, one third 
of Cash Workers surveyed said that the burden of responsibility on them has increased, 
because they now work both inside and outside of the home.132 As Tobin and Campbell 
argue, therefore, the push to employ women, which aims to ‘empower’ them, can have 
the effect of disproportionately burdening them.133 
 
Perhaps the most politically challenging aspect of the gendered allocation of CfW 
opportunities is the relationship between work outside the home and violence within it. 
According to the same UN Women report, twenty percent of the female participants in 
UN Women’s CfW programme reported a fall in domestic violence in their homes since 
taking on CfW. The rest noted no change. Many of the women who faced less domestic 
                                                
127 Interviews with Syrian shop-holder in Za‘tari market, man (3), Syrian man working in Za‘tari market (2), 
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violence explained that this was the result of them “spending fewer hours in their home 
with their spouse,” which provided “less space for domestic disputes.”134 
 
The same report, however, repeatedly notes that discussions with men in the camp 
revealed that, when men had the ability to earn a living for their family it improved their 
self-esteem, well-being, and mental health, because they were more able to fulfil the role 
of breadwinner which was expected of them (by themselves and others, including by 
humanitarians).135 Livelihood opportunities for men thereby were understood, by this 
report, to counteract one of the factors causing higher levels of domestic violence within 
Za‘tari: the: 
 
lower self-esteem among Syrian men [that had] led to negative or 
exaggerated expressions of masculinity. Feeling disempowered with an 
eroding social status, they resort to violence to assert their authority 
and express their frustrations within the family.136  
 
As the report immediately notes: “[e]conomic opportunities are key to combatting 
this” [emphasis in original].137 These conclusions were supported by the men with whom 
they spoke, one of whom said that although NGOs are “always talking” about domestic 
violence: 
 
I do not need you to tell me that hitting my wife or yelling at my child 
is bad. Let me earn a living and you will see that it will solve this.138  
 
Adult women in Za‘tari who took part in focus group discussions conducted by the 
CPGBV Sub-Working Group in 2012 similarly supported the idea that “there will be a 
reduction in violence as men find jobs.”  
 
This framing of the levels of domestic violence within Za‘tari being straightforwardly a 
function of men’s employment status, and also thereby their psychological well-being 
and self-esteem, is belied by decades of research that demonstrates the multiplicity of 
causes of gendered violence within the home.139 It was however, both among refugees 
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and many humanitarian workers, a very common understanding of the immediate cause of 
a perceived increase in GBV, in comparison to pre-conflict Syria. Yet despite this 
understanding, as previous chapters of this thesis have explored, men were typically not 
understood by humanitarians to need psychosocial support, or to be a specific category 
of person whose employment opportunities humanitarians should promote.  
  
Making a deliberate and explicit decision to increase CfW opportunities for men (rather 
than for the community as a whole, or ‘vulnerable’ sections of it) would be very 
challenging for humanitarian actors not only because of men’s uncertain place within 
humanitarian operations, but also because of the material implications this might have. 
When work with men and boys is expanded, for example in terms of SGBV prevention, 
there was a perceived need among humanitarian actors to repeatedly emphasise that this 
work should not reduce or affect the work done with women and girls.140 Given the long 
(and continuing struggle) to get refugee women’s issues taken seriously within 
humanitarian operations, this is understandable. Without higher budgets, however, 
increased work with men on SGBV or livelihoods, even if that work helps and improves 
the lives of women in the community indirectly, may well come at the expense of direct 
SGBV or livelihoods work with women. As in Chapter 5, additional work with men may 
involve a perceived disloyalty to those who were deemed to be the central objects of 
humanitarian attention. When it became possible for Syrians to seek formal work 
opportunities outside of the camp, these gendered contestations and trade-offs also 
emerged. The ability of humanitarian actors to implement their goals, however, was more 
limited, as I will now explore.  
 
Za‘tari, the Jordanian Labour Market, and the Jordan Compact 
In the first five years of the Syria crisis, the formal integration of Syrian refugees into 
domestic labour markets constituted a red line for Jordan and other host states 
neighbouring Syria. While Lebanon, in which Syrians had long worked in much larger 
numbers, appeared to somewhat facilitate, or at least typically not prevent, Syrians’ 
informal labour market participation, Jordanian authorities took a somewhat different 
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approach.141 Syrians who were found working were often punished by being forcibly 
encamped in (or ‘deported’ to) refugee camps.142 Initially this was primarily to Za‘tari, 
although once Azraq opened in 2014, increasingly to the newer camp. According to 
Human Rights Watch, this fate has been faced by at least 16,000 Syrian refugees, due to 
either working without a permit or alternatively because of issues with their residency 
documents.143 Businesses employing Syrians have regularly been punished for doing so, 
with almost 600 businesses being closed down in 9 months of 2013 alone, specifically 
because they were employing Syrians without a work permit.144  
 
Within this system, Za‘tari was therefore a means to threaten, punish, and render 
precarious, Syrians attempting to work in the informal labour market. Furthermore, as I 
have argued elsewhere,145 as Za‘tari’s population became more permanent, and Syrians’ 
ability to leave the camp became severely restricted,146 Za‘tari also functioned to keep a 
proportion of the Syrian population away from, and unable to access, the broader labour 
market. The conditions of the bailout system, in particular, which had an important role 
in determining who could leave the camp, meant that those who remained in Za‘tari were 
overall more likely to be from rural backgrounds, less skilled, less educated, and with 
fewer financial resources at their disposal.147 In other words, they were more likely to 
belong to those categories of Syrians who were perceived to be exercising the most 
downward pressure on wages.148 
 
Nevertheless, this system did not prevent Syrians from leaving the camp in all cases. 
Some did so without permission from the authorities, for example to work in the nearby 
farmland and then return to the camp, although a 2015 ILO and Fafo study found that 
“few Zaatari residents are able to secure jobs outside the camp.”149 As ‘bailout’ requests 
from the camp’s residents were increasingly refused in 2014, as part of a process to 
“make it more complicated for [Syrians] to leave the camps,” the complexity of getting 
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work outside of Za‘tari only increased.150 ‘Bailouts’ were replaced by a system of ‘leave’ 
permits (tasrih al-ijaza).151 Unlike bailouts, leave permits offered only a temporary, short-
term ability to leave the camp. Although leave permits gave Syrians no right to work 
outside the camp, some did use the leave permits to undertake several days’ work at a 
time, while others used it to conduct business transactions, for example related to the 
market in Za‘tari, or to visit family living in non-camp settings in Jordan. At first it was 
possible to get a leave permit for 15 days, although that was reduced to 7 days in the 
summer of 2016 – a source of consternation among many of my interlocutors in Za‘tari 
at that time.152 
 
Despite UNHCR’s claim in the summer of 2015 that up to 1,000 leave permits were 
being processed daily, 153  according to numerous Syrians in Za‘tari, obtaining a leave 
permit could be a challenging process. The biggest difficulty, and frustration, was the fact 
that there was typically, I was told, only one officer issuing leave permits at a time, and 
the officers who did this rotating role would be liable to close the office at different 
times each day, with no notice, and no fixed hours. This unpredictability incentivised 
Syrians wishing to obtain leave permits to arrive at the relevant office early in the 
morning, which often meant queuing in the heat or extreme cold, depending on the time 
of year, for several hours at a time, perhaps only to find that, as they approach the front 
of the queue, the officer responsible would declare the office closed until tomorrow. In 
addition to the unpredictable opening hours, Syrians’ requests for a leave permit could be 
turned down for ‘security reasons’, of which Syrians would not be provided details, and 
against which they could not appeal. If they were to successfully use a leave permit, they 
would also have to have access to money for transportation when outside of the camp, 
which would prove prohibitive for many.154 
 
Jordan’s policy on Syrians’ access to the labour market underwent a fundamental change, 
however, in February 2016. At the end of the London donors’ conference for Syria and 
the region, the GoJ issued a document entitled ‘The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic 
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Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community 
to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis.’155 The Compact announced the GoJ’s intention, 
with the support of international donors, to “[turn] the Syrian refugee crisis into a 
development opportunity.” 156  Despite the continuation of an emphasis on (some) 
refugees’ ‘vulnerability’ in Za‘tari, Syrians were simultaneously being reframed as an 
untapped economic resource.157 Through opening up access to EU markets, and through 
the use of SEZs and favourable investment laws, the GoJ anticipated being able to 
provide 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees over the ‘coming’ years, and set an 
ambitious target of issuing 50,000 work permits by the end of 2016. As will be explored 
below, gender quotas became one of the central contestations in the implementation of 
the Compact, but the attempts to implement these quotas were much less successful than 
in the camp context. 
 
The policy shift represented by the Compact had been anticipated for several months, 
with NGOs on the ground in Jordan preparing to undertake livelihood interventions that 
had hitherto been forbidden by the GoJ.158 Presaging these shifts, in late 2015 Alexander 
Betts and Paul Collier, two academics at the University of Oxford, wrote an article in 
Foreign Affairs, arguing for Syrians to be able to join the labour market.159 The situation of 
refugees in Za‘tari was a key component in their article and early blueprint. The authors 
had observed that King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area was located only ten miles 
from Za‘tari, and with only 10,000 employees in the factories there, the area was 
operating at only ten percent capacity in terms of workforce.160 Their proposed ‘zoning’ 
of Syrian labour was appealing to the GoJ, because it could be presented to the Jordanian 
public as reducing (or in the case of Za‘tari not increasing) the ‘competition’ between 
Syrians and Jordanians in the labour market.161 
 
As Betts and Collier later wrote of their encounter with Za‘tari and its nearby 
development zone, “[t]he combined intellectual resources of two Oxford professors 
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managed to add two and two: with some appropriate international support, everyone 
could be better off.” 162  Betts and Collier’s vision, however, was both ethically 
questionable, and much more difficult to realise than they and their allies envisaged. The 
SEZs in Jordan are renowned within the country for their exploitative labour practices, 
and Syrians largely were not willing to accept the prevailing working conditions.163 The 
wage rates can make economic ‘sense’ for some migrant workers, often single women 
from South Asia, who make up the bulk of the workforce in many SEZs. They typically 
live in dormitories on site, and, unlike the clear majority of Syrians in Jordan, do not pay 
rent or raise families in the country.  
 
Donors, government ministries, and humanitarian actors made numerous attempts to 
facilitate Syrians’ access to work permits through donor funding, NGO projects, 
legislative and regulatory changes, and partnerships with private sector actors, but very 
few Syrians were willing to accept the conditions in the SEZs. As I have argued, together 
with Katharina Lenner, these difficulties can be understood in the context of the Jordan 
Compact representing  “a policy model that elicit[ed] enough consensus to be 
‘implementable,’ and to achieve a variety of disparate objectives,” yet “long-standing 
features of political economy” and key features of “the lives and survival strategies of 
Syrian refugees” were “under-appreciated by most of the actors involved in designing the 
scheme.” 164  More broadly, as Heaven Crawley has argued, Betts and Collier’s 
interventions contain “little serious discussion of [refugees’] human rights” and represent 
a troubling “contention that global capitalism can come to the rescue of the refugee 
system.”165 
 
The focus on the possibilities of work for Syrians in camps may have been economically 
rational, in the sense that Syrians in camps typically have lower outgoing costs than 
refugees in host communities, in particular because they do not have to pay rent.166 They 
thus might have been more readily drawn into the exploitative labour regimes of the 
SEZs in Jordan than their non-camp counterparts.167 Yet despite this early focus on 
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Za‘tari and its residents, and a plausible economic rationality for it, once the 
implementation of the Jordan Compact started in earnest, camp residents quickly became 
marginal to the efforts to formalise Syrian labour. Although the government’s decision to 
allow Syrians to obtain work permits, in exchange for renewed donor funding for Jordan, 
removed the labour market rationality for restricting Syrians’ freedom of movement 
from the camp, other concerns remained. GoJ actors argued in negotiations that there 
were ‘security reasons’ for not allowing camp residents to leave readily, which prevented 
Za‘tari’s full integration into the Jordan Compact.168  
 
Reflecting these concerns, in the summer of 2016, when work permit numbers for 
Syrians in Jordan were increasingly fairly quickly, 169  the Ministry of Labour issued a 
decree stating that the work permits were not to be issued to camp residents without the 
agreement of the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate. According to Maha Kattaa, the 
ILO’s Response Co-ordinator for the Syria Crisis in Jordan, this in practice made it 
extremely hard for camp residents to obtain work permits.170 Numerous Syrians that I 
spoke to during the summer of 2016 all confirmed that obtaining a work permit was 
extremely hard as a camp resident. Many were even somewhat dismissive of the 
relevance of the scheme to their lives, understanding that the push for work permits was 
a matter only concerning non-camp residents. 171  Despite discussions taking place 
between UNHCR, the GoJ, and other partners from the summer of 2016 to try and 
open up access to work permits for camp residents, progress was slow.172 The opening of 
an employment centre in the camp to run job fairs and assess refugees’ skills in August 
2017, a full 18 months after the announcement of the Jordan Compact, together with 
renewed efforts by UNHCR to support refugees’ work in factories through training and 
transportation, to some extent appear to have represented the beginning of greater access 
to the formal labour market for Syrians in Za‘tari. By December 2017, almost 4,500 work 
permits had been issued to refugees in the camp,173 although much of this work will be 
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taking place within deeply exploitative labour regimes, with low wages, long hours, and 
poor working conditions.174  
 
Gender again became central to the contestations over the distribution of work to 
Syrians. Since the beginning of the Jordan Compact, up to the latest figures released in 
April 2018, fewer than 5 percent of the work permits that had been issued to Syrians 
were given to women.175 Some agencies, such as UN Women, initially proposed that 30% 
of work permits be reserved for women, suggesting that donor funds, which were to be 
dispensed when certain work permit targets were reached, should also be tied to the 
proportion of work permits given to women. A livelihood specialist, who had been 
pushing for a gender quota, argued that, in her experience, gender had not been a priority 
in the early discussions around implementing the Jordan Compact. Without a quota, she 
believed, there would be little incentive for humanitarian actors to make the efforts that 
would be required to get women into the paid labour force. Increasing the number of 
women doing CfW in Za‘tari had required a lot of effort, she explained, including visiting 
women at home to encourage them to take up opportunities, and dividing existing jobs 
into discrete work tasks to increase the number that were, in practice, open to women. 
However, she described the attempts to link the disbursement of World Bank funds to a 
gender quota as “a struggle.” 176  The quota initiative gained little traction among 
humanitarian actors, many of whom prioritised increasing the overall number of work 
permits as quickly as possible.177  
 
In contrast to this perspective, another livelihood specialist with whom I spoke sighed 
heavily when I raised the possibility of a gender quota for the dispensing of work 
permits. Rather than trying to force the question through quotas, she argued, the 
humanitarian sector should first look at what possibilities there were for work, and 
whether they were likely to be appealing to Syrian women.178 As Katharina Lenner and I 
have explored at length, a pilot within the garment sector, which aimed to get 2,000 
Syrian women into employment shortly after the Jordan Compact was announced, 
managed to get only 30 employed by the end of the calendar year. This was, in large part, 
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due to Syrian women’s reluctance to work in the garment sector. Factories often lacked 
childcare facilities, were far away from the areas in which many Syrians live, offered 
inadequate compensation, and many women expressed concerns about working in an 
environment with large numbers of men. Populations of refugees and migrant workers 
are not readily substitutable, as the planners of the Jordan Compact had envisaged.179 
 
The proposed 30 percent quota did not happen. At the beginning of 2017, the 
Livelihood Working Group noted that there were campaigns to try to increase the 
number of women holding work permits in sectors such as agriculture, and set a much 
more modest target of 10 percent by June/July 2017.180 This target, however, was not 
linked to the disbursement of donor funds, and was thus, compared to the target that 
some had hoped for, much weaker both qualitatively and quantitatively. As was 
previously mentioned, however, by April 2018 only 5 percent of the work permits issued 
to Syrians had been given to women, and so even this much lower target had been 
missed. 
 
Underlying the push for women to gain work permits was an assumption that women do 
and/or should want to find paid work outside of the home, which sheds further light on 
humanitarianism’s relationships with women. The evidence about what kind work Syrian 
women would actually like to attain is mixed. A UN Women report on their activities 
within Za‘tari reported that “74 per cent of women stated a preference for paid work 
outside the home and 18 per cent prefer to have paid work at home.”181 The women who 
were questioned for this report, however, were women who were already taking part in 
UN Women’s CfW or other activities, meaning that the figures do not constitute a 
representative sample of the camp population.  
 
By contrast, in a survey of Jordanian and Syrian women in Jordan, conducted by UN 
Women and REACH, 58 percent of Syrian women stated a preference for paid work 
within the home, while only 7 percent preferred work outside the home. The figures for 
Jordanian women were much more balanced, with 28 percent preferring work at home, 
compared with 26 percent outside the home. Despite these figures, the report 
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nonetheless offers the general conclusion that there is “[n]o significant preference for 
home-based work,” without differentiating by nationality. 182  Similarly, when Syrian 
women without work permits were asked why they did not hold a work permit and had 
not applied for one, 43 percent answered that they did not want to work.183 As with 
masculinities, femininities, in any context, are plural and varied. Yet, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, some humanitarian workers could only conceptualise some Syrian women’s 
preference to work inside the home as a result of their cultural socialisation, rather than 
as a personal preference, a considered response to the circumstances in which they were 
living, and/or a decision about what is best for them and their families. Women’s 
capacity to make decisions for themselves is cast into doubt, when their preferences do 
not align with prescriptions of liberal feminism.184  
 
In this latter survey, when Jordanian and Syrian women who were not working were 
asked why they were not working, the most common factors cited were childcare (28 
percent) and housework (20 percent), meaning that if work permits were to be 
successfully issued to women on the scale envisaged, the provision of childcare, for 
example, may also be necessary. But within the context of the Jordan Compact, because 
it is private sector actors, not humanitarian ones, who would be employing women, the 
provision of childcare by humanitarians, as in the case of the aforementioned provision 
of training and transportation for refugees in Za‘tari, can also be understood as 
subsidising exploitative labour regimes. But even if there were satisfactory ways to 
alleviate the aforementioned factors for women who wanted to work, as noted above, 
work outside the home can effectively push more work onto women, because they 
typically maintain many domestic duties within the home.185 It is hard to see how this 
pattern would not be followed outside of the camps.  
 
As outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, the perceived imperative to ‘empower’ Syrian women, 
including economically through the labour market, relies on a particular understanding of 
women as ‘vulnerable’ and as uncontroversial objects of humanitarian care. In my 
discussions with humanitarian and NGO workers in Jordan, men’s perceived lack of 
vulnerability was often understood to be related to their ability to access the labour 
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market. As noted in Chapter 2, many humanitarian workers, I was told, “still have in the 
back of their minds that Arab men can work easily.” 186  This view erases the many 
difficulties and dangers faced by men seeking to access the labour market informally in 
Jordan, of which, at least on some level, many humanitarian workers are aware.187 If one 
of the key reasons why men allegedly do not need the focus or assistance of the 
humanitarian sector is their access to livelihoods, attempting to ‘empower women’ 
through quotas should surely call into question the place of men within humanitarian 
assistance, given the potential trade-offs between employment opportunities for women 
and men. In my experience, however, it did not.     
 
Furthermore, the overwhelming predominance of men as recipients of work permits 
reflects a number of factors – such as which sectors are open to non-Jordanian workers, 
gendered understandings of responsibility, and what has elsewhere been termed an 
“androcentric division of labour.”188 However given that families often have very limited 
resources; the (official and unofficial) fees to gain a work permit can be between 100 
JOD and 400 JOD (approximately $140 - $560);189  men are particularly liable to be 
arrested, forcibly encamped, or deported for not having a work permit;190 many Syrian 
families may be prioritising the safety of their male family members by using their limited 
resources to apply for a work permit for them. Having a quota for work permits for 
women would also therefore potentially take away Syrian families’ ability to prioritise 
their resources in the ways that they think best serves them. While increasing women’s 
labour market participation may be understood to be an attempt to correct or 
compensate for power imbalances between Syrian men and women, it is also, 
unavoidably, the imposition of another agenda, another power structure, and can 
represent the removal, not the provision, of choices to many Syrians. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed key livelihood opportunities available to Syrians living in 
Za‘tari: CfW programmes and the ability to access the Jordanian labour market outside 
of the camp. It has argued that being a breadwinner is central to the masculinities for 
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many Syrian men, although the construction of masculinities differs according to age and 
class, demonstrating the plurality of masculinities even within the ‘local’ context of 
Za‘tari. These masculinities are challenged by the precarity of the work available through 
CfW, the limited number of CfW opportunities, and by humanitarian attempts to 
prioritise the ‘vulnerable.’ CfW nonetheless contains its own hierarchies, among Syrians 
of different classes, and between humanitarian workers and their Syrian ‘volunteers.’ 
These arguments have demonstrated the prioritisation of humanitarian goals over the 
knowledge and views of the Syrian community, the ways in which encampment can 
facilitate the exercise of humanitarian power over refugees, and shown the paradoxical 
place that the labour market holds in humanitarian ideas about ‘vulnerability.’  
 
Before moving on to discuss the market, however, I will offer two wider reflections on 
the analysis presented in this Chapter. Firstly, attempts to prioritise women’s access to 
livelihood opportunities appear to be more successful under contexts of encampment. 
That is, the ability to implement the humanitarian sector’s goals in the sphere of gender 
has been facilitated by a system that involves the restrictions of refugees’ rights, and the 
more extensive humanitarian control over refugees’ lives that this enables.191 In a sense, 
this is unsurprising; scholarship has demonstrated that refugee camps are designed with 
the aims and goals of the humanitarian sector in mind.192 Within the specific sphere of 
livelihoods, however, it demonstrates how humanitarian actors assume not only 
governmental functions in a camp,193 and operate as a kind of public sector employer,194 
but are also able to insert rationalities into employment schemes in a way that is not 
possible within the wider Jordanian economy. The gendered labour market produced by 
humanitarian operations is somewhat different to the gendered labour market within 
Jordan at large, although not without its own hierarchies. Humanitarian attempts to 
correct power imbalances are only possible because of its privileged position in a power 
hierarchy relative to refugees.  
 
Secondly, the possible gendered effects of Za‘tari residents being able to take up work 
permits in much larger numbers could potentially have a big impact on camp life. At the 
end of 2017, the number of Za‘tari residents who had been issued work permits was 
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fewer than 5,000, and these permits last for a maximum of one year, although can be 
renewed. But if tens of thousands of Za‘tari residents were able to receive work permits, 
then a very large proportion of the camp population may have the ability to leave either 
daily to nearby factories and farms, or to work for longer periods in Jordan with only 
brief and occasional return visits to the camp. If, as has been the case within other 
livelihood schemes within the camp, there is a (somewhat successful) effort to prioritise 
women and ‘vulnerable’ persons, then there could be an intensification of the existing 
dynamics in the camp, whereby many men lack activities, feel side-lined by humanitarian 
authorities, with detrimental impacts on their mental health and psychosocial wellbeing. 
At the same time, the burdens placed upon women could increase even further. If, on 
the other hand, as has been the case within the work permit scheme outside of the camp, 
work permits are overwhelmingly received by Syrian men rather than Syrian women, the 
gender demographics of life in the camp will change. More men will be working, in 
absolute and relative terms, and spending potentially extended periods of time outside of 
the camp, perhaps akin to many migrant workers, who often spend the majority of their 
time away from their families. In this instance, the effective permanent population of the 
camp would include a much larger proportion of women and children. Za‘tari would 
thereby come closer to resembling the humanitarian vision of a ‘vulnerable’ population, 
which is perhaps what many humanitarians would have preferred all along. 
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Chapter 7: Marketising Resources, Marketing Refugees: ‘Self-Reliance’ and 
‘Entrepreneurship’ in the Market of Za‘tari 
 
“#Innovation starts with affected communities. Great examples from @ZaatariCamp,” 
reads a September 2015 tweet from UNHCR Innovation.1 @ZaatariCamp is the Twitter 
handle of Za‘tari, the first refugee camp in the world to have its own Twitter account.2 
Set up in October 2013, and run by UNHCR staff, its profile describes the camp as 
“vast, dusty and unpredictable” and a “remarkable stretch of desert [that] is home to 
80,000 Syrian refugees.”3 Among the various depictions of the camp that @ZaatariCamp 
and @UNHCRInnovation offer, one consistent portrayal is of Za‘tari as a space of 
‘innovation’ and ‘entrepreneurship.’ UNHCR Innovation has even tweeted that the camp 
is a “hotspot” of innovation. 4  The market, where much of this ‘innovation’ and 
‘entrepreneurship’ happens, has, according to @ZaatariCamp, “helped refugees in 
finding normalcy in displacement.”5  
 
The market is central not only to how the camp is imagined and portrayed externally, but 
also to life within the camp. It is the busiest area of Za‘tari, the centre of its economic 
life, the public area of the camp most removed from the domain of humanitarian actors, 
and the venue for thousands of tours given to those visiting the camp. This chapter 
argues that Syrians’ endeavours to create and sustain the market are attempts to create 
spaces free from the control of state and humanitarian agencies, and thus another form 
of refusal to occupy the passive, feminised subject positions demanded of them. 
Humanitarian actors see Syrians’ independent economic activities as too radical a form of 
self-reliance, and therefore attempt to control and regulate it through further 
deployments of masculinised forms of power. Humanitarian actors also bring their own 
agendas to the economic life of the camp in the form of private sector partnerships and 
official forms of humanitarian innovation. Unable to create passive refugee subjects, 
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humanitarian actors instrumentally utilise the vision of refugeehood and refugee camps 
that Syrians themselves have created. Syrians’ attempts to live self-reliant economic lives 
are therefore constrained within the camp but promoted outside of it, condemned as 
unruly, yet fetishised as entrepreneurial.  
 
The Market of Za‘tari 
By the time I arrived in Za‘tari, I had seen many hundreds of pictures of the camp: in 
news reports, NGO documents, and fundraising appeals. Za‘tari, and its market in 
particular, have become symbols of the Syrian refugee crisis and the object of 
tremendous media interest.6 News stories about unrelated aspects of the Syria situation, 
such as those entitled “Jordanian Air Force Bombs Syrian opposition vehicles,” and 
“Bond Markets Could Help Alleviate the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” appear with pictures of 
the Za‘tari’s market as the accompanying image.7 When I walked down the streets of the 
market, at times it almost felt, disturbingly, as if I were almost looking at a photo, so 
iconic had the market become (perhaps in my mind as well as in the media).8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Map of Za'tari's Main Market Streets9 
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The market dominates several of the main streets of the camp. The NGO REACH’s 
assessment identified four main streets that constituted the market, as shown in the map 
above. Market Street 1 (using REACH’s terminology) starts very near to Base Camp, and 
the northern end of that street has long contained a large number of schools, clinics, and 
hospitals, which contributed to the eventual location of the market.10 The market also 
began in this area because many of the families living on or near to ‘Market Street 1,’ and 
who were already living in caravans rather than tents, were distributed porches and kits 
that contained additional building materials as part of ‘winterisation’ efforts in 2012-
2013. In line with Syrians’ determination to exercise agency over the space of the camp 
and the use of resources brought into it, many converted these porches into shops and 
stalls.11 As the camp expanded further east from the original area that was inhabited 
(mainly Districts 1-4), shops also began to appear in new and different areas of the camp, 
and became concentrated on the streets labelled as Market Streets 2, 3 and 4 on the 
above map. In earlier years of the camp, Syrians who were planning to leave the camp 
would often sell their caravans to others who planned to remain in the camp, many of 
which were used to establish shops, although UNHCR has attempted to prevent this by 
obliging families who wish to leave the camp to return their caravan first.12  
 
REACH’s assessment in 2014 noted 1,438 shops and stalls on those four streets, 13 
although in 2017 UNHCR typically quoted the figure of 3,000 informal shops and 
businesses in the camp.14 This likely reflects an increase in the number of shops over 
time, that a large number of businesses do not operate from the main streets of the 
market, and that some businesses are conducted from home, rather than from a 
designated shop. The most common types of shops in the market are mini markets, 
clothes shops, shoe shops, jewellery shops, phone and internet shops, and restaurants 
and bakeries, while currency exchanges and animal/pet shops are among the more 
unusual sightings in the market. A majority of shop-owners told REACH that their main 
source of stock was the camp, in which wholesalers also operate, although almost half 
indicated that they re-stocked from at least one area outside the camp, primarily Mafraq. 
The vast majority of businesses are small, with 88% of those in the REACH assessment 
                                                
10 Dalal, “Camp Cities Between Planning and Practice,” 113. 
11 Betts, Bloom, and Weaver, “Refugee Innovation,” 20. 
12 Conversations with Syrian shop-holders, Za‘tari, 01.08.2016. 
13 REACH, “Market Assessment,” 1. 
14 E.g. see UNHCR, “Zaatari Refugee Camp Factsheet January 2017” (UNHCR, 2017). 
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receiving between 1 and 50 customers daily. Just over half of the businesses surveyed 
employed staff, although almost 60 percent of these additional workers were family 
members, the vast majority of whom were not paid a wage. Extrapolating from 
REACH’s figures, there were only around 300 paid employment opportunities for non-
family members in the market at the time of the assessment. 96 percent of those working 
in the market are men, and only 4 percent women.15 
 
Syrians began to conduct the informal economic activity that developed into the market 
as soon as the camp was set up: from day two of Za‘tari’s existence, “there was a ten year 
old kid selling Hamra cigarettes and tomatoes.” 16  In a fashion typical of many 
humanitarian operations, 17 Syrians very quickly began to marketise and exchange the 
goods that were distributed to them, such as the porches and caravans that now house 
the market. In the words of then-camp manager Kilian Kleinschmidt, refugees were 
“privatising” the resources. 18  Humanitarian actors did not see these items as 
commodities, and would often lament, in interviews and more casual interactions, that 
the items they provided at considerable expense were being sold on at much lower prices 
than humanitarian actors paid for them.19 These disputes, I argue, represent different 
understandings of refugeehood and the level of agency that refugees are expected to 
exercise within camp settings, and are another demonstration of many Syrian men’s 
resolve to provide financially for their families. Syrians’ determination to use the 
resources available to them in ways that suit their interests, as they see them, is an act of 
survival, but also, as this chapter will demonstrate, an act of defiance against the 
authorities that would prefer them to be passive, helpless, recipients of aid.20 
 
One prominent example of this marketisation is the bikes in the camp. The camp is 
slightly over 5 square kilometres, and has hostile weather conditions in both summer and 
winter, making sources of transportation and mobility within the camp important. The 
                                                
15 REACH, “Market Assessment,” 8, 12–15, 18. 
16 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari. Hamra cigarettes are a popular Syrian brand.  
17 E.g. see Karen Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees (Bloomfield, CT : Kumarian Press, 2005); Bram J. 
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20 For scholarship on the humanitarian creation of dependent subjects, see Harrell-Bond, Voutira, and 
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taxi service is very expensive, Syrians have no access to private motorised vehicles, and 
the only other main form of transportation is donkey-pulled carts or wheelbarrows, 
which one occasionally sees children inside.21 Many bikes have been donated to Za‘tari, 
most notably by Amsterdam Municipality, which brought 500 second-hand bikes to the 
camp in early 2015.22 These were distributed to Syrians, often to men undertaking regular 
CfW with humanitarian actors. But the majority of Syrians who now have bikes in the 
camp, I was told by numerous sources, have bought them from the market, where many 
of the bikes originally distributed by humanitarian agencies end up.23 Two men running 
bike shops in the camp told me that they would sell bikes for anything from 35 JOD 
(approximately $50) for a smaller, cheaper bike, up to about 150 JOD (approximately 
$210) for the best bikes that were available.24 Many Syrians considered the use of bikes to 
be appropriate only for men and boys, although this is being challenged by at least one 
young woman in the camp.25 Because of the extreme rarity of women using bikes in the 
camp, humanitarian actors would distribute them only to (some) men who were working 
for them, not to women. According to a colleague who worked with women in the camp, 
many Syrian women considered this to be discrimination, but wanted the bikes not for 
themselves, but for their male family members.26 
 
Syrians’ attempts to create this market through the creative re-appropriation of 
humanitarian resources have been a source of contestation and controversy since the 
camp was opened. The market receives a great deal of praise from humanitarian workers 
on the ground,27 and in the international media (see below). Yet in the earlier years of the 
camp, UNHCR had a complex relationship with the development of the market, which 
was happening largely outside of their control. 28  In particular, there were strong 
disagreements between UNHCR staff working in Za‘tari and the UNHCR leadership in 
Amman. Humanitarian staff ‘on the ground’ in Za‘tari were more likely to adopt, 
relatively speaking, a laissez faire attitude to the agency that Syrians were able to exercise 
over space within the camp, while the agency’s leadership in Amman, which is 
                                                
21 Author observation and conversation with Syrians, Za‘tari, 24.11.2015 and 22.12.2015. 
22 Agence France Presse, “Dutch Bikes given to Syrian Refugee Camp in Jordan,” March 30, 2015, 
http://ara.tv/jhbdk. 
23 Conversations with Syrian men, including bike shop-holders, Za‘tari, 01.08.2016. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Yaser Al-Hariri, “The Bike Is for Her Also,” The Road Media (blog), March 1, 2017, https://zaatari-
media.org/2017/03/01/the-bike-is-for-her-also/.  
26 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 10.08.2016. 
27 Conversations with NGO workers, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015 and 16.02.2016. 
28 Interviews with former NGO worker in Za‘tari; former UNHCR worker in Za‘tari; and former 
employee of international organisation in Za‘tari. 
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accountable to the government for UNHCR’s actions in the country, was concerned by 
the way the camp was developing, by the policies of its staff in the camp, and the level of 
attention that Za‘tari was receiving.29 Yet as this Chapter will demonstrate, the relative 
leniency of some UNHCR operatives in the camp did not constitute support for Syrians’ 
attempts to create the market, or to thereby to fundamentally alter its social world and its 
temporalities.  
 
In line with the analysis presented in Chapter 3, for Jordanian governmental and non-
governmental actors, the development of the market was a sign that Syrian refugee 
camps in Jordan might be following the same trajectory as Palestinian camps in the 
country.30 Even though, in comparison to Lebanon for example, Jordan’s Palestinian 
camps are ‘well surveyed’ by the regime, Palestinian camps, and the fact that they are de 
facto permanent features of the Jordanian landscape, are highly sensitive topics within 
Jordan and the wider region.31 SRAD’s attempts to regulate the entry of goods into the 
market can be understood as an attempt to ensure that Za‘tari does not become similarly 
permanent. For example, SRAD insists that no concrete or breeze blocks be brought 
into the camp, although a small number are visible, and all of the shop-holders I met 
were keen to emphasise that they abided by this restriction put in place by the 
government.32  
 
As in other attempts to exert control over the life of the camp, SRAD uses draconian 
measures to ensure Syrian compliance with its rules, and to exert its supremacy over the 
space of the camp. Syrian interlocutors in the market, while reluctant to discuss the issue 
in any level of detail, volunteered to me the information that the police regularly shut 
shops down for (perceived) infractions of the rules governing the camp, and at times 
have deported the shop-holders to Syria as a punishment.33 Syrians’ agency within the 
camp is only acceptable within the limits defined by the authorities. Although Betts, 
Bloom and Weaver refer to Za‘tari as an “enabling environment” for Syrians’ economic 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Conversations with Jordanian NGO workers and Jordanian police officer, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015, 
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33 Betts and Collier, Refuge, 171. Fieldnotes, Za‘tari Refugee Camp, 01.08.2016. 
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activities,34 to the extent that this enabling environment exists, it is because of Syrian 
refugees’ struggles to create it.  
 
Too Much Self-Reliance? Syrians’ Attempts at Radical Autonomy in the Market  
The resistance, at higher levels of the UNHCR hierarchy, to the ways that the camp was 
developing might be considered surprising in light of the fact that for decades UNHCR 
has formally attempted to move away from a model of aid distribution and ‘dependency’ 
towards one of ‘self-reliant’ refugees who are ‘active partners’ in protection and 
assistance. 35  ‘Self-reliant’ refugees, according to UNHCR, are those who have the 
“economic and social ability to meet essential needs on a sustainable and dignified 
basis.”36 Among UNHCR policy documents, this ‘self-reliance’ is variously framed as a 
right, a protection tool, and a strategy for combatting poverty.37 In other documents, 
such as UNHCR’s handbook on the subject, understandings of ‘self-reliance’ are infused 
with the language of neoliberal governmentalities. UNHCR describes ‘self-reliance’ as “a 
form of empowerment,” that will enable refugees to be “recast…as agents of 
development” and to cope with crisis and meet their own social and economic needs 
with renewed “hope and vigour.” 38  The refugee, like increasing numbers of others, 
becomes “not a citizen with claims on the state, but a self-enterprising subject who is 
obligated to become an entrepreneur of himself or herself.”39 Noting the articulations of 
refugee policies and neoliberalisations in the North, Randy Lippert has argued that the 
critiques of refugees’ alleged dependence on aid bear a “remarkable” resemblance to 
contemporary critiques of welfare systems in Europe and North America.40 
 
Yet it is, as Gaim Kibreab has demonstrated, a ‘myth’ to suggest that long-term aid 
creates a system, or mentality, of dependency among refugees.41 The push for refugee 
self-reliance, as UNHCR’s own documents acknowledge, is also a response to the 
declining budgets that the agency has experienced since the 1980s, as a response to 
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increasingly protracted refugee crises across the globe.42 In line with the need to reduce 
budgets, and in accordance with neoliberal governmentalities, UNHCR has promoted 
‘self-reliance’ policies even in contexts in which refugees’ objective circumstances would 
appear to foreclose the possibility of them achieving genuine self-reliance.43 
 
As Mark Duffield has argued, in the field of development it is “axiomatic” that 
populations in underdeveloped countries “are self-reliant in terms of their main 
economic, social and welfare requirements,” and therefore crises present an opportunity 
to deepen and strengthen self-reliance.44 There is a limit, however, to the forms of self-
reliance that humanitarian and development agencies are willing to support. Populations 
in the South are expected to undertake “approved forms” of self-reliance, such as “the 
self-reliance of NGO-audited microcredit projects [and] legal forms of economic self-
help.”45 Other forms of self-reliance, on the other hand, the ones that signal “radical 
autonomy…[and] the discovery of effective means of existence beyond states and free of 
aid agencies” (emphasis in original) are in opposition to “official aid efforts” and 
therefore threatening to those agencies and authorities.46 
 
Promoting (particular forms of) ‘self-reliance’ was part of humanitarian workers’ 
understandings of their role in Za‘tari. A former UNHCR worker in the camp, in 
response to my question of whether ‘self-reliance’ for refugees was part of what he and 
his colleagues were attempting to achieve in Za‘tari, said “I do think, yeah, it is, 
generally.” Most people in the organisation subscribed, he said, to both the goals of ‘self-
reliance’ and conducting their work in a participatory way. 47  Immediately after this, 
however, he drew attention to exactly the tension that Duffield explores – in complex 
circumstances such as Za‘tari, he said, “your idea of what resilience and community 
empowerment are might not necessarily be theirs.”48 Put another way, what forms of 
self-reliance are acceptable to humanitarian actors, and what forms are, ironically, too self-
reliant? When is a self-reliant population an unruly population in need of governance? As 
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in other areas of this thesis, there is a deep gap in priorities and understandings between 
humanitarian actors and their ‘beneficiaries.’ The contestations surrounding the supply of 
electricity in the camp provide a particularly pertinent example of these differing 
understandings of self-reliance in Za‘tari. 
 
The provision and use of electricity in the camp has long been a subject of controversy, 
or a “sensitive issue” in the words of one NGO worker.49 UNHCR never planned for 
electricity to be supplied to refugees’ houses in the camp,50 but it did bring electricity into 
the camp in order to create systems of public lighting (at least in the older parts of the 
camp, in which the busiest streets were) and to ensure that there was electricity available 
in facilities such as schools and hospitals.51 Syrians living in the camp, however, had other 
ideas, and soon started to informally connect their homes and businesses to the 
electricity pylons. By October 2013, 73% of households were connected to electricity.52 
In August 2014, according to REACH’s assessment, 94.8% of businesses in the market 
were connected to the local power grid.53  
 
This meant that the cost of electricity being supplied to the camp, for which UNHCR 
was responsible, grew rapidly, and became a major concern for them. According to 
UNHCR officials, in 2014 the electricity bill ran to $500,000 per month, 54  although 
others quote even higher figures, especially for winter months.55 UNHCR also expressed 
concerns about the safety implications of uncoordinated and unregulated large-scale 
attempts to tap into the electricity supply, especially given that for the first two years of 
its existence, the majority of accommodation in the camp was tents rather than caravans. 
For example, in its 2013 ‘Safety and Security Report’ for the camp, UNHCR notes that 
“several” of the fires that occurred in the camp in that year were a result of “faulty 
electrical connections.”56  
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Yet even if it is a phenomenon that carries risks, both private and public, Syrians’ 
interactions with the electricity system, and their attempts to turn it to their advantage, is 
also an instance of self-reliance, of people not having a ‘dependency mentality,’ not 
waiting for governing agencies to provide for them, but using what is available from their 
circumstances to provide for themselves. But because it is, to use Duffield’s terminology, 
a non-approved form, which demonstrates autonomy from aid agencies, 57  it is not 
recognised as an instance of ‘self-reliance.’ Instead, the electricity system in the camp 
became an example of “chaos and crime” in the camp,58 and a key aspect of camp life 
over which governance needed to be asserted. 59  UNHCR undertook “a clean-up of 
electrical wiring,” i.e. removed many connections from the grid,60 installed electricity 
metres in many of the shops,61 and although electricity is now supplied to caravans, the 
overall budget is limited by UNHCR to $100,000 per month.62  
 
Because of this cap on the monthly electricity budget, the number of hours for which 
this electricity supply has been made available to camp residents changes regularly, with 
both the number of hours per day, and which hours per day, changing according to how 
much electricity is being used. UNHCR and SRAD have released a guidance sheet, to 
inform refugees how to reduce their electricity usage, and to encourage them to do so.63 
By September 2015, at the beginning of my fieldwork, it was being supplied for only 8 
hours a day, between 7pm and 3am, which was a reduction from the previous provision 
of 11 hours per day.64 During one of my visits to the caravan of a family in July 2016, a 
Syrian man showed me a text message he received earlier that day, to say that from today 
the electricity times would be changed from 7pm to 4am, to 6pm to 2am.65  
 
Electricity is supplied in the evening and the night, I was told by one Syrian man, because 
if it were supplied in the daytime it would be used a lot more, and thus available for 
fewer hours per day. 66  The timings that have been chosen have created particular 
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difficulties for women in the camp, who do the overwhelming majority of domestic 
labour, much of which requires, or at the very least is made significantly easier by, the 
presence of electricity.67 That NGOs, both in their programmatic outposts in the camp, 
and in Base Camp, typically have electricity throughout the day, for fans in the summer, 
for heaters in the winter, and for computers all year round, unsurprisingly doesn’t go 
unnoticed by the Syrian population,68 many of whom are dissatisfied by the electricity 
supply they receive. In the summer of 2016, for example, it was the issue about which 
the Community Police in the camp received the most complaints.69 
 
These restrictions and regulations of the electricity supply have had an important impact 
on the functioning of the market, significantly reducing the level and variety of activity in 
the market streets. One senior NGO official even went as far as to say that the electricity 
policies “killed the Champs-Élysées,” the term many humanitarians use for the main 
market street, as is discussed below.70 Some shops responded to humanitarian actors 
preventing them from connecting to the local electricity grid by buying small generators 
for their shops, which requires a permit, as does any gasoline that is brought into the 
camp to power them. While I was asking one shop worker whether the shop had 
electricity, she began to turn to point to the generator at the back of the shop, which was 
slightly obscured from view. Her voice stopped abruptly, and she turned to the 
policeman who was accompanying me, and checked with him that generators were 
allowed in the camp. The policeman reassured her that there was no problem, as long as 
they had a permit for the generator, which she in turn assured him they had.71 Where 
electricity is provided in ‘self-reliant’ ways, with the relevant permits, and at extra cost to 
Syrians, it is a topic of little interest, let alone concern, and conversation quickly moved 
on. But for some shop-holders, depending on the nature of their business and the level 
of electricity usage entailed, providing electricity in ways that accorded with the official 
vision of ‘self-reliance’ was costly and difficult.72 
 
Adding further analytical depth to the complex contestations surrounding self-reliance is 
the argumentation presented in Chapters 3 and 6 about the importance of gendered 
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understandings of agency and responsibility among refugees and humanitarian workers. 
Syrian refugees in Za‘tari want to exercise agency over the space of the camp, how it is 
designed, and how it is run, yet the men who are often at the (at least visible) foreground 
of organising such efforts are seen as ‘political,’ and thereby to threaten the 
implementation of humanitarian goals, and to disrupt the governability of the camp 
population. Simultaneously, being a ‘breadwinner’ was central to the creation of 
masculinities for many Syrian men in the camp, and largely expected of men by 
themselves, Syrian women, and humanitarian workers. Put another way, many Syrians do 
want to be self-reliant, and to exercise control and agency over their own lives and 
circumstances, but not necessarily in the ways that humanitarian actors designate as 
appropriate for them.  
 
In accordance with this analysis, it is not surprising that men dominate the work 
opportunities created in, and provided by, the market, which offered some men much-
needed meaningful activity that was studiously not provided by humanitarian actors. 
When I asked Syrians working in the market (men and women) to estimate what 
proportion of the people working in the market were women, some declined to give a 
figure, but suggested that it was very few, while others offered an estimate of 5 percent, 
remarkably close to REACH’s 2014 finding that only 4 percent of market employees 
were women or girls.73 The REACH assessment also found that only 1.7% of businesses 
in the camp were owned by women.74  
 
These gendered expectations were also clear in how men and women justified their 
presence in the market, and the shops in which they worked. During some of my visits to 
shops, I would ask the employees, men and women, why they were working in the 
market. Men’s presence was typically justified by the simple need to work, or by the fact 
that this was the best work opportunity they had found. That they should be working 
went unquestioned in their answers.75 In contrast, most of the women I met working in 
the market would respond to the question by offering particular information about their 
circumstances, in order to justify their presence in the paid labour market. For example, 
some women told me that male family members were not in the camp, or were physically 
unable to work, and so they had to do it instead. Others explained that the type of shop 
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that they were working in was deemed to require (or benefit from) women staff: beauty 
shops, wedding shops, and women’s underwear shops were all offered as examples of 
this type of shop.76 The concentration of women in specific businesses is also reflected in 
the data gathered by REACH, whereby although 4 percent of employees in the market 
were female, females were only employed in 2.9% of businesses.77  
 
The proportion of men working in the market is a reflection of the patterns of labour 
market participation in much of pre-conflict Syria; access to particular positions is 
mediated by gender, class and other factors. Referring to Syria’s 2006 Labour Force 
Survey, Line Khatib details that women represented 25 percent of public sector workers, 
but only 8 percent of private sector workers.78 In the previous three decades prior to the 
Syrian uprising, it is noteworthy that as neoliberal reforms in Syria were progressively 
bolstering the role of the private sector at the expense of the public sector,79 women’s 
participation in the former decreased significantly.80 The percentages of men and women 
working in different roles in the camp, both in the ‘public sector’81 of CfW, and the 
private sector in the market, quite closely mirror the situation in pre-2011 Syria, albeit 
with women occupying a slightly smaller percentage of roles in the market than in the 
paid private sector in pre-2011 Syria. 
 
The quest for different forms of ‘self-reliance’ also made visible the importance of 
temporalities in Syrians’ relationship to the camp, and the relationship between 
masculinities, breadwinning and planning for possible futures. While the circumstances 
of refugeehood require Syrians to act in the ‘subjunctive mode,’ that is, in the present in 
relation to an unknown future, 82  many of the shop-holders I met had invested 
significantly in their shops in order to expand them. Several of the shops I visited in July 
and August 2016 had made improvements over the recent holiday period of Ramadan 
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(early June – early July 2016).83 One showed me around his barber’s shop, with its newly-
decorated violet interior, before pointing out the smaller stall across the road that he 
previously owned. A falafel seller had installed a new faux-brick design on the back wall 
of his shop to create more atmosphere. A tailor had recently opened up a new branch of 
his shop across the street, which bore the same name as the original, with a number two 
in brackets afterwards.  
 
This level of planning and investment demonstrate that while, as Cathrine Brun argues, 
humanitarian policies create little room for biographical lives or potential futures,84 there 
are (uncertain) futurities that shape and influence the actions of Syrians. The camp may 
be designed to be a temporary space, and Jordanian state actors may go to great lengths 
to try and render it so, but Syrians’ investment in their futures within and beyond Za‘tari 
undermine the idea that the camp is necessarily a transitory space. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that providing for others, which many Syrian men were expected to do, 
and expected of themselves, often included attempts to provide for children of the 
family, and to plan for and improve their future, which was a common preoccupation of 
many Za‘tari residents.85 Thirdly, in their presentation of the businesses they had started 
and grown, and their obvious pride in showing me the improvements and investments 
that they had made, it was clear that the shops provided many men in the camp with a 
sense of purpose that, as this thesis has demonstrated, it was otherwise difficult for them 
to find.86 
 
Private Sector Good, Private Sector Bad 
A second humanitarian agenda that plays an important role within Za‘tari is that of 
‘humanitarian innovation.’ Innovation, as Tom Scott-Smith argues, “is the new 
buzzword in humanitarianism.” 87  While a “nebulous concept…calls to innovate all 
involve an underlying commitment to novelty, embracing new technologies and shifting 
focus to ‘new actors’ in the private sector.”88As was explored in Chapter 3, the encamped 
population represents a captive audience for humanitarian actors. This includes attempts 
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to deploy ‘innovations’ in the governance of refugees, who in many cases have little 
choice but to comply. One article on humanitarian innovation even explicitly refers to 
the “potential for seeing [humanitarian innovation] as a ‘crisis laboratory’ for stimulating 
novel thinking.”89 In other contexts, UNHCR has deployed technology that is genuinely 
experimental and unproven in its refugee operations. 90 The camp hosts its own 
Innovation Lab, run by NRC, an organisation that has previously run other “innovative” 
activities in Za‘tari, including “upcycling for the vulnerable.”91 The camp is also the site 
of a ‘refugee coding week’92 run by software company SAP, regular tours for private 
sector actors,93 and demonstrations of Google’s self-drive cars.94  
 
One part of the humanitarian innovation agenda is the incorporation of private sector 
actors into humanitarian operations. According to a paper written by Alexander Betts, 
Louise Bloom, and Naohiko Omata, academics at the University of Oxford’s Refugee 
Studies Centre, the humanitarian sector should abandon its “instinctive antipathy” for 
private sector actors, who as innovators are a model to be emulated.95 The state sector is 
the “old way,” the private sector is the “new way.” Humanitarianism the “old way,” 
development the “new way.” Dependency the “old way,” empowerment the “new 
way.”96 While humanitarians are encouraged to become more open to private partners, 
the private sector, in a report released by the Overseas Development Institute, is 
encouraged to see possible collaboration with the humanitarian sector not as a form of 
corporate social responsibility, but as a business opportunity.97  
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Within Za‘tari, the incorporation of private sector actors and innovations represent 
another deployment of masculinised rational-bureaucratic power by humanitarian 
agencies, and a simultaneous disempowerment of the refugee population. In this instance 
it is rationalised by the use of technology and ‘innovation.’98 These dynamics are clearest 
in the two supermarkets in the camp, which are commonly referred to as al-mall (meaning 
‘the mall’). The first to open, in January 2014, was Safeway, which has fourteen stores in 
Jordan, and is owned by the Kuwaiti company The Sultan Center.99 A year and a half 
after the camp opened, this supermarket offered, according to one Jordanian news outlet, 
“refugee retail therapy” for Syrians living there. 100  The second supermarket, which 
opened just weeks later, is called Tazweed (‘supply’ or ‘provision’ in Arabic). According 
to its website, Tazweed is a “leading provider of customized and integrated logistics and 
support services in remote, demanding, and hostile environments.”101 The client list on 
its website is a mixture of UN agencies, large international NGOs, and state militaries, 
including the militaries of both the United States and Jordan.102 In Safeway, the staff is 
half Jordanian and half Syrian (the latter ‘employed’ through CfW), and 93 percent of the 
staff at Tazweed are reportedly Jordanians from the local area.103 Tazweed also conducts 
youth trainings for Jordanians in Mafraq Governorate, and Za‘tari village specifically,104 
allowing Jordanians to benefit from the introduction of certain forms of private sector 
activity into the camp. 
 
The means through which Syrians are able to shop at the supermarket have been subject 
to a series of ‘innovative’ steps, steps that have, in turn, reduced the ability of Syrians to 
innovate independently. In the earliest months of the camp, food assistance was initially 
offered by the World Food Programme (WFP) through the provision of hot meals, 
although by October 2012 this had changed to ‘take home’ dry rations.105  In September 
2013, the system switched again, and WFP began to distribute paper food vouchers that 
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Syrians could use at dedicated shops in Za‘tari, and to gradually increase the value of 
food vouchers distributed, while simultaneously gradually reducing the food it distributed 
as a monthly ration, which included staples such as pasta, rice, lentils, sugar and salt.106 
The model of distributing food rations, which some NGO workers told me had been 
used because it was the system to which humanitarian workers were accustomed to using 
‘in Africa,’ was unpopular with many Syrians. The changes, whereby Syrians had 
increased autonomy over their diet, were therefore unsurprisingly welcomed.107   
 
This new system of paper vouchers was replaced again the following year by an ‘e-card,’ 
which functions like a debit card, and is topped up every month by the WFP. Syrians can 
use these e-cards in particular shops, which included the two supermarkets mentioned 
above. Yet e-cards were also soon innovated away by a combination of “cutting-edge 
technology” and “WFP’s commitment to employing innovative tools and approaches in 
the fight against hunger.”108 This particular innovation came in the form of iris scanning 
technology, “allowing” (although ‘obliging’ would have been more accurate) “refugees to 
purchase food from camp supermarkets using a scan of their eye instead of cash, 
vouchers, or e-cards” for the “first time in the history of humanitarian assistance.”109 The 
World Food Programme, its Jordan Director announced, was “thrilled” that it had this 
new ability to “serve” Syrian refugees in the camp. 110  Or, in the words of Andrew 
Harper, then UNHCR Country Representative in Jordan, on Twitter, the iris scanning 
system represented “[m]ore really cool stuff not seen before to facilitate protecting and 
assist [sic],”111 betraying the fascination with the new that Tom Scott-Smith argues is 
central to the support for the humanitarian innovation agenda.112 
 
This system is made possible by UNHCR taking an iris scan of each refugee as they enter 
Jordan. UNHCR stores the scan on a database, which can be used by other partners such 
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as WFP.113 The involvement of the private sector is again central to these developments. 
The introduction of the iris scan for registration came from a partnership between 
UNHCR and Cairo Amman Bank, and was a  “flagship tool for the bank” since 2008, 
according to the independent evaluation of UNHCR’s Syria crisis operations in Jordan 
and Lebanon.114 The introduction of these facilities to Za‘tari involved a different bank, 
Jordan Ahli Bank, its counterpart Middle East Payment Services, and IrisGuard, a 
company with offices in the UK and Jordan, which developed the platform. While the 
gathering and deployment of biometric data may offer benefits to UNHCR and its 
partners, Syrians are not offered the chance to opt in or out – they simply must submit to 
having their biometric data taken and retained by UNHCR if they wish to seek refuge or 
receive humanitarian assistance. Such ‘innovations’ allow huge amounts of data to be 
collected,115 in this context for example people’s biometrics but also their movements, 
spending habits, and eating patterns. As Katja Jacobsen argues, these developments 
cannot be understood separately from broader political sentiments, in particular the 
increased securitisation of refugee populations. Furthermore, the collection of this data 
in the contemporary environment could jeopardise UNHCR’s “ability to enact its role as 
the guarantor of refugee protection.”116  
 
On one of my visits to the camp, I encountered a crowd of at least 100 waiting near the 
securitised entrance to Base Camp that Syrians can use if they have an appointment or 
specific reason to enter. That day was in the middle of a summer heatwave, with 
temperatures already nearing 40 degrees Celsius at 10.30 am. The heat was intensified by 
the piercing light bouncing off of the white caravans among which people were milling, 
and waiting. I asked some of the men squatting in the shade of a caravan what everyone 
was waiting for, and they informed me that they had been told they needed to come this 
morning to have their irises scanned. I replied that I thought everyone in the camp had 
done this already. Through a sigh, he explained that they had, but had been told that they 
must come to do it again, although had not been offered an explanation for why. A 
second Syrian man in the discussion told me that this was typical of how the camp was 
run – instructions that make little sense to their recipients are handed down without even 
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a semblance of justification. He had once asked, he told me, why he was being made to 
perform a task that appeared to him to be similarly pointless and repetitive. He was told, 
bluntly, “it’s none of your business.”117  
 
As Scott-Smith argues, it is important to ask who benefits from the agenda of 
humanitarian innovation. In whose interest do these systems work?118 For refugees living 
in the camp, innovations can create, as is often heavily advertised, means of humanitarian 
assistance that are more dignified. Being able to choose one’s own shopping (even within 
very limited financial means) may be more agential than being handed generic food 
rations. Being able to go to shops, rather than wait in distribution lines, may be 
preferable because of the flexibility it allows in terms of time, and because it is more akin 
to Syrians’ previous experiences of life. Having ‘e-cards’ where an allowance can be used 
over multiple occasions, rather than paper vouchers that had to be used in one go, may 
provide a modicum of increased flexibility, and increased ‘normalcy.’119 But as the above 
incident demonstrates, these supposed rationalisations can also create extra burdens for 
Syrians, whose time is a necessary component of making the delivery of humanitarian aid 
more ‘efficient.’ The introduction of iris scans has also led to increased inconvenience for 
many Syrians who shop using them. While it does not have to be the ‘head of household’ 
who is the designated shopper whose iris is scanned, families must designate one person 
to do their shopping, and this person stays the same over time. The need to do this 
inevitably reduces the amount of flexibility that Syrians have over their daily lives.120  
 
Through these innovations, the fungibility of the WFP’s assistance has also effectively 
been eliminated, which has had an effect on the market, i.e. the private sector activity 
conducted by Syrians themselves. Food that was handed out could be sold on if it were 
deemed unsuitable or unnecessary, paper vouchers could be used in the market (albeit 
for below their face value), and then redeemed by stall sellers in the supermarkets of the 
camp, or sold on again.121 The e-card and iris scan systems eliminate this fungibility. Just 
as some forms of ‘self-reliance’ are approved of, and others are deemed too self-reliant, 
certain forms of private sector activity is facilitated, at the expense of others. When I put 
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it to an NGO worker in the camp that these changes might have harmed the market, he 
rather dismissively replied that now Syrians trade other commodities, so it’s not difficult 
for them. The difficulty was rather for the NGOs, who would provide a voucher that 
was sold on below its face value.122 Syrians using humanitarian items for their own ends 
is thereby understood as a threat to humanitarian actors’ ability to exercise control over 
the use of resources in the camp.   
 
While the earlier forms of vouchers that were traded on the informal market derived 
their value from the fact that they could, if the holder wished to, be redeemed in 
particular shops, to the extent that these changes have restricted the fungibility of refugee 
assistance, they also ensure that the money goes more directly and reliably to the private 
sector actors offering the technological means to shop using e-cards and iris scans. The 
system appears to be providing reliable profits. According to a report produced by the 
University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre, one of the supermarkets in the camp, 
although it does not name which one, is now that company’s most profitable branch in 
Jordan.123  
 
The personal interactions of humanitarian workers with Syrians’ own private sector is 
another interesting lens through which to examine their relationship to Syrians’ 
independent economic activity. On my second visit to the camp, a colleague told me that 
humanitarian and NGO workers were not allowed to buy food from the stalls run by 
Syrians in the market. This was presented to me as a directive coming from UNHCR, 
and as having been justified on health and safety grounds. Eating food from a Syrian stall 
and then becoming ill, I was told, might count as an accident at work. One NGO worker 
present in the discussion, perhaps sensing my scepticism, strongly defended the ban, by 
reminding me of the importance of safety, and that “there is no hospital in the camp.”124 
Later that day, my colleagues and I had an unexpected break between workshops. 
Having been told that we should not be consuming food from the market, we drove out 
of the camp (through the checkpoints) to a local restaurant in Za‘tari village, purchased 
bread and falafel, and then returned to the camp (back through the checkpoints) to eat it 
with a wider group of colleagues. The food we brought prompted a debate about the 
relative merits of the different restaurants in Za‘tari village, with which there seemed to 
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be a good deal of familiarity.125 Other NGO workers, on the other hand, believed the 
ban to have been a restriction from the earlier days of the camp that had now been lifted, 
and others still said they had never heard of it.126  
 
There was also ambiguity about whether non-food items could be purchased by 
humanitarian workers and visitors. While being given a tour of the market by a Jordanian 
police officer, one of the largest shops we stopped at was selling a range of men’s shirts. 
As I complimented the shop-holder on his colourful collection, he joked that he did not 
know whether he had any shirts that would fit someone of my height (six foot four 
inches). As he went to another part of the shop to investigate, conscious of the apparent 
regulations surrounding the purchase of food, I discreetly asked the police officer 
whether or not I was allowed to purchase goods from the market. He paused for a few 
seconds, and then replied “It’s okay. But it’s a secret.”127  
 
When Syrians shop in the supermarkets, on the other hand, they are treated with 
suspicion by the companies running them. On one of my visits to the camp, a colleague 
was feeling unwell, and suggested that before our workshops we pay a visit to the 
supermarket, so that she could purchase some food to increase her energy levels. 
Walking into Tazweed supermarket, the most striking feature, in particular in contrast to 
the market, was its uniformity. Items were sold in large quantities, and there were many 
of each item on sale. In a UK context it might be more accurately pictured as a ‘cash and 
carry’ or ‘wholesalers’ rather than a ‘supermarket.’ In particular, it was noticeable that the 
section with fresh produce was relatively small compared to the supermarket as a 
whole.128 To the extent that this reduces the competition with the shops stocking fresh 
produce in the market, this might be seen in a positive light. Given, however, that Syrians 
are forced to use a proportion of their income here, it might restrict their choices.  
 
Immediately after completing the purchase of any goods from the store, you are required 
to demonstrate to a security guard, who stands less than three metres from the checkout 
tills, that you have paid for every item. This security guard checks the items in your 
possession against the receipt provided by the cashier, and then puts a tear in the receipt 
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upon satisfactory inspection of the goods. As a colleague and I left having purchased one 
item, this check was easy to perform. Much less so for the Syrian woman standing next 
to us, who was patiently unloading each item in her large trolley, so that the security 
guard could check a purchase that happened only a few feet away from him, only a few 
seconds ago. 129  These checks both protect the company’s financial interests, while 
underlining that the system of humanitarianism within which the supermarkets operate is 
“maintained and legitimized by the absence of trust between the givers and the 
recipients.”130   
 
#Innovation @ZaatariCamp: Za‘tari on the Internet, the Internet in Za‘tari  
At the same time, however, the private sector activity taking place in the market is 
showcased online by humanitarian agencies as a demonstration of the entrepreneurship 
of Syrians. In its promotion of Syrians and their activities online, UNHCR gives sharply 
contrasting visions of refugeehood to the visions its policies and actions on the ground 
appear to deem acceptable and appropriate. Gendered and racialised understandings of 
who is a ‘refugee’ are again important, as humanitarian agencies promote Syrians as ‘non-
African,’ active, driven, entrepreneurs. 
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, these portrayals are prominent on the 
Twitter feeds of @ZaatariCamp and @UNHCRInnovation. UNHCR’s website similarly 
reports on the innovation and entrepreneurship of Syrians, for example, by profiling a 
new pizza delivery service that opened in early 2015.131 One of the most notable features 
of this piece, I would argue, is not the details presented about the business itself (such 
pizzas and pastries are a common part of many Syrians’ diet), but rather it is the 
quotations from UNHCR staff about the pizza delivery service. The new shop is a 
demonstration, the reader is told by a UNHCR representative, of the fact that Syrians in 
Za‘tari “are not just…waiting for humanitarian agencies to create opportunities for 
them…[they] are proactive, they are very creative, and they come up with new ideas.”132 
One might question whether there was any doubt over Syrians refugees’ ability to “come 
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up with new ideas.” Would it need pointing out, unless it was (at least implicitly) in 
doubt?  
 
Attempts to promote an image of Syrian refugees in Za‘tari as entrepreneurial and 
innovative are part of a deliberate strategy used by UNHCR to counter prevailing 
negative images of Syrian refugees, and of Za‘tari as a camp. In contrast to the media 
portrayals that Za‘tari received, particularly in its early years, as a place of violence and 
disorder, 133  in many media accounts it is now portrayed as a space that facilitates 
entrepreneurship and that is inhabited by entrepreneurial and innovative people. 
According to Jared Kohler, a photographer formerly contracted to UNHCR Jordan, UN 
agencies believe that there is nothing to gain from an advocacy viewpoint by amplifying 
stories that highlight abuses, violence and corruption in the camp, and so they are 
“always looking for a feel good story.”134 As opposed to the refugee contexts of sub-
Saharan Africa, where it is believed that dire material circumstances can clearly be 
captured and communicated to middle-class, Western audiences, more empathy for 
Syrians can be created among these same audiences if they are portrayed as innovators 
and inventors, as people who “you wouldn’t mind if they moved into your 
neighbourhood.”135  
 
These narratives are regularly used by English-language international news media. ABC 
News informs us that “Syrian entrepreneurs thrive” in the camp, 136  which has 
“mushroomed as Syrians set up shop,” according to the Guardian.137 It has also been 
found in academic production, as in Lionel Beehner’s article on Za‘tari, in which he 
describes Syrians as “a unique breed of refugees,”138 who were, apparently, unaccustomed 
to receiving public goods from the state. This spurred on their economic activity, which 
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demonstrates that “today’s refugees are on average economically better off, more 
sophisticated, and generally more entrepreneurial than their predecessors.”139 
 
Even the main market street is named, by humanitarian actors and in the media, to 
resonate with western audiences. This street, designated ‘Market Street 1’ by REACH, is 
regularly called the Champs-Élysées. 140  The term is also sometimes written or said as 
‘Shams-Élysées,’ a play on the French street and the historical name for Syria (al-Sham, 
which is also a contemporary name for Damascus).141 While humanitarian workers, and 
several of my non-Syrian interviewees, would use the term, I never once heard it used by 
a Syrian. The name was coined not by Syrians but by French aid workers, who were 
working in a clinic towards the end of the street. 142  In this context, rather than an 
expression of Syrian pride at their creation, the term appears to more resemble a 
distasteful joke, a reflection of the amazement that is regularly expressed at Syrians’ 
capacities. This Champs-Élysées, according to the BBC News website, is a “fertile ground 
for small businesses.” 143  This article included a story of a Syrian family who had 
apparently moved to the camp from a Jordanian town, after seeing the business 
opportunities available to them in Za‘tari. When I mentioned this story to one Syrian 
man in the camp with whom I had been discussing the market, his scorn was barely 
hidden by his laughter.144  
 
It would be inaccurate to assume, however, that humanitarian workers are critical of, or 
would disagree with, these narratives that are deployed strategically to create sympathy 
for Syrian refugees. One of the most often-recurring features of my conversations with 
humanitarian and NGO workers in Jordan was their consistent surprise, at times even 
astonishment, at Syrians’ ‘entrepreneurial’ activities. When discussing the market with 
                                                
139 Beehner, 160. 
140 E.g. see Toufic Beyhhum and Nadim Dimechkie, “The Champs-Elysées in Zaatari Camp.,” Middle East 
Revised (blog), September 9, 2015, https://middleeastrevised.com/2015/10/09/the-champs-elysees-in-
zaatari-camp/; Robert King, “Strolling the Champs-Élysées with 120,000 Syrian Refugees,” Vice, October 
21, 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/strolling-the-champs-elysees-with-120000-syrian-refugees-
0000116-v20n10; Phoebe Weston, “Inside Zaatari Refugee Camp: The Fourth Largest City in Jordan,” 
August 5, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/11782770/What-is-
life-like-inside-the-largest-Syrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html. 
141 E.g. in Emma Batha, “Harness the Ingenuity of Refugees, Aid Agencies Told,” Reuters, July 17, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-refugees-innovation-idUSKCN0PR13520150717; Betts, Bloom, and 
Weaver, “Refugee Innovation.” 
142 Conversations with Jordanian police officer and NGO workers, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
143 Dale Gavlak, “Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp Fertile Ground for Small Businesses,” BBC News, July 30, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28541909. 
144 Interview with married Syrian man living in Za‘tari (3). 
  246 
some of the rare critical voices in the humanitarian sector, these conversations might 
reflect on how impressive it was that Syrians living in Za‘tari were able to be so 
productive and inventive despite the restrictions placed upon them by political and 
humanitarian authorities.145 Yet more often, the surprise did not seem to be what Syrians 
had done in spite of the specific political circumstances in Za‘tari, but rather that Syrians, 
who were refugees, had managed these accomplishments.146  
 
Although the camp has become a perceived case study for the innovative abilities of 
refugees,147 these sentiments about Syrians were also found beyond the camp context. At 
a social event in Amman, I was introduced to a white European man who was a 
postgraduate student studying, he told me, refugee innovation and entrepreneurship and 
how aid agencies can harness and incorporate it into their work. He proceeded to show 
me pictures, on his phone, from a non-camp context in Jordan, where a Syrian family 
had been designing and building a house. Despite what I understood to be his good 
intentions, I found his apparent amazement at the ability of ‘Syrian refugees’ to design 
floorplans for a new house patronising in the extreme. I was unwilling to feign 
amazement, but also uncertain how to best react in a casual social setting, so found 
myself awkwardly smiling and nodding as he scrolled through the pictures on his 
phone.148  
 
It is important to understand to whom Syrians are being compared, explicitly or 
implicitly, when amazement is expressed about their entrepreneurial abilities. Such an 
analysis must again highlight the importance of gendered and racialised understandings 
of ‘the refugee,’ and the interconnectedness of gender and race in these 
understandings.149 In their depoliticisation of the camp, and in their attempts to suppress 
the self-reliance of Syrians that were documented in this chapter, humanitarian and 
governmental agencies have attempted to enforce adherence to a gendered and racialised 
vision of ‘the refugee’ as passive and non-agential, which Syrians have continually 
resisted. Yet in their public communications with western audiences, humanitarian 
agencies attempt to separate Syrian refugees from passive, feminised ‘Africans,’ whom 
humanitarians regularly deem, either explicitly or implicitly, to be the relevant basis of 
                                                
145 E.g. interview with Curt Rhodes. 
146 Interview with Jordanian women’s rights activist; conversations with NGO workers, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015. 
147 Betts, Bloom, and Weaver, “Refugee Innovation.” 
148 Fieldnotes, Amman, 12.02.2016.  
149 See Chapter 2. 
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comparison through which they can understand Syrians’ activities, and a benchmark 
against which to judge their work, programmes, and experiences working with Syrians. 
 
For example, food shortages ‘in Africa’ mean that ‘Africans’ would tolerate eating the 
same food that was provided by humanitarians each day, but not Syrians.150 In ‘Africa,’ 
refugees ask for handouts, but Syrian refugees ask for jobs.151 Literacy programmes were 
suggested for Za‘tari because ‘in Africa’ they worked well.152 ‘In Africa,’ refugees had a 
lot of enthusiasm for the work engaging men and boys.153 These comparisons reached 
high levels of the camp management. One former UNHCR employee relayed to me an 
incident where their manager in the camp was discussing the fact their (the manager’s) 
child was now an intern on a hygiene project in a camp in an African context that the 
manager had helped to set up decades ago. According to my interviewee, the manager 
remarked that since Syrians can transform Za‘tari in just a couple of years, you would 
expect, in a camp in Africa, that “in thirty years these people would have learned to clean 
up their own shit by now.”154  
 
These comparison with Africans, through which we discover Syrians’ high expectations 
and high abilities, are evidence of what Adia Benton has termed “professional 
humanitarianism’s thorny and under-examined relationship with anti-blackness and white 
supremacy.”155 In the words of one of my interviewees “frankly, it’s just so racist, and I 
think it’s linked to the sector mentality that all refugees are Africans, and all Africans are 
illiterate.” 156  The aforementioned attempts to portray refugees as innovators and 
entrepreneurs are, according to the photographer quoted above, an attempt “to make 
them look white, so to speak.” 157  Yet while the racialised commentary on Syrians’ 
entrepreneurship, both on the ground and in portrayals of it, was frequent and at times 
explicit, gender operated differently. While the contrast with expectations of ‘the refugee’ 
is a gendered contrast, in the sense of ‘the refugee’ being expected to be both a female 
and a passive and thereby feminised figure, the fact that it was Syrian men, 
overwhelmingly, with gendered motivations and understandings of their activities, who 
                                                
150 Conversation with NGO worker, Amman, 27.10.2015. 
151 Conversation with humanitarian and NGO workers, Amman, 18.12.2015. 
152 Conversation with NGO workers, Amman, 18.01.2015. 
153 Humanitarian worker, Amman, 09.06.2016. 
154 Interview with former UNHCR worker in Za‘tari. 
155 Adia Benton, “African Expatriates and Race in the Anthropology of Humanitarianism,” Critical African 
Studies 8, no. 3 (2016): 267. 
156 Interview with former NGO worker in Za‘tari.  
157 Interview with Jared Kohler. 
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had created and run the market, is rarely mentioned or discussed in online depictions or 
by humanitarian workers on the ground.158  As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, men’s 
activities and agency are dangerous to the projects of humanitarianism. Their ‘non-
African’ entrepreneurship, however, if understood in particular ways, and as long as it is 
‘governable,’ has the potential to be employed strategically to further humanitarian 
agendas.  
 
These discussions of Syrians, however, are also grounded in long-standing discourses of 
Syrians specifically, and the people of the Levant more generally, being hard-working and 
entrepreneurial. Kilian Kleinschmidt declared in a televised interview that it was “very 
natural [Syrians] have set up shops, because they are traders.” 159  Interestingly, this 
understanding of Syrians as entrepreneurs co-existed in Jordan with hesitation about 
their suitability for jobs in the formal labour market in certain sectors. As I have explored 
elsewhere at length, together with Katharina Lenner, one of the reasons why employers 
were reluctant to employ Syrians in garment factories was because they worried that 
Syrians would be inefficient, ‘like Jordanians.’ Such judgments are located within 
different racial and gendered stratifications, in which South Asian female migrant 
workers were deemed the most skilled and productive.160 
 
Nevertheless, that Syrians are, at least by many, ‘known’ to be entrepreneurial and 
hardworking161 is a source of considerable pride among the refugee population. In casual 
conversation, Syrians in Za‘tari asked me whether I had seen the market in the camp and 
what they had managed to create from nothing, and regaled me with the stories they had 
heard from 6th October City in Cairo, where many Syrians have settled, and how many 
Syrian restaurants have opened there in the past few years. “Wherever we go,” one man 
told me, “there is activity, there is work, there are shops, there are restaurants.”162 Syrian 
shop-holders in Za‘tari would similarly tell me that the market is a result of the hard 
work for which Syrians are justifiably known.163  
 
                                                
158 E.g. see Gavlak, “Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp”; Tran, “Jordan’s Zaatari Refugee Camp Mushrooms”; 
Weston, “Inside Zaatari Refugee Camp.” 
159 UNHCR, A Day in the Life 1. 
160 Lenner and Turner, “Making Refugees Work?” 
161 For a discussion of the attributes for which Syrians are ‘known’ in Lebanon, see Chalcraft, The Invisible 
Cage Interestingly, the types of work deemed “suitable” for Syrians in Jordan differs noticeably from 
Chalcraft’s observations in Lebanon, see Lenner and Turner. 
162 Conversation with Syrian men, Za‘tari, 24.11.2015.  
163 Conversations with Syrian shop-holders, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
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In striking contrast to the camp’s online presence, access to the internet in the camp 
itself was severely restricted. In late January 2016, cellular data access (the internet 
provided through data packages on mobile phones) abruptly stopped working. Although 
there were suggestions and rumours in the camp that it was a temporary measure, as the 
weeks and months went on, it became increasingly clear that the Jordanian authorities 
that run the camp had decided to turn off the internet.164 Despite the impact of the 
decision on Syrian residents and NGOs working in the camp, it was not officially 
announced to either Syrians or NGOs. It was not mentioned in the weekly Camp 
Management Coordination meetings,165 and when NGO workers and Syrians made more 
informal enquiries they were simply told that it was for ‘security reasons.’ Similarly, there 
was no international attention or outcry, as has happened in other instances of internet 
restriction in the region.166  
 
The restricted ability to keep in contact with friends and family, and events in Syria and 
around the world, runs the risk of severely impacting Syrians’ mental health and attempts 
to make informed decisions about their choices and futures.167 But humanitarians and 
refugees appear to believe that the ‘security reasons’ rationale is not one that can easily be 
contested. Syrians typically have very little, if any, access to camp decision-makers. But 
furthermore, in an environment in which deportations to Syria are a common 
phenomenon, as one Syrian woman expressed it to me, “you know when they say 
security reasons, you…” She stopped, and then mimed pulling a zip across her lips.168 As 
in the instance of deportations, because to challenge the decision would involve directly 
challenging the police and security services, NGOs feel equally powerless to challenge 
the internet restrictions, either directly to SRAD or through UNHCR. As I noted earlier, 
one NGO project manager told me frankly: “It’s the police. They’re managing the camp. 
You cannot win in a discussion with the police or with the camp management because 
they work, erm, together.”169 
 
                                                
164 Conversations with Syrian women, humanitarian and NGO workers, author observation, Za‘tari and 
Amman, 09.02.2016, 12.02.2016, 16.02.2016, 24.03.2016, 10.04.2016; interview with INGO programme 
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165 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
166 Al Jazeera, “When Egypt Turned off the Internet - Al Jazeera English,” January 28, 2011, 
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167 E.g. see International Medical Corps and UNICEF, “Mental Health/Psychosocial and Child Protection 
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168 Conversation with Syrian woman, Za‘tari, 27.07.2016. 
169 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
  250 
Internet access was nonetheless present, to a much greater extent, in Base Camp and 
NGO centres. Although the cellular data signal is weak in many areas of Base Camp too, 
NGOs can apply to get “whitelisted” and to get their own line of password-protected 
internet into the camp, which would be inaccessible to Syrians. By the summer of 2016, 
however, even the Base Camp wireless network password was being kept from many 
NGO employees who work in the camp, to try and stop the password being given to 
Syrians, thereby circumventing the ban on the internet, and slowing down the wifi 
network due to ‘over’ use.170  
 
Syrians were nonetheless attempting to find ways around the restrictions on the internet; 
“whatever barrier you put there, they will drill around it.” 171  One can typically find 
Syrians squatting next to the fences that surround Base Camp, often as closely as they 
can to the fence to find shade from the sun, trying to gain access to the wireless 
networks that are used by humanitarian workers. As I walked with a Jordanian police 
officer past some Syrians doing this on one visit, feigning ignorance I asked him what 
they were doing. “Stealing wifi!” came the reply.172 Some Syrians use their technical skills 
to log onto the wifi networks without passwords or permission, others have connections 
to those who have access to the passwords.173 An NGO project manager chuckled as he 
recounted that a Syrian child had once somehow managed to get hold of a Base Camp 
wifi password, and proceeded to sell it to anyone who wanted it for 2 JOD (about $3). It 
wasn’t just Syrians who took advantage of the service offered by the boy: “you would see 
David174 standing with his laptop and using the password that he just bought from the 
kid.”175  
 
It is almost Orwellian that stories about Za‘tari on the internet will discuss the 
entrepreneurship of Syrians, or the role of technology in the camp, without mentioning 
the ways in which, at the time of writing their articles, access to the internet was severely 
restricted. A BBC News article from March 2016, for example, entitled “Tech eases 
Syrians’ trauma in Jordanian refugee camp,” is enthusiastic about the “vibrant 
community of makers” that live there, but utterly silent on the GoJ’s attempts to stop 
                                                
170 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari, Amman (2). 
171 Interview with Curt Rhodes. 
172 Jordanian police officer, Za‘tari, 21.07.2016. 
173 Conversations with NGO workers, Za‘tari, 27.10.2015, 22.12.2015 and 21.07.2016. 
174 This name has been anonymised.  
175 Interview with INGO programme manager in Za’tari (2). 
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Syrians’ from using one of the most essential forms of technology that could be available 
to them.176 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the market of Za‘tari, which was created and has been 
sustained by Syrians themselves, and demonstrated it is a means through which they 
achieve vital income and perform masculinities. More widely, it has used the market as a 
site of analysis through which to understand central contestations between camp 
authorities and refugees: over gendered and racialised understandings of refugeehood 
and agency, the repressive and rational-bureaucratic modes of power that humanitarian 
and states actors deploy, and the prioritisation of humanitarian goals and logics over 
those of Syrian refugees themselves.  
 
It has argued that Syrians’ efforts to build, expand, and invest in the market can be 
understood as an attempt to build a form of self-reliance that aims for radical autonomy 
from external governance structures, and that represents resistance to the passive subject 
position of the ‘refugee.’ Both humanitarian and governmental agencies have challenged 
this vision for the camp. Jordanian governmental actors attempt to monitor and restrict 
economic activity within the camp, while simultaneously making efforts to align it with 
governmental interests. Humanitarian agencies, meanwhile, have brought the agendas of 
innovation and official self-reliance to Za‘tari. Despite these humanitarian agendas 
coming into conflict with the operations of the market, and despite UNHCR appearing 
to have a fundamentally different vision of what a camp should be, the agency 
nonetheless continues to favourably portray the refugees of Za‘tari as innovative 
entrepreneurs to a wider public, while acquiescing to restrictive policies on the internet – 
a key tool of entrepreneurship – on the ground. Syrian refugees’ attempts to live with 
economic dignity therefore often proceed in spite of, rather than facilitated by, the 
agendas of those who exercise sovereign power in Za‘tari. 
  
                                                
176 Jen Copestake BBC Click, “Tech Eases Syrians’ Trauma in Jordanian Refugee Camp,” BBC News, 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has argued that refugee men present a challenge for humanitarianism. In 
contrast to humanitarian actors’ understandings of refugee women and children as 
‘vulnerable,’ and thereby uncontroversial objects of care, humanitarians read refugee men 
as agential, independent, political, and at times threatening. They thereby disrupt 
humanitarian understandings of refugees as passive, feminised objects of care. The result 
of these gendered and racialised understandings is that refugee men have an uncertain 
position in humanitarian practices, policies, and imaginaries. They are too political when 
they protest, too agential in the market, yet insufficiently interested in much of the work 
of the humanitarian sector. As this thesis has demonstrated, however, it is humanitarian 
actors that show a distinct lack of interest in the lives of Syrian men. Men are assumed, 
incorrectly, to have easy access to labour markets, rendering them ostensibly non-
‘vulnerable.’ Yet while the labour market is perceived to be a source of men’s 
independence, it is also a way in which humanitarians can promote the ‘empowerment’ 
of those whom they deem ‘vulnerable.’ When Syrian men attempt to create their own 
livelihood opportunities, however, they are once again too agential, since their actions 
conflict with humanitarian and state visions of refugee camps, and how they should be 
governed. 
 
Enthusiasm for working with Syrian men is primarily generated when that work can be 
understood by humanitarian actors as a new means through which to achieve their pre-
existing goals of supporting women and children. But in these instrumental attempts to 
work with refugee men, the ‘local’ context of Za‘tari disrupted humanitarian actor’s 
‘global’ understandings of priorities and methods; Syrian men do not speak 
humanitarianism’s ‘global’ language. This same ‘global’ language ostensibly promotes the 
empowerment of refugee women, while problematically re-inscribing the rights and lives 
of refugee women as outside of the ‘political’ realm, into which humanitarians do not 
intervene. When women’s autonomous decisions run contrary to these ‘global’ standards, 
the latter take precedence, further demonstrating the inseparability of humanitarian care 
and humanitarian control.  
 
After introducing the overall arguments of the thesis and the fieldwork that was 
undertaken for it, in Chapter 2, I analysed how refugee men and masculinities were 
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understood as objects of research, and how they were positioned, by humanitarians, 
relative to prevailing understandings of gender, the refugee, and power and politics. In 
each of these instances, refugee men, their needs, and the gendered threats they faced, 
were understood as somehow outside of the realm of humanitarian work with refugees. 
Subsequently, I offered an analysis of the context of Za‘tari in Chapter 3. This explored 
the camp’s location within the territory, history and politics of Jordan; the embodied, 
material and spatial practices of humanitarianism that take place there; and the ways in 
which Syrian men in Za‘tari were primarily understood in the years prior to my fieldwork 
– as political troublemakers who needed to be governed. When the attempts to police 
and depoliticise the camp more effectively had been relatively successful, refugee men 
became more invisible in camp life, from the vantage point of humanitarians. As Chapter 
4 demonstrates, they were deemed non-‘vulnerable,’ and uninterested in and unavailable 
for the work of the humanitarian sector. Work with refugee women, by contrast, one of 
the objects of humanitarian attention, proceeded according to ‘global’ standards, rather 
than the standards of Syrian women themselves.  
 
The focus of the thesis then shifted to an area of work in which refugee men did appear, 
before humanitarians, as an object of interest: SGBV prevention. This enthusiasm was 
generated, I argued, not by an interest in refugee men’s lives per se, or in the difficulties 
they were experiencing, but rather because working with men could be understood as an 
instrumental mechanism through which pre-existing humanitarian goals could be 
achieved. In contrast, Syrian men in Za‘tari were primarily concerned with (the shortage 
of) livelihood opportunities in the camp, the subject of Chapter 6. For many Syrian men, 
performing the role of a breadwinner was central to their understanding of masculinities, 
which was challenged by the availability and allocation of CfW in the camp. These 
masculinities, and the allocation of work, differed according to class and generation. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, this thesis analysed the informal market of Za‘tari, and how 
humanitarian agendas clashed with Syrians’ attempts to exercise agency and earn income 
within the camp space. While humanitarian actors restricted Syrians’ authentic attempts 
for radical autonomy on the ground, they promoted Syrians as ‘entrepreneurial’ to 
external audiences. The figure they promoted contrasted with prevailing images of the 
‘refugee,’ the kinds of refugees that humanitarians attempt to create, and their 
understandings of how camp spaces should operate. 
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As a study of the place of refugee men within humanitarianism, this thesis has been 
particularly concerned with masculinities, not only the masculinities of Syrian men living 
in the camp, but also the masculinised forms of power deployed by humanitarian 
individuals and organisations. It did not aim to be, nor is it, an all-encompassing study of 
the masculinities of Za‘tari. Such a study would have required access to spheres of life 
and areas of the camp that it was not possible for me to enter, at least in a sustained way, 
such as mosques, caravans, and family relationships. While, given the restrictions of the 
context, my access to Za‘tari was relatively extensive for a researcher, it did not allow for 
all of these avenues to be explored, and this thesis is therefore neither a complete study 
of men’s masculinities, nor of their entire social worlds within the camp. A thesis that 
discussed all of the masculinities of Za‘tari would also have necessitated an exploration 
of women as performers of masculinities. While this thesis discussed both female-headed 
households and women’s participation in paid work, my interlocutors did not discuss 
these phenomena as instantiations of female masculinities, and the language used here 
reflects that. Nevertheless, a research project that centred masculinities, rather than 
refugee men, may find this a useful avenue for further exploration.  
 
This study was located within the specific context of Za‘tari. As spaces in which 
humanitarian actors characteristically exercise extensive power over refugee populations, 
refugee camps constitute appropriate and revealing sites for investigations into 
humanitarianism. As the refugee camp that hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees in 
the Middle East, and as a camp that is highly regulated, policed, that restricts Syrians’ 
movement, but also in which humanitarian policies are deeply contested by camp 
residents, Za‘tari was a particularly appropriate context for undertaking my research into 
humanitarianism. However, humanitarian actors are increasingly operating in non-camp 
spaces, including within Jordan,1 and what constitutes a ‘camp’ varies dramatically across 
context, with ‘camps’ often being less formal, and having more fluid boundaries, than 
Za‘tari.2 The differences and similarities between my research in Za‘tari and the situation 
in non-camp contexts could be examined in future research. It might be expected that, in 
contexts where humanitarian actors have less control over refugees’ lives, and where 
there may be alternative service providers, the dynamics of the interactions between 
humanitarians and refugee men would be different. In these contexts, other issues, for 
                                                
1 Brun, “There Is No Future in Humanitarianism.” 
2 Agier, Managing the Undesirables. 
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example resettlement, may constitute a more important part of humanitarian-refugee 
relations.  
 
Further research could also attempt to understand the place of refugee men in 
humanitarianism in contexts where the prevailing gender regimes in the host 
communities are different, and where gender and race among refugee communities are 
read differently. For example, does a European host context alter humanitarian 
understandings of Syrian, Arab and Muslim refugee men? Given humanitarian agencies’ 
need to adapt to, and to a large extent to fall into line with, the policies of host 
governments, the contours of humanitarian work will change, as will refugee men’s needs 
and circumstances. In these contexts, research projects may find it appropriate to 
dedicate greater time and attention to exploring the perspectives of state actors. 
Furthermore, research could explore to what extent a refugee population being 
composed of individuals who are, for example, predominantly neither Arab nor Muslim, 
alters humanitarian understandings of refugee men? Would men who are racialised 
differently be understood by humanitarians, like Syrian men, to be non-‘vulnerable’? 
How does the humanitarian deployment of gendered and racialised modes of power play 
out differently when they govern different populations?  
 
Finally, both within contexts of Syrian displacement and elsewhere, work by 
organisations from and funded by non-Western states would be another interesting topic 
of enquiry. Although humanitarianism remains an enterprise largely dominated by 
western donors, organisations and rationalities, within the Syria refugee response there 
are a large number of organisations from, and funded by, Gulf Arab states such as Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 3  This reflects a wider trend in which states and 
organisations from the South are playing an increasingly prominent role in a range of 
humanitarian operations.4 The Gulf organisations working in the Syria response operate, 
to a large extent, in parallel to the UN-led structures that coordinate the refugee 
response, but have hitherto been the subject of little scholarly attention. The place of 
refugee men, and of gender more broadly, within Gulf humanitarianism is an important 
avenue that has not yet been explored in research.  
 
                                                
3 UNHCR, “Gulf Donors and NGOs Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Jordan” (Amman: UNHCR, 2014). 
4 Paul Amar, ed., Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries 
(Hoboken: Routledge, 2013). 
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This thesis is grounded within the subfields of feminist IR and critical scholarship on 
humanitarianism, and offers distinct contributions to them, as I will shortly outline. 
Nevertheless, in advancing its arguments it has drawn on a range of cross-disciplinary 
literatures, including scholarship on gender and development, refugee studies, (forced) 
migration in the Middle East, refugee masculinities, the history and politics of Jordan, 
and postcolonial, feminist scholarship on gender and race. Different elements of this 
research will therefore be of interest to scholars working in this wide range of fields, and 
to scholars of the Syria crisis and refugee response. 
 
Furthermore, through its approach and methodology, this thesis offers contextual depth, 
and links ethnographic insights and broader theoretical debates, and thereby 
demonstrates the connections between wider power structures and a specific context. It 
goes beyond studying the formal policies, structures, and elites of humanitarianism, and 
analyses how different power structures are enacted by the embodied, material and 
spatial practices of humanitarianism within a particular space. It demonstrates how these 
practices take on particular meanings within that context, and how they are resisted by 
those populations who are subject to them. This ethnographically-informed, contextual 
approach, while extremely fruitful, remains relatively rare within IR as a whole.  
 
Within the subfields in which it is located, it makes several contributions to scholarship. 
Deploying a feminist curiosity, it refuses to accept humanitarianism’s categories of the 
‘vulnerable’ refugee woman and the independent, agential refugee man. Instead it asks 
new questions of humanitarianism, and new questions about the refugee men subject to 
its power. It promotes an understanding of men as both the subjects and objects of 
power. As objects of power, refugee men are actively disempowered by humanitarian 
policies and practices. This is not done to ‘empower’ refugee women, as humanitarians 
imagine, but to enable the exercise of humanitarian power over both refugee men and 
refugee women. In contrast to both the humanitarian sector and much scholarship on 
men in contexts of humanitarianism, this thesis refuses to focus solely on men and 
gender equality or men and SGBV, and thereby broadens the possibilities for research 
and debate on men as the objects of humanitarianism. 
 
Through its historically informed account of gendered interventions in the Middle East, 
this thesis also allows contemporary humanitarianism, with its ‘global’ standards, its 
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instrumentalisation of women’s rights, and its depoliticisation, hypermasculinisation and 
feminisation of men, to be understood in light of the rationalities it shares with the 
(post)colonial interventions that continue to haunt, and be enacted across, the region. In 
its examination of the contestations that result from this deployment of power, it brings 
out the relevance of studying masculinities for understanding humanitarianism, and 
external interventions more broadly. It demonstrates the importance of Syrian men’s 
attempts to perform masculinities, how humanitarian policies challenge these 
masculinities, how humanitarian understandings of Syrian men’s gender influence 
humanitarian work, and the ways in which humanitarian actors deploy masculinised 
modes of power. In these contributions therefore, it not only studies ‘men’ and ‘gender’ 
within humanitarianism, but also, crucially, genders humanitarianism itself.  
 
As I finished writing this thesis, I reflected on another ending: the final time I left Za‘tari 
with my NGO colleagues, in August 2016. In contrast to the extensive permit checks 
each time we entered the camp, we went smoothly through the checkpoint at the camp’s 
edge. We received a perfunctory, even if not friendly, wave from a Jordanian soldier as 
we passed. Every day, a small number of Syrians were at the checkpoint too, waiting with 
documents and permits in hand, also trying to leave, even if only temporarily. These daily 
exits epitomised the absurdity of thousands of people applying for permits to enter a 
space that many more thousands are desperate to leave. These moments, and indeed the 
existence of Za‘tari as we know it, are dependent on the containment of its population, a 
containment in which both the Jordanian state and humanitarian actors are, at best, 
deeply complicit. Coupled with the analysis presented in this thesis, moments such as this 
one make it difficult to think of Syrians in Za‘tari as being hosted by Jordan. Rather, one 
might be led to think they are held captive there, with humanitarian actors not 
empowering them, but keeping them imprisoned.  
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Appendix: List of Interviewees 
This appendix contains a list of all of my interviewees, as described and defined in the 
introduction. Where interviews with more than one individual were conducted together, 
they have been recorded within the same row of the table. The interviews are listed in 
order of the date on which they took place. When more than one person has the same 
descriptor, numbers have been assigned to differentiate between them, again using date 
order. The varying amount of information provided here reflects the differing levels of 
confidentiality agreed with the interviewees. I have also listed here how I would refer to 
each interviewee if quoting them, although some of these interviews have not been cited. 
I nonetheless used them all in the preparation of this thesis, in the ways agreed by each 
interviewee.   
Table 1: List of Interviewees 
 
Name/Description and Role  If quoted or 
referenced, referred 
to as 
Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
Stephen Boddy, Billy Dodds, 
Sully Sultan, all employed by 
SIREN Associates, which 
oversaw the project to implement 
community policing operations in 
Za‘tari, non-Jordanian, men. 
Stephen Boddy, Billy 
Dodds, Sully Sultan 
Amman 15.10.2015 
NGO worker in Za‘tari, non-
Jordanian, woman 
NGO worker in 
Za‘tari 
Amman 16.10.2015 
Former employee of international 
organisation in Za‘tari, Jordanian, 
man 
Interview with former 
employee of 
international 
organisation in Za‘tari 
Amman 13.11.2015 
SGBV specialist working for 
international agency, non-
Jordanian, woman 
SGBV specialist (1) Amman 30.11.2015 
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Women’s rights activist, 
Jordanian, woman 
Jordanian women’s 
rights activist 
Amman 06.12.2015 
Former NGO worker in Za‘tari, 
non-Jordanian, man 
Former NGO worker 
in Za‘tari 
Via Skype 08.12.2015 
Former UNHCR camp 
management official working in 
non-Jordanian contexts, non-
Jordanian, man 
Former UNHCR 
camp management 
worker 
Via Skype 20.12.2015 
LGBTI activist working with 
refugees in Jordan, non-
Jordanian, man 
LGBTI activist 
working with refugees 
Amman 26.01.2016 
Former UNHCR worker in 
Za‘tari, non-Jordanian, man 
Former UNHCR 
worker in Za‘tari 
Via Skype 06.02.2016 
Women’s protection and 
empowerment programme 
manager for INGO, Jordanian, 
woman 
Women’s protection 
and empowerment 
programme manager 
Amman 28.03.2016 
Jared Kohler, photographer 
formerly contracted to UNHCR 
Jordan, non-Jordanian, man 
Jared Kohler Amman 28.03.2016 
Official in donor agency working 
on Jordan Compact, non-
Jordanian, man 
Donor agency official Amman 11.04.2016 
INGO resettlement officer, non-
Jordanian, woman  
Resettlement officer Amman 11.04.2016 
Ahmad Awad, Director of 
Phenix Center for Economic and 
Ahmad Awad Amman 20.04.2016 
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Informatics Studies, Jordanian, 
man 
Single Syrian woman living in 
host community with children 
Single Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (1) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
26.04.2016 
Married Syrian woman living in 
host community with husband 
and children  
Married Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (1) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
26.04.2016 
Married Syrian woman living in 
host community with husband 
and children 
Married Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (2) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
26.04.2016 
Married Syrian man living in host 
community with wife and 
children  
Married Syrian man 
living in host 
community (1) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
26.04.2016 
Single Syrian woman living in 
host community with extended 
family and children 
Single Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (2) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
26.04.2016 
Married Syrian woman living in 
host community with husband 
and children 
Married Syrian man living in host 
community with wife and 
children 
Married Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (3) 
Married Syrian man 
living in host 
community (2) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
26.04.2016 
Married Syrian man living in host 
community with wife and 
children 
Married Syrian man 
living in host 
community (3) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
27.04.2016 
Married Syrian man living in host 
community with wife and 
Married Syrian man 
living in host 
Irbid 27.04.2016 
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children community (4) Governorate 
Married Syrian woman living in 
host community with husband 
and children 
Married Syrian man living in host 
community with wife and 
children 
Married Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (4) 
Married Syrian man 
living in host 
community (5) 
 
Irbid 
Governorate 
27.04.2016 
Older Syrian woman living in 
host community with extended 
family 
Single Syrian woman 
living in host 
community (3) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
27.04.2016 
Married Syrian man living in host 
community with wife and 
children 
Married Syrian man 
living in host 
community (6) 
Irbid 
Governorate 
27.04.2016 
Official involved in garment 
sector work permits trial, non-
Jordanian, woman. 
Official involved in 
garment sector work 
permits trial 
Amman 02.05.2016 
UNHCR official working on 
gender 
N/A: interview for 
background only 
Amman 17.05.2016 
Suhail Abualsameed, Jordanian 
consultant and SGBV specialist, 
Jordanian, man 
Suhail Abualsameed Amman 18.05.2016 
Curt Rhodes, International 
Director of Questscope, non-
Jordanian, man 
Curt Rhodes Amman 19.05.2016 
Dina Khayyat, Chairperson, 
JGATE (Jordan Garments and 
Dina Khayyat Amman 28.05.2016 
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Textiles Exporters Association), 
Jordanian, woman 
Linda Kalash, Director of 
Tamkeen Fields for Aid, 
Jordanian, woman 
Linda Kalash Amman 29.05.2016 
UNHCR official working on 
livelihood programmes, non-
Jordanian, woman. 
N/A: interview for 
background only 
Amman 31.05.2016 
Humanitarian worker with focus 
on LGBTI rights 
Humanitarian worker 
with focus on LGBTI 
rights 
Amman 01.06.2016 
2 managers of Needlecraft for 
Clothing Industry, non-Jordanian, 
men 
Needlecraft factory 
manager (1), 
needlecraft factory 
manager (2) 
Al-Dulayl 
Industrial 
Park 
06.06.2016 
Lina Darras, Psychosocial 
Support Unit Manager, ARDD, 
Jordanian, woman 
Lina Darras Amman 09.06.2016 
Interview with single Syrian man 
living in Jordanian host 
community 
Single Syrian man 
living in host 
community (1) 
Karak 13.06.2016 
Interview with married Syrian 
woman living in Jordanian host 
community 
Married Syrian woman 
(5) living in host 
community 
Karak 13.06.2016 
Interview with single Syrian man 
living in Jordanian host 
community 
Single Syrian man 
living in host 
community (2) 
Karak 13.06.2016 
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Ruba Abu-Taleb, Nutrition 
Coordinator, Jordan Health Aid 
Society (JHAS) and Health Sector 
Gender Focal Point, Jordanian, 
woman 
Ruba Abu-Taleb Amman 15.06.2016 
Areej Sumreen, Clinical 
Psychologist, Institute of Family 
Health, Noor al-Hussein 
Foundation, Jordanian, woman 
Areej Sumreen Amman 22.06.2016 
Livelihood specialist, Jordanian, 
woman 
Livelihood specialist Amman 27.06.2016 
Livelihood programme manager 
for INGO, non-Jordanian, man 
Protection programme manager 
for INGO, non-Jordanian, 
woman 
Livelihood programme 
manager 
Protection programme 
manager 
Amman 27.06.2016 
 
INGO programme manager in 
Za‘tari, Jordanian, man 
 
INGO programme 
manager in Za‘tari (1) 
Amman 30.06.2016 
SGBV specialist working for 
international agency, non-
Jordanian, woman 
SGBV specialist (2) Amman 04.07.2016 
Single Syrian woman working in 
the market 
Syrian woman working 
in Za‘tari market (1) 
Za‘tari 21.07.2016 
Married Syrian woman with 
children working in the market 
Syrian woman working 
in Za‘tari market (2) 
Za‘tari 21.07.2016 
Single Syrian woman working in Syrian woman working Za‘tari 21.07.2016 
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the market in Za‘tari market (3) 
Syrian shop-holder in Za‘tari, 
man 
Syrian shop-holder in 
Za‘tari, man (1) 
Za‘tari 21.07.2016 
Syrian man working in Za‘tari  Syrian man working in 
Za‘tari market (1) 
Za‘tari 21.07.2016 
Married Syrian woman living in 
Za’tari with husband and children 
Married Syrian man living in 
Za‘tari with wife and children 
Married Syrian woman 
living in Za‘tari (1) 
Married Syrian man 
living in Za‘tari (1) 
Za‘tari 27.07.2016 
Married Syrian woman living in 
Za’tari with husband and children 
Married Syrian man living in 
Za‘tari with wife and children 
Married Syrian woman 
living in Za‘tari (2) 
Married Syrian man 
living in Za‘tari (2) 
Za‘tari 27.07.2016 
Syrian shop-holder in Za‘tari, 
man 
Syrian shop-holder in 
Za‘tari, man (2) 
Za‘tari 01.08.2016 
Syrian shop-holder in Za‘tari, 
man 
Syrian man working in Za‘tari 
market 
Syrian man working in Za‘tari 
market 
Syrian shop-holder in 
Za‘tari, man (3) 
Syrian man working in 
Za‘tari market (2) 
Syrian man working in 
Za‘tari market (3) 
Za‘tari 01.08.2016 
Married Syrian man living in 
Za‘tari 
Married Syrian man 
living in Za‘tari (3) 
Za‘tari 01.08.2016 
Syrian man working in Za‘tari 
market 
Syrian man working in 
Za‘tari market (4) 
Za‘tari 01.08.2016 
Syrian man working in Za‘tari Syrian man working in Za‘tari 01.08.2016 
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market Za‘tari market (5) 
INGO programme manager in 
Za’tari, Jordanian, man  
INGO programme 
manager in Za‘tari (2) 
Amman 08.08.2016 
Maha Kattaa, International 
Labour Organization Syria Crisis 
Response Coordinator in Jordan, 
Jordanian, woman 
Maha Kattaa Amman 13.08.2016 
Lawyer who worked in Za’tari for 
an NGO, Jordanian, man 
NGO lawyer in Za’tari Amman 14.08.2016 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for 
Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations 
Official, non-Jordanian, man 
European Commission 
Directorate-General 
for Neighbourhood 
and Enlargement 
Negotiations Official 
Via 
telephone 
14.07.2017 
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